SAṀBANDHA-VĀRTIKA

[1]

स्वाविद्याविभवप्रसूतविपुलद्वैतप्रपञ्चाहित-
स्पष्टभ्रान्तितिरोहितात्ममतयो यं भागशो मन्वते ।
निर्भागं सकलाभिधानमननव्यापारदूरस्थितं
वन्दे नन्दितविश्वमव्ययमजं भक्त्या तमेकं विभुम् ॥ १ ॥

With devotion do I bow to that one who is imperishable, unborn, all-pervasive and partless, who stands far above the operations of all speech and thought, who makes the universe happy and whom they regard as being endowed with parts—they whose view of the Self is veiled by the potent delusion which is brought about by the expansive world of duality, generated by the power of nescience resident in themselves.

This is an invocation addressed to the supreme Reality which is eternal and without parts, and which transcends the reach of speech and mind. That Reality is of the nature of unexcellable bliss, and is the source of all happiness. It is one without a second. There are no divisions in it. The apparent differentiations are due to nescience (*avidyā*) which veils the real self and projects the non-real world. Nescience too has no locus apart from the non-dual self. Somehow it resides in the self and veils it, and weaves the variegated texture of the illusory world. Being blinded by this illusion, the ignorant imagine that the supreme is a whole-of-parts, and that it really creates the world.

Four preliminary matters (*anubandha-catuṣṭaya*) are to be settled before the commencement of any work. They are: (1) subject-matter (*viṣaya*), (2) relation (*saṁbandha*), (3) fruit (*prayojana*), and (4) eligible

person (*adhikārin*). Here, in the invocation, these four are indicated. (1) The words '*that one who is all-pervasive*' teach that the non-dual self is the subject-matter. (2) The relation is between this subject and Scripture which teaches it. (3) The words '*who makes the universe happy*' show that the attainment of supreme happiness is the fruit. (4) And, the one who desires that happiness is the eligible person.

[2]

यां काण्वोपनिषच्छलेन सकलाम्नायार्थसंशोधिनीं
संचक्रुर्गुरवोऽनुवृत्तगुरवो वृत्तिं सतां शान्तये ।
अर्थाविष्करणं कुतार्किककृताशङ्कासमुच्छित्तये
तस्या न्यायसमाश्रितेन वचसा प्रक्रम्यते लेशतः ॥ २ ॥

The commentary explaining the sense of all scriptures which the preceptor[1] wrote for the satisfaction of the good people, following his preceptors, under the pretext of (explaining) the Kāṇvopaniṣad[2]—the exposition of its meaning in brief through words supported by reason is commenced for the purpose of removing the objections raised by pseudo-logicians.

The *Vārtika* on Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Bṛhadāraṇya-kopaniṣad* is commenced for refuting the arguments put forward by those who are opposed to non-dualism. Rājaśekhara says in his *Kāvyamīmāṁsā* that *Vārtika* is a work which examines what is said, what is not said and what is not well said in the original text.*

1. I. e. Śaṅkara.

2. The *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* forms part of the *Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa* (of the *Śūkla-yajur-veda*) which is in two recensions—

*The Haridas Sanskrit Series No. 14, Benares (1934), p. 21. *uktā-'nukta durukta-cintā vārtikam.*

Mādhyandina and *Kāṇva*. It covers the last five sections (*prapāṭhakas*) of the XIVth book of the *Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa* in the Mādhyandina śākhā and the whole of the XVIIth book in the Kāṇva-śākhā. Śaṅkara's commentary is on the *Kāṇva* recension of the Upaniṣad. Hence, it is referred to, here, as the *Kāṇvopaniṣad*. Śaṅkara calls it *Vājasaneyi-brāhmaṇopaniṣad*. One of the Saṁhitās of the *Śukla-yajur-veda* is the *Vājasaneyi-saṁhitā*, which takes its name from Yājñavalkya Vājasaneya, the chief teacher of this Veda. Śaṅkara gives the same name to the *Brāhmaṇa* also.

NKL—vedāntānām advaitaparatvam ayuktaṁ bhedālaṁbanapratya-kṣādi-virodhādityādi śuṣka-tārkikottha-saṁbhāvanā-nirāso-'vāntara-phalam ityarthaḥ.

[3]

अत्र चोपनिषच्छब्दो ब्रह्मविद्यैकगोचरः ।
तत्रैव चास्य सद्भावादभिधार्थस्य तत्कुतः ॥ ३ ॥

And here the word *upaniṣad* has for its sense exclusively Brahman-knowledge, since in respect of that alone there is its express sense. Why is it so?

That release (*mukti*) is the fruit of the Upaniṣads is shown in this and the succeeding verses (i.e. vv. 3-10), by explaining the meaning of the title *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*. First, the word *upaniṣad* is explained. The meaning of it is Brahman-knowledge; for that is the express sense of the word. The etymological meaning of the word is 'to sit (*sad*) down (*ni*) near (*upa*)'. It refers to the ancient practice of competent pupils sitting near their preceptors and listening to them. What was imparted at such 'sessions' came to be called *upaniṣad*.

[4]

उपोपसर्गः सामीप्ये तत्प्रतीचि समाप्यते ।
त्रिविधस्य सदर्थस्य निशब्दोऽपि विशेषणम् ॥ ४ ॥

The prefix *upa* means nearness; that, in effect, indicates the inner self; and the particle *ni* also is a qualification of the sense of *sad* which is threefold.

The prefix *upa* is used in the sense of nearness or proximity. It refers to what is immediate; and that is the self. The distinctions of 'in' and 'out' do not apply to the self. It is called 'inner' only in the sense that it is not remote or mediate.

The particle *ni* (meaning 'completely' or 'fully'), like *upa*, goes with *sad* which has, three senses, viz. destroying, leading to understanding, and terminating (*sadḷ viśaraṇa-gaty-avasādaneṣu*).

The next three verses interpret the meaning of the word *upaniṣad* in these three senses respectively.

[5]

उपनीयेममात्मानं ब्रह्मापास्तद्वयं यतः ।
निहन्त्यविद्यां तज्जं च तस्मादुपनिषद्भवेत् ॥ ५ ॥

Because by bringing this self near Brahman which transcends duality it destroys nescience and its product, it may be called *upaniṣad.*

The *upaniṣad* is so called because it makes known the non-duality of the self and Brahman, and *destroys* nescience along with its product, the world.

[6]

निहत्यानर्थमूलं स्वाविद्यां प्रत्यक्तया परम् ।
गमयत्यस्तसंभेदमतो वोपनिषद्भवेत् ॥ ६ ॥

Or, destroying one's own nescience which is the cause of evil, it makes known the supreme as the inner and indivisible (self). Hence it is called *upaniṣad.*

Because it *leads* to the knowledge of the identity of the inner self with Brahman, it is called *upaniṣad*.

[7]

प्रवृत्तिहेतून्निःशेषांस्तन्मूलोच्छेदकत्वतः ।
यतोऽवसादयेद्विद्या तस्मादुपनिषन्मता ॥ ७ ॥

Or, through the removal of their causes, knowledge puts an end to the conditions of activity without residue. Hence it is held to be *upaniṣad*.

Self-knowledge *causes the termination* of nescience and its brood, attachment, etc.; so, it is known as *upaniṣad*.

[8]

यथोक्तविद्याबोधित्वाद्ग्रन्थोऽपि तदभेदतः ।
भवेदुपनिषन्नामा लाङ्गलं जीवनं यथा ॥ ८ ॥

Because the text teaches the aforesaid knowledge and is non-different therefrom, it too has the name *upaniṣad* as the ploughshare is called livelihood.

It has been shown in the previous three verses that *upaniṣad* means *vidyā* (knowledge). Here it is stated that the books which teach *vidyā* are also called *upaniṣads*. An example from empirical usage is cited. The ploughshare is the *means* of livelihood, but is itself spoken of as livelihood. Similarly, the sacred books which serve as the means for Brahman-knowledge (*upaniṣad*) are themselves referred to as *upaniṣads*.

G. A. Jacob quotes this *vārtika* in his *A Second Handful of Popular Maxims*, under the heading '*lāṅgalaṁ jīvanam*.'*

* *Laukikanyāyāñjaliḥ*, Part II (Nirnayasagar Press, Bombay, 1909), p. 72.

[9]

अरण्याध्ययनाच्चैतदारण्यकमितीर्यते ।
बृहत्त्वाद्ग्रन्थतोऽर्थाच्च बृहदारण्यकं मतम् ॥ ९ ॥

It is called *āraṇyaka* because it was studied in the forests; since it is great, both in extent and sense, it is called *Bṛhadāraṇyaka.*

Here, the expressions *āraṇyaka* and *bṛhat* are explained. As the Upaniṣad was taught and studied in the forest-regions, it is called *āraṇyaka.* And, as it is great both in length and in meaning, it is *bṛhat. Bṛhat + āraṇyaka + upaniṣad = Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad.*

[10]

इत्यादिनामव्युत्पत्तिच्छद्मना प्रकृतोचितम् ।
सर्वोपनिषदामाह मुक्तिमात्रं प्रयोजनम् ॥ १० ॥

Thus under the pretext of explaining the etymological meaning of the name, he (the commentator) has stated that the end of all *Upaniṣads* is release alone.

By explaining the meaning of the word '*upaniṣad*' it has been shown that the fruit of Brahman-knowledge is the removal of bondage with its cause, and the attainment of unexcellable happiness.

[11]

मिथोविरोधसिद्ध्यर्थं कर्मज्ञानाधिकारिणोः ।
संसारव्याविवृत्सुभ्य इत्युक्तिं भाष्यकृज्जगौ ॥ ११ ॥

In order to establish the mutual conflict between those who are eligible for action and those who are

eligible for knowledge, the commentator wrote the words 'for the sake of those who desire freedom from transmigration'.

After indicating the fruit of Vedānta-study, the question as to who is the eligible person for such study is taken up. Śaṅkara, the commentator, declares that the eligible persons are those who desire freedom from transmigration, viz. release, and not those who are attached to actions.

[12]

त्यक्ताशेषक्रियस्यैव संसारं प्रजिहासतः ।
जिज्ञासोरेव चैकात्म्यं वेद्यन्तेष्वधिकारिता ॥ १२ ॥

He alone is eligible to study the Vedāntas[1] who has renounced all actions without residue, who desires to shake off transmigration and also to know the unity of the self[2].

It may be urged that the same person is eligible for ritual actions and Brahman-knowledge, even as is the case with *Agnihotra* and *Darśapūrṇamāsa* rites. But it is not so. Even among rituals all are not meant for all. E.g., *Bṛhaspatisava* and *Rājasūya* are enjoined on different persons. There is no rule, therefore, that the same persons should be eligible for following all that is taught in the Veda. The eligibility for Vedānta consist of discrimination between the eternal and the non-eternal, non-attachment to the enjoyments of this world and the next, possession of virtues like equanimity, self-control, etc., and desire for release. In short, those who want to get freedom from transmigration and realize the non-dual self are fit students for Vedānta-study.

1. *Trayī* is Veda ; *Trayyanta* is Vedānta. The plural indicates the texts of Vedānta.

2. *Aikātmya* is the truth that there is only one reality which is the self. We have rendered this word by employing such expressions as the unity of the self, the oneness of self, and the one self.

[13]

एतमेवेति च तथा प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यवित्तये ।
सर्वकर्मत्यजं प्राह श्रुतिर्विद्याधिकारिणम् ॥ १३ ॥

Scripture too says in the passage 'This only, etc.' that the one who is eligible for knowledge is he who has renounced all actions for the sake of knowing the real nature of the inner self.

The scriptural text declarative of the eligibility for Brahman-knowledge is cited here.

1. *BU*, IV, iv, 22: "Desiring this world (the Self) only, the renouncers renounce. Verily, because they knew this, the ancients did not desire offspring, saying: 'What shall we do with offspring, we whose is this self, this world?' They, verily, rising above the desire for sons and the desire for wealth and the desire for worlds, led the life of mendicancy."

[14]

प्रत्यग्विविदिषासिद्ध्यै वेदानुवचनादयः ।
ब्रह्मावाप्त्यै तु तत्त्याग ईप्सन्तीति श्रुतेर्बलात् ॥ १४ ॥

Reciting the Veda, etc. are for the sake of generating the desire to know the inner self; for attaining Brahman, however, they (action, etc.) are to be renounced, on the strength of the scriptural passage 'They desire' (*īpsanti*).

How, then, it may be asked, is the performance of sacred acts like reciting the Veda, etc. related to Brahman-knowledge? The answer is that such acts are helpful in generating in the mind of the *adhikārin* the desire to know Brahman. Cf. *BU*, IV, iv, 22: 'Such a one the Brāhmaṇas desire to know by reciting the Vedas, by sacrifice, by gifts, by penance, by fasting. By knowing that one, one becomes a sage.' For attaining Brahman, however, the renunciation of actions is the means. Here, the *Mādhyandina* version of that part of *BU*, IV, iv, 22, translated in note 1 to the previous verse, is quoted. See *Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa*, XIV, vi, 25: (ed. by A. Weber, 1855, p. 1090). *tam-etaṁ vedānuvacanena vividiṣanti, brahmacaryeṇa tapasā śraddhayā yajñenānāśakena caitameva viditvā munir bhavati; etam eva pravrājino lokam īpsantaḥ pravrajanti.* (*īpsantaḥ* of the *Mādhyandina-śākhā* is the same as *icchantaḥ* of the *Kāṇva-śākhā* meaning 'desiring'.)

[15]

उक्ताधिकारविषयप्रतिपत्त्यर्थमीरितम् ।
संसारहेत्वितिवचः स्फुटन्यायोपबृंहितम् ॥ १५ ॥

For the purpose of knowing the aforesaid eligibility and content (which is to be explained), are stated the words 'the cause of transmigration, etc.' which are replete with clear reasonings.

After commenting on the eligibility for the Vedānta-study, the subject-matter is introduced here.

[16]

ऐकात्म्यविषयान्नान्यो वेदान्तवचसां यतः ।
लभ्यते विषयः कश्चित्तद्धीस्तस्मात्तमोपनुत् ॥ १६ ॥

Since the words of the Vedāntas have for content the one self, no other content results—the knowledge thereof, therefore, dispels the darkness (of ignorance).

The subject-matter or content of Vedānta is *aikātmya*, the oneness of self. The knowledge of that is what removes ignorance.

[17]

संसारकारणाविद्याध्वंसकृज्ज्ञानलब्धये ।
प्रारब्धेयं प्रयत्नेन वेदान्तोपनिषत्परा ॥ १७ ॥

In order to attain the knowledge which destroys nescience, the cause of transmigration, this work based on the Vedāntopaniṣad[1] has been commenced, with care.

The primal cause of transmigration is ignorance or nescience (*ajñāna*, *avidyā*). Merit (*dharma*) and demerit (*adharma*) are only intermediary causes. What dispels nescience is not mediate knowledge but the direct experience (*sākṣātkāra*) of the self. The aim of this work is to lead to that goal.

1. I. e. the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*.

[18]

प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यधीरेव प्रत्यगज्ञानहानिकृत् ।
सा चाऽऽत्मोत्पत्तितो नान्यद्ध्वान्तध्वस्तावपेक्षते ॥ १८ ॥

Knowledge of the true nature of the inner self alone is the destroyer of the ignorance regarding the inner self. And, it requires nothing other than its own generation to destroy the darkness (of ignorance).

Self-knowledge is what is opposed to ignorance, and therefore what removes it. Apart from its rise, nothing else is required for the removal of ignorance. Action which is governed by ignorance cannot remove it.

NKL gives the following syllogism. The knowledge of self does not require action, because it is the knowledge of truth, like the knowledge of the reality of nacre. (*pratyag-dhīr na karmāpekṣā tattva-dhītvāt śukti-tattva-dhīvat.*)

[19]

साधनं चाधिकारी च कर्मविज्ञानकाण्डयोः ।
मिथो विरोधतः सिद्धावधुना तत्र चोद्यते ॥ १९ ॥

As it has been established that in the rites- and knowledge-sections, the means, eligible persons, etc. are mutually conflicting, now in respect thereof it is objected to (as follows).

Now it has been shown that the two sections of Scripture—ritual and knowledge—are different from each other in regard to the means they teach, and in regard to the eligibility for their study. They differ also as regards content and fruit. The Pūrvamīmāṁsaka, of course, will not accept this position. He opens his case in the next verse.

NKL—sādhanaṁ phalaṁ ca adhikārī viṣayaś cety arthaḥ.

[20]

नन्वभ्युदयवन्मुक्तिं गृह्णीमो विधिलक्षणाम् ।
कार्यं विना नाधिकारी नापीज्याफलसङ्गमः ॥ २० ॥

"Now, let us admit that, like prosperity, release (too) is attained through injunctions (i. e. *karma*), for

without something to be done (*kārya*) there is no eligible person, nor the relation of sacrifice (i.e. means) and end.

An objection usually begins with a *nanu* (an inceptive particle implying doubt or objection). Here the Mīmāṁsaka begins to state his objection. Just as heaven, etc., which constitute prosperity (*abhyudaya*), are obtained through ritual acts, release (*mukti*) also is attained through action, because it is an end taught in Scripture. Thus, the eligibility is the same for both *karma-kāṇḍa* and *jñāna-kāṇḍa* (ritual- and knowledge-sections of the Veda).

NTV—nanu abhyudayavat mumukṣoḥ iṣyamāṇo mokṣaḥ sādhyaḥ siddhe prepsānupapatteḥ, ataś ca kriyaiva tatsādhanam, na jñānam, kriyāyā eva abhūta-prādurbhāva-phalatvāt, jñānasya pradīpavat siddhārthābhivyakti-mātra-phalatvāt.

NKL—muktiḥ karma-sādhyā vaidika-phalatvāt, svargādivat.

ijyā-śabdo yāgavacano 'py atra sādhanamātra-gocaraḥ. Though the word 'ijya' means sacrifice, here it indicates 'means' in general.

[21]

लभ्यते लौकिकोऽपीह किमङ्गाऽऽगमसंश्रयः।
विधिलक्षणसिद्ध्यर्थं सन्ति वाक्यानि च श्रुतौ ॥ २१ ॥

"Even what relates to the empirical world results (only through *kārya*); how much more what depends on Scripture? For establishing injunction as the means, there are texts in Scripture.

Here an argument *a fortiori* (*kaimutika-nyāya*) is advanced. Even in the world, without a knowledge of something to be done (*kārya*), there is no eligibility. It goes without saying, therefore, that this must be so with regard to sacred matters. Nor may it be said that there is no parity between what obtains in the world and

what is true of the Veda. In *PM*, I, iii, 10 (*Lokavedādhikaraṇa*) it is established that the words and their meanings are the same in the Veda and in empirical usage. It is not as if an uncommon set of words is used in the Veda. Hence there is parity.

The Mīmāṁsā view is as follows :—In texts like 'One performs the *Agnihotra* as long as one lives,' *life-long-ness* is enjoined, not as a property of the act, but as a property of the agent. The meaning is that the performance of the act is contingent upon the 'being alive' of the agent. Now, since the contingence is upon a constant factor, viz. being alive, the act is an obligatory one (*PM*, II, iv, 1-7. *Yāvaj-jīvādhikaraṇa*). Heaven is said to be the fruit of sacrifice. But sacrifice which is an act perishes as soon as it has been performed while heaven comes only later on at death. What, then, is the cause of heaven? In order to solve this problem, an unseen potency called *apūrva* or *kārya* is assumed. The sacrifice generates the *apūrva*, and this lasts till the fruit is gained (*PM*, II i, 5. *Apūrvādhikaraṇa*). It is the *kārya* that is the principal. Not only are substances, properties and preparations auxiliaries; actions, result and agent also are auxiliaries (*PM*, III, i, 3-6. *Bādaryadhikaraṇa*.)

On the basis of the sections of the *Pūrvamīmāṁsā-sūtra* cited above, the Mīmāṁsaka urges that *mukti* results only through the performance of action, and that, therefore, it is what is to be accomplished (*kārya*).

[22]

कुर्वीत क्रतुमित्यादिर्विधिरभ्युदये यथा ।
उपासीतेति च तथा मुक्तावपि समीक्ष्यते ॥ २२ ॥

"Just as in respect of prosperity (*abhyudaya*) there is the injunction 'Perform the rite,' so in respect of release (*mukti*) there is seen (the injunction) 'Meditate'."

The objector now quotes Scripture in support of his view. There is no doubt regarding the existence in the Veda of the injunctions of ritual. They take the form 'Perform the rite'. Similarly, it is contended, there are injunctions regarding release, which are expressed in the form 'Do meditate'.

[23]

नाभ्युदयस्य मुक्तेश्च साध्यासाध्ये ध्रुवाध्रुवे ।
वैलक्षण्यान्न युक्तेयं तुल्यसाधनता तयोः ॥ २३ ॥

No. Prosperity and release, which are (respectively) what-is-to-be-accomplished and what-is-not accomplished, what-is-impermanent and what-is-permanent, are opposed to each other. Therefore, they cannot have the same means.

To the objection raised, the *siddhāntin* now replies. Prosperity and release are quite different ends. Prosperity is what-is-to-be-accomplished; release is the eternally-accomplished. The former is impermanent; the latter is permanent. Therefore, the same means cannot serve the two ends; nor can the eligibility be the same for both.

NTV—anyathā svargādivat saṁsāra eva mokṣa iti prasajyeta. Otherwise, like heaven, *saṁsāra* itself would have to be regarded as release.

[24]

अन्यच्छ्रेयोऽन्यदुतैव प्रेय-
स्ते उभे नानार्थे पुरुषं सिनीतः ।
तयोः श्रेय आददानस्य साधु
भवति हीयतेऽर्थाद्य उ प्रेयो वृणीते ॥ २४ ॥

'The good is one thing, the pleasing is quite another. The two bind man to different ends. Of these, all is well with him who chooses the good; and he who weds the pleasing falls from the (supreme) end.'

A text of the *Kaṭhopaniṣad* (ii, 1) is reproduced here. *Śreyas* is *mokṣa* that is eternal. *Preyas* is pleasure that perishes. They govern different men. He who lets himself to be governed by the former attains the final goal. And he who chooses the latter falls away from that goal. The means also are different. While *jñāna* is the means to *śreyas*, *karma* is the means to *preyas*.

[25]

परीक्ष्य लोकान्कर्मचितान्ब्राह्मणो
निर्वेदमायान्नास्त्यकृतः कृतेन ।
तद्विज्ञानार्थं स गुरुमेवाभिगच्छे-
त्समित्पाणिः श्रोत्रियं ब्रह्मनिष्ठम् ॥ २५ ॥

'Examining the enjoyments acquired through deeds a Brāhmana becomes dissatisfied, since what is not accomplished (*akṛta*) is not attained through deeds. For a knowledge of that he should, verily, approach, with fuel in hand, a preceptor who is versed in Scripture and established in Brahman.'

This is a text from the *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* (I, ii, 12). It declares that for him who has become non-attached to *saṁsāra* there is eligibility for *jñāna*. His non-attachment is the result of a realization of all that is finite. Whatever is accomplished in the world perishes. Nothing wrought through *karma* lasts for ever. He who realizes this truth turns away from *saṁsāra* and seeks the knowledge

of the non dual self which is eternal, immortal, fearless, immutable, unmoving and firm. In order to obtain that knowledge, he approaches a preceptor (*guru*) who is established in Brahman and learned in the *śāstras*.

[26 a]

नन्वभ्युदयवत्साध्या मुक्तिरप्राप्तरूपतः ।

"Now, like prosperity, release is to be accomplished, since it is of the nature of what has not been attained."

Now, the objector argues that release is a thing-to-be-accomplished, for it has not yet been accomplished by us. So, he maintains that release is on a par with prosperity.

SP—vimatā muktiḥ sādhyā, aprāpta-rūpatvāt, svargavat.

Release, which is in dispute, is what-is-to-be-attained, because it is of the nature of the unattained, like heaven.

[26 b]

नैवं साध्याऽपि नो मुक्तिर्न त्वभ्युदयवद्यतः ॥ २६ ॥

Not thus. Even though release for us is what-is-to-be-accomplished, it is not so in the sense that prosperity is.

This is the reply to the above objection. Release is not what-is-to-be-accomplished in the sense in which prosperity is. it is imagined to be so on account of delusion. Therefore, it is not what-has-not-been-attained, or what-is-to-be-accomplished, in the principal sense. It is so, only in a figurative sense.

SP—bhrāntam aprāptirūpatvaṁ mukteḥ, na mukhya-sādhyatvāvaham. That release is the unattained is a delusion; it is not what-is-to-be-attained in the primary sense of the term.

NTV—dvividho hi loke prāpyaḥ, yathā gamanādinā grāmādiḥ, yathā ca jñānena kaṇṭhe cāmīkarādiḥ, pariharaṇīyaś ca dvividhaḥ, cikitsādinā rogādiḥ, yathā vā sthāṇvādi-jñānena corādiḥ.

There are two kinds of attainables in the world: (1) like a village, etc., which are to be reached by walking, etc., and (2) like the forgotten ornament round the neck which is to be attained through knowledge. Similarly, there are two kinds of remediables; (1) like disease, etc., which are to be remedied by proper treatment, and (2) like the imagined thief, etc., who are to be driven away by a knowledge of the post, etc.

[27]

स्वतोमुक्तान्तरायस्य तमसो विद्यया हतेः ।
तत्कैवल्यमतः साध्यमुपचारात्प्रचक्षते ॥ २७ ॥

Where, by knowledge, darkness (ignorance) which is an obstruction already removed is destroyed, there is perfection (*kaivalya*); it is figuratively spoken of as what is accomplished (*sādhya*).

Ignorance (*avidyā*) which is not real is removed by knowledge (*vidyā*). Release which is the eternal nature of the self is figuratively spoken of as what is to be attained through knowledge.

[28]

चिकित्सयेव संप्राप्य स्वास्थ्यं रोगार्दितस्य तु ।
आत्माविद्याहतेर्बोधात्तत्कैवल्यमवाप्यते ॥ २८ ॥

For one who is afflicted by disease there is attainment of one's native state (i.e., health) through medical treatment. When through knowledge the ignorance of self is destroyed, perfection is attained.

Here an illustration is offered. Health is one's natural state. Sometimes it gets obscured by disease. When, by proper treatment, the disease is removed, we say, one becomes whole. This is only a figure of speech.

NTV—nitya-śuddha-mukta-buddha-svabhāvam brahmaiva mokṣaḥ tac-ca svāntarāya tamo-nivṛtyā prāpnotīty upacaryate.

Release is Brahman itself which is by nature eternal, pure, ever free and intelligent, and that is said to be attained, figuratively, when the obstacle to it, viz. the darkness of ignorance, is removed.

NKL—muktir asādhyā ātmābhinnatvāt ātmavat.

[29]

ब्रह्म वा इदमित्यादिर्ब्रह्मैवेति तथा श्रुतिः ।
सुषुप्तनरवच्छ्रुत्या बोध्योऽतोऽयं न कार्यते ॥ २९ ॥

'Brahman verily was this'[1] etc., 'Brahman alone'[2]: thus Scripture. Like the man who sleeps (is awakened) so one is made to know by Scripture and not made to act.

The Scriptural texts that declare the eternal nature of release are cited.

1. *BU*, I, iv, 10. 'Brahman, verily, was this in the beginning. It knew only itself thus: "I am Brahman." From it all this came into being.'

2. *BU*, IV, iv, 6, 'Being Brahman alone, he attains Brahman.'

These and other texts teach that Brahman is the eternally attained.

What Scripture has to do is only to awaken the individual to this truth, and not to make him do anything.

NKL—yathā rājā supto bandi-prabhṛtibhis tattva-kathanena bodhyate, na kaṁcid anuṣṭhāpyate.

[30]

किमत्र विधिना कार्यमनृतन्त्वत्वहेतुतः ।
श्रुतोऽप्यनर्थकोऽत्र स्याद्विध्यर्थासंभवत्वतः ॥ ३० ॥

What can be accomplished by injunction here, since (release) is not dependent on human effort ? Injunctions that are declared in Scripture have no purport here, since the injunctive sense is impossible.

Jñāna cannot be the content of an injunction. Only *karma* can be enjoined. Deeds are dependent on the will of man. Not so is knowledge. Even if there are passages in Scripture relating to knowledge which appear to be in the form of injunctions, they are not to be understood as such. What can a razor's edge do against a rock ? It will only get blunted. Even so, injunction cannot affect knowledge.

[31]

यच्चास्यासति कर्तव्ये नाधिकारो निरूप्यते ।
तदप्यशेषतश्चोद्यमूर्ध्वमुन्मूलयिष्यते ॥ ३१ ॥

As for what is stated, that in the absence of what is to be accomplished there is no eligibility, that objection too will be uprooted completely later on.

What was stated by the objector in v. 20 is recalled here, and the promise is made that it will be replied to later. See v. 228 *et seq.*

[32]

पर आहाऽऽत्मनः स्वास्थ्यं श्रेयो यद्यभिवाञ्छसि ।
कर्मभ्य एव तत्सिध्येच्छतत्वात्कर्मणः श्रुतौ ॥ ३२ ॥

Another says: "The natural state of the self which you desire as the good can result only from deeds; since deeds are taught in Scripture.

The objector now says: You hold that the remaining of the self in its own nature is the goal. Agreed. But that can be achieved only by performing the deeds enjoined in Scripture.

The combination of *mukti* and *karma* is on the maxim of *the lost horses and burnt chariot (naṣṭāśva-dagdharathavat)*. Jacob explains the maxim thus: "This is based on the story of two men travelling in their respective chariots, and one of them losing his horses and the other having his chariot burnt, through the outbreak of fire in the village in which they were putting up for the night. The horses that were left were harnessed to the remaining chariot, and the two men pursued their journey together. Its teaching is—union for mutual advantage."*

[33]

श्रुतौ स्मृतौ च विहितं कर्मैव श्रूयते यतः ।
न च कर्मातिरेकेण मुक्त्यभ्युदयसाधनम् ॥ ३३ ॥

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* *A Handful of Popular Maxims* (Nirnayasagar Press, Bombay, 1925), p. 31.

"Since in Scripture and in Traditional Code action alone is declared to be obligatory, there is no means other than action for release and prosperity.

Whether the end be prosperity or release, the means taught in Scripture is action.

[34]

यत्नतो न्यायतः किंचित्पश्यामो वेदचक्षुषा ।
निषेधविधिमात्रत्वाद्वेदार्थस्येह सर्वतः ॥ ३४ ॥

" With care and through reasoning let us see with the eye of the Veda. Here, everywhere, the sense of the Veda is either prohibition or injunction alone."

So far as the sphere of relative experience is concerned, it is clear that the purport of the Veda lies in injunctions and prohibitions. That is to say, it is taught in the Veda that *karma* alone is the means to the human goal. Release is a human goal, like heaven. Therefore, *karma* should be the means thereto.

NTV—etad uktaṁ bhavati—niṣedha-vidhi-codanaiva śāstraṁ pravartaka-nivartakāveva śāstrārthaḥ pravṛtti-nivṛtti-sādhyam eva śāstra-prayojanaṁ; vidhi-pada-rahitānāṁ vākyānāṁ apramāpakatvād ajñātārthaprameyābhāvāt pravṛtti-nivṛtti-sādhya-prayojanābhāvac ca pauruṣeya-vākyavat nirapekṣa-prāmāṇyābhāvān na karmātirekeṇa mukty-abhyudaya-sādhanam-iti.

This is what has been said: Scripture is only mandate, of the form of prohibition and prescription; the sense of Scripture is only what prompts and prevents; the fruit of Scripture is only what can be accomplished by activity and withdrawal.

[35]

ननु श्रुतौ पुरोक्तानि वाक्यानि बहुशो मया ।
अविधायित्वतस्तेषां न न्याय्यं भवतोदितम् ॥ ३५ ॥

Now, several texts of Scripture were cited by me above. Since they are non-injunctive, what you have stated is not reasonable.

The *siddhāntin* observes that, as he has already cited Scriptural texts which are non-injunctive in character, it is wrong to maintain that Scripture has purport only in injunctions and prohibitions.

[36]

आम्नायस्य क्रियार्थत्वाद्विधिनेति च सूत्रणात् ।
विधिशेषतया तेषामेकवाक्यत्वसंभवे ॥ ३६ ॥

"Syntactical unity for them is possible as subsidiary to injunction because of the aphorisms 'Since Scripture has *kriyā* for purport'[1] 'With injunction, etc.'[2].

The *pūrvapakṣin* replies that the non-injunctive texts have no independent purport, and that they should be construed with an injunction.

1. *PM.* I, ii, 1. 'Since Scripture has action for purport, what are not for the sake of that are useless; in these, therefore, Scripture is declared to be non-eternal.'

2. *PM*, I, ii, 7. 'Being construed with injunction, they would serve the purpose of eulogizing those injunctions.'

These two *sūtras* occur in the *Arthavādādhikaraṇa* (*PM*, I, ii, 1-18). The first one states the opponent's (i.e., he who is opposed to Mīmāṁsā) contention that eulogistic passages are useless, and that, therefore, to that extent the Veda would become unreliable. The other *sūtra* (I, ii, 7) gives the reply. The eulogistic (*arthavāda*) passages have no independent purport. They should be construed syntactically with the injunctions. Their duty, in fact, is to praise the injunctions.

For example, there is the following text in the Veda (*Taittirīya-saṁhitā*, II, i, 1) 'One desiring prosperity should sacrifice the animal *śveta* dedicated to Vāyu: Vāyu, verily, is the eftest deity: ..... he leads the man to prosperity'. Here, the sentence 'Vāyu, verily, is the eftest deity' does not indicate any action. It has to be construed with the injunctive sentence 'One desiring prosperity should sacrifice, etc.'

Similarly, those texts of the *jñāna-kāṇḍa* which are themselves non-injunctive, says the *pūrvapakṣin*, acquire meaning only as construed with the injunctive texts. In other words, they have syntactical unity (*ekavākyatva*) with *vidhi-vākyas*.

NTV—codanātirikta-vedavākyānām niṣpramāpakatvāt, nirviṣayatvāt, niṣprayojanatvācca aprāmāṇyam.

The Vedic texts which are non-injunctive do not make known the truth, have no content, and are futile; hence, they are not authoritative.

NKL—vimatā na svārthaparā vidhi-vikala-vedatvāt so 'rodīd ity ādivat.....karmāpekṣita-kartrādi-prakāśanadvārā teṣām api vidhinaikavākyatvam lāghavāt.

[37]

वचसामक्रियार्थानां वाक्यभेदप्रकल्पना ।
गुर्वीं स्यान्ननु कैवल्यं फलं नित्यमिहेष्यते ॥ ३७ ॥

"To assume sentence-split for sentences which do not have *kriyā* for purport would be prolix."

Now, here, what is desired is perfection, the eternal truth.

Here, the statement of *pūrvapakṣa* continues upto the words *gurvī syāt* in the second line. The rest of that line states an objection raised by the *siddhāntin*.

Pūrvapakṣin.—There is no fruit in the sense of the Vedānta texts; even as there is no fruit seen in the *artha-vāda*, 'He wept (*arodīt*);—because he wept, *Rudra* came to be called *Rudra*.' (*Traittirīyasaṁhitā*, I, v, 1). The sentence 'He wept, etc.' should be construed with the injunction 'Silver shall not be given on the *barhis*'. Otherwise there would be sentence-split (*vākyabheda*) and prolixity (*gaurava*). To separate the *arthavāda* text from the injunctive text would be wrong. Equally unjustifiable is it to assume a separate fruit for the *arthavāda* text.

Siddhāntin.—*Mokṣa* is the fruit of Vedānta, and that is eternal. If the Vedānta-texts were subsidiary to the injunctive texts *mokṣa* would become non-eternal. Therefore, *mokṣa* is not what is accomplished through action.

SP—na sā (muktiḥ) karma-sādhyā nityatvād ātmavat.

[38]

कथं नित्यं भवेत्तन्नो यदि स्यात्कर्मणः फलम् ।
कर्मोत्थं न यतः किंचिद्ध्रुवं जगति वीक्ष्यते ॥ ३८ ॥

How can it be eternal, if it were the fruit of action ? Nothing that is given rise to by action is seen to be permanent in the world.

The *siddhāntin* continues : Whatever is accomplished through action perishes. *Mokṣa* is eternal. Therefore, it cannot be the fruit of action.

[39]

तत्साधनेन चावश्यं भवितव्यमतो भवेत् ।
पारिशेष्यादिह ज्ञानं वेदान्ते तत्प्रसिद्धितः ॥ ३९ ॥

That (release) should result necessarily through some means. Hence, by elimination, knowledge becomes here (the means). This is well known in the Vedānta.

If action is not the means to *mokṣa*, what is the means ? By a process of elimination it is settled that knowledge is the means. *Pāriśeṣya-nyāya* is the principle of residues.

[40]

नैवं क्रियाभ्य एवास्या मुक्तेः सिद्धत्वहेतुतः ।
कुतः क्रियाभ्यः सिद्धिश्चेच्छृणु तद्भण्यते यतः ॥ ४० ॥

" Not thus ; for the reason that release results from rites alone. If it be asked, how does it result from rites ?, listen, how it is so is explained.

The *pūrvapakṣin* contends that the principle of residues does not apply here, as, in his view, *mokṣa* is accomplished through action. He proceeds to explain how this is so.

[41-42]

निषिद्धकाम्ययोस्त्यागात्कर्मणोर्नित्यकर्मणः ।
करणात्प्रत्यवायस्य हतेर्भोगेन च क्षयात् ॥ ४१ ॥
शरीरारम्भकस्यैवं मुक्तिः सिद्धाऽन्तरात्मनः ।
विनाऽप्यैकात्म्यसंबोधात्कर्मणैवोक्तवर्त्मना ॥ ४२ ॥

"By giving up prohibited and optional rites and by performing the obligatory rites, the sin of non-performance being removed and the *karma* responsible for generating (a fresh) body being destroyed through experiencing: when thus release for the inner self results, (it must be admitted that) even without the knowledge of the one self, action alone is the means to release in the aforesaid manner."

This is the recipe for *mokṣa* : your present body is the result of the accumulated *karma* of your past. If you desire *mokṣa*, all that you need accomplish is that when your present body falls, there should be no more embodiment for you. The causes of embodiment (i.e. birth) are merit (*puṇya*) and demerit (*pāpa*). If you succeed in avoiding both till the time of death, thereafter you will not be born. How to avoid merit and demerit ? By not performing prohibited (*niṣiddha*) acts, you avoid demerit. By not resorting to optional rites (*kāmya-karma*), you do not gather merit. Obligatory duties (*nitya-karma*) you should perform, because their non-performance will bring in demerit, while their performance does not lead to any fresh merit. The *karma* that is responsible for the present body, however, perishes when it has been experienced. Thus when the present body falls, there will be no cause for seizing another body. And that is *mokṣa*. When it is attained through *karma*, where is the need for *jñāna* ?

NKL—mokṣārthī na pravarteta tatra kāmyaniṣiddhayoḥ, nitya-naimittike kuryāt pratyavāya-jihāsayā-iti nyāyena uktam upapādayati niṣiddheti.

[43]

ननु चाऽऽत्मावबोधस्य निचाय्येति फलं श्रुतम् ।
ब्रह्म वेदेति च तथा नैवं तस्यार्थवादतः ॥ ४३ ॥

Now, that release is the fruit of self-knowledge is declared by Scripture in 'Having realized (him, one is released from the mouth of death),' [1] as also in 'He who knows Brahman (becomes Brahman)'. [2]

"Not thus; since they are eulogies."

Siddhāntin : Inspite of what you have said, *karma* cannot be the means to *mokṣa*; for Scripture expressly declares that knowledge is the means.

1. *KU*, I, iii, 15. 'Devoid of sound, of touch, of form, without decay, and likewise devoid of taste, eternal, and devoid of odour, beginningless, endless, superior to the Great (*Mahat*) and firm: having realized him, one is released from the mouth of death.'

2. *MU*, III, ii, 9. 'He, verily, who knows that supreme Brahman, becomes Brahman itself. In his family there will be born no one who does not know Brahman. Sorrow he crosses; sin he crosses: Liberated from the knots of the cavity (of the heart), he becomes immortal.'

Pūrvapakṣin : The Scriptural texts you have quoted are eulogies (*arthavāda*).

[44]

फलोक्तेरर्थवादत्वं द्रव्यसंस्कारकर्मसु ।
सर्वत्र दर्शनाच्छास्त्रे पर्णमय्यां फलोक्तिवत् ॥ ४४ ॥

"In Scripture everywhere it is seen that the declaration of fruit in respect of material and purificatory rites is eulogistic, as in the case of the declaration of fruit for (the sacrificial ladle) made of *parṇa*-wood.

Admitting that there are texts in Scripture declaring *jñāna* to be the means to *mokṣa*, the *pūrvapakṣin* maintains that these texts are eulogistic and, therefore, have no purport of their own. *PM*, IV, iii, i, declares: "The mention of fruit in connection with 'material', 'purification', and 'acts' should be regarded as eulogistic, because they are for the sake of another (action)." There is the text, for example, which says: 'He whose sacrificial ladle is made of *pārṇa*-wood does not hear any evil of himself.' Here the text does not enjoin the non-hearing of evil as an actual result. It is only a praise of the ladle made of *parṇa*-wood which is subservient to the act of offering. Similarly, the declaration of fruit in the texts relating to self-knowledge is an eulogy.

[45]

आत्मनःकर्मशेषत्वात्तद्धियः कर्मशेषता ।
विधिं त्वयाऽनिच्छताऽपि ह्यभ्युपेयाऽर्थवादता ॥ ४५ ॥

"Since the self is subsidiary to action, the knowledge of that is subsidiary to action. Though injunction is not accepted by you (in Vedānta), the eulogistic character (of Vedānta texts) must be admitted (by you)."

The *pūrvapakṣin* continues: Just as *parṇa*-hood helps the sacrifice by offering its material to the ladle, even knowledge helps the same by way of purifying the agent. Therefore, the mention of fruit in the texts about self-knowledge is an eulogy. Even though knowledge may not be enjoined, it becomes subsidiary to injunction by purifying the agent.

NKL—karmāṅga-saṁskāratayā jñānasya kriyā-śeṣatvam ity arthaḥ.

AVS—etad uktaṁ bhavati ātma-jñānasya ātma-saṁskāratvāt ātmanaś ca kriyā-śeṣatvāt, tad-dvāreṇa taj-jñānasya kriyā-śeṣatvopapatteḥ phala-śravaṇam avivakṣitam iti.

[46]

नैवं तद्धेतुतद्रूपविरोधादितरेतरम् ।
मुक्त्यभ्युदययोस्तस्मान्न सम्यग्भवतोदितम् ॥ ४६ ॥

Not thus. Since release and prosperity are opposed to each other as regards means and nature, what was stated by you is not sound.

The *siddhāntin* replies: Action cannot be the means to release, even though it may lead to prosperity. Discrimination (*viveka*) is the means to release; non-discrimination or nescience (*aviveka*) is the basis of prosperity. Permanence or eternity (*dhruvatva*) is the nature of release; transitoriness (*adhruvatva*) is the characteristic feature of prosperity. Since prosperity and release are so divergent, the same means cannot serve both ends.

NKL—kaivalyaṁ karmaphalam ity etad dūṣayati—ne'ti. tayor hetu, taddhetu, rāga-vairāgya-pūrvakau tayo rūpe bandha-tad-dhvaṁsātmake tayor virodhān mukty-abhyudayayor eka-puruṣāsaṁbandhaḥ.

[47]

स्वरूपेऽवस्थितिर्मुक्तिरात्मनो भवतोच्यते ।
काम्यादिवर्जनादिभ्यस्तस्याः सिद्धिश्च वर्ण्यते ॥ ४७ ॥

You say that the resting of the self in its own nature is release ; and you explain that it is attained through giving up optional rites, etc.

The *siddhāntin* recalls here what was stated by the *pūrvapakṣin* in v. 32. Admitting that the resting of the self in its own nature is release, it was urged that this is achieved through the performance of Scripture-ordained acts.

[48-49]

तत्राऽऽत्मा किं स्वरूपे प्राङ्न स्थितो येन तत्स्थितौ ।
हेतुं व्यपेक्षते यत्नात्स्वरूपं हि न तद्भवेत् ॥ ४८ ॥

स्वतोऽनवस्थितो यत्र हेतुना स्थाप्यते बलात् ।
अथावस्थित एवायं किमर्थं हेतुमार्गणम् ॥ ४९ ॥

Does the self not rest in its nature previously, that in order to rest therein it depends on a means through effort ? But, then, that cannot be its nature wherein it has to be made to rest forcibly through means, as it does not rest of itself. If it rests, then for what purpose is the search for means ?

Here the *pūrvapakṣin* is asked: Prior to the performance of actions, does the self rest in itself or not ? If the latter, then 'resting-in-itself' cannot be the nature of the self, for it is adventitious, being dependent on an external means. If the former, then, where is the need for the performance of actions ? Surely, no one wants to go to a village which has already been reached.

कैवल्येऽपि च तत्सक्तेरनिर्मोक्षः प्रसज्यते ।
अतो निषिद्धकाम्यादिवर्जनान्नाऽऽत्ममुक्तता ॥ ५० ॥

If even in release there be attachment thereto (rites) there is the contingence of non-release. Therefore, by giving up prohibited and optional rites, there is no release for the self.

If it be said that the performance of actions is natural to the self, then, there would be no difference between bondage and release.

[51]

विषयाभ्यासजास्वास्थ्यनुत्त्यर्थमिति चेन्मतम् ।
स तु विषयसंपर्कः कस्माद्भवति कारणात् ॥ ५१ ॥

If it be thought that it (the prescription of rites, etc.) is for the sake of resolving the non-abidance in the self brought about by repeated contacts with the objects, due to what cause does that contact with objects come about?

The *pūrvapakṣin* may say: 'I admit that the performance of actions is not natural to the self. Nor is it required to make the self remain in itself. Yet I maintain that it is necessary for removing the sin that has been generated in the self by repeated contact with the objects of sense.'

Now, if that be so, he should be asked: 'What brings about contact with sense-objects?'

NTV— paramārthato 'saṁgasyā 'tmano viṣayādinā tat-kāraṇena vā kenāpi saṁbandhānupapatteḥ na tan-nivartanena karmaṇāṁ mokṣa-sādhanayogyatā syāt.

In truth, the self is unattached, and there can be for it by no means any relation either to the objects, etc., or to their cause. And so, actions cannot be the means to *mokṣa* for the purpose of removing them (viz. the objects and their cause).

[52]

अकस्माद्भवतः सक्तेर्मुक्तावप्यनिषेधतः ।
अनिर्मोक्षप्रसक्तिर्वस्तथा सति समापतेत् ॥ ५२ ॥

If, according to you, such contact is accidental, then, since it cannot be prevented even in release, there is for you the contingence of non-release.

If contact with sense-objects is accidental, i.e. if it be without a cause, then, it may occur even in *mokṣa*, with the result that there would be no *mokṣa*.

[53]

धर्माधर्मनिमित्तश्चेत्किं पुनर्धर्मपातके ।
अप्यसङ्गस्वभावस्य संपर्कं कुरुतो बलात् ॥ ५३ ॥

If the cause be merit and demerit, do merit and demerit occasion contact by force for what is by nature unattached ?

It may be held that merit (*dharma*) and demerit (*adharma*) are the cause of the contact. In that case, two alternatives are possible :

(A) that merit and demerit establish contact with the objects for the self that is unattached ; and

(B) that the self for which contact is established is not unattached.

Here, the first alternative (A) is mentioned.

NTV—nityāsaṅgacinmātrasyā 'tmana ukta-saṁparko nopapadyate.

For the self which is eternal, unattached pure consciousness, the aforesaid relation (to the objects, etc.) is not possible.

avidyaiva akhaṇḍānanda-caitanyasya asaṅgasyā 'tmanoḥ ukta-samparkaṁ karoti.....tan-nivṛttaye jñānamevaiṣitavyam, na karma.

For the self which is impartite bliss and consciousness and is unattached, nescience alone brings about the said relation; for removing that, knowledge alone is to be sought for, not action.

[54-55]

भल्लातकाङ्कवद्वस्त्रे न हि लोके स्फुरन्नपि ।
कुशलोऽपि कुलालः सन्नघटादिस्वभावकम् ॥ ५४ ॥
मृद्व्योम घटी कुर्यान्मरुद्वाऽग्नेश्च शीतताम् ।
आत्मा कर्त्रादिरूपश्चेन्मा काङ्क्षीस्तर्हि मुक्तताम् ॥ ५५ ॥

Just as the marking-nut makes the cloth bear marks, not thus can merit and demerit produce contact for the self.[1] A potter, even though able-bodied and skilled, cannot make a pot out of ether which is not of the nature of pot, etc; nor can wind produce coolness in fire.[2]

If the self be of the nature of agent, etc.,[3] then do not hope for release.

The alternative (A) is not sound.

1. This is a contrary example. A piece of cloth may be stained, but not the self.

2. These two are similar instances: ether cannot serve as the material of pot; fire cannot be made cool by a blowing wind.

3. This is the second alternative (B). Here, again, there are minor distinctions.

i. Is the self of the nature of effects (*kārya*) such as agent, etc.? Or,

ii. is it of the nature of the potency (*sakti*) of being agent, etc.?

And, as regards the first of these:

(a) Is there release for the self on the destruction of the effects, agency, etc.? Or,

(b) is there release even when there is not that destruction?

The first, i (a), is not possible.

[56]

न हि स्वभावो भावानां व्यावर्त्येतौष्ण्यवद्रवेः ।
स्वभावाद्विनिवृत्तोऽर्थो निःस्वभावः खपुष्पवत् ॥ ५६ ॥

Not, indeed, can the nature of things be changed, as the heat of the sun. A thing which has lost its nature is void of reality like the sky-flower.

Here, the reason for the impossibility of i (a) is given.

A thing cannot change its essence. If it should change, it will cease to be itself. Gauḍapāda says (*GK*, iv, 29):

prakṛter anyathābhāvo na kathañcid bhaviṣyati.

[57]

नाविनश्यन्यतो वह्निर्व्यावर्त्येतौष्ण्यतः क्वचित् ।
न च कर्त्राद्यनिर्मुक्तौ मुक्तिः संभाव्यतेऽन्यतः ॥ ५७ ॥

Fire which has not been destroyed does not lessen its heat at any time.

For if the self be not freed from agency, etc., will release be possible by any other means?

Here, the unsoundness of i (b) is shown.

[58-59a]

ननु कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वकार्यमेवाऽऽत्मसंसृतिः ।
न तु तच्छक्तिरित्येवं शक्तिमात्रतया स्थितौ ॥ ५८ ॥
सर्वानर्थविनिर्मुक्तेरुपपन्नाऽऽत्ममुक्तता ।

"Now the effect consisting in agency and enjoyership, is alone the transmigration of the self, and not the potency thereof. Thus when the potency alone remains, and all evil is removed, the release of self is intelligible."

Here, the *pūrvapakṣin* accepts the alternative ii, and argues: The self is of the nature of the potency of being agent, etc. But what constitute *saṁsāra* actually are the effects, such as agency, enjoyership, etc., and not their potency. So, when the effects are destroyed, there is release, even though their potency may persist.

AVS—kartṛ-śakti-kāryasya anarthatvāt tasya ca muktāv abhāvāt śakteś ca anarthatvābhāvāt, tad-bhāve 'pi mokṣaḥ syād eva ity arthaḥ.

[59b]

मैवं भेदे तथाऽभेदे दोषः स्याच्छक्तिकार्ययोः ॥ ५९ ॥

Not thus; whether potency and its effect be different or non-different, there will be the (aforesaid) defect.

The *siddhāntin* rejects the alternative. Whether potency be identical with its effects or different from them, there would result non-release for the soul.

NTV—śakti-tatkāryayor bhede.....iyaṁ śaktir idaṁ ca kāryam iti vyavasthā na syāt, tilebhya eva tailam payasa eva dadhītivat kartṛtva-śakter eva kriyā bhoktṛtva-śakter eva bhoga iti ca vyavasthā na syāt.

Were potency and its effect different, then, one cannot say 'this is potency, and this is its effect.' Just as we say 'from the sesamum seeds, oil; from milk, curds,' we cannot say that action comes from the potency of agency alone, and enjoyment from the potency of enjoyership alone.

[60]

शक्तितत्कार्ययोर्यस्माद्व्यतिरेको न विद्यते ।
नियमासंभवः प्रापद्व्यतिरेकस्तयोर्यदि ॥ ६० ॥

For there is no difference between potency and its effect. If there be difference between them, invariable relation (of cause and effect as between them) would be impossible.

There can be no difference between potency and its effect. If there is difference, potency cannot be the cause of its effect. Indeed, as between differents like cow and horse, there is no causal relation.

AVS—ayam arthaḥ. śakti-śakyayor vyatirekāyogāt, vyatirekas tāvan nāsti, yadi kathaṁcid vyatirekaḥ syāt, tadā mṛda eva ghaṭaḥ kṣīrād eva dadhī 'ti niyamo na siddhyet, sarvataḥ sarvaṁ saṁbhavet.

[61]

कार्यकारणता न स्यात्स्वतो भेदेन सिद्धयोः ।
अभेदे च तयोरैक्यात्कार्यकारणता कुतः ॥ ६१ ॥

If they are established to be different by nature, there would not be the relation of cause and effect. And if they are non-different, they would be identical; whence, then, the relation of cause and effect?

Whether it is held that potency and its effect are different, or that they are identical, there is difficulty because either way the two cannot be related as cause and effect.

[62-64]

नाकुर्वत्कारणं दृष्टं कार्यं चाक्रियमाणकम् ।
अथाभेदस्तयोरिष्टः कार्यध्वस्तौ प्रसज्यते ॥ ६२ ॥

तच्छक्तेरपि विध्वंसस्तयोरव्यतिरेकतः ।
शक्तिस्वरूपहाने च शक्तिमद्रूपनिह्नुतिः ॥ ६३ ॥

तयोरव्यतिरेकत्वात्स एवाऽऽयात्यनीप्सितः ।
निरात्मवादः पूर्वोक्तस्तस्मान्नैवं प्रकल्पयेत् ॥ ६४ ॥

No cause is seen that is unproductive; nor an effect that is not produced. If non-difference between the two is what is accepted, then, on the destruction of the effect, there is the contingence of destruction for its potency too, for they are non-different. When the nature of potency is destroyed, the nature of the potent also is destroyed, because they are non-distinct. The same aforesaid view of no-self is brought in, even without our desire. Hence not thus should it be objected.

On the view that potency and its effect are non-different, defect is shown here. If the effect is included in potency, then, so long as the latter lasts, the former cannot be destroyed. In other words, agency, etc., will be constantly there for the self. So, there will be no release for it.

AVS—abhede idaṁ kurvad idaṁ kriyamāṇam iti vibhāgasya kartum aśakyatvāt, akurvata eva kāraṇatvam akriyamāṇasyaiva kāryatvaṁ prāpnoti tad ubhayaṁ dṛṣṭa-virodhī 'ti.

[65]

मतं कार्यानभिव्यक्तिर्निमित्तासंभवाद्यदि ।

शक्तेरिति न तद्युक्तं शक्तितद्धेतुसंभवात् ॥ ६५ ॥

If it be your view that release is the non-manifestation of the effect of the potency, since the cause is impossible, that does not stand to reason, as potency, and the cause (dharma, etc.) are there.

Pūrvapakṣin—It is not the destruction of either the effect or its potency that is release. Release is the non-manifestation of the effect of the potency. It cannot be said that, then, release would be the same as deep sleep. In sleep there is the cause of renewed manifestation, viz. *adṛṣṭa*, etc., whereas in release there is no such cause.

Siddhāntin—What you have stated is wrong. The cause of *saṁsāra* is potency or some excellence present in it. What produce its effect are merit (*dharma*), etc. Since they are present, even in release there is the contingence of the manifestation of the effect.

NTV—yady api kāryānabhivyaktiḥ muktau saṁbhavati, tathāpi mukty-avasthāyāṁ kartṛtva-śakter ātmano nityādyananuṣṭhāna-janya-pāpmanaḥ kāmya-pratiṣiddhānuṣṭhāna-janya-puṇya-pāpayoś ca bhāvāt punar dehāntara-prāptyādi saṁbhavāt, viṣayābhyāsajāsvāsthyanutti-lakṣaṇo mokṣo na saṁbhavatīti pariharati na tad yuktam ityādinā.

[66]

शक्तिरूपेण संबन्धो निमित्तानामपीष्यते ।

नैमित्तिकैरिति ततो वह्न्यौष्ण्यादिसमानता ॥ ६६ ॥

The relation of causes with what are occasioned is through the form of potency. Hence there is parity with fire-heat, etc.

Causes are related to effects through potency. So, if potency is there, the effect must be there. E.g. if there is fire, there must be heat. The fire-heat example was given in v. 57.

[67]

कार्यस्य शक्तितन्त्रत्वे सर्वदा कारणस्थितेः ।
कार्योत्पत्तिः सदैव स्यान्निदाघे घर्मवद्यतः ॥ ६७ ॥

If the effect is dependent on potency, then, as the cause is always existent, the origination of the effect would always be there, like heat in summer.

Does the effect consisting of agency, etc., depend on the entire cause? Or, does it not? If the first alternative is accepted, then, potency is the entire cause, and since it is present in release the effect too must be present.

[68-69]

तथैव शक्त्यतन्त्रत्वेऽप्येष दोषो यतो भवेत् ।
सदा कार्यं न जायेत कारणासंभवात्सदा ॥ ६८ ॥
निदाघे शीतवद्यस्मादतोऽसम्यगिदं वचः ।
निष्कारणस्य चोद्भूतौ कार्यजन्म सदा भवेत् ॥ ६९ ॥

Likewise, even if it be independent of potency, the same defect there would be. The effect would never arise, since always the cause is not, as cold (does not arise) in summer. Therefore these words (of yours) are not sound. If what has no cause is generated, then, there would be the generation of effect always.

If the effect is not dependent on the entire cause, then, it would never arise. Or, if it arises even without a cause, it would be there always.

NKL—tasmād ajñānam eva viṣayasaṃparka-kāraṇaṁ tac ca jñāna-mātro 'panodyam iti bhāvaḥ.

[70-71]

कार्यता वा कुतोऽस्य स्यान्न चेत्कारणतन्त्रता ।
न च शक्यं प्रतिज्ञातुं जन्माऽऽरभ्याऽऽमृतेर्नृभिः ॥ ७० ॥

निषिद्धकाम्यकर्मादिवर्जनं निपुणैरपि ।
सूक्ष्मापराधसंदृष्टेरतियत्नवतामपि ॥ ७१ ॥

And how could there be effectness for it, if it be not dependent on a cause? Even by the skilled men it is not possible to resolve to renounce prohibited and optional rites, etc., beginning from birth until death; for even in the case of the most diligent, subtle mistakes are seen.

If agency, etc., were independent, they would not be effects; if so, they would always be there.

The Mīmāṁsaka said that, in order to attain *mokṣa*, one must give up optional rites and prohibited actions. But, is it possible for anyone to do so throughout one's life from birth to death? Even the best of persons cannot conform to this rule.

NTV—asaty ātmavijñānena karmaghasmare sarvātmanā kāmya-pratiṣiddhāni na kenacit parihartum śakyante, rāga-dveṣa-lobhādināṁ doṣāṇām anivṛtteḥ.

[72]

संशयस्तु भवत्येव पक्षासिद्धिस्तु तावता ।
अथ चेन्मोक्ष्यते सोऽत्र यस्य संपत्स्यते तथा ॥ ७२ ॥

The doubt at least is there, and so your view is not established (*pakṣāsiddhi*).

'He, for whom this is realized in full, is released', if thus it be said (we reply):

At any rate, the doubt as to the possibility of acting according to the Mīmāṁsaka prescription is there. If it were a small matter, then even if there be doubt, one may act. But *mokṣa* is not a small matter; nor the prescription of the means. So, no one would undertake to follow the way shown by the Mīmāṁsaka.

The *pūrvapakṣin* still persists in saying: "He who acts according to my prescription does surely attain *mokṣa*."

[73]

त्वदुक्तं नैतदेवं स्यादवक्तव्यत्वहेतुतः ।
निश्चितं साधनं वाच्यं ज्ञानं निःश्रेयसं प्रति ॥ ७३ ॥

What is stated by you cannot be so, for the reason that it cannot be explained. In respect of release an ascertained means should be stated, viz. knowledge.

Siddhāntin's reply: A doubtful means is not adequate to establish its end. That which is doubtful cannot be determinate. If it were such operations as agriculture, etc., one may be active even though one may not be sure of the yield. Not so in the case of *mokṣa*. You profess to teach the means to *mokṣa*. But that means should be such that it has been ascertained to be the means.

[74]

न तु यादृच्छिकी सिद्धिर्वक्तव्येह विपश्चिता ।
दैवगोचर एवैष न तु मानुषगोचरः ॥ ७४ ॥

Not by the one who is wise will it be held that accomplishment is accidental. This is the sphere of destiny, and not the sphere of man.

No one who is intelligent would adopt a hit-or-miss method for achieving a goal. The hit-or-miss process is a gamble with destiny.

[75]

सहकर्त्री भवेच्छक्तिरिति न्यायाद्भवेद्यदि ।
मनुष्यगोचरोऽपीति नाऽऽख्यातासंभवात्तथा ॥ ७५ ॥

If it be stated that it also is the sphere of man on the rule that 'potency becomes helpful (to the verbs)', no, because there is no such verb.

Nor may it be said that this is within the sphere of man also (i.e. that human effort also is required) on the rule that potency or ability is helpful to injunction.

The rule is mentioned in the Mīmāṁsā works in connection with the topic of injunction of eligibility (*adhikāra-vidhi*). The rule runs thus: "For verbs, which express a meaning, power is an auxiliary." Here the meaning is: an injunction applies only to him who has the ability to perform the act enjoined. This is a commonsense rule. For instance, the Vedic injunctions, which require, on the part of the agent, the use of his eyes, tongue and ears, are not applicable to the blind, the dumb and the deaf.

This rule, says the *siddhāntin*, does not apply in the present case. Where there is an injunctive verb, there the ability of the agent is helpful. But nowhere in the Veda is there the injunction that he who desires *mokṣa* should give up optional rites, etc.

[For an explanation of the rule, see G. A. Jacob, *A Third Handful of Popular Maxims*, pp. 21-22; also *Arthasaṁgraha*, section on 'Adhikāra-vidhi', Śābara-bhāṣya on *PM*, I, iv, 30, and *Tantra-vārtika*, II, ii, 27. The present verse is quoted by Jacob as an illustration.]

[76]

मुक्त्यर्थीं न हि काम्यादि वर्जयेदिति चोदना ।
अस्ति वेदे क्वचिद्येन शक्तेर्विध्येकदेशता ॥ ७६ ॥

There is no injunction anywhere in the Veda that he who desires release should leave off optional rites, etc., in which case there would be for potency the nature of being part-content of the injunction.

What was stated above is explained. There is no Vedic injunction that he who desires *mokṣa* should leave off optional rites, etc.

[77]

काम्यादिवर्जनं त्वेतत्स्वमतिप्रभवं यतः ।
नातः शक्तेस्तदंशत्वं कथंचिदपि युज्यते ॥ ७७ ॥

Since the saying about the leaving off of optional rites, etc., has its source in your imagination, it is not proper to say that for potency there is the nature of being part thereof (i.e. of the injunction).

Nor may the following statement be quoted by the *pūrvapakṣin*:

"Let the one who desires *mokṣa* turn away from optional rites and prohibited actions; let him perform the obligatory and occasioned rites in order to avoid sin."*

**mokṣārthī na pravarteta tatra kāmya-niṣiddhayoḥ nitya-naimittike kuryāt pratyavāya-jihāsayā.*

This statement is not supported by Scripture.

If the view of the *pūrvapakṣin* is born out of his own brain, it carries no authority for us.

[78]

नित्यादिकरणान्नापि काम्यादेश्चापि वर्जनात् ।
श्रेयः संभाव्यते विद्यानिष्फलत्वप्रसङ्गतः ॥ ७८ ॥

Not from the performance of obligatory rites, nor from leaving off optional rites, is release (*śreyas*) possible; since there is the contingence of the futility of knowledge (*vidyā*).

The *pūrvapakṣin* may say: "I have already quoted a *smṛti* passage in support of my view; and we have to presume a *śruti* text as the basis of the *smṛti* passage."*

The *siddhāntin* replies: "What you say is not sound. The *śruti* expressly declares that *mokṣa* is through *jñāna*. With that declaration your view is in conflict."

NKL—kāmyādi-varjanam abhyupagamya na tataḥ kaivalya-siddhir ity āha nityād iti.

[79]

काम्यात्स्वर्गादिकं मा भूदक्रियायां तदुद्भवम् ।
अर्थान्तरात्स्वभावाद्वा भवन्न तु निवार्यते ॥ ७९ ॥

From the optional rites let there not be heaven, etc., and from prohibited rites what is generated thereby (viz., hell). But nothing could prevent their coming into being either through some other means or of their own accord.

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* *ācārāc ca smṛtiṁ jñātvā smṛteś ca śruti-kalpanam iti nyāyāt.*

Let there be, somehow, the giving up of optional rites, etc. Even then that cannot serve as the means to *mokṣa*.

Heaven, etc., and the body that is adequate for their enjoyment may not come to one, because one has given up the optional rites. Similarly, hell and the body appropriate to it may not result to one, because one has not done the prohibited deeds.

Even, then, there is no *mokṣa*. For, heaven, etc., may come to one through some other means.

[80]

अन्यतो भवने मानं न चेदस्त्विह संशयः ।
एतावताऽपि पक्षस्ते प्रतिबद्धो न सिध्यति ॥ ८० ॥

If it be said that there is no evidence in the matter of their resulting from other causes, (we reply) there may be doubt in regard thereto. And so your view is not established, it being obstructed.

Pūrvapakṣin—To one who has followed the way I have shown, there is no evidence that heaven, etc., come through some other means.

Siddhāntin—Even granting that there is no evidence, the possibility that they may come is still there.

[81]

अथैतयोरिति तथा चोदनार्थातिलङ्घिनाम् ।
सुखदुःखादिसंदृष्टेर्न चाप्यस्तीह संशयः ॥ ८१ ॥

Since those who transgress the sense of injunction are declared to be related to pleasure and pain in the

words "But on neither of these ways"[1], etc., there is not the said doubt here.

There is no doubt, whatsoever, that those who follow the way of works have to be re-born. Scripture speaks of three alternatives. Those who perform ritual go by the Southern Path. Those who combine ritual with knowledge go by the Northern Path. A third place—the status of low creatures—is indicated for those who transgress injunctions and prohibitions.

[1]*CHU*, V, x, 8: "But on neither of these ways are the small, constantly revolving creatures, (of whom it is said:) 'Take birth, die'—theirs is a third state."

NTV—smṛtir api viruddha-phalena karmaṇā pratibaddhasya karmāntarasya ciram apy avasthānaṁ darśayati—kadācit sukṛtaṁ karma kūṭastham iva tiṣṭhati, majjamānasya saṁsāre yāvad duḥkhād vimucyate.

[82]

नित्यस्याकरणे दोषस्तात्क्रियायां न यद्यपि ।
अन्यतोऽसौ स्वभावाद्वा न तु मानेन वार्यते ॥ ८२ ॥

Even though there be defect if there is non-performance of obligatory rites and no defect if there is performance thereof, there is no evidence to prevent the same resulting otherwise or by its own nature.

In this birth one may perform obligatory rites and thus avoid demerit. But still, there may be demerit or defect due to the non-performance of obligatory rites in a former birth. Or, the demerit may result from some other cause; or, it may appear of its own accord.

[83]

नित्यादेः फलमिष्टं चेदुपात्तदुरितक्षयः ।

तथाऽप्यागामिदोषेष्वाशङ्का पूर्ववदुद्भवेत् ॥ ८३ ॥

If it is admitted that the fruit of obligatory rites is the destruction of accumulated sin, even then the doubt would arise, as before, in regard to defects that are to come.

Even if the present performance of obligatory rites destroys the previously accumulated demerit, what can prevent the demerit that may accrue in the future as a result of the neglect of obligations? Since that danger is there, the doubt regarding re-embodiment still persists.

[84]

अनभीष्टफलानां च दुरितत्वात्क्षयो भवेत् ।

नत्वाभ्युदयिकानां स्यादभीष्टत्वात्क्षयस्तव ॥ ८४ ॥

Though fruits which are not desired may perish because they are of the nature of sin, the destruction of those which lead to prosperity is not for you, since they are desired by you.

Granting that the performance of obligatory duties destroys demerit or sin, what about the merit that has not yet been enjoyed or is yet to come? Since merit is desired, and is not opposed to the performance of obligatory rites, the latter cannot destroy it. So, for the sake of enjoying merit, one may have to be re-born.

[85]

सर्वेषां दुष्टता चेत्स्यान्न विधानाददुष्टता ।

नापि श्येनादितुल्यत्वं फलदोषेण दुष्टता ॥ ८५ ॥

If there is defectiveness for all, no; what is enjoined cannot be defective. Nor is there parity with

the Hawk sacrifice, etc.; for it is defective because of the defect of the fruit.

It cannot be argued that merit *(dharma)* is a defect even as demerit *(adharma)* is a defect. For, merit is enjoined, and what is enjoined cannot be a defect. Here, the *Śyena* sacrifice is no example. The *Śyena* is defective because its fruit is defective. There is no *adhikārī* for it; and it is not enjoined at all. Not so the *Soma* sacrifice which is enjoined, and which yields merit.

NKL—vimatam aduṣṭam, vihitatvāt, agnihotravat.

[86]

ऐकात्म्यज्ञानतश्चेत्स्याव्यर्था कर्मप्रधानता ।
प्रधानत्वं च विद्यायास्तमेतमिति दर्शितम् ॥ ८६ ॥

If (release be) through the knowledge of the one self, futile is action as the principal. That knowledge is the principal is shown in the text 'Such a one (the Brahmins desire to know)' [1]

If it be admitted that release is attained when all actions are destroyed by the knowledge of identity with pure consciousness which is the self, then action cannot be the direct means. And, Scripture expressly declares that knowledge is the direct means.

1. *BU*, IV, iv, 22.

NKL—karmaṇāṁ sākṣān-mokṣa-hetutvam pramāṇa-prayojana-vikalam iti dūṣayati-vyarthe 'ti...karmaṇāṁ jñānecchā-sādhanatva-pradarśita-dvārā jñānasya sākṣān-mokṣa-hetutvaṁ darśitam ity arthaḥ.

NTV—evaṁ sati karmaṇāṁ kaivalya-sādhanatvaṁ niṣpramāṇakam ity arthaḥ. kiṁca mukti-phala-jñānecchā-sādhanatvena karmaṇāṁ viniyogāt, jñānasyaiva kaivalya-sādhanatvaṁ sapramāṇakam ity āha-pradhānatvaṁ ce' ti.

[87]

तत उक्तेन मार्गेण कर्तृसंस्कारकारिणाम् ।
ऐकात्म्यज्ञानतात्पर्यं कर्मणामिति निश्चितम् ॥ ८७ ॥

In the manner stated it has been settled that the rites which purify the agent have for purport the knowledge of the one self.

Actions purify the agent and culminate in knowledge; and knowledge is the means to *mokṣa*.

NKL—karmaṇā śuddha-buddher viraktasya jñānecchā syād ity arthaḥ.

[88]

तेन निःसारतां बुद्ध्वा कर्मणां वेदतत्त्ववित् ।
ऐकात्म्यज्ञानमन्वेति तपोमुषितकल्मषः ॥ ८८ ॥

Therefore, he who knows the truth of the Veda will realize the futility of rites, and seek the knowledge of the one self, being rid of blemishes through austerity.

He, whose mind has been purified by the performance of obligatory duties (*nityakarma*), learns in general the teaching of the Veda, realizes that no lasting fruit can result from deeds, becomes unattached to work, renounces and enters upon the path of inquiry with a view to gaining knowledge.

[89]

यस्तु जन्मान्तराभ्यासात्क्षपिताशेषकामनः ।
आदावेवाधिकारी स पुनः कर्म न वीक्षते ॥ ८९ ॥

He, who, through practice in a previous birth is free from desires without a residue, is an eligible person

even at the beginning (i.e. while in the first *āśrama*). He does not stand in need of action again.

In certain cases the requirement of mental purification through obligatory duties might have been fulfilled in the previous birth itself. Where this is so, there is no need for fresh actions. Such persons are eligible for renunciation and knowledge even in the first *āśrama*.

NKL—ajñāna-nivṛtter jñāna-mātra-phalatvād ity arthaḥ.

[90]

विरक्तस्य तु जिज्ञासोर्मानान्नान्यव्यपेक्षणम् ।
कर्मापेक्षा हि साध्येऽर्थे सिद्धेऽर्थे तदनर्थकम् ॥ ९० ॥

For him who is dispassionate and who desires knowledge there is no need of anything other than knowledge. Action is required in respect of what is to be accomplished. In respect of the established it is of no use.

For accomplishing what is to be accomplished action is required, but not for realizing what is eternally established. For the latter, only knowledge is necessary. Knowledge does not stand in need of *karma*. It is not like the *Āgneya* which requires the aid of the *Prayājas*.

[91]

वामदेवस्य मैत्रेय्या गार्ग्याश्चैव समञ्जसम् ।
दर्शनं ब्रह्मचर्यादेस्तथा प्राव्राज्यशासनात् ॥ ९१ ॥

This is clearly seen in the cases of Vāmadeva, Maitreyī and Gārgī.[1] Renunciation even at the stage of a student's life is declared in Scripture.[2]

As sprinkling helps in the case of the *Darśapūrṇamāsa* by purifying the material sprinkled upon, so here *karma* helps in the rise of *jñāna* by purifying the mind. *Karma* is not the direct and independent means to *mokṣa*.

1. In these cases there is *jñāna* even without the performance of Vedic rites.

2. *Jābāla*, 4.

NKL— janmāntarā-'nuṣṭhita-karmaṇāṁ śuddhi-dvāreṇa jñāna-hetutva-liṅgam āha-vāmadeve 'ti.

NTV—tasmāt kevala-jñānād eva sañcitā- 'śeṣa-puṇyā-'puṇya-nivṛttiḥ na karmaṇa iti. janmāntara-kṛtena karmaṇā śuddha-sattvasya sa-sannyāsa-jñānam eva mokṣa-sādhanam ity atra liṅga-darśanaṁ śrutiṁ cā 'ha.

[92]

इष्टापूर्तादिहेतूनामानन्त्यात्स्वर्गसिद्धये ।
हेत्वन्तरासंभवोऽतो दुर्ज्ञानः संभवाद्भवेत् ॥ ९२ ॥

Since causes like sacrifice and good works (*iṣṭāpūrta*), etc., are innumerable, the impossibility of other causes for attaining heaven is difficult to know. As they are possible, it may quite well be.

The *pūrvapakṣin* believes that if one abstains from optional rites in this birth and performs the obligatory duties, one will attain release. But as against him, it is pointed out that even if one succeeds in keeping away from optional rites in this birth, the enjoyment of heaven may come to him when his present body falls, as a result of good deeds performed in previous births.

Iṣṭa means scripture-ordained deeds (*śrauta-karma*); *pūrta* means works taught in the *smṛtis* (*smārta-karma*).

NKL—agnihotrādikam iṣṭaṁ vāpy-ādikaṁ pūrtaṁ śaraṇāgata-paripālanādi dattam.

[93]

एवं निषिद्धवाक्येषु यथोक्तं न्यायमादिशेत् ।
नित्यकर्मवचःस्वेवं नातो मुक्तिविनिश्चयः ॥ ९३ ॥

Thus in the case of prohibitory texts, the aforesaid rule must be applied; thus also in the case of texts enjoining obligatory rites. Hence there is no certainty of release.

The argument advanced above in regard to optional rites applies also to prohibited deeds. The same consideration holds good in the case of the obligatory and occasioned rites.

[94]

अनेकजन्मोपात्तस्य पुण्यापुण्यस्य कर्मणः ।
अनन्तदेहहेतोश्च विप्रघातस्य संभवात् ॥ ९४ ॥

For, there are merit and demerit of deeds like brahmanicide gathered in several births which are productive of innumerable bodies.

It cannot be said that the present birth is enough to experience the sum-total of merit and demerit acquired in all the previous births. For, we hear that to suffer for a single sin like brahmanicide one may have to take on a series of bodies.

[95]

ततः शेषेण वचनात्तथा तद्य इहेत्यतः ।
अनारब्धफलेहानां गम्यते संस्थितिस्ततः ॥ ९५ ॥

The existence of the fruit of works which have not begun to take effect is made known in texts like 'Hence by the residue (of the fruit of deeds)'[1], and 'Accordingly, those who are (of pleasant conduct) here'[2], etc.

Scripture and Traditional Code are cited here to show that there is unspent *karma* which is the cause of future births.

1. *Gautama-dharma-sūtra*, x, 31.
2. *CHU*, V, x, 7.

[96]

फलं नित्यस्य नापीह दुरितक्षयमात्रकम् ।
फलान्तरश्रुतेः साक्षात्तद्यथाऽऽम्रस्मृतेस्तथा ॥ ९६ ॥

The fruit of obligatory rites is not merely destruction of sin, because other fruit (also) is declared in Scripture directly,[1] as in the Traditional Code 'When mango (is planted)'.[2]

It was stated by the *pūrvapakṣin* that in the case of the obligatory rites their non-performance leads to demerit whereas their performance brings in no result. The latter part of this belief is refuted here. Scripture and Traditional Code expressly declare that merit is the fruit of the obligatory rites. So, whether the obligatory rites are performed or not performed, there is *saṁsāra*.

1. *BU*, I, v, 16.
2. *Āpastaṁba-dharma-sūtra*, I, xx, 3.

[97]

आम्रे निमित्त इत्यादि ह्यापस्तम्बस्मृतेर्वचः ।
फलवत्त्वं समाचष्टे नित्यानामपि कर्मणाम् ॥ ९७ ॥

The words of the *Āpastaṁba-dharma-sūtra* 'When mango is planted', etc. declare fruitfulness of even obligatory rites.

The passage from the *Āpastaṁba-dharma-sūtra* is explained.

[98]

उक्तमेव तु संशीताविदं त्वत्र विनिश्चितिः ।
कार्यमारभते शक्तिर्यत्किंचेह व्यवस्थिता ॥ ९८ ॥

As regards the doubt (*vide* v. 80), its resolution has already been stated. Potency, as long as it lasts, will be productive of effect.

As regards the doubt expressed by the *pūrvapakṣin* in v. 80, viz. that *mokṣa* may result if one follows the course prescribed by him, as there is no evidence that heaven, etc., would come through some other means, in the case of such a person, the reply has already been given (*vide* v. 81).

It has also been stated that as long as there is potency there is the possibility of its fructifying.

[99]

यस्मादसति कार्येऽसौ शक्तिरेव न सिध्यति ।
कार्यकारणयोः सिद्धिरन्योन्याव्यतिरेकतः ॥ ९९ ॥

For, if the effect be absent, the potency itself will not be established. The establishment of cause and effect is reciprocal.

It cannot be argued that, though there is potency in the state of release, it does not fructify; for if there is potency it must express itself. Cause and effect are reciprocally related. The establishment of one depends on that of the other.

[100]

कर्तृभोक्तृस्वरूपेऽतो ह्यभ्युपेतेऽन्तरात्मनि ।
न मुक्त्याशाऽस्ति पूर्वोक्तन्यायमार्गसमाश्रयात् ॥ १०० ॥

Hence, if the inner self be admitted to be of the nature of agent and enjoyer, there is no hope of release

(as has been shown) through having recourse to the arguments set forth above.

Hence if the soul has the potency of agency and enjoyership, there can be no release for it. This has already been stated (*vide* v. 55 ff.).

NKL– ataḥ śakti-pakṣe mokṣāsiddhiḥ.

[101]

सापराधत्वतो मुक्तिः संदिग्धैव प्रसज्यते ।
द्विजातीनां खरादेस्तु त्वदुक्त्या स्यादसंशयात् ॥ १०१ ॥

Since there is the possibility of transgression, there arises doubt in respect of release for the twice-born; and by what you have stated there would be release, without doubt, for the donkey, etc.

Even though a person belonging to the twice-born class follows assiduously the course of discipline prescribed by the Mīmāṁsaka, one cannot be sure that he has not transgressed. Without his knowing, he may overlook an injunction or perform a prohibited deed, with the result that when the present body falls he will have to take on another body. So, there will be no release for him.

If it is contended that the effects of all the previous actions can be reaped in the present birth, then release must be admitted even for the donkey, etc., when their present bodies are destroyed.

NKL—itthaṁ darśanam eva kaivalya-sādhanam iti sādhana-bheda-siddhāv adhikāri-bheda-siddhaḥ.

[102]

ननूक्तं कर्मशेषत्वमात्मनो यागकर्तृता ।
नैतदेवं यतो नैतत्कर्माङ्गं ज्ञानमिष्यते ॥ १०२ ॥

"Now, it was said (in verse 45) that knowledge is subsidiary to action and that the self is the agent of

sacrifices ". This is not so ; for, this kind of knowledge which is subsidiary to action is not what is accepted.

The *pūrvapakṣin* stated in v. 45 that since the self is subsidiary to action, the knowledge of that is subsidiary to action.

With reference to that, the *siddhāntin* says here that the knowledge of the self as the agent of sacrifices, etc. is not what is meant by self-knowledge. The knowledge of the empirical self may be useful to action. But that is not knowledge of the true self.

[103]

कर्तृत्वमात्मनः सिद्धं यतोऽन्यत्रापि यागतः ।
निःशेषकर्मकारित्वात्तस्मादुक्तमपेशलम् ॥ १०३ ॥

Even elsewhere, apart from sacrifices agency is established for the self, since it is the agent of all actions. Hence what you have said is unsound.

The knowledge of the empirical self cannot properly be said to be subsidiary (*aṅga*) to ritual action ; for that kind of knowledge, we find, is related to secular action also. And, a subsidiary is that which helps the principal, while being unique to it.

[104]

न ह्यात्मज्ञानविरहात्कर्म कर्तुं न शक्यते ।
पर्णज्ञानमृते यद्वज्जुहूर्लातुं न शक्यते ॥ १०४ ॥

It cannot be said that in the absence of a knowledge of the self it is not possible to perform ritual, even as, without the knowledge of the *parṇa*-wood, it is not possible to fetch the sacrificial ladle.

It cannot be said that in the absence of self-knowledge it is not possible to perform action, as without the knowledge of the *parṇa*-wood it is not possible to employ the sacrificial ladle. For, true

self-knowledge is inimical to the performance of any action. The self is transcendent of all that is empirical; it is beyond hunger, etc.; it has no use for caste-distinctions such as Brahmin, Kṣattriya, etc.; it is not subject to transmigration; it is known through the Vedānta.

[105]

देहान्तराभिसंबन्धी नत्वात्माऽस्तीत्यजानतः ।
विवेकिनो न युक्तेयं प्रवृत्तिः पारलौकिकी ॥ १०५ ॥

Nor may it be said that an intelligent man will not be active in respect of the other world if he does not know that there is the self related to another (divine) body.

It may be said that in order to perform sacrifices, etc., one must know that it is the same self that will go to heaven after death. In other words, the sacrificer must be able to distinguish the self from the present body, etc.

This is replied to in the next verse.

[106]

एवं तर्हि न कर्माङ्गं कर्तुश्चेष्टैकहेतुतः ।
फलार्थिवन्न च ज्ञानं क्रियाङ्गत्वेन चोदितम् ॥ १०६ ॥

Even thus (the knowledge of the self) is not subsidiary to action; since the agent alone is the instrument to the desired, like the one who desires the fruit. Knowledge is not enjoined as subsidiary to action.

Now, it has been said that the self as distinct from the body should be known in order to perform ritual action. What kind of self is intended here? Is it the self as agent, or as non-agent? The

knowledge of the self as agent is common to all action—sacred and secular. And so, it cannot be the subsidiary of sacred action. As an example, we may cite the knowledge of the self as enjoyer which is required for all action. As for the knowledge of self as non-agent, it is not at all required for action. On the contrary, it is destructive of all action.

[107]

नन्वेवमपि सिद्धः स्यात्प्रवेशः सर्वकर्मसु ।
आत्मज्ञानस्य सामर्थ्यान्न नाम विधिसंश्रयात् ॥ १०७ ॥

"Now, even so, it would be established that knowledge of self enters into every act, because of competence, though not as dependent on an injunction."

The *pūrvapakṣin* says, here, that in the absence of a self distinct from the present body, all acts relating to the other world would be unintelligible. Knowledge of such a self, then, is subsidiary to action, even though it may not be so as dependent on injunction.

[108]

नैतदेवमविज्ञाततत्त्वस्यैवेह कर्मसु ।
अनात्मार्थविशिष्टस्य ह्यधिकारित्वहेतुतः ॥ १०८ ॥

It is not so; because eligibility here in respect of rites is for him who has not known the truth and who is qualified by the sense of not-self.

Siddhānta—You seek to establish the subsidiariness of self-knowledge to action through presumption (*arthāpatti*). Now, what is the kind of self that you are thinking of? Is it the qualified self (*viśiṣṭa*)? Or, the pure self (*kevala*)? The qualified self is an illusory one (*kalpita*). The knowledge of that may be subsidiary to action. Thereby, true self-knowledge does not become subsidiary. Knowledge of the

pure self which is true self-knowledge is what is opposed to action. It is only he that is endowed with ignorance (*ajñāna*) that is eligible for action. Self-knowledge is what liberates one from ignorance.

NTV—brāhmaṇyādy-anātma-viśiṣṭasyaivā-'tmano 'dhikāra-hetutvāt taj-jñānasyaiva karmasu praveśaḥ, natv-apeta-brahma-kṣatrādi-bhedā-'saṁsāry-ātmatattva-jñānasyā-'nupayogāt, virodhāc ca.....anātmārtha-brāhmaṇyādi-vaiśiṣṭyam adhyāsa iti, tat-kāraṇam ajñānam evā 'nvaya-vyatirekābhyām.

NKL—brāhmaṇo gṛhastha iti brāhmaṇatva-gṛhasthatvādi-dharma-viśiṣṭa-dehātmābhimānino 'dhikārāt ity arthaḥ.

[109]

स्वरूप आत्मनः स्थानमाहुर्निःश्रेयसं बुधाः ।
ततोऽन्येनाभिसंबन्ध आत्मनोऽज्ञानहेतुकः ॥ १०९ ॥

The abidance of the self in its nature, the wise say, is beatitude. The relation of the self with what is different from that is the result of ignorance.

What is release? It is the abidance of the self in itself. And, that results to one for whom ignorance has been removed through knowledge. Since knowledge is the means to *mokṣa* it cannot be subsidiary to action. The relation of the self to the not-self is caused by nescience. Of the pure self which is unattached, that relation is not possible.

NTV—jāti-vyaktyādi-bhāvābhāvāt ajñāna-hetukam eva tādātmyam.

NKL—svātmāvasthāna-kaivalyasya svābhivakatvād anya-saṁsarga-rūpam asvāsthyam ajñāna-kṛtam ity arthaḥ

[110]

आगन्त्वनात्मरूपं तत्स्वसंवित्त्यैव गम्यताम् ।
नातोऽवाप्तपुमर्थस्य स्वरूपावस्थितस्य तु ॥ ११० ॥

The adventitious nature of not-self is made known by the self-same intelligence. Not therefore is there (for the ignorant) the attainment of the human goal which is being-in-the-self.

Moreover, we offer the following inference: The not-self has nescience for its basis, because it is an effect, like the serpent. Likewise is the relation thereto.

And, the nature of not-self is known by the witness-self. Without the relation of the self to it, this is not possible. Both the not-self and the relation thereto have nescience as their ground.

NTV—yat svasaṁvityaiva gamyatām ahaṁ-rūpaṁ tad anātmā ghaṭavat.....ahaṁ-rūpam anātmā suṣuptāv ahaṁkārābhāvāt.

[111-113]

कर्तृभोक्त्रादिरूपत्वं प्रत्यगज्ञानतोऽन्यतः ।
कर्म तत्फलभोगश्च बाह्यानि करणानि च ॥ १११ ॥

ततोऽपि बाह्यो देहश्च जातिस्तत्समवायिनी ।
जरामरणजन्मानि देहाधिकरणानि च ॥ ११२ ॥

दारपुत्रधनादीनि देहबाह्यानि यानि च ।
कर्माधिकारहेतूनि स्वतोऽस्यानधिकारिणः ॥ ११३ ॥

The nature of the agency, enjoyership, etc., is on account of the nescience of the inner self; not otherwise. Also, action, enjoyment of its fruit, and outer sense-organs; thence also the physical body and the caste inherent therein, old age, death and birth which are located in the body; and wife, son, wealth,

etc., which are external to the body and which serve to make the self eligible for action, though by itself it is not eligible.

Agency, enjoyership, etc., are caused by nescience. Similarly the other factors that make for finitude: mind, sense-organs, physical body with its attributes, and what are related to it, like son, wealth, etc. It is as endowed with these that one becomes eligible for action. The pure self which is unattached, unchanging, and unconditioned, is not eligible for action.

NKL—kartṛtvādir nātmadharmo dṛśyatvād rūpavad iti tu-śabdārthaḥ.

[114-116 a]

अभिन्नस्याऽऽत्मनो मोहाद्भेदकानीति मन्वते ।
विशेषणं स्वरूपं वा नान्योन्यस्य स्वतो यतः ॥ ११४ ॥

लोके दृष्टं विनाऽविद्यां मोहाद्दृष्टं तु सर्वतः ।
चोरोऽसौ मामभिप्रैतीत्येवं चोरविशेषणम् ॥ ११५ ॥

स्थाणुं संभावयत्यज्ञो न तु दृष्टं तमो विना ।

These, it is thought, are what bring about differentiation for the self which is undifferentiated. One being either the attribute (*viśeṣaṇa*) or the nature (*svarūpa*) of another is not out of itself. Without nescience it is not seen in the world. It is everywhere seen due to delusion (*moha*). It is the ignorant man that superimposes the attribute of being a thief on a post thus, 'This thief comes against me'. Without darkness this is not seen.

The attribute or the nature of a thing is not, of its own accord, seen in another thing. This happens only on account of delusion

(*moha*). Agency, etc., are not the attributes of the self; nor do they constitute its nature. So, it is ignorance or nescience that is responsible for making these appear in the self.

An illustration is given. One mistakes a post for a thief in the dark. This is clearly a case of delusion.

NTV—kartṛtvādy-ātma-viśeṣaṇam ajñāna-kṛtam eva.

NKL—sarvataḥ sarvatra dehādi-kalpitam anyātmanā bhāsamānatvād anyasya viśeṣaṇatvāc ca rajju-sarpādivat ity arthaḥ.

[116 b-117 a]

नन्वविद्यामृतेऽप्यन्यद्दृष्टमन्यविशेषणम् ॥ ११६ ॥

औपगवो नृपहयस्तथा श्येनचिदादयः ।

"Now, even without nescience, one is seen to be the attribute of another; as for instance, *Aupagava* (son of Upagu), *nṛpahaya* (the king's horse) and *Śyenacit* (he who performs the hawk-sacrifice), etc."

Pūrvapakṣa — Even in the absence of delusion, there may be transference of attributes. Examples:— (1) *Aupagava* means 'son of Upagu'. Here Upagu is the attribute of son. (2) *Nṛpahaya* means 'the king's horse'. Here king is a qualification of horse. (3) *Śyenacit* means 'he who performs the hawk-sacrifice'. Here hawk-sacrifice stands in adjectival relation to the person who performs it. In each of these cases there is the relation of qualification and qualified, without nescience.

[117 b-118 a]

नैतदेवं यतस्तत्र नैवं प्रत्यक्षयेष्यते ॥ ११७ ॥

अन्येनान्यस्य संबन्धः कृशोऽहमितिवत्क्वचित् ।

It is not so; for in those cases there is not the relation of identity between the two (the qualification and the qualified) as in 'I am lean'.

Siddhānta — The examples you have given have no parity with the cases of delusion we mentioned. When a person says, 'I am lean', he does not see any difference between himself and the lean body. Here, the qualification is not distinguished from the qualified. Not so in the case of *Aupagava*, etc. Upagu and his son are, certainly, not identified; only their relation is indicated.

[118 b-119 a]

उपग्वादिर्हि पित्रादिः प्रकृत्यर्थो विशेषणम् ॥ ११८ ॥
भिन्नस्यौपगवापत्यप्रत्ययार्थस्य गम्यते ।

The sense of the stem *Upagu*, namely, father, etc., is the qualification of the sense of the suffix, which is different in *Aupagava*, namely, son.

In the instances of *Aupagava*, etc., the difference between the qualification and the qualified is evident; and so, they are not on a par with the delusions, 'I am lean', etc. The *pūrvapakṣin* cannot argue thus: What is in dispute, viz., the relation of the qualification and the qualified is caused by the non-apprehension of difference, because it is a relation of the qualification and the qualified, as, for instance, in 'I am lean'.

[119 b-120 a]

नैवं कर्त्रादिदेहान्ताज्ञात्यादीन्देहगांस्तथा ॥ ११९ ॥
व्यतिरेकतया कश्चिद्विशिनष्टीह मानवः ।

Not so does man here[1] think (of himself) as different from the qualifications beginning with egoity and ending with the body and likewise from the caste, etc., inherent in the body.

Just as Upagu differentiates himself from his son, the individual does not distinguish himself (i.e. the self) from egoity, etc.

1. *Here* means 'in the state of ignorance'.

[120 b-121 a]

यत आत्मतयैवैतैर्विशिनष्ट्यविशेषणम् ॥ १२० ॥

करोम्यन्धो द्विजो बालो दग्धश्छिन्नोऽहमित्यपि ।

For, man thinks of these as the self, as non-different therefrom. Thus he says, 'I do', 'I am blind', 'I am a twice-born', 'I am a child', 'I am burnt', 'I am cut', etc.

That the difference between the self and its adjuncts is not grasped by the individual is evident from his experience such as 'I do this action', 'I am blind', etc.

[121b-122 a]

नाविद्यामन्तरेणैषां विशेषणविशेष्यता ॥ १२१ ॥

इयमेवाऽऽत्मनो ज्ञेया कर्माधिकृतिकारणम् ।

This relation of qualification and qualified is not possible without nescience. This alone is to be known as the cause of making the self eligible for rites.

The relation between the self and egoity, etc., is due to nescience, even as the relation between the post and man in the delusion 'This is a thief'. (See vv. 114-116a.)

It is the self that is identified with the adjuncts like egoity that is eligible for performing rites.

NTV—avidyā-kṛta-viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyataiva karmādhikṛti-kāraṇam... evaṁ kartṛtvādeḥ avidyādhyastatva-prasādhanena ajasyaiva karmādhikāraḥ prasādhitaḥ

[122 b-123 a]

अधिक्रियन्ते येनैते बृहस्पतिसवादिषु ॥ १२२ ॥

अतोऽनवगतैकात्म्यकर्माधिकृतिहेतुतः ।

It is for the reason that ignorance of the one self makes one eligible to (perform) rites that eligibility is prescribed for *Bṛhaspatisava*, etc.

That it is only the ignorant man that is eligible for rites is further shown. In the text 'A Brāhmaṇa is to sacrifice with the *Bṛhaspati-sava*', it is seen that the person who is eligible for this sacrifice is one who has conceit in a particular caste. This is so with all sacrifices. Otherwise, all persons would be eligible to perform all sacrifices. Without conceit (*abhimāna*) of some sort or other, the performance of sacrifice is not possible. And, conceit is born of nescience. Therefore, it is only the ignorant person that is eligible for rites. A knowledge of the nature of such a person, viz. the empirical soul, may be auxiliary to ritual, but not the knowledge of the pure self.

NKL—ajñasya karmādhikāratve jñānasya tadviparītādhikāritvam, ato na karmāṅgatā.

[123 b-124 a]

श्रुत्यादिमानप्रमितप्रत्यग्याथात्म्यनिष्ठितम् ॥ १२३ ॥

सर्वकर्मसमुच्छेदि ज्ञानं वेदान्तमानजम् ।

The knowledge, which has for content the real nature of the inner self made known by the means of valid knowledge, like Scripture, etc.[1], and which removes entirely all action (with its fruit) arises from the testimony of Vedānta.

The knowledge of the pure self which is obtained from the Vedānta cannot be an auxiliary to *karma*, because it is destructive of all *karma*. There are texts in support of this view. The *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* (II, ii, 8) declares: 'The knot of the heart is cut, all doubts are dispelled, and his deeds perish, when the higher and the lower

Brahman has been realized.' And, the *Bhagavad-gītā* (iv, 37) : 'The fire of knowledge reduces all deeds to ashes.'

1. *Et cetera* may mean Traditional Code, Epics, Purāṇas, the experience of the wise, inference, etc. Or, if *śruti* is taken to mean the first of the six *pramāṇas* (modes-of-evidence for determining the purport of a scriptural passage), viz. express statement, then *et cetera* would stand for *liṅga* (capacity), *vākya* (syntactical connection), *prakaraṇa* (context), *sthāna* (position), and *sāmākhyā* (name). *

[124 b-125]

तन्मूलाज्ञानघातित्वाज्ज्ञानस्येह प्रसिद्धितः ॥ १२४ ॥

न तु प्रवर्तकं तस्मान्नार्थवादत्वसंभवः ।

फलोक्तेः पर्णमय्यां तु युज्यते कर्मशेषतः ॥ १२५ ॥

Knowledge is well known as the remover of ignorance which is the root cause of that (viz. action). It is not what prompts one to activity. Hence, the declaration of fruit in respect thereof cannot be an eulogy. As for the (ladle) made of *parṇa*-wood, eulogistic character (of the text) is intelligible, because it is an auxiliary to rite. (See vv. 44 and 45.)

It cannot be maintained that knowledge removes nescience alone, and not *karma* ; for nescience is the cause of the conceit of agency, etc., which are responsible for *karma*, and with the destruction of the cause the effects also get destroyed. That knowledge destroys ignorance is evident, even as the fact that light dispels darkness. So, the knowledge of the pure self which is destructive of the cause of all activity cannot be an auxiliary to *karma*. Because it is not auxiliary, the texts that proclaim its fruit cannot be of the nature

* See *Mīmāṁsā-nyāya-prakāśa*, para 67 ff. translated by Franklin Edgerton (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1929).

of *artha-vāda*. The case of the ladle made of *parṇa*-wood is quite different. Here a separate statement of fruit is an eulogy because the wood is an auxiliary of the sacrifice and whatever is the fruit of the sacrifice is the fruit of the wood also.

NKL—yato jñānam ajñānasyaiva nivartakam ity uktatvān na karma-nivartakatvam.....tattva-jñānam ajñāna-nivartakam iti śukti-jñānādau dṛṣṭatvāt.

[126]

यत्त्वचोदि त्वयाऽपीयमभ्युपेयाऽर्थवादता ।
अनिच्छताऽपि विध्यर्थमत्र प्रतिविधीयते ॥ १२६ ॥

What you asked me to admit even without my willingness to admit, that knowledge is the content of an injunction, being eulogistic in character—to that we shall reply here. (See v. 45.)

What has already been refuted is being further refuted. Knowledge is not the content of an injunction.

[127]

इच्छाम्येवार्थवादत्वं वचसोऽन्यपरत्वतः ।
यथाश्रुतार्थवादित्वान्न त्वभूतार्थवादता ॥ १२७ ॥

I even admit that the text declaring fruit is an eulogy, since the words are dependent on another (i.e. the major text). But as it is an eulogy in accordance with what is declared in Scripture, it is not an eulogy of what is non-existent.

We may even admit that the declaration of the fruit of knowledge is an *artha-vāda*, because such declaration is an auxiliary of the major texts like 'that thou art'. But it is certainly not a case of *abhūtārtha-vāda*.

[128]

इज्येते स्वर्गलोकाय दर्शादर्शौ यथा तथा ।
न त्वभूतार्थवादित्वं पापश्लोकाश्रुतेर्यथा ॥ १२८ ॥

'For the sake of attaining the heavenly world, the New Moon and Full Moon rites are performed.' As in this text, so in that also. There is no eulogy of what is non-existent, as in the text 'He who has a ladle of *parṇa*-wood hears no evil sound.'

The text 'The knower of Brahman becomes Brahman' is a *bhūtārtha-vāda* like the text relating to the New Moon and Full Moon rites; it is not *abhūtārtha-vāda* like the text which declares the fruit of the ladle made of *parṇa*-wood.

[129]

कुतः प्राप्तं फलमिति प्रत्यक्षं ह्यात्मधीफलम् ।
यतोऽवगम्यते तेन ज्ञानं कर्म न ढौकते ॥ १२९ ॥

'How is it obtained that it is the fruit?' Indeed, the fruit of self-knowledge is immediate. Since this is seen to be so, knowledge does not touch action.

That the fruit of the knowledge of Brahman is the attainment of Brahman is known from the direct experience of the wise. Therefore, knowledge cannot be an auxiliary of *karma*.

NKL—jñānasya kartṛtvādi-nivartakatvān na karmāṅgatvam.

[130]

प्रवृत्तेः प्रतिकूलत्वान्मुक्तिं प्रति विरोधतः ।
मुमुक्षोरधिकारोऽतो निवृत्तौ सर्वकर्मणाम् ॥ १३० ॥

Because activity is an obstacle and is opposed to release, the one who desires release is eligible to withdraw from all action.

The knowledge of the pure self is the means to release; *karma* is the means to prosperity. Since their ends are different, the eligible persons also must be different. The discipline that the person who desires release follows is repeated hearing of the Vedānta texts, etc. This is opposed to *karma* which is prompted by the conceit of agency, etc. So, the person who seeks release has nothing to do with *karma*. He is eligible for Vedānta-study through the renunciation of works.

NTV—jñānasya svatantra-phalatva-prasādhanena adhikāri-bhedo 'pi siddhaḥ.

[131-133 a]

प्रवृत्तिहेतुप्रध्वस्तेर्न प्रवृत्तौ कथंचन ।
नाभिप्रेतपुरप्राप्तिसमर्थं सुगमं शिवम् ॥ १३१ ॥
वारिपथ्यदनोपेतं सर्वानर्थविवर्जितम् ।
प्राप्तं मार्गं समुत्सृज्य तद्विरुद्धेन वर्त्मना ॥ १३२ ॥
यियासति सुधीः कश्चिद्यथा भ्रान्तोऽध्वगस्तथा ।

He for whom the cause of activity has been destroyed has no (eligibility) whatsoever for action. No wise man would leave the path he is on, which has the capacity to lead to the desired city, which is easy and good, which is endowed with water and victuals for the journey, which is free from all obstacles, and desire to take to the contrary path, like a deluded traveller.

Attachment, etc., are the cause of activity. He who longs for release has no attachment, etc. And so, there is no activity for him.

Nor is there activity for him who has realized the truth through Vedānta-study. The path of *karma* is such that it will not take one to *mokṣa*; the way of knowledge is the appointed road. No discriminating traveller will choose the wrong route, leaving the right one.

NTV—yo hi yad icchati tat-sādhane pravartate, atat-sādhanāt tad-viruddha-sādhāne ca nivartata ityuktam. ito 'pi karmaṇi na pravartate mumukṣuḥ, pravṛtti-hetu-rāgādi-dhvaṁsāt.

NKL—sugamaṁ giri-nady-ādi-pratibandha-rahitaṁ, śivaṁ kaṇṭa-kopalādi-rahitaṁ,sarvānartha-vivarjitam cora-vyāghrādy-anākulam.

[133 b-136 a]

तथाऽविद्योत्थकर्त्रादिधर्मशून्यमविक्रियम् ॥ १३३ ॥

अक्रियाकारकं ज्ञात्वा निःशेषपुरुषार्थदम् ।

आत्मप्रत्ययमागम्यमात्मानं देवमञ्जसा ॥ १३४ ॥

तत्स्थितौ च फलेऽभीष्टे नित्ये साधनवर्जिते ।

तद्विरुद्धफले बाह्यसाधनेऽनेककारके ॥ १३५ ॥

कथं कर्मणि सर्वज्ञो मनो दध्याद्धसन्नपि ।

Likewise, having known the unchanging Self which is devoid of the nescience-generated characteristics such as agency, etc., which neither acts nor causes others to act, and which is the giver of the final human end, which is knowable by self-knowledge, and when that knowledge of the divine self is there, in respect of the eternal fruit which is desired and which is devoid of any other means, how can the omniscient one set his mind, even in jest, on action whose fruit is contrary (to release) which depends on external means and on several causal correlates?

The seeker and the knower of the self have no use for *karma*. The self is devoid of agency, etc. It is itself the human end and is eternal. The fruit of *karma*, on the contrary, is non-eternal and is contingent upon so many factors. So, he who seeks the self and he who has realized the self have no need of *karma*.

1. *NKL* interprets *āgamyam* as *āgama-yogyam*, or as *parāmarśa-siddha-svāpānubhava-gamyam*.

[136 b-137 a]

सम्यग्धीमृदिताशेषध्वान्तस्य च न पूर्ववत् ॥ १३६ ॥

अज्ञानादि पुनः कर्तुं शक्यतेऽकारकत्वतः ।

For one whose ignorance has been entirely destroyed by right knowledge, it is not possible to perform (action) which is of the nature of nescience, etc., as before, for, there is no prompter to activity.

It cannot be said that the one who has realized the self may have to perform action again because of some other nescience. For, there is no possibility of nescience for such a person.

NKL—akārakatvata iti kūṭasthatvād ātmanaḥ kāraṇatvāyogāt kāraṇāntarasya cā 'bhāvād ity arthaḥ.

[137 b-138 a]

श्रुत्यादिमानप्रमितयाथात्म्यज्ञानतत्फलः ॥ १३७ ॥

प्रतिकूलत्वतो विद्वान्यतः कर्मसु नेहते ।

The wise one, who is endowed with the knowledge of the truth as understood through the means of valid knowledge like Scripture, etc., and with the fruit of such knowledge, does not desire action, since it is opposed (to knowledge).

The wise one who has realized the self will not desire *karma*, because *karma* is opposed to self-knowledge.

[138 b-139 a]

अतोऽज्ञस्यैव निःशेषमुमुक्षुप्रजिहासितः ॥ १३८ ॥

कर्त्राद्यनात्मधर्मस्य कर्माधिकृतिरात्मनः ।

Therefore for the ignorant one alone, who has the characteristics of the not-self, like agency, etc., is there the eligibility for rites, shunned by all seekers after release.

Mere nescience is not enough for qualifying a person for *karma*. In sleep one has nescience, but does not act. The eligibility for action consists in being endowed with agency, etc., which are the products of nescience. He who seeks release renounces agency, etc. So, not for him is the eligibility for action.

[139 b-140 a]

विद्यात्ममोहतत्कार्यविरोधाच्च परस्परम् ॥ १३९ ॥

रोगादिवदनर्थत्वात्कर्त्रादिः प्रजिहासितः ।

Because knowledge and delusion of self are mutually opposed by nature as well as in their effects, agency, etc. are sought to be relinquished, as they are evil, like disease, etc.

Knowledge and delusion are opposed to each other both by nature (*rūpataḥ*) and by result (*kāryataś ca*). Therefore, he who seeks release through knowledge desires to renounce delusion-born agency, etc.

NTV—vidyā tad-viṣayā-'tmā ca prepsitau, tad-virodhāt mohas tat-kāryaṁ cā 'narthaḥ.

[140 b-143 a]

जिहासितुः स्वभावोऽसावित्युक्तिः शिशुवक्तृका ॥ १४० ॥

कर्त्रादिश्चेत्स्वभावः स्यात्प्रत्यक्षाकर्तृरूपिणः ।
प्रत्यक्षादिविरोधः स्यादनिर्मोक्षस्तथैव च ॥ १४१ ॥

अस्तु काममनिर्मोक्षो विक्रियावत्त्वतो दृशेः ।
अग्निवत्फलभोक्तृत्वान्नो चेदाकाशकल्पता ॥ १४२ ॥

इति चेन्नाऽऽत्मनो ध्रौव्याद्विक्रियानुपपत्तितः ।

'This (agency, etc.) is the nature of the one who desires to leave.' This statement is infant's prattle. If agency, etc., be the nature of what is immediately experienced (by the wise) as non-agent, there would be conflict with perception, etc.[1], and likewise non-release. 'Let there be non-release, since the seer (soul) is subject to transformation, being the enjoyer of fruit, like fire. Or, if not, it would be unreal, like ether'. If thus it be said, no; for transformation in the case of the soul is unintelligible, since it is constant (*dhruva*).

The self is not an agent of actions or enjoyer of fruits. To say that it is, is to go against the immediate experience of the wise ones. And, if the self were really agent, etc., there would be non-release.

The materialist (*Lokāyata*) may say that this is a contingence of the acceptable. There is no unchanging or permanent self. The so-called self is subject to transformation, even as the element, fire, is. Even if the self is distinguished from the physical body, it must be regarded as the enjoyer, and enjoyership involves change. If the self is neither agent nor enjoyer, it would be nothing like ether. [The Lokāyata recognizes only four elements: earth, water, fire and air.]

The contention of the Lokāyata is unsound, because the self is eternal.

1. Etc. means inference, etc.

NTV—ādi-grahaṇena anumānādi-virodha ucyate, tathāhi kartṛtvāder dṛśyatvāt ātmanaḥ svarūpaṁ dharma vā na saṁbhavati ghaṭa-tad-rūpādivat.

NTV—tad āhuḥ, antarbhāve tu bāhyānāṁ cit-svabhāvo nirañjanaḥ, bahirbhāve tu bāhyatvāt cit-svabhāvo nirañjana iti.

NKL—kartṛtvādir nātmadharmo jñeyatvāt rūpādivat apūrvo-'nantaro-'bāhyaḥ kṛtsnaḥ prajñāna-ghana eveti anumānāgama-virodha-saṅgrahaḥ.

[143 b-144 a]

मूर्तामूर्तत्वहीनस्य प्रतीचो विक्रिया कुतः ॥ १४३ ॥

प्रमायोगो हि भोक्तृत्वं प्रमा चैवाऽऽत्मनः सदा ।

For the soul which has neither shape nor non-shape, how could there be transformation? Enjoyership is but conjunction with experience; and the self is always consciousness.

That there can be no transformation for the self is further explained. It is the world that consists of elements and elementals that is subject to transformation. The self is not so; it is the unchanging witness. Agency, enjoyership, etc., are attributed to it, when it is in conjunction with the ego, etc., and, this attribution is due to nescience.

NKL—bhāvābhāva-sādhaka-caitanyasyā-'bhāvaḥ kena siddhyed iti bhāvaḥ.

[144 b-146 a]

वाय्वग्निवद्विकारो न प्रागभावाद्यसंभवात् ॥ १४४ ॥

अग्न्यादीनां तु सांशत्वाद्बलवद्भिस्तादिन्धनैः ।
अभिभूतस्वरूपाणां काष्ठनिर्मथनादिना ॥ १४५ ॥

युक्तैवाऽऽविष्कृतिर्नित्यं तेषां कार्यात्मकत्वतः ।

Transformation is not possible (for the self), as for wind and fire, because there is no possibility of prior non-existence. Of fire, etc., being overpowered by heavy fuel, manifestation is intelligible through the churning of wood, etc., because they (fire, etc.) are endowed with parts and are always of the nature of products.

That, of which there is prior non-existence, is subject to transformation. This is true of all elements and elementals. The self is not so; therefore, it does not change.

Fire, etc., may become manifest by the rubbing of sticks, etc. That is because they are finite wholes-of-parts. The self, however, has no parts. Therefore, it has no transformation.

NKL—nahi svataḥsiddhasya prāgabhāvādayaḥ svatonyato vā siddhyanti, prāgabhāvādimatva-vyāptaṁ vikāritvaṁ nātmanaḥ.

[146 b-147 a]

न त्वात्मनो निरंशत्वान्मुख्यौ संभवतः क्वचित् ॥ १४६ ॥

आविर्भावतिरोभावौ स्वतःसिद्धेश्च कारणात् ।

For the self, manifestation and disappearance are nowhere to be found in the primary sense, because it is without parts and is self-established.

Really speaking, there can be no obscuration and manifestation for the self; for it has no parts and is self-established.

NTV—kim ātmana ekadeśenā 'virbhāva-tirobhāvādiḥ sarvātmanā vā? natāvad ekadeśena niraṁśatvāt, nāpi sarvātmanā, svarūpābhāva-prasaṅgāt. kiṁca, yad anyādhīna-savyapadeśyaṁ tasyaivā 'virbhāva-tirobhāvādiḥ, ātmā tu svatas-san atopy āvirbhāvādiḥ tasya nāsti. api ca yaj jaḍaṁ tasyā 'virbhāvādiḥ, ātmā tvajaḍaḥ svayaṁprakāśatvāt, ato 'pi nāvirbhāvādir asya.

[147 b-148 a]

अभ्युपेताऽप्यभिव्यक्तिर्नाभिव्यङ्ग्यस्य विक्रिया ॥ १४७ ॥

यथा तथाऽनभिव्यक्तिः सर्वेषामपि वादिनाम् ।

Even if manifestation be admitted, there is no transformation in what is to be manifested. So also in the case of non-manifestation. This is true for all disputants.

Even if manifestation and non-manifestation be admitted for the self, there is no transformation for it. All philosophers who believe in the self at all must recognize its changelessness.

NTV—vimata ātmā na abhivyakti-vikriyāvān abhivyaṅgyatvāt, kūpa-khananādāv ākāśādivat. tathā na anabhi-vyakti-vikriyāvān ātmā anabhi-vyaṅgyatvāt tadvat. vikriyāvatve ca carmādivad anityatva-prasaṅgāt.

[148 b-149 a]

अतोऽनभ्युपगच्छद्भिर्मुक्तौ कर्त्रादिरात्मनः ॥ १४८ ॥

अविद्याकल्पितो ज्ञेयो न ह्यसौ परमार्थतः ।

Therefore, for those who do not admit agency, etc., for the self in the state of release, it (agency, etc.) must be understood as posited by nescience. It is not, indeed, in reality.

If there is no change for the self, it may be asked, how is the manifestation, in it, of agency, etc., to be explained? We reply: that

manifestation is caused by nescience. In *mokṣa* there are no agency, etc., for the self. So, these are illusory like the nacre-silver and the rope-serpent.

NTV—natāvad ātmani kartṛtvādiḥ paramārthaḥ tasya kūṭastha-bodhaghanatvāt, nāpy anātmani loṣṭa-pāṣāṇādiṣv adṛṣṭatvāt, tasmād dehādau ātmādhyāsāt ātmani ca ahaṅkārādhyāropāt kartṛtvādir bhavati. kiṁcā 'laktaka - sannidhānāt sphaṭika - lauhityavad antaḥkaraṇopādhy-uparāgād ātmany āropyamāṇaḥ kartṛtvādiḥ kathaṁ paramārthaḥ syāt.

NKL—kartṛtvādi tat - sthitau mukty - anupapattes tasya jñāna-nivartyatvo'pagame rajju - sarpādivat kalpitatvam ity arthaḥ.

[149 b-150]

कर्त्राद्यात्मस्वभावस्य प्रात्यक्ष्यान्न तदात्मनि ॥ १४९ ॥

मात्रादिबोधकं मानं प्रत्यगात्मनि साक्षिणि ।
न व्यापारयितुं शक्यं वह्निं दग्धुमिवोल्मुकम् ॥ १५० ॥

Because agency, etc., are perceived by the self, they are not in the self. The means of valid knowledge which makes known cognizership, etc., are incapable of functioning in respect of the inner witness-self, just as the fire-brand cannot burn fire itself.

Agency, etc., cannot be the characteristics of the self, because they are perceived by the self. What reveals cognizership, etc., cannot reveal the witness-self, because it is the witness-self that reveals them. Verily, fire cannot burn itself.

NKL—ahaṁ daṇḍītivad ahaṁ-pratyayo 'haṁkārāvacchinna-dehādi-viṣayo, na tat-sākṣiṇi kartṛtvādy-abhāvānumāna-virodhī 'ty arthaḥ.

[151]

साक्षिसाक्ष्याभिसंबन्धः प्रमात्रादौ यथा तथा ।
साक्षिवस्तुनि नैव स्यात्केवलानुभवात्मनि ॥ १५१ ॥

The relation of witness and witnessed which obtains in the case of cognizer, etc., is not thus possible in the case of the witness-reality, the self which is pure experience.

The empirical cognizer which is the ego requires to be illumined by the witness, because it is inert. The witness itself does not require another witness to illumine it. It is pure intelligence, of the nature of illumination, like the resplendent sun.

NTV—pramātrādeḥ jaḍatvāt sākṣi-dṛśyatvaṁ, sākṣiṇaḥ svayaṁ-prakāśa-kevalānubhavātmatvāt na svagrāhyatvaṁ, nāpi paragrāhyatvam.

NKL—sākṣiṇo na sva-grāhyatvaṁ vṛtti-virodhāt, nāpy anyena jaḍasyā 'sādhakatvāt, ajaḍatve tasyaiva sākṣitvāt, ity arthaḥ.

[152]

परार्थसंहतानात्मभोग्यकर्त्रादिबोधिना ।
विरोधात्तद्विरुद्धोऽर्थः प्रत्ययेनेक्ष्यते कथम् ॥ १५२ ॥

By the cognition which makes known the not-self consisting of being enjoyed, agency, etc., which are collocations for the sake of another, how is it possible to see a content (self) opposed to it, because of the opposition?

The witness is not the content of the empirical *pramāṇas*. It is not an agent; nor is it what is enjoyed. It is not for the sake of another, i.e. it is not an instrumental value. So, it cannot be known by the cognition which has for content the cognizer, etc.

[153]

इच्छाद्वेषादिरप्येवं नाऽऽत्मनो धर्म इष्यताम् ।
कामः संकल्प इत्येवं मनोधर्मत्वसंश्रयात् ॥ १५३ ॥

Thus, desire, aversion, etc., too, are not admitted to be the characteristics of the self; because they are declared to be the features of the mind in the text 'Desire, resolve'[1], etc.

It cannot be argued that since desire, etc., belong to the self, agency, etc., also must belong to it. Desire, etc., are declared by Scripture to be the features of the mind.

1. *BU*, I, v, 3.

NTV—yathā kartṛtvādiḥ na ātma-dharmaḥ, kiṁtv avidyā-kalpitaḥ, evam icchā-dveṣādir api na ātma-dharmaḥ, kiṁtu avidyā-kalpita eva, ātmanaḥ pramāṇā-'viṣayatvena tad-gatecchādīnām api māna-meyatvā-bhāvāt, dṛśyatvāc ca icchādīnām.

[154]

स्वपरोभयहेतुत्वे ह्यनिर्मोक्षप्रसङ्गतः ।
सम्यङ्निरूपणे चैषामविद्याकार्यतैव हि ॥ १५४ ॥

If either themselves or some other or both be the cause (of desire, etc.) there is the contingence of non-release. On closer examination, they turn out to be the effects of nescience.

An inquiry into the nature of desire, etc., does not yield any conclusion. What is the cause of desire, etc.? Are they self-caused, other-caused, or both? None of these alternatives is sound. If desire, etc., are self-caused, they cannot be removed. If they are other-caused, there will be infinite regress. The third alternative involves a contradiction. Therefore, we say that desire, etc., are the result of nescience. They belong to nescience, which does not brook inquiry and yet is immediatey experienced, e.g. the blue colour of the sky.

[155]

इच्छादीनां स्वहेतुत्वेऽनर्थं कुर्यात्कथं स्वयम् ।
आत्मा जानन्यथा शत्रोरात्मनोऽतो न युज्यते ॥ १५५ ॥

If desire, etc., be caused by oneself, then how is it that one brings evil upon oneself, knowing that it is so, as on the enemy? So it is not proper.

The soul cannot be the cause of desire, etc. These are of the nature of evil. And, no one would consciously cause evil for oneself.

[156]

तथा परनिमित्तत्वेऽनर्थस्यापरिहारतः ।
नैकान्तिकफलत्वं स्याद्रोगादिपरिहारवत् ॥ १५६ ॥

Likewise, if the supreme soul (i.e. God) were the cause, evil would not get remedied, and there would be no constancy of fruit. It would be like the temporary cure of disease, etc.

If God be the cause of desire, etc., then they cannot be rooted out completely, for God may cause them even in a released person. So, even if they are once removed, they may re-appear.

[157]

करणैः संहतिं चर्ते परिहारः कुतो दृशेः ।
तथोभयनिमित्तत्वे नैकान्तिकफलोदयः ॥ १५७ ॥

How can the seer (i.e. the released soul) find remedy without instruments and the collocation (viz., body)? If both cause (desire, etc.), there would be no rise of constant fruit.

It cannot be said that a released soul will have the power to remove, again, the desire, etc., caused by God. For, how can the released soul do anything, as it has no instruments and auxiliaries of action?

If it be held that both the soul and God are responsible for the rise of desire, etc., even then it is not possible to secure release that will last for ever.

[158]

परामिप्रायानियमान्नैव स्यान्मोक्षनिश्चितिः ।
निर्हेत्वविद्याक्लृप्तौ तु दोषः कश्चिन्न विद्यते ॥ १५८ ॥

Since the will of the supreme would be without regulation, there would be no certainty of release. But if nescience which is without cause be the cause, no defect whatever is seen.

So, if God be regarded as the cause of desire, etc., there is the defect of the impossibility of release. In the view that nescience is their cause, there is not this defect.

NTV—na ātmā kartrādi-rūpaḥ kiṁtu bodha-lakṣaṇaḥ.....tasminn evā 'tmani pratīyamānaḥ kartṛtvādi-pramukho-'nartha-vrātaḥ paramārthato na bhavati, kimtv āvidyaka iti.....asmākaṁ tu anādy-avidyā-vijṛṁbhitatvābhyupagamāt na kaścid doṣaḥ.

[159-160 a]

तद्वर्जनस्य संसिद्धेः प्रसिद्धोपायसंश्रयात् ।
परागर्थप्रमेयेषु या फलत्वेन संमता ॥ १५९ ॥

संवित्सैवेह मेयोऽर्थो वेदान्तोक्तिप्रमाणतः ।

Since the removal of that (nescience) by resorting to the well-known means is well established, the same

consciousness *(saṁvit)*, which is accepted as the fruit in the case of the external objects of knowledge, is the sense to be known, here, through the Vedāntic testimony as the means of valid knowledge.

In the state of release there is the removal of nescience. And so, desire, etc., are also removed there. Without the material cause, the effect cannot exist, and nescience is the material cause of desire, etc.

How is the removal of nescience brought about? The self itself is the means to the removal of nescience. In the case of one who is endowed with all the qualifications for Vedānta-study and who has gained the true teaching, the self-luminous self manifests itself and destroys the nescience which is located in itself.

The reflection of the intelligence-self in the external objects when they are known through means of valid knowledge is technically called the 'fruit'. The prototype of this reflection is the content of Vedānta.

NTV—jñānam ajñānasyaiva nivartakam iti loke prasiddham, yathā ghaṭa-śukty-ādi-jñānaṁ tat-tad-ajñāna-nivartakam, nivartakam eva arthāt prakāśakam, pramāṇam iti hi sthitiḥ.....tasmād ātma-jñānam eva ātmājñāna-tat-kārya-nivṛttau sādhanaṁ yathā veṇujopy agniḥ taṁ sa-mūlaṁ dahati, svaṁ ca śāmyati tadvat.

pratyakṣādeḥ advayānubhavāt anya-viṣayatvaṁ na kalpayet, kiṁtu tad-viṣayatvam eva kalpayed ity arthaḥ. tasmād ākāśādi-prapañce pramāṇābhāvāt asau avidyā vijṛṁbhata iti, jñānān nivṛttir mokṣa upapannaḥ.

NKL—vākya-kṛta-vṛttivyāpti-caitanyam ajñāna-nivartakam ity arthaḥ.

[160 b-161 a]

अप्रामाण्यप्रसक्तिश्च स्यादितोऽन्यार्थकल्पने ॥ १६० ॥

वेदान्तानामतस्तस्मान्नान्यमर्थं प्रकल्पयेत् ।

If some other content be assumed, the Vedāntas would become unauthoritative. Therefore, let no other content be assumed.

For empirical *pramāṇas*, external objects are regarded as contents. This, however, is not true. Even for empirical *pramāṇas*, we say, the self is the content; i.e. they have as their object the conditioned self; whereas the content of Vedānta is the unconditioned self.

[161b-162 a]

नन्वेवमपि मानत्वव्याघातः स्यात्क्रियाविधेः ॥ १६१ ॥

वेदान्तेष्वप्यनाश्वासस्तथा च प्रसजेद्ध्रुवम् ।

"Now, even thus there would be contradiction of validity for injunction of rites. And likewise, even as regards Vedāntas there would result loss of faith."

Pūrvapakṣa: If what the Vedānta teaches is true, the teaching of the *karma-kāṇḍa* cannot be true. If that be the case, one may not have faith in any part of the Veda, including the Vedānta.

[162 b-163 a]

नैतदेवं यतोऽशेषमानानामपि मानता ॥ १६२ ॥

आ परात्मावबोधात्स्यात्तत्र सर्वसमाप्तितः ।

It is not thus; for all means of valid knowledge are valid till the realization of the supreme self; and in that all end.

The validity of the ritual teaching of the Veda, as of all empirical *pramāṇas*, lasts till the rise of knowledge. The Vedānta, however, is supremely valid because its content is the highest truth.

NTV—ukta-lakṣaṇā-'tmāvabodhāt prāg aprāmāṇyaṁ na śakyate prasaṁjayituṁ sarva-pramāṇānām avyāhatatvena prāmāṇyopapatteḥ,

uktā-'tmāvabodhād ūrdhvaṁ na mānānāṁ mānatāsti bodha-ghanasyā 'tmano jñānād ajñāna-nivṛtyā tat-kāryasyāpi nivṛtteḥ.

NKL—kiṁ tattvāvedana-pramāṇasya hānir uta vyāvahārika-pramāṇasya? nādyo 'bhyupagamāt ity āha-naitad iti. dvitīyopi brahma-sākṣātkārāt pūrvam uttara-kālaṁ vā? na prathama ity āha-yata iti. dvitīyepi iṣṭāpattir ity āha-tatreti.

[163 b-164 a]

नातोऽवतारो मानानामैकात्म्येनैव संक्षयात् ॥ १६३ ॥

श्येनादिविधिबाधः स्यादहिंसाविधिना यथा ।

Thereafter, the means of valid knowledge do not function, for they have been destroyed by the oneness of the self. Just as the injunction relating to the hawk-sacrifice is sublated by the injunction of non-violence.

Empirical *pramāṇas* cannot function after the rise of absolute knowledge, because their cause, nescience, has been destroyed. The knowledge of identity sublates the empirical *pramāṇas*, even as in the *karma-kāṇḍa* itself the injunction about non-injury sublates the injunction relating to the hawk-sacrifice.

NTV—dagdha-paṭavat bādhitānuvṛttyaiva dehādi-pratibhāso-'padeśo- 'papattiḥ, dṛḍhatarā- 'haṁmamābhimānā- 'bhāvād dehādiṣu na pramātṛtvam upapadyate, aikātmya-jñānena bādhitatvāt.

yathā na hiṁsyāt bhūtānīty anena śyenenā- 'bhicaran yajetety asya bādhaḥ, evam aikātmya-jñānena sarva-pramātṛ-pramāṇa-prameya-bādhaḥ.

tasmād aikātmya-jñāna-bādhitatvād saṁsāro mithyaiveti bhāvaḥ.

[164 b-165 a]

कर्माण्यतो विधीयन्तेऽविद्यावन्तं नरं प्रति ॥ १६४ ॥

न तु विध्वस्तसकलकर्महेतुं द्विजं प्रति ।

Rites, therefore, are enjoined on the man who is endowed with nescience, and not on the twice-born for whom the seed of all action has been destroyed.

Karmas are for him who is endowed with nescience, and who considers himself to be a man. Therefore, the *karmakāṇḍa* is an empirical *pramāṇa*, and is valid only till the rise of absolute knowledge. There is no injunction to perform *karma* for him who has gained wisdom, and who has risen above all the conditions that make for finitude.

[165 b-166 a]

सर्वकर्मनिरासेऽतो ह्यधिकारो विवेकिनः ॥ १६५ ॥

यथोक्तन्यायतः सिद्धो न तु कर्मसु कर्हिचित् ।

Hence, to the discriminating there is eligibility, indeed, for repudiation of all action, and not for actions in the least; this has been settled through the aforesaid reasoning.

He who seeks knowledge has no need to perform *karma*. He has discrimination and dispassion. He has only to renounce the world and study the Vedānta. That is the means to *mokṣa*. Therefore, it is only in regard to the ignorant that there is the injunction of rites. Such injunction cannot reveal the truth.

NKL.—karma-phalatve mokṣasya sātiśayatvā-'nityatvādi-prasakter ity arthaḥ.

[166 b-167 a]

कारकव्यवहारे हि शुद्धं वस्तु न वीक्ष्यते ॥ १६६ ॥

शुद्धे वस्तुनि सिद्धे च कारकव्यापृतिस्तथा ।

If there be the operation of causal agents, verily, the pure reality is not seen; and if the pure reality is attained, there would be no operation of causal agents.

Karma is the activity of such causal factors as the agent, etc. If these factors exist, there will not arise even the desire for knowledge, and it will not be possible to intuit the pure reality. Therefore, the performance of *karma* is only till knowledge has not arisen. When there is discriminative knowledge, *karma* is given up.

NKL—kartrādy-abhimānasya tad-vilakṣaṇa-brahmābhimānasya ca virodhād ity āśayaḥ.

[167 b-168 a]

कारकाकारकधियोर्नैकदैकत्र वस्तुनि ॥ १६७ ॥

विरोधात्संभवोऽस्तीह प्रकाशतमसोरिव ।

The cognitions of agent and non-agent are not possible in the one reality at one and the same time, because they are opposed (to each other) like darkness and light.

The wise one has the knowledge of the self as non-agent. And so, to say that such a one has eligibility to perform action carries no meaning. Agency and non-agency cannot co-exist.

NKL—yathā annaṁ madhu-saṁyuktam madhu cā 'nnena saṁyutaṁ, evaṁ tapaś ca vidyā ca samyuktaṁ bheṣajaṁ mahat—iti smaraṇāc chuddha-vastu-darśane kāraṇaṁ vyāpāraḥ syād atrāha—kāraketi. smṛtau vidyā-śabdena saguṇa-jñānam uktam ity āśayaḥ.

[168 b-169 a]

अविरोधः क्रमेण स्यात्स्थितिगत्योरिवेति चेत् ॥ १६८ ॥

नाऽऽत्मज्ञानस्य कूटस्थवस्तुतन्त्रत्वहेतुतः ।

"Let there be no opposition, through sequence, as for standing and walking." If thus it be said, no; for the reason that self-knowledge is dependent on the immutable reality.

It may be said that there is sequence as between the sense of agency and the sense of non-agency. While, we admit, there may be the sense of agency before the rise of the sense of non-agency, the other way is impossible. After the knowledge of Brahman which is non-agent has arisen, there can be no sense of agency at all.

NTV says that even the sequence of agency and non-agency is unintelligible.

na ca pūrvam kartṛtvaṁ paścād akartṛtvam ity avirodha iṣyata iti vācyaṁ—avidyayā kartṛtvasya jñānotpatteḥ prāg apy asatvāt. paramārthatas tu kauṭasthyād eva nirastam, tad uktam—tvam kuru tvam tad eveti pratyayāv ekakālikau, eka-nīḍāu kathaṁ syātām viruddhau nyāyato vada—iti.

[169 b-170 a]

नौष्ण्यात्मको मितो वह्निः क्रमशोऽक्रमशोऽथवा ॥ १६९ ॥

वस्तुतः शीततामेति कर्तृतन्त्रं तथा भवेत् ।

Fire which is known to be of the nature of heat does not, of its own accord, become cold, either in sequence or otherwise. What is dependent on an agent admits of that (sequence).

The nature of a thing cannot be altered. It is not within the power of the agent to do so. No agent can make fire cold.

[170 b-171 a]

भेदाभेदात्मकत्वाच्चेदेकस्यापीह वस्तुनः ॥ १७० ॥

अविरोधो न तन्न्याय्यं त्वदुक्तार्थविरोधतः ।

"Of the one reality, because of difference *cum* non-difference, there is no conflict (of being agent and non-agent)." This does not stand to reason, because the sense of what you say is conflicting.

The *Bhedābheda-vādin* contends that Brahman is both agent and non-agent. The reply is that his statement involves self-contradiction. How can one and the same thing be agent as well as non-agent, identical and yet different?

[171 b-172 a]

नानेकस्यैकता न्याय्या तथैकस्याप्यनेकता ॥ १७१ ॥

वस्तुतन्त्रत्वतो बुद्धेर्न चेदेवं मृषा मतिः ।

It does not stand to reason that there is oneness for the many or manyness for the one. Cognition is dependent on the object. If this were not so, cognition would be false.

The contradiction is further explained. If a thing is identical, it cannot be different; if different, it cannot be identical. Cognition must be in accord with the nature of the thing cognized. And, a thing cannot possess contradictory natures.

NTV—bhedābheda - jñānayor anyonyasya viṣayopamardanam antareṇa prāmāṇyaṁ nopapadyate, tad-viṣayayoḥ paraspara-viruddhatvena bhāvābhāvavat samuccayānupapatteḥ.

yuktaṁ tatra puruṣa-prayatna-sādhyayoḥ vrīhi-yava-yāgayoḥ buddhī vikalpena-prāmāṇyam aśnuvāte iti. bhedābheda-buddhyos tu puruṣa-prayatnā-'sādhya-gocarayor idaṁ rajatam nedaṁ rajatam iti jñānavad anyatara-viṣayāpahāram antareṇa prāmāṇyaṁ nopapadyate.

[172 b-173 a]

यथा चास्य विरुद्धत्वं तथोदर्के प्रवक्ष्यते ॥ १७२ ॥

ऐकात्म्यस्यैव मेयत्वं तस्यैवाप्रतिबोधतः ।

And, how there is contradiction will be explained later. Being-the-object-of-valid-cognition (*meyatva*) is for the one self alone, for that alone is unknown.

The one self alone is the content of valid knowledge, not the world. There is no unknownness in the world, for we experience it. It is the self that remains unknown, and needs to be realized. The world is superimposed on the self.

NTV—bhedābhedayoḥ paraspara-virodhād anyatarasyā 'prāmāṇikatvāt bādhāyāṁ sāmānādhikaraṇyam.

[173 b-174 a]

वस्तूनीह प्रमीयन्ते व्यावृत्तानि परस्परम् ॥ १७३ ॥

अभावेन प्रमाणेन तेनोक्तं ते विरुध्यते ।

"Things are known here, as mutually exclusive through means of valid knowledge which are different (viz., perception, etc.). Therefore, what you have stated stands contradicted.

Pūrvapakṣa—It is wrong to say that there is no evidence for plurality. Perception, etc., are the *pramāṇas* which make known a plurality of things.

[174 b-175 a]

भेदे वा यदि वाऽभेदे संसृतेर्ब्रह्मणा सह ॥ १७४ ॥

ब्रह्मणोऽब्रह्मता तद्वद्विद्यानर्थक्यसांशते ।

"Whether the empirical world is different or non-different from Brahman, there would be non-Brahman-hood for Brahman and likewise there would be futility of knowledge, and being endowed with parts.

It was stated (in v. 172 b-173 a) that the world is superimposed on Brahman. Is the world different from Brahman or identical with it? If different, there would be duality, and Brahman would become a limited entity. If there be identity or non-difference, is the world non-different from Brahman, or is Brahman non-different from the world? If the former be the case, there is no need for Brahman-knowledge. If the latter, Brahman will be an entity with parts.

[175 b-176 a]

ब्रह्माविद्यावदिष्टं चेन्ननु दोषो महानयम् ॥ १७५ ॥

निरविद्ये च विद्याया आनर्थक्यं प्रसज्यते ।

"If it be admitted that Brahman has nescience, then this is a great defect. And if it be free from nescience, there results futility for knowledge."

If it is stated that the world is different from Brahman, and that there is neither the futility of knowledge nor the limitation of Brahman because the world is not real, being a product of nescience, then what this nescience is must be explained. Is nescience located in Brahman or in the jīva, or is it independent? Brahman cannot be the locus of nescience, because it is of the nature of knowledge and is all-knowledge. For the same reason the jīva which is non-different from Brahman cannot be the locus. If nescience be an independent entity it cannot be removed by knowledge.

[176 b-177 a]

नाविद्याऽस्येत्यविद्यायामेवाऽऽसित्वा प्रकल्प्यते ॥ १७६ ॥

ब्रह्मदृष्ट्या त्वविद्येयं न कथंचन युज्यते ।

No; nescience is predicated (of Brahman) (by the jīva which is) in the state of nescience. From the standpoint of Brahman, however, this nescience is by no means intelligible.

Siddhānta—Brahman is the locus of nescience. This, however, is only from the empirical point of view. The supreme truth is that there is no nescience at all; only Brahman is.

NTV—na cā 'kāraka-rūpasya brahmaṇaḥ kāraka-rūpāśraya-viṣayatvavirodhaḥ kārakākāraka-virodhasya avidyāyām eva āsitvā'vakalpanāt, tad evam brahmaiva avidyāyām eva āsitvā avidyāyāh āśrayaḥ īśvaro'ntaryāmī mukto baddhaḥ śiṣyo gurur ityādi sarva-vyavahāra-bhāg bhavati.

vastu-gatyā brahmaṇi vicāryamāṇe na avidyā nāpi tad-āśrayatā nāpi tad-viṣayatā na bandho na muktir na tat-sādhanaṁ, ato niravidye vidyānarthakyam iṣyate.

tad-uktaṁ saṁpradāyavidbhir ācāryaiḥ na nirodho na cotpattiḥ na bandho na ca sādhakaḥ, na mumukṣur na vai muktaḥ ityeṣā paramārthatā iti.

[177 b-178 a]

यतोऽनुभवतोऽविद्या ब्रह्मास्मीत्यनुभूतिवत् ॥ १७७ ॥

अतो मानोत्थविज्ञानध्वस्ता साऽप्येत्यथाऽऽत्मताम् ।

As nescience is experienced like the experience 'I am Brahman', so, being destroyed by knowledge generated by valid means of knowledge, it also attains selfhood.

Nescience is not the content of *pramāṇa*; it is in the sphere of the experience which is Brahman. Brahman is the basic consciousness which is common to both *pramāṇa* and *apramāṇa*. Scripture, etc., remove only the delusion of those who believe that it is non-existent.

Since nescience is not the content of *pramāṇa*, since it is established only on the basis of the witness-self, and since it is destroyed by the psychosis born of the Vedānta-text, it is not real. And, what is called the destruction of nescience is Brahman itself. When destroyed by *pramāṇa*, nescience attains Brahman-hood and gets resolved there.

NTV—yathā brahmāsmīti anubhūtiḥ anubhava-siddhā tarkeṇa nāpalapanīyā, evam avidyā tat-saṁbandhaś ca nāpalapanīyaḥ, mānottha vijñānasya avidyā-dhvastiḥ prayojanam ity āha—ata iti. avidyāyāḥ paraṁ pāraṁ tārayasi, bhūyaścānte viśva-māyā-nivṛttiḥ mām eva ye prapadyante māyām etām taranti te,

jñānena tu tad-ājñānam yeṣām nāśitam ātmanaḥ,

taraty avidyāṁ vitatāṁ hṛdi yasmin niveśite—

ityādyāḥ śrutayaḥ smṛtayaś ca jñānāt ajñāna-dhvastiṁ darśayanti.

ajñānaṁ punaḥ na sad-asad-ubhayā-'nubhaya-lakṣaṇaṁ, atas tan-nivṛttir api tad-anusāriṇī yuktā kalpayitum, yakṣānurūpo hi balir iti nyāyāt, yadyapi mānottha-vijñāna-dhvastiḥ tataḥpūrvam avidyā ātmanaḥ pṛthag iva avabhāsate.

tad uktam ānandabodha-bhaṭṭārakaiḥ—neha nāneti ca pratipanno-pādhau śrauta-niṣedhātmano bādhād avidyā-nivṛtter apy atītatvāditi mānottha-vijñānānantaraṁ tv avidyā-tat-kāryeṣv iva satvānāpādanād ātmatām āpnotīty arthaḥ.

NKL—brahmāsmīty anubhūtir vākyajāntaḥkaraṇavṛttiḥ kevalasya sākṣi-vedyā yathā ity arthaḥ.

[178 b-179 a]

ब्रह्मण्यविदिते बोधान्नाविद्येत्युपपद्यते ॥ १७८ ॥

नितरां चापि विज्ञाते मृषाधीर्नास्त्यबाधिता ।

When Brahman is not known through valid cognition, that there is nescience is unintelligible; and more so when it is known; there is no unsublated false knowledge.

That nescience and its relation to Brahman are not known through *pramāṇa* is still further shown. They cannot be known while Brahman remains unknown; for without knowing the locus one cannot know the located. Nor can they be known when Brahman is known; for, then, there is no nescience to be known. No delusion survives its sublation.

AVS—brahmaṇi brahmaṇaś cā 'vidyeti mithyā-jñānam etat. tan na tiṣṭhati jñāne udita ity arthaḥ.

[179 b-180 a]

अविद्यावानविद्यां तां न निरूपयितुं क्षमः ॥ १७९ ॥

वस्तुवृत्तमतोऽपेक्ष्य नाविद्येति निरूप्यते ।

He who is endowed with nescience cannot establish it; in consideration of the nature of reality it is established that there is no nescience.

The ignorant do not have valid cognition of nescience and its relation, for there is no *pramāṇa*; and if there be *pramāṇa*, nescience will cease to be nescience. Nor do the wise cognize nescience, for there is no nescience for them. So, nescience is established only through the witness-self.

NKL—nirūpamāṇākṣamatvaṁ ajñānatvād iti draṣṭavyam. ajñānaṁ mithyā apramāṇikatvāt śukti-rajatavad iti.

[180 b-181 a]

वस्तुनोऽन्यत्र मानानां व्यापृतिर्न हि युज्यते ॥ १८० ॥

अविद्या च न वस्त्विष्टं मानाघातासहिष्णुतः ।

It does not stand to reason that the means of valid knowledge function except in relation to what is real. And nescience is not admitted to be real, for it cannot bear the scrutiny of the means of valid knowledge.

An inference is here given to show that nescience cannot be known through *pramāṇa*. What is not a thing cannot be known through *pramāṇa*, like the horns of a hare. Nescience cannot be known through *pramāṇa* because it is not a thing.

NTV—yad vastvanyan na tan mānagocaraḥ yathā naraviṣāṇādi, avidyā ca na vastumānasaṁbandhā-'sahiṣṇutvād ity arthaḥ.

[181 b-182 a]

अविद्याया अविद्यात्व इदमेव तु लक्षणम् ॥ १८१ ॥

मानाघातासहिष्णुत्वमसाधारणमिष्यते ।

Of the nescience–nature of nescience this is the non–common definition that it does not stand the scrutiny of the means of valid knowledge.

Nescience does not stand the scrutiny of *pramāṇa* ; for that is its nature.

[182 b-183 a]

त्वत्पक्षे बहु कल्प्यं स्यात्सर्वं मानविरोधि च ॥ १८२ ॥

कल्प्याऽविद्यैव मत्पक्षे सा चानुभवसंश्रया ।

In your view, many assumptions will have to be made, and all opposed to validity. In my view, nescience alone has to be assumed, and that too as dependent on experience.

Here the *siddhāntin* says that, while in the view of *bhedābheda* several assumptions have to be made, in his own view only nescience has to be assumed. The assumptions of *bhedābheda* are that as between Brahman and the world there are difference and non-difference, that there is the destruction of bondage which is beginningless and real, that release is the fruit of *karma*, and that it is eternal, etc. These assumptions may be made if they are valid. But everyone of them involves a contradiction.

Nescience, which we assume, is established by the witness-intelligence.

NKL—sarvasya bhinnābhinnatvaṁ saṁsārasya anādeḥ paramārthasya nivṛttimatvaṁ, kṛtakasya mokṣasya nityatvaṁ ca mānaviruddhaṁ kalpyam ity arthaḥ.

AVS—bhedābhedavādi-pakṣe anāder bandhasya paramārthasya nivṛttiḥ kalpyā, sā ca pramāṇa-viruddhā, na hy anādeḥ paramārthasyā 'tmano nivṛttir dṛṣṭā, sāder mokṣasya nityatvaṁ ca kalpyeta, tac ca pramāṇa-viruddhaṁ, yat kṛtakaṁ tad anityam iti sthitatvāt sarvaṁ vastu bhinnābhinnam iti ca sarva-pramāṇaviruddhaṁ parikalpyata iti.

[183 b-184 a]

तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्योत्थसम्यग्धीजन्ममात्रतः ॥ १८३ ॥

अविद्या सह कार्येण नाऽऽसीदस्ति भविष्यति ।

On the mere rise of the true knowledge generated by the sentence 'That thou art', nescience, along with its effects, was not, is not and will not be.

That nescience is not real is realized when the supreme wisdom dawns on hearing the great text 'That thou art.'

[184 b-185 a]

अतः प्रमाणतोऽशक्याऽविद्याऽस्येति निरीक्षितुम् ॥ १८४ ॥

कीदृशी वा कुतो वाऽसावनुभूत्येकरूपतः ।

Therefore, it is impossible to demonstrate through means of valid knowledge that nescience is in (Brahman), or as of what form it is, or whence, for there is only experience (of it).

Questions about nescience, as to where it is, whence it is, what it is, etc., cannot be answered intelligibly. It is only established through experience.

[185 b-186 a]

देवताद्रव्यकर्त्रादि ननु वस्त्वस्तु नाद्वयम् ॥ १८५ ॥

सर्वलोकप्रसिद्धत्वाददृश्यस्याप्यसिद्धितः ।

"Now, deity, material, agent, etc.—let these be real and not the non-dual, because they are well known to all people, and non-duality is not established."

Pūrvapakṣa—The world of plurality is real because it is well known to all people. The non-dual Brahman is not known to people; so it cannot be real.

[186 b-187 a]

नैतत्साधु प्रमाणानां सर्वलोकाभिधं न हि ॥ १८६ ॥

प्रमाणमस्ति यत्प्राणाद्ध्रुवानेवं प्रभाषते ।

This is not sound. Among the means of valid knowledge, there is no means of valid knowledge called 'known to all people', on whose strength you speak thus.

Siddhānta—There is no *pramāṇa* called 'known to all people.'

[187 b-188a]

अभिमानश्च यत्रायं सर्वलोकस्य गम्यते ॥ १८७ ॥

प्रत्यक्षोऽर्थोऽयमित्येवं मिथ्यात्वं तस्य चोदितम् ।

The conceit (of the form) 'This object is perceived' is experienced by all people. The illusoriness thereof has been declared.

It is true that people imagine 'I see this,' etc. But all such imagination is illusory because it is sublated by the knowledge of the true self.

[188 b-189 a]

प्रत्यक्षं च यथाऽऽसन्नं परोक्षाद्वस्तुनो मतम् ॥ १८८ ॥

सर्वप्रत्यक्तमस्तद्वद्बोधो वाक्योत्थ आत्मनि ।

As perception is thought to be of what is nearer than the mediate object, so is there knowledge of the self as the inner-most of all, generated by the sentence (of Scripture).

If it be said that the cognition of the self got from Scripture cannot sublate the world that is sense-perceived, because that cognition is not immediate, like inference, we ask : what is meant by the non-immediacy of the Scriptural cognition? Does it mean (1) not making known a content that is proximate, (2) not making known a content that is immediate, (3) not being the locus of immediacy, or (4) being devoid of independence?

The first alternative is not correct. There is nothing nearer or more proximate than the inner spirit. So, the knowledge that is born of the Vedānta-texts has a content which is most proximate.

AVS—pratyakṣād āgamasya sannihitārthatvāt, pratyakṣād āgamo balavān.....yathā pratyakṣānumānayor virodhe pratyakṣasyaiva balavatvam anumānāt pratyakṣasya sannihitārthatvāt. sannihitārthatvañ ca liṅga-vyavadhānābhāvāt. atra ca tadbhāvāt. āgamasya tu pratyakṣāt sannihitārthatvam ātma-viṣayatvāt. pratyakṣasya vā 'san-nihitārthatvaṁ parāg-viṣayatvāt. ato durbalam ato bādhyatvaṁ ato mithyātvam iti.

[189 b-190 a]

आत्मानुभवमाश्रित्य प्रत्यक्षादि प्रसिध्यति ॥ १८९ ॥

अनुभूतेः स्वतः सिद्धेः काऽपेक्षा ह्यात्मसिद्धये ।

Depending on self–experience, perception, etc., are established. As experience is self–established, what

need is there (for means of valid knowledge) in the matter of establishing the self?

The second alternative is not possible. Perception, etc., are not self-established, because they are inert; nor are they established through *pramāṇas*, for then there would be an infinite regress; nor are they not established, for in that case no object can be known. Perception, etc., are established only on the basis of the self which is experience. The self, however, is not dependent on any other. So, it is intrinsically immediate. The knowledge of it that rises from the study of Vedānta cannot have for its content something which is not immediate.

NTV—pratyakṣa-sphuraṇasya āgama-gamyā-'tmānubhavā-'dhīnatvāt āgamo balavān, durbalaṁ pratyakṣam ity ato bādhyatvān mithyātvam.....pratyakṣa-sattāyā ātmādhīnatvāt ātma-sattāyāś ca pratyakṣānadhīnatvāt ātma-viṣayoyam āgamo balavān.

AVS—pratyakṣa-sphuraṇasya āgamagamyātmādhīnatvād āgamo balavān, pratyakṣaṁ durbalam.

[190 b-191 a]

आत्मानुभवपूर्वत्वात्प्रत्यक्षत्वस्य न स्वतः ॥ १९० ॥

आत्मैकगम्यमैकात्म्यं वेदान्तेष्ववगम्यते ।

Since perceptuality is preceded by self-experience and does not exist of its own accord, the one self is known by the self alone—thus it is understood from the Vedāntas.

The third alternative, that the cognition generated from Scripture is not the locus of immediacy, is not tenable. Even perception is not immediate of its own accord, because it is inert. It is immediate only because of its relation to the self-nature which is eternally immediate. So, the immediacy of perception is dependent on the self-established

self-experience. Similarly, Scriptural cognition, too, which is dependent on the same, may well be the locus of immediacy.

Nor is the fourth alternative—that scriptural cognition is devoid of independence—sound. Validity is intrinsic. The Vedāntas which have the self for purport are not expectant of anything else. And the self-cognition which arises from them is intrinsic.

AVS—pratyakṣa-sattāyā ātmādhīnatvād ātma-sattāyāś ca pratyakṣatvāt tad-adhīnatvābhāvat āgama ātma-viṣayo balavān pratyakṣam durbalam.

[191 b-193 a]

यच्चाप्युक्तं श्रुतिस्मृत्योः क्रियाया एव सिद्धितः ॥ १९१ ॥

अतः क्रियातिरेकेण नास्त्यन्यन्मुक्तिसाधनम् ।
केन चोक्तं क्रिया मुक्तेः साधनत्वं न गच्छति ॥ १९२ ॥

तमेतमिति नाश्रौषीः संस्कारा इति च स्मृतिम् ।

As for what was said, that because Scripture and Traditional Code establish rites alone, there is no means to release other than rites, by whom was it said that rites do not attain the status of means to release? Have you not heard the Scriptural text 'That one'[1], etc., and the Traditional Code 'Purificatory rites'[2]?

It was stated by the *pūrvapakṣin* (in v. 33) that Scripture and Traditional Code establish rites alone, and that rites are the means to release. Now, are rites the direct means to release, or do they serve as the means in sequence? Not the first, because they cannot bring about release; and there are Scriptural texts which say that release is not attainable through *karma* (e.g. *Mahānārāyaṇa Upaniṣad*, x, 5; and *Kaivalya*, 2.). The second alternative is acceptable to us. Rites

are instrumental to release either by generating the desire for know ledge or through purification.

1. *BU*, IV, iv, 22. See note on v. 14.

2. See *Gautama-dharmasūtra*, ed. by L. Srinivasacharya (Government Oriental Library Series, Bibliotheca Sanskrita No. 50, Mysore, 1917), viii, 19-22, pp. 127-132.

NKL—nānyaḥ panthā iti sākṣātsādhanatva-niṣedhād vividiṣādvārā saṁskāra-dvārā vā mukti-hetutvaṁ vācyaṁ tad-iṣṭam eva.

AVS—kriyayaiva kaivalya-sādhanaṁ cen nāsti pramāṇam, kriyāpi kathañcit śuddhi-dvāreṇa sādhanaṁ ced asti pramāṇam.

[193 b-194 a]

यद्यप्यैकात्म्यधीः साक्षाच्छ्रुतिस्मृत्योर्न चोद्यते ॥ १९३ ॥

तथाऽप्यसौ न तद्बाह्या ताभ्यामेवाऽऽत्मबोधनात् ।

Though the cognition of the one self is not directly enjoined by Scripture and Traditional Code, it is not outside of them, for through them alone there is self-knowledge.

Although knowledge of the self is not the content of injunction (*acodita*), it is not something which is alien to the Veda (i. e. not *avaidika*). It is taught in Scripture and Traditional Code, even as knowledge of *karma* is taught therein. Hence, it stands to reason that self-knowledge is the means to the human goal, viz. release.

AVS—śrutismṛtyavihitam api brahmātmaikatva-jñānam na śruti-smṛti-bāhyaṁ śruti-smṛti-janyatvāt.

[194 b-195 a]

यच्च न ज्ञाप्यते वेदे वस्त्वित्येतदचूचुदः ॥ १९४ ॥

तच्चापहस्तितं चोद्यं वक्ष्यते च निराकृतिः ।

As for what was stated (in v. 33) that in the Veda the reality is not made known, that objection has been refuted (in v. 123) and its (further) refutation will be set forth later on.

The contention of the *pūrvapakṣin* that the Veda does not teach the oneness of self has already been refuted, and will be refuted again.

[195 b-196 a]

विधावसति वाक्यस्य यच्चावोचोऽप्रमाणताम् ॥ १९५ ॥

स्फुटन्यायोक्तिभिस्तच्च यन्नात्परिहरिष्यति ।

As for what you said that, in the absence of injunction, the sentence (about Brahman knowledge) would be invalid, that will be refuted[1] with care through clear and logical arguments.

The objection raised in v. 34 is referred to here.

1. *NKL—parihariṣyatīti pāṭhe bhāṣyakāra iti śeṣaḥ.*

[196 b-199 a]

यच्चोक्तं न पुमर्थोऽस्ति वस्तुमात्रावबोधनात् ॥ १९६ ॥

आख्यानप्रचुरा यस्मात्त्रय्यन्ता इह लक्षिताः ।

रामो राजा बभूवेति न ह्येतावत्प्रबोधतः ॥ १९७ ॥

संभाव्यते पुमर्थोऽतो विध्यर्थविरहात्क्वचित् ।

परार्थतैव सर्वत्र ज्ञानस्येहोपलक्ष्यते ॥ १९८ ॥

ज्ञात्वाऽनुष्ठानवचनाद्विद्वान्यजत इत्यपि ।

And as for what was said: "There is no human goal by a knowledge of the mere reality, for the

Vedāntas are characterized by a profusion of stories; by a knowledge thus 'There lived a king named Rāma', the human goal does not result, as there is not any injunctive sense; everywhere, here, knowledge is indicated as being for the sake of another; for there is the statement about performance after knowing, thus: 'The learned one performs sacrifice'."

Here, the objection stated in v. 36 is alluded to. The view of the *pūrvapakṣin* is that the Vedāntas are subsidiary to *karma*, even as the looking into clarified butter by the sacrificer's wife is a subsidiary to the *Darśapūrṇamāsa* rites.

[199 b-200 a]

उक्तोऽत्र परिहारः प्रागूर्ध्वं चापि प्रवक्ष्यते ॥ १९९ ॥

विद्याफलस्य प्रात्यक्ष्यादितिहेतुसमाश्रयात् ।

The reply to it has been stated already (v. 129) and will be stated hereafter also, in reliance on the ground that the fruit of knowledge is immediate.

The reply has been stated already, and will again be stated. We rely on the texts which speak of the experience of the wise. Self-knowledge leads to the destruction of evil in its entirety and to the manifestation of unlimited bliss. And so, Vedānta is not an auxiliary of the injunction of *karma*.

[200 b-201 a]

ननु निर्धूतशोकादि फलं यच्छ्रूयते श्रुतौ ॥ २०० ॥

आत्मस्तुतिरसौ तस्मात्त्वन्मनोरथकल्पितम् ।

"Now, as for what is declared in Scripture about the fruit of freedom from sorrow, etc., that is an eulogy of the soul. Therefore, what you say is your imaginary dream".

Pūrvapakṣa—The texts 'The knower of the self crosses sorrow,' etc., are intended to praise the soul which has the eligibility for ritual action. They do not teach the wisdom about the non-dual self.

[201 b-202]

अत्रोच्यते ह्यभिप्रेतं गम्यमानं प्रमाणतः ॥ २०१ ॥

फलं तत्संपरित्यज्य कस्माल्लक्षणया स्तुतिम् ।
अश्रुतामनभिप्रेतां कल्पयस्यबुधो यथा ॥ २०२ ॥

Here it is replied: Leaving the fruit which is intended and which is validly cognized, why do you, like one ignorant, assume through secondary implication eulogy which is neither declared in Scripture nor intended (by it)?

Siddhānta—On what ground do you say that the texts quoted above do not have for purport the destruction of sorrow, etc.? (1) Is it because it is not wished for, or (2) because it is not known from the sentence, or (3) because it is not known through other means of valid knowledge? Not the first; for, every one desires the fruit in the form 'Let me be happy; let not sorrow come to me'; and it cannot be said that this fruit is not wished for. Not the second; for, the sense we have urged is readily understood from the text. Nor the third; for, the experience of the wise is the evidence for it.

You think that the text in question is a case of *abhūtārthavāda*. On what ground, we ask. Is it known directly from the statement? Or, is it what is wished for? Or, is it established through some other *pramāṇa*? Not the first; for, from the statement itself we do not understand any praise of the soul; it has only to be assumed by implication; and such an assumption is not proper because it would go against the fruit which is known from Scripture, and which is experienced by the wise. Not the second; for, praise of the soul cannot be what is wished for; what is wished for is the attainment

of happiness, the destruction of sorrow, and the means thereto. Nor the third; for, it is not known through any *pramāṇa* that the destruction of sorrow, etc., constitute the praise of the soul.

NKL—jñāna-phalasya kimaniṣṭatvāt tyāgaḥ, apratīyamānatvād vā, bādhitatvād vā. nādya ity āha—abhipretam iti. sukha-duḥkha-parihāratvād ity arthaḥ. avagata-saṅgatikasya pratīte na dvitīya ity āha—gamyamānam iti. na tritīyaḥ apauruṣeyatayā vidhi-vākyāt svataḥ pramāṇatvād ity āha—pramāṇata iti.

AVS—jñāna-phalasya kartṛtvādy-upamardasya pratyakṣatvād ata eva kartṛtvādi- pratibhāsanasya viduṣo bādhitānuvṛttitvāt phala-śrutir nābhūtārthavādaḥ ataḥ sādhanādhikāri-bhedo vastuparatvaṁ ca vākyasya ity etam manoratham ity uktaṁ manorathamātram.

[203-204 a]

न चास्त्येकविषयत्वं प्रत्यक्षवचसोर्यतः ।
श्रुत्यैव परिहारोक्तेः स्वप्नादिस्थानसंचरात् ॥ २०३ ॥
बहुशोऽसङ्गवचसा निःसङ्गत्वं ब्रुवाणया ।

Nor is there identity of content between the perception (I am miserable) and the Scriptural statement; the reply has been stated by Scripture itself in the text referring to the passage through dream and other states, which declares several times the unattached nature (of the self) in texts declarative of non-attachment.

The perceptual experience of the form 'I am miserable' cannot contradict the Scriptural text, because the two do not have an identical content. The experience has for its content the empirical soul. Scripture speaks about the true self which is of the nature of the eternal bliss-experience, which is the witness of the three states of experience, and which is not affected by these changing states.

[204 b-205 a]

मनोराज्यसमं मन्ये सर्वमेतत्त्वयोदितम् ॥ २०४ ॥

न प्रत्येमि यतः साक्षात्प्रत्यक्षं ज्ञानतः फलम् ।

"I consider all that has been stated by you to be a castle in the air; for I do not see the fruit of knowledge to be directly perceived."

Pūrvapakṣa—Your belief that Brahman is pure consciousness, that agency, etc., are superimposed thereon, and that the fruit of Brahman-knowledge is the complete removal of agency, etc., is a product of your imagination. There is no direct experience of what you say.

[205 b-206 a]

श्रुतादपि न चेद्वाक्याज्जायेत फलवन्मतिः ॥ २०५ ॥

आशङ्क्येत तदैवैतद्यदेतद्भवतोदितम् ।

If the fruitful knowledge does not arise even from the sentence (That thou art) declared in Scripture, then what you have said may be raised as a doubt.

Siddhānta—Our view is not a day-dream. You may legitimately raise the doubt you have raised only if from the Vedānta text wisdom leading to release did not result. For the proper person the Veda does generate knowledge. If for the ineligible person the said wisdom does not rise, it is not the fault of the Veda.

NKL—jñāninopi sukhādi-darśanāt, bādhitānuvṛtteḥ paribhāṣā-mātratvād, ity arthaḥ. tadyathā ahinirlvayanītyādi-śruti-siddhatvāt bādhitānuvṛttiḥ paribhāṣāmātram.

[206 b-207 a]

नित्यमुक्तत्वविज्ञानं वाक्याद्भवति नान्यतः ॥ २०६ ॥

वाक्यार्थस्यापि विज्ञानं पदार्थस्मृतिपूर्वकम् ।

The knowledge of the eternally free arises from the sentence, not otherwise. The knowledge of the sentence-sense is preceded by the memory of the word-senses.

For the eligible person, knowledge arises from hearing the major text 'That thou art'. It is true that all do not get this knowledge. That is because the true knowledge of this sentence can come only after there has been a correct understanding of the words constituting it. Those who do not have this understanding cannot realize the truth of the major text, even as a deaf person cannot appreciate music.

NKL—śodhitapadārthajñānavatāṁ viśiṣṭādhikāriṇām eve'ty arthaḥ.

[207 b-208 a]

अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां पदार्थः स्मर्यते ध्रुवम् ॥ २०७ ॥

एवं निर्दुःखमात्मानमक्रियं प्रतिपद्यते ।

The word-sense is remembered for certain through co-presence and co-absence. Thus, the self free from sorrow and action is understood.

The knowledge of the word-senses too does not come to all. One must inquire into the meaning of the words through the application of the rule of co-presence and co-absence. Nor is it enough to have a knowledge of the word-senses alone. One must understand the sentence as a whole also.

NTV—kena krameṇa vākyāt tad-arthāvagatir ity apekṣāyāṁ āha—vākyārthasyāpi ityādinā—prathamam anvayavyatirekābhyāṁ tvaṁpadārthaḥ smaryate, anantaraṁ nirduḥkham akriyas-tvaṁpada-lakṣyam ātmānaṁ pratipadyate, tadanantaraṁ sadevetyādi-vākyebhyo brahmāsmīti pratyagātmany aparokṣa-pramā jāyate.

NKL—ātmano 'vasthā-trayenugamād avasthā-trayasya paraspara-vyabhicārād ityādi caturvidhānvayavyatirekābhyām ity arthaḥ. śodhita-tatpadārtha-jñānaṁ tathāpi durlabhaṁ tatrānvayavyatirekayor

The reply to this suggestion is : no. The meditations are either for the fulfilment of *karmas*, or for achieving prosperity, or for gaining release in sequence (*krama-mukti*). What we have already said with regard to *karmas* holds good as regards meditations also. In the *vividiṣā*-text (*BU*, IV, iv, 22) the word *tapas* stands for meditations.

[330]

विमुच्यमान इत्युक्तेरर्चिराद्युक्तितस्तथा ।
स्वार्थमात्रावसायित्वं नोपास्तीनां प्रतीयते ॥ ३३० ॥

Because of the text, ' Being released, '[1] and because of the text about the path of light,[2] it is seen that the meditations do not directly lead to release.

Upāsanas are not the direct means to release ; they are the means only in sequence. As evidence, two scriptural texts are cited :

1. *BU*, IV, ii, 1.
2. *BU*, VI, ii, 15; *CHU*, V, x, 1.

NTV—tad āhuḥ paurāṇikāḥ—brahmaṇā saha te sarve saṁprāpte pratisañcare, parasyānte kṛtātmānaḥ praviśanti paraṁ padam-iti.

AVS—arcirādivākyodāharaṇam upāsanānām krama-mukti-phalatva-dyotanāya. svārtha-śabdena viriñcyādi-phala-grahaṇam.

[331]

इत्येवमभिसंबन्धः कर्मकाण्डस्य युज्यते ।
इतोऽन्यथाऽभिसंबन्धे न किंचिन्मानमीक्ष्यते ॥ ३३१ ॥

It cannot be said that the Vedānta texts are invalid because their cause is defective ; for, the Veda is not the composition of any human being.

There can be no conflict of other means of valid knowledge with he Vedānta, because their contents differ.

Nor may it be said that the Vedānta cannot give rise to direct knowledge; for the kind of knowledge one gets depends upon the nature of the object too. The object of Vedāntic knowledge is the self which is eternally immediate. So, the Vedānta texts may well generate immediate knowledge of the self.

Śaṅkara will establish this later, while refuting the view that valid knowledge requires four factors, viz., the word, reasoning, meditation and the self. He will, then, say that from the major text alone the immediate knowledge of the self arises.

[211]

नवसंख्याहृतज्ञानो दशमो विभ्रमाद्यथा ।
न वेत्ति दशमोऽस्मीति वीक्षमाणोऽपि तान्नव ॥ २११ ॥

Though seeing the nine, the tenth man does not know 'I am the tenth', because his knowledge is clouded by the number nine and he is deluded.

The *pūrvapakṣin* may say that there is no need for *Veda-pramāṇa* because the self is of the nature of immediate awareness .

In reply, the *siddhāntin* cites the illustrative story of the ten travellers. The tenth man does not realize that he is the tenth because he is obsessed with the number 'nine.' And he realizes the truth—that, too, immediately—when he is told 'You are the tenth'.

[212]

अपविद्धद्वयोऽप्येवं तत्त्वमित्यादिना विना ।
वेत्ति नैकलमात्मानं प्रत्यग्मोहाप्रबोधतः ॥ २१२ ॥

Similarly, though the duality might have been destroyed, he does not know the one self without the text, 'That thou art', etc., because he is without wisdom, due to delusion regarding the inner self.

Although one knows in general about the self, one does not know it truly because of the obstacle, viz., nescience. In order to remove this obstacle *Veda-pramāṇa* is necessary.

[213]

बुभुत्सोच्छेदिनैवास्य सदसीत्यादिना दृढा ।
प्रतीचि प्रतिपत्तिः स्यात्प्रत्यगज्ञानबाधया ॥ २१३ ॥

For him there arises firm knowledge in respect of the inner self through the texts, 'Thou art real', etc., which destroy the desire to know, sublating the ignorance regarding the inner self.

Although the self is of the nature of immediate awareness, and we are that, there may arise in us the desire to know the self which is the eternal bliss. We study the Veda and Vedānta and acquire superficial knowledge of that. In order to acquire distinct and clear knowledge of the same we should listen to the major texts. From such listening arises illumination which is unsublatable and free from doubts.

It cannot be said that when the self is known, nescience also would become a content of valid knowledge. When nescience is sublated, the self is realized; and so in that experience there is no nescience at all.

NKL—dṛḍhety abādhita-niṣciti rūpā ity arthaḥ.

[214]

निःशेषकर्मसंन्यासो वाक्यार्थज्ञानजन्मने ।
तस्याऽऽरादुपकारित्वात्सहायत्वाय कल्प्यते ॥ २१४ ॥

Renunciation of all action is assumed to be a proximate auxiliary, because it helps in the generation of the knowledge of sentence-sense.

Renunciation of all *karma* is an auxiliary of knowledge; for it helps in the understanding of the major texts.

NTV—tatra śravaṇaṁ śabda-śakti-nirdhāraṇāvasānaidaṁparya-viparyaya-vināśi, mananaṁ bādhābhāva-parīkṣā sā bādha-buddhiṁ niruṇddhi, ekālaṁbanapratyayāmreḍanaṁ dhyānaṁ tac chinatti citta-vikṣepaṁ bhinatty atad-vāsanāṁ, vedāntās tv ātmānaṁ sākṣāt bodhayanti, tathāpi vedāntāḥ śravaṇādiṣu satsv evā 'tmavidyāṁ prasūyante nāsatsu.

śravaṇa - manana - dhyānābhyāsāḥ śabdasya jñānotpatti - prati-bandhāpanayena sahāyatāṁ pratipadyante.

[215]

त्याग एव हि सर्वेषां मोक्षसाधनमुत्तमम् ।
त्यजतैव हि तज्ज्ञेयं त्यक्तुः प्रत्यक्परं पदम् ॥ २१५ ॥

Renunciation is the supreme means to release in the case of all. By him who renounces is to be known the supreme place which is the inner self of the renouncer.

Here by 'release' is meant knowledge. Renunciation is an auxiliary of knowledge. It is called the *supreme* means because it is the proximate auxiliary. *Karma* cannot serve as the proximate auxiliary because it involves the conceits of agency and enjoyership.

NTV—atra mokṣa-śabdena mucyateneneti brahma-jñānam ucyate.

[216]

शान्तो दान्त इति तथा सर्वत्यागपुरःसरम् ।
उपायमात्मविज्ञाने श्रुतिरेवाब्रवीत्स्वयम् ॥ २१६ ॥

Scripture itself has declared the means to self-knowledge as preceded by renunciation of all (action) in the words 'subdued, self-controlled', etc.

Scripture is cited to show that renunciation of *karma* is an auxiliary of knowledge. *BU*, IV, iv. 23: 'Therefore, he who knows it thus becomes subdued, self-controlled, indrawn, forbearing and absorbed, and sees the self even in the self; he sees all as the self.' Here by the word 'indrawn' (*uparataḥ*) is meant renunciation of obligatory and occasioned rites. It is as preceded by renunciation that the self is to be seen.

[217]

प्रवृत्तिलक्षणो योगो ज्ञानं संन्यासलक्षणम् ।
तस्माज्ज्ञानं पुरस्कृत्य संन्यसेदिह बुद्धिमान् ॥ २१७ ॥

Yoga (action) is characterized by activity; knowledge is characterized by renunciation. Therefore, having knowledge in view let the wise one, here, renounce.

Another text is quoted here: The *Mahābhārata*, Āśvamedhika-parvā, 43, 26.

[218]

मुक्तेश्च बिभ्यतो देवा मोहेनापिदधुर्नरान् ।
ततस्ते कर्मसूद्युक्ताः प्रावर्तन्ताविचक्षणाः ॥ २१८ ॥

The gods, fearing release, covered men with delusion. Therefore, they, devoid of sight, began to perform rites with zeal.

It cannot be said that all might renounce for the sake of knowledge which is the means to release. The gods delude men, whom they use as their domestic animals. *BU*, I, iv, 10: 'He who

worships another god thinking, "He is different, and I am different", does not know; he is as an animal to the gods.' It is only a few that see through this delusion and escape from the herd and seek knowledge. Renunciation, therefore, is not something which comes of its own accord effortlessly and with ease.

[219]

अतः संन्यस्य कर्माणि सर्वाण्यात्मावबोधतः ।
हत्वाऽऽविद्यां धियैवेयात्तद्विष्णोः परमं पदम् ॥ २१९ ॥

Therefore, renouncing all actions and destroying nescience through knowledge of the self, let him attain the supreme place of Viṣṇu, through knowledge alone.

After renouncing the world, one ought to 'hear' the Vedānta texts for the sake of gaining self-knowledge. This is an originative injunction (*utpatti-vidhi*) even as the injunction to renounce is. An originative injunction is that which makes known the bare nature of an act, e.g., 'He is to offer the *Agnihotra* oblation.' [The other types of injunction are: applicatory injunction (*viniyoga-vidhi*), injunction of the eligible (*adhikāra-vidhi*), and procedural injunction (*prayoga-vidhi*).]

When through 'hearing', etc., one matures, one acquires self-knowledge. With that, nescience which is the root of all evil is destroyed. The body may last for some time longer so that the unspent portion of the *prārabdha* may be enjoyed. When that enjoyment is over, one attains the supreme Reality.

The last quarter of this verse is from the Upaniṣads. See *KU*, iii. 9.

[220]

इति भाल्लविशाखायां श्रुतिवाक्यमधीयते ।

सर्वकर्मनिरासेन तस्मादात्मधियो जनिः ॥ २२० ॥

Thus in the Bhāllavi section the Scriptural text is found: Through the renunciation of all action the knowledge of self is born.

The *Bhāllavi Śākhā* is not now extant.

[221]

सत्यानृते इति तथा सर्वसंन्यासपूर्वकम् ।

आत्मनोऽन्वेषणं साक्षादापस्तम्बोऽब्रवीन्मुनिः ॥ २२१ ॥

Sage Āpastamba taught directly in the words 'True and false' that the search for the self is to be preceded by renunciation.

Āpastamba-dharma-sūtra, II, xxi, 13.

[222]

नाविरतो दुश्चरितान्नाशान्तो नासमाहितः ।

नाशान्तमानसो वाऽपि प्रज्ञानेनैनमाप्नुयात् ॥ २२२ ॥

'He who has not desisted from evil conduct, who is not subdued, nor self-composed, and whose mind is not quiescent cannot attain him (self) through knowledge.'

KU, ii, 24.

Here renunciation is laid down as a condition precedent for self-knowledge—not renunciation of optional rites alone, but of all *karma*.

[223]

वेदानुवचनादीनां विनियोगोक्तियत्नतः ।
भिन्नाधिकारितालिङ्गं कर्मविज्ञानकाण्डयोः ॥ २२३ ॥

The statement of procedure 'By the recitation of the Veda,'[1] etc., which has been made through effort shows that there is a difference of eligibility for the two sections, viz. of rites and knowledge.

It is not that the one who is eligible for *karma* is eligible for knowledge. *Karma* is an auxiliary of knowledge. For the two sections of the Veda, the eligible persons are different.

1 *BU*, IV, iv, 22. See note on v. 14.

[224]

ज्ञानोत्पत्त्यादिकाल्लिङ्गाद्यतस्तद्धेतुमात्रकम् ।
गम्यते न विशेषोऽतः कर्मैवेति न गम्यते ॥ २२४ ॥

Through the mark, generation of knowledge, etc., it is known that action is a cause thereof; but not that it alone is the distinctive cause.

Although, sometimes, *karma* is said to be generative of knowledge, it is not the distinctive cause of knowledge. *Karma* is the cause of knowledge through the purification of the mind; but *sannyāsa* is the direct means through the *modus operandi*, 'hearing', etc.

NTV—jñānotpatti-liṅgāt karmaṇāṁ na sākṣāt jñāna-sādhanatvaṁ gamyate kiṁtu paraṁparayāpi sādhanatva-mātraṁ gamyate ataḥ karma-jñāna-kāṇḍayor bhinnādhikāritā.

NKL—dharmāt sukhaṁ ca jñānaṁ ceti kvacit jñānahetutvaṁ gamyate. vividiṣantīti kvacid vividiṣā-hetutvam. saṁskārā iti kvacit saṁskāratvam. anupahatamanāveti kvacic chuddhi-pradhānatvam.

ato 'nekabalāt karmaṇāṁ jñāna-hetutvamātram gamyate, na tu karmaiveti viśeṣaḥ. tasmāt karmaṇāṁ śuddhi-dvāreṇa hetutvaṁ, tat-tyāgasya sākṣād eveti na virodhaḥ ity arthaḥ.

AVS—karmaṇāṁ jñāna-sādhanatva-mātraṁ gamyate, na tu karmaiva sādhanam iti, tasmāt karmāṇi śuddhi-dvāreṇa sādhanaṁ, sannyāsas tu sākṣāt-sādhanam iti vibhāgaḥ.

[225]

मुण्डोऽपरिग्रहोऽसङ्गोः बहिरन्तः शुचिः सदा ।
ब्रह्मभूयाय भवति परिव्राडिति च श्रुतिः ॥ २२५ ॥

'With shaven head, without possession, non-attached, pure always within and without, the wandering monk is fit to become Brahman'—thus Scripture.

This is an adaptation from the *Jābālopaniṣad, 5: atha parivrāḍ vivarṇa-vāsā muṇḍo 'parigrahaḥ śucir adrohī bhaikṣaṇo brahmabhūyāya bhavatīti.*

NKL—bāhya-yajñopavītādirahito 'parigrahaḥ.

[226]

इत्यादिश्रुतिवाक्यानि स्मृतिभिः सह कोटिशः ।
ज्ञानाय विदधत्युच्चैः संन्यासं सर्वकर्मणाम् ॥ २२६ ॥

The texts like these from Scripture, along with crores of texts of Traditional Code, enjoin emphatically the renunciation of all action for the sake of knowledge.

NKL quotes the following text: *saśikhaṁ vapanaṁ kṛtvā bahiḥsūtraṁ tyajed budhaḥ, tasmāt karma na kurvanti yatayaḥ pāradarśinaḥ.*

[227]

यच्चाभाणि विना कार्यं नाधिकारो निरूप्यते ।
दोषोऽयमपि नैव स्याज्ज्ञानोपाये यथोदिते ॥ २२७ ॥

As for the defects you pointed out, viz. that without something to be done eligibility is not established (v.31), even this does not exist, as there is the means for knowledge in the manner stated above.

It cannot be said that there must be something-to-be-done (*kārya*), in the absence of which there will be no eligibility. Is it contended that *kārya* is necessary for establishing in one who desires release eligibility for the means to *jñāna*, or for *jñāna* itself? Not the first; for, the means to knowledge consists of 'hearing', etc., as preceded by *sannyāsa*. Here the means itself is *kārya*; nothing else.

[228]

विधिमार्गेऽधिकारस्य परीक्षा वर्तते यतः ।
फलभूते तु विज्ञाने नाधिकारो निरूप्यते ॥ २२८ ॥

As in the path of injunctions there exists an examination of eligibility, there is no need to establish eligibility in regard to knowledge which is of the nature of fruit.

The second alternative too is not possible. As regards *jñāna*, there is no question of considering eligibility. It is not the content of an injunction, and it is a seen fruit. Inference: what is in dispute, viz. *jñāna*, is not what is enjoined, because it is a fruit, like *svarga*.

NTV—vidheyasādhane kriyāyāṁ loka-vedayor adhikārasya parīkṣā vartate, jñāne tu pramāṇaphalabhūte pramāṇatantratvān na vidheyatā, tena adhikāras tatra nirūpyate. yato 'to yathodita-jñānopāya evā

'dhikāra ity arthaḥ. kiñca puruṣatantra eva vidheyatayā 'dhikāra iṣyate, na vastutantre, pramāṇaphalabhūtaṁ ca vijñānaṁ vastutantraṁ yataḥ ato vijñānasādhana evā 'dhikāraḥ, na jñāne.

[229]

अधिकारविचारो हि नृतन्त्रे वस्तुनीष्यते ।
वस्तुतन्त्रे न युक्तोऽसौ स्वयं चैव पुमर्थतः ॥ २२९ ॥

Inquiry into eligibility is necessary in respect of an object which is dependent on man; that is not proper in respect of what is reality-dependent, for that itself is the human goal.

What is called *jñāna* is nothing other than the destruction of nescience through the rise of the self-cognition from the major texts. In fact, the self itself is the destruction of ignorance. Therefore, self-knowledge is the human goal. That is the nature of reality, and does not depend on an agent.

NTV—puruṣeṇa kartum akartum anyathā ca kartum aśakyatvāt jñānasya ity arthaḥ. kiñca pumarthasādhanam eva vidheyaṁ na pumarthaḥ svargādi, brahmajñānam tu svayaṁ pumarthaḥ svargādi-sukha-sākṣātkārādivat, jñāna-jñeyasyā 'tmanaḥ svargādivat svayaṁ pumarthatvāt.

NKL—ātmanaḥ sukha - rūpatvāt tadākāra - vṛtteḥ sukhasākṣāt-kāratayā svargavat pumarthatvān na vidheyatvam.

AVS—vihitampraty adhikāri-cintā, jñānasyā 'vihitatvāt svargā-divat phalarūpatvāt jñānasya kartum-akartum-anyathākartum aśakyat-vāt jñāna-jñeyasya cā 'tmanaḥ pumarthatvāc ca nāthā 'dhikāri-cinteti. kva tarhi adhikāri-vicāraḥ prastuta iti cet jñāna-sādhana śravaṇādāv iti brūmaḥ.

[230]

अनात्मनि प्रमेयेऽर्थे या फलत्वेन संमता ।
प्रेमया सैव वेदान्तेष्वनुभूतिरिहाऽऽत्मनः ॥ २३० ॥

What is admitted as the fruit in the case of the not-self which is known as an object, that itself is to be known here in the Vedāntas as the experience of the self.

What was stated in v. 159-160a is here recalled. See note thereon.

NTV—etad uktaṁ bhavati-yā yā pumarthe saṁvit sā sā pumarthā loke dṛṣṭā yathā sukha-tatsādhanādy-anubhūtiḥ, ātmā ca sukha-tatsādhanādy-anubhūti-svabhāvo vedānta-prameyaḥ, tasmād anena pumarthena bhavitavyam iti.

na hy anubhūter apumarthatā loke paramārthato 'sti, apumartha-rūpatvasya anubhūter āropāt, anyathā nirupādhika-premāspadatā yadarthaṁ sarvaṁ yac ca nānyārthaṁ tat sukham iti sukha-lakṣaṇa-lakṣitatā ca anubhūty-ātmano na syāt.

[231]

विज्ञानमानन्दमिति ह्यात्मैवेति श्रुतेस्तथा ।
पुमर्थस्यैव मेयत्वं मातृत्वाद्यनपेक्षिणः ॥ २३१ ॥

Because of the Scriptural texts "Consciousness, bliss",[1] "The self alone (is bliss)",[2] the human goal is alone the object of knowledge, without being expectant of cognizership, etc.

Cognizership, etc., are conditioned by adjuncts such as egoity, etc., which are the products of nescience. Although the contents of cognition vary, because, again, of nescience, the immediateness of cognition is the same in all cases. That is the self of the nature of awareness. That is the human goal.

1. *BU*, III, ix, 28.

2. *SP* makes the *śruti* text referred to here read '*ātmaivānandaḥ*'. But there is no such text in the Upaniṣads, though there are many which teach the same meaning; e.g. *BU*, IV, iii, 32.

[232]

तज्ज्ञानं यस्य संजातं जातमेवास्य नान्यथा ।
कुक्षिस्थस्यापि हि सतो वामदेवस्य तद्यथा ॥ २३२ ॥

In whom the knowledge of that has arisen, in him, for ever, has that arisen and never will it be otherwise; as that (arose) in the sage Vāmadeva even while in the womb[1].

On the view that there is injunction of knowledge, it must be stated why there should be injunction. Is it for the non-sublation of knowledge, or for bringing about relation to the fruit, or for the destruction of the obstacles to knowledge?

Not the first; for in the case of Vāmadeva there was knowledge even while he was in the womb of his mother. There was no sublation of the study, etc., made in his earlier birth, and no one exhorted him to know the self. The true knowledge that results from 'hearing', etc., can never be sublated.

1. *AIU*, iv, 5.

NTV—yathā śukti-jñāna-samakālam eva tat-prāptir evam brahma-jñāna-samakālam eva tat-prāptir bhavati, yathā garbhastho vāmadevo brahma-jñāna samakālam eva sārvātmyaṁ pratipede.

[233-234]

तच्चाविद्यानिरास्येव व्याधभावनयाऽञ्जितः ।
राजसूनोः स्मृतिप्राप्तौ व्याधभावो निवर्तते ॥ २३३ ॥

यथैवमात्मनोऽज्ञस्य तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यतः ।
लब्धैकात्म्यस्मृतेर्व्येति सर्वाऽविद्या सकार्यका ॥ २३४ ॥

And that certainly removes nescience. When for the prince who is deluded by the idea that he is a hunter there is the recollection, the hunter-idea is removed; even so, for him who is ignorant of the self and attains recollection of the one self through the sentence 'That thou art', etc., all nescience, along with its products, vanishes.

Nor is the second alternative possible. There is no need for an injunction to bring about a relation between self-knowledge and the destruction of ignorance which is the fruit.

Nor the third. In the story of the prince who grew as the son of a hunter, forgetting his royal birth, the destruction of the obstructing belief is brought about by true recollection, even without an injunction.

NTV—kaścid rājakumāro jātamātrād eva vyādhakulaṁ praviṣṭo vyādho 'smī 'ty ātmānaṁ manyate, tatra rajākumāro 'sī 'ty upadeśa-mātreṇa rājakumāra-smṛtau vyādhabhāvo nivartate.

NKL—kasyacid rājakumārasya garbhaniḥsāraṇānantara-bhraṣṭa-rājyatayā vanaṁ praviṣṭasya vyādhaiḥ putratayā poṣitasya dṛḍhabhā-vita-vyādhabhāvasya auṣadhādi-sevayā prāpta-rājya-sāmarthyasya tan-mantrabhiś cinha-viśeṣa-darśanena avagata-rājabhāvasya nāsti tvam vyādho rājaiveti bodhita-vākyaja-bodhaḥ abodha-dhvaṁse nāparam apekṣate yathā ity arthaḥ.

[235]

यत एवमतो नात्र विधिः कल्प्यः कथञ्चन ।
अनर्थकः कल्पितोऽपि तस्येहानुपयोगतः ॥ २३५ ॥

This being so, injunction here is not to be assumed by any means. And, the assumption is futile, as it is of no use here.

Moreover, does Scripture say that there is injunction with regard to knowledge, or is such injunction assumed? There is no Scriptural declaration to that effect. As for the texts like, 'The self is to be seen,' (*BU*, II, iv, 5) etc., they are not injunctions. This will be explained later on.

There is no need to assume an injunction, for there is no ground for such an assumption. As, in respect of the self, activity and turning away are not possible, what is the use of assuming an injunction?

[236]

उत्पत्तिराप्तिः संस्कारो विकारश्च विधेः फलम् ।
मुक्तिर्विलक्षणैतेभ्यस्तेनेहानर्थको विधिः ॥ २३६ ॥

Origination, attainment, purification, and modification—these are the fruit of injunction. Release is different from these; therefore, injunction here is futile.

Injunction is possible only with regard to action. Action may lead to one of four results: origination, attainment, purification, and modification. Release which is the fruit of knowledge is none of these. It cannot be originated, because it is not what is made, and is beginningless. It is not what is attained, because it is without any relation, and is of the nature of what is eternally attained. It is not what is purified, because it is devoid of qualities, and no speciality can attach itself to it. It cannot be modified, because it is not a finite entity and is unchangeable. Therefore, release is not the fruit of an injunction.

NTV—vastunaḥ.....notpādyatā ananyāyatta-prakāśatvāt, na svaviṣaya-jñāna-vikāreṇa vikāryatā, niravidyatvāc ca na saṁskāryatā, ātmatvāc ca nāpyatā ity arthaḥ.

NKL—piṇḍotpatti-phalaṁ saṁyavanaṁ piṣṭau saṁyantīti vidhīyate. payaḥ-prāpti-phalaṁ dohanaṁ gāṁ dogdhīti vrīhi-saṁskāra-phalaṁ prokṣaṇaṁ vrīhīn prokṣatīti vrīhi-vikāra-phalo 'vaghāto vrīhīn avahantīti.

[237]

अनन्यायत्तसंसिद्धेर्निरविद्यात्मवस्तुनः ।

न क्रियात्वं फलत्वं वा नापि कारकरूपता ॥ २३७ ॥

Since the real self which is free from nescience is not brought about by anything else, there is not for it the nature of being act, fruit, or causal correlate.

It cannot be said that Brahman is the content of the injunction to meditate. For, no action is possible with reference to Brahman. Brahman is not dependent on anything else. It is self-established. It cannot even be called a fruit, because it is not generated by any act.

[238]

अतोऽत्र विध्यभावोऽयं न कथञ्चन दूषणम् ।

अलंकृतिरियं साध्वी वेदान्तेषु प्रशस्यते ॥ २३८ ॥

Hence, the non-existence of injunction, here, is by no means a defect; this is a good ornament; it is praised in the Vedāntas.

The Vedāntas do not become *apramāṇa* because there is no injunction in them. On the contrary, the absence of injunctions is their merit.

AVS—yatra vidhi-kṛtyaṁ nāsti tatra vidhyasaṁbhavo na doṣaḥ, pratyuta alaṁkāraḥ.

[239]

चोदनाभिर्नियुक्तोऽहं तथा ब्रह्माहमित्यपि ।

परस्परविरुद्धत्वादेकदैकत्र न द्वयम् ॥ २३९ ॥

'By the commands I am prompted' and 'I am Brahman'—these two, because of mutual contradiction, cannot be (valid) at the same time and in the same place.

Injunction and knowledge belong to different universes of discourse. The one who has self-knowledge cannot be the patient of an injunction. There is nothing for him to do or not to do.

[240]

स्वामी सन्न हि भृत्येन स्वामिनेव नियुज्यते ।
संबोधनीय एवासौ सुप्तो राजेव बन्दिभिः ॥ २४० ॥

Being master, one is not prompted by a servant, as by a master. He is only to be awakened, as a sleeping king by his bards.

Even the seeker of knowledge is not to be prompted by an injunction. He is the master of the Veda, and not its servant, because he has risen above the way of *saṁsāra*. He is only to be awakened, even as a king may be by his bards.

The above explanation is on the assumption that the entire verse refers to the seeker of knowledge. An alternative explanation is that the first half of the verse applies to the one who has self-knowledge already, and the second half to the one who seeks it.

The seeker of knowledge may require prompting for 'hearing', etc., but not for knowledge.

NTV—sarva-niyantuḥ pratyagātmano veda-svāmitayā na veda-niyojyatayā, kiṁtu avidyā-nidrayā supto bodhyata eva.

NKL—lakṣaṇayā tadākāra-vṛtti-janana-dvārā ajñāna-nivartakatvāt prāmāṇyam ity arthaḥ.

AVS—mumukṣuḥ padārtha-vivekavān veda-svāmitvān na vedena preryate, kiṁtu bodhyata ity arthaḥ.

[241]

चोदनालक्षणत्वादि धर्मं प्रत्येव गृह्यताम् ।
धर्मस्यैव प्रतिज्ञोक्तेर्न तु ब्रह्म प्रतीष्यते ॥ २४१ ॥

Being of the nature of command, etc., is to be understood with reference to religious duty (*dharma*) alone; because religious duty alone is declared as the premise; and it is not Brahman that is intended.

Injunctions have meaning only in regard to religious duty (*dharma*), and not in regard to Brahman. The *Pūrvamīmāṁsā-sūtra* has only *dharma* as the content of its inquiry.

[242]

अथातो धर्म इत्युक्तेश्चोदनालक्षणोक्तितः ।
तद्भूतानां क्रियार्थेन ह्यम्नायस्य क्रियार्थतः ॥ २४२ ॥

Because of the statement "Then, therefore, (the desire to know) religious duty" (*PM* I, i, 1), because of the declaration "Of the nature of command" (I, i, 2), because of (the *sūtra* I, i, 25) "(In a sentence) all words denoting things are (in close textual juxta-position) with the words expressive of action", and because of (the *sūtra* I, ii, 1) "Scripture is for the sake of ritual", (Brahman is not subsidiary to injunction).

A few aphorisms of the *Pūrvamīmāṁsā-sūtra* are cited here to show that injunction has no reference to Brahman.

[243]

भावार्थाः कर्मशब्दा ये प्रतीयेत क्रिया ततः ।
इत्येवं नरतन्त्रेऽर्थे ज्ञेया द्वादशलक्षणी ॥ २४३ ॥

"All verbs are indicative of productive operations (*bhāvanās*); from them the unseen potency (*apūrva*) is known", etc., (II, i, 1). Thus the twelve-chaptered work (on Pūrva-mīmāṁsā) is to be understood as having for purport what is dependent on man.

After quoting another aphorism, it is declared here that *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* discusses *dharma* alone which depends on man, and not Brahman which is beyond such distinctions as action, causal agent, etc.

NKL—kartum akartum anyathā vā kartuṁ vyacchakam, tad viṣayā prāktana-mīmāṁsā na para-niṣpanna-brahma-gocarā ity arthaḥ.

[244]

वेदान्तार्थापवादाय नालं साऽतत्प्रमाणतः ।
मानं नालं निराकर्तुं वस्तु यन्मान्तरैर्मितम् ॥ २४४ ॥

It cannot remove the sense taught by Vedānta; for it is not an evidence therefor. A thing that is known through one means of valid knowledge cannot be set aside by another means of valid knowledge.

Mīmāṁsā has no power to sublate what is taught by *Vedānta*. Nor is injunction of *karma* capable of cancelling what is known through *Vedānta*.

If the reading be *tat-pramāṇataḥ* instead of *atat-pramāṇataḥ*, then the rendering would be 'for, it is the authority for that (viz. *dharma*).'

AVS—pūrva-bhāgasya vyāvahārikaṁ prāmāṇyam na tattvāvedana-lakṣaṇam, ato na tattvamādi-siddhārtha-bādhakatvam.

[245–246]

स्वमेयमात्रशून्यत्वान्मितेर्नान्यत्र मानता ।
अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा इत्याद्युक्तं नयान्वितम् ॥ २४५ ॥

मीमांसान्यायवत्त्वाभ्यां धर्ममीमांसनोक्तिवत् ।

एवं सत्यनुकूलार्थं तत्त्वमित्यादिकं वचः ॥ २४६ ॥

An evidence is valid only in respect of what can be known by it ; it is not an evidence elsewhere. The text " Then, therefore, the desire to know Brahman ", etc., is endowed with reasoning, because there are enquiry and rules, as in the case of the Pūrva-mīmāṁsā text. This being so, the text 'That thou art', etc., has a harmonious sense.

A *pramāṇa* functions only in respect of its content. It has no business to intrude into another field. If *Karma-mīmāṁsā* be valid, *Vedānta* too is valid. So, it cannot be said that *Vedānta* is a pseudo-*pramāṇa*.

[247–248 a]

सर्ववेदान्तविषयमन्यथा तद्विरुध्यते ।

न तत्र करणापेक्षा नेतिकर्तव्यता तथा ॥ २४७ ॥

यत्र यत्राऽऽत्मभावेन श्रुत्या ब्रह्मावबोध्यते ।

(It is) the content of all Vedāntas. Otherwise, that would be contradicted. Not there is the expectancy of instrument, nor of a *modus operandi* where by Scripture Brahman is made known as being of the nature of the self.

The Vedānta-teaching is about the non-dual Brahman. Its aim, thus, is to make known the truth. *Karma-kāṇḍa*, however, which depends on differences such as action, etc., makes known only what is not true. So, it must be admitted that each is *pramāṇa* in its own field.

There can be no productive operation (*bhāvanā*) in relation to Brahman. Each productive operation has three elements. What is to be accomplished (*bhāvya*)? What is the instrument (*karaṇa*)? And, what is the *modus operandi* (*itikartavyatā*)? Brahman is not what is to be accomplished (*bhāvya*). The other two elements, therefore, have no meaning with reference to it. *Bhāvanā* relates to action, and not to Brahman. The Vedāntas only teach that Brahman is the Self.

NKL—sarva-vedānta-viṣayaṁ sarvopaniṣad-gataṁ mahāvākyam upakramādi-liṅga-gati-sāmānyābhyāṁ tatparam ity arthaḥ.

kiṁ kena kathaṁ bhāvayed ity aṁśatrayāpekṣā bhāvanā neha saṁbhavati, karaṇāṁśābhāvad iti bhāvaḥ.

AVS—yatra aṁśa-trayaṁ tatra bhāvanā, yatra bhāvanā tatra vidhiḥ, atra tu tattvamasīty-ādi-pradeśeṣu na aṁśa-trayam, tata eva na bhāvanā, tata eva na vidhiḥ, ato 'dhikāri-sādhana-bheda iti.

[248 b–249 a]

इतिकर्तव्यतादानं करणादानमेव च ॥ २४८ ॥

तत्र तत्र विधिः स्थाने प्रहितस्य फलेच्छया ।

Where *modus operandi* and instrument are brought in, it is but proper that there should be an injunction for one who is impelled by the desire for fruit.

Bhāvanā with the three elements mentioned above is possible only in the sphere of action.

[249 b–250]

आप्ताशेषपुमर्थत्वात्त्यक्तानर्थस्य च स्वतः ॥ २४९ ॥

अनात्मनीव नेच्छेयं कथंचित्स्यादिहात्मनि ।

तन्निवृत्तौ निवर्तेते इतिकर्तव्यसाधने ॥ २५० ॥

Because the human goal has been attained fully and because evil has been removed of its own accord, there does not arise by any means desire here for the self, as for the not-self.

When that desire is removed, the *modus operandi* and means are removed.

It is intelligible that there may be desire for heaven, etc., which constitute the not-self. There can be no such desire in relation to the self. When one knows the nature of the self from the major texts, one realizes one's eternal bliss-nature and freedom from evil. So, the self is not the fruit or result of some activity. There can be no *bhāvanā* with regard to it.

[251]

निरन्तरायतोऽशेषपुमर्थस्याऽऽत्मरूपतः ।
न चांशलयशून्येह भावनेष्टा परीक्षकैः ॥ २५१ ॥

As the human goal without residue and free from obstacles is of the nature of the self, a productive operation devoid of the three elements is not acceptable to inquirers.

It cannot be said that there may be in *Vedānta* a *bhāvanā* without the three elements. Such a productive operation is impossible. And, the one who has realized the self desires nothing; he has nothing to accomplish.

NTV—avidyākhyontarāyo vidyodayād eva nivartate na tu vidhivaśād ity arthaḥ.

NKL—pumarthasya sukha-sākṣātkārasyā 'tmarūpataḥ svataḥprāptatvān nirantarāyato pratibandhatvād bhāvyāntarasya kalpayitum aśakyatvād ity arthaḥ....avidyāstamayaḥ phalaṁ dhīsādhyaṁ dhīś ca na prayatnam apekṣata ity arthaḥ.

[252 a]

भावनातो न चान्यत्र विधिरभ्युपगम्यते ।

And in cases other than where there is productive operation, injunction is not admitted.

Since *bhāvanā* is not possible in the case of Brahman, there can be no injunction with regard to it. Brahman is made known by the major texts. It is only that knowledge that is the means to release, not *karma*. Therefore, for the two sections the eligible persons and the means are different.

NTV—tasmāt pūrṇa-niśreyasa-pratyag-anubhūty-avidyā-nivṛttyā tadavaśeṣa-sādhana-jñāne vidhyabhāvān na tatrā 'dhikāraḥ, kiṁtu jñāna-sādhana-śravaṇādāv eveti siddham.

[252 b–253]

मोहमात्रान्तरायायां मुक्तावस्तु यथोदितम् ॥ २५२ ॥

एकदेशो विकारो वा संसारी त्वात्मनो यदा ।

किं तदाऽप्युक्तमार्गेण मुक्तिः किंवा क्रियाश्रयात् ॥ २५३ ॥

" If delusion were the only obstacle, what has been stated (by you) will do for release. When, however, the soul in bondage is either a part (*ekadeśa*) or a modification (*vikāra*) of the self, even then, is release got through the said path, or as dependent on action?"

Pūrvapakṣa—If delusion alone were the obstacle to *mokṣa*, then *jñāna* may remove it. But it is not so. In the views which regard the *jīva* as a part or as a mode of the supreme spirit, there would be required *karma* for effecting release. If that be so, how can there be difference of means as between the two sections?

[254]

निवृत्तावेव निःशेषसंसारस्य तदाऽपि तु ।
आगन्तोरधिकारः स्यान्न प्रवृत्तौ कथंचन ॥ २५४ ॥

Even then, the eligibility is for turning away from the adventitious transmigration without residue and not, by any means, for activity.

Siddhānta—Even in the view that the *jīva* is a part of Brahman, what is it that is regarded as release—is it the attainment of Brahman, or is it the destruction of difference? On the first alternative, the non-difference of the part and the whole is not brought about by *karma*, because that is self-established. What is required is only the destruction of bondage including *karma*. Therefore, the attainment of Brahman does not require *karma*.

[255]

आत्माज्ञाननिमित्तस्य ह्यन्यत्वानुपपत्तितः ।
तदाऽप्यविद्याविध्वस्तावधिकारो न कर्मणि ॥ २५५ ॥

As difference is unintelligible being dependent on nescience of self, even so, eligibility is for destroying nescience, not for action.

Now for the other alternative. If the *jīva* is a part of Brahman, it is non-different therefrom. So, there can be no real difference between them. And, the difference must be due to nescience. The destruction of that can be only through *jñāna*, and not through *karma*.

[256]

कर्तव्याभावतस्त्वेवं विकारेऽपि न कर्मणि ।
कारणैकत्वसंपत्तेः स्वतःसिद्धत्वहेतुतः ॥ २५६ ॥

Even if (the soul be) a modification (of the self) there is no (eligibility for) work, as there is nothing to be done, since attaining oneness with the cause is established of itself.

After examining the view that the *jīva* is a part of Brahman, the other view that it is a mode is here considered. If the *jīva* is a mode, then Brahman must be its principal. Here, what is release? Is it the attainment of Brahman which is the principal? Or, is it the destruction of difference from that? Not the first, for the non-difference of the effect from the cause is not accomplished through *karma*, because that non-difference is natural.

[257]

मृदापत्तिर्घटस्येव विकारस्याऽऽत्मनो ध्रुवम् ।
अविकारात्मसंपत्तिः सा च तत्त्वावबोधतः ॥ २५७ ॥

As the attainment of clay by pot, the attainment of the unmodified self by the *jīva*-self which is a modification is certain; and that is through knowledge of the truth.

The other alternative, viz., that *karma* is required for the destruction of difference is now refuted. Just as pot, the effect, is non-different by nature from clay, the cause, so also is the *jīva* from Brahman. The difference, such as it is, must be due to nescience; and that can be removed only by true knowledge.

[258]

कार्यकारणयोर्भित्तौ कार्यकारणता कुतः ।
अभित्तौ च तयोरैक्यात्कार्यकारणता कुतः ॥ २५८ ॥

If cause and effect be different, how is there relation of cause and effect; if non-different, since they are identical, how is there the relation of cause and effect?

Hitherto, admitting the views that the *jīva* is a part and a mode of Brahman, it was shown that *karma* cannot be the direct means to *mokṣa*. Now, those views themselves are criticized.

At the basis of all relations is that of cause and effect. But this relation is unintelligible.

[259-260 a]

विज्ञानात्मविकारस्य कारणैक्यं विमुक्तता ।
स्वतस्तस्य च संसिद्धेः कार्यता नोपपद्यते ॥ २५९ ॥

कर्मातोऽनर्थकं मुक्तावेकदेशविकारयोः ।

Release is identity of the modification of the intelligence-self with the cause. Since that is established of itself, it is not something to be accomplished (*kāryatā*). There is futility of action for release of what is either a part or a modification.

Brahman is of the nature of consciousness. Even those who hold that the *jīva* is a part or mode of Brahman believe that its release consists in its identity with Brahman which is its cause and ground. But that identity is self-established, and so cannot be accomplished by *karma*.

[260 b-261]

अप्यनर्थाय कर्म स्यात्क्रियमाणं न मुक्तये ॥ २६० ॥

प्रतिकूलं विमुक्तेश्च क्रियमाणमसंशयम् ।
कर्माऽऽरभेत तेनैतन्मुक्तौ कर्म निरर्थकम् ॥ २६१ ॥

Moreover action that is being done will make for evil, not for release. Action that is being done will produce, without doubt, obstacle to release. Therefore, in regard to this release, action is futile.

Not only is *karma* futile, but also it will be the cause of evil. *Karma* that is done according to the injunction of Veda will lead to *Svarga*, etc., that are obstacles to *mokṣa*.

NKL—na kevalaṁ nairarthakyaṁ kaivalya-pratikūla-saṁsārā-raṁbhakatvād anarthakaraṁ ca.

[262]

विकारोऽत्यन्तनिर्भिन्नो यदा तु स्याद्विकारिणः ।
तदाऽपि विकृतेर्नाशो मुक्तिरित्यभिधीयते ॥ २६२ ॥

If, however, the modification is wholly different from that which is modified, even then, it must be said that the destruction of the modification is release.

If it be held that the *jīva* is radically different from Brahman, then release would consist in its total destruction.

[263]

अलाप्यनर्थकं कर्म तत्फलासंभवत्वतः ।
कर्मेव ज्ञानमप्यत्र फलाभावादनर्थकम् ॥ २६३ ॥

Even here action is futile, since there is no possibility of its fruit. Like action, even knowledge is of no use, here, as there is no fruit.

If it be held that the destruction of the *jīva* is release, there would be no need for *karma*. If it be said that there may be need for knowledge, then our view will have to be accepted.

NKL—phalinobhāve phalāsaṁbhavād ity abhisandhiḥ.

[264]

नैवाविद्याकृतैवासौ वास्तवी यदि संसृतिः ।
स्वरूपनाशदोषः स्यादेकदेशेऽपि पूर्ववत् ॥ २६४ ॥

If transmigration were real, it will not be a product of nescience. There will be the defect of destruction of nature, even on the view of (the *jīva* being) a part, as before.

Moreover, on the view that the *jīva* is a mode of Brahman, is bondage natural, or is it nescience-caused? If bondage be natural, it cannot be destroyed by Brahman-knowledge. Nor can it be removed by *karma*, bacause *karma* is the cause of bondage.

The same criticism holds good with regard to the view that the *jīva* is a part of Brahman.

[265-266 a]

यदा त्वविद्ययाऽध्यस्तं संसारित्वं न वस्तुतः ।
विकारेऽवयवे चैव तदा पूर्वोक्त एव तु ॥ २६५ ॥

पक्षो निर्वहणीयः स्यादस्माभिरपि संमतः ।

If, however, transmigration is superimposed by nescience, and not a reality, whether (the *jīva* be) a modification or a part, then what was stated before has to be maintained. This is acceptable to us also.

If bondage be nescience-caused, then the modality or part-hood of the *jīva* cannot be real; that too would be the result of nescience. If that be so, then, what results is our view. The two sections of the Veda are different; and the persons eligible for them are different.

[266 b-267]

सर्ववादाविरोधी च नातो विधिरिहेष्यते ॥ २६६ ॥
तदा हि कल्पनाः सर्वा विकारावयवादिकाः ।
वृथैवेमा ह्यविद्यैव सर्वाः संपादयिष्यति ॥ २६७ ॥

This does not conflict with any view. Therefore, there is not admitted here injunction. Then, indeed, all assumptions such as 'modification', 'part', etc., are futile. Nescience itself will accomplish all these.

All those who believe in *mokṣa* will have to admit that bondage is nescience-caused and that release is through knowledge. Then, it follows that there is no possibility of injunction in the *Vedāntas*. *Mokṣa* is not a fruit like *Svarga*, and *jñāna* is not dependent on human will. So, the *Vedāntas* terminate simply after revealing the nature of Reality. The assumptions that the *jīva* is a part or mode, etc., of Brahman are all imaginations.

NKL—ātmajñānān niḥśreyasādhigama iti sarva-vādinām avivāda-padam ity arthaḥ.

[268-269 a]

पूर्णं निःश्रेयसं तस्मात्तदपूर्णमविद्यया ।
आभासते मृषैवातो यथाभूतात्मविद्यया ॥ २६८ ॥

प्रध्वस्तायामविद्यायां पूर्णमेवावशिष्यते ।

Wholeness is release. Hence the non-wholeness which is on account of nescience appears but illusorily. Therefore, when nescience is destroyed through the knowledge of the real self, wholeness alone remains.

Brahman is the whole (*pūrṇa*); that itself is release, perfection. *Karma* cannot achieve that, because Brahman is not a finite object.

Cp. BU, V, i, 1 :

pūrṇam adaḥ pūrṇam idam
pūrṇāt pūrṇam udacyate,
pūrṇasya pūrṇam ādāya
pūrṇam evā 'vaśiṣyate.

[269 b-270]

अनर्थको विधिस्तस्मात्सर्वो निःश्रेयसं प्रति ॥ २६९ ॥

इत्येतन्न्यायतः सिद्धं यत्तु प्राक्चोदितं त्वया ।
आम्नायस्य क्रियार्थत्वादित्यत्राप्यभिधीयते ॥ २७० ॥

Futile, therefore, is all injunction in regard to release; this has been logically established. (v. 228, ff.) As for what was objected to by you 'Because Scripture is for the sake of ritual' (v. 36), in regard to this also, it may be remarked as follows.

Since Brahman does not fall within any of the four categories of the fruit of action, there can be no injunction with regard to it.

As for what was said that Scripture is for the sake of ritual, we have already stated our reply. We shall explain that further.

ĀVS—niḥśreyasa-śabdena brhmābhilapyate, tat pūrṇaṁ deśādy-aparicchinnaṁ, tasya ca bhedaḥ tad-avidyā-vilasitaḥ, vidyayā tv avidyā-nivṛttau brahmaiva bhavati, ataḥ sarva-prakāro vidhir mokṣaṁ-praty anarthaka eva.

[271]

तत्राऽऽम्नायाभिधानस्य ह्याम्नायांशाभिधानतः ।
विध्युक्तीनां क्रियार्थत्वं सिद्धं हेतुतयोच्यते ॥ २७१ ॥

There, the term, '*āmnāya*' refers only to a part of Scripture, because 'being for the sake of ritual' is only as regards injunctive texts.

In the *Pūrvamīmāṁsā-sūtra* (I, ii, 1) 'Since Scripture has action for purport', etc., the word 'Scripture' (*āmnāya*) refers only to the *karma-kāṇḍa*, and does not include the Upaniṣads. From *PM*, I, i, 2, it is clear that only injunctive texts have action for purport, and not all scriptural texts.

[272]

क्रियाप्रकरणस्थानां विधिशेषात्मनां सताम् ।
वचसामक्रियार्थानामानर्थक्याय तद्वचः ॥ २७२ ॥

That statement (in the *Sūtra*: *ānarthakyam atadarthānām*) relates to the futility of those words which do not have ritual for purport, but which are subsidiary to injunction in the context of ritual.

The expression in *PM*, I, ii, i, 'There is futility for those (words) which do not have that (ritual) for purport', also refers to *karma-kāṇḍa*.

[273]

न तूपनिषदां न्याय्यं पार्थगर्थ्यस्य संभवात् ।
पूर्वोक्तेनैव न्यायेन नातस्तद्विधिशेषता ॥ २७३ ॥

Because they have a different purport, it is not proper to regard the Upaniṣads as auxiliary to injunction. This is evident, by the aforesaid reasoning.

Although the Upaniṣads do not have action for purport, they are not futile. They have a different sense; and their fruit cannot be denied, because it is declared in Scripture, and because it is actually experienced by the wise.

[274]

विधिना त्वेकवाक्यत्वादिति यच्चापि चोदितम् ।
तेषामेव तदप्यस्तु तदानर्थक्यचोदनात् ॥ २७४ ॥

As for what was urged, 'Because of syntactical unity with injunction,' let that be so with regard to

those (texts which occur in the ritual sections); because it is declared that they would be futile (otherwise).

PM, I, ii, 7 'Because of syntactical unity with injunction through eulogizing, (the non-injunctive texts) may be for the sake of injunction' (see v. 36) also refers to those non-injunctive texts which are to be found in the *karma-kāṇḍa*.

NTV—na cā 'rthavādastha-padānām anuṣṭhāpanam asti, ato yuktaṁ tāni vidhinaikavākyatām anubhaveyur iti.

[275]

न तु वेदान्तवचसां दृष्टार्थत्वेन हेतुना ।
तद्बुद्धेः पृथगर्थत्वमुक्तमेवातिविस्तरात् ॥ २७५ ॥

This is, however, not so as regards Vedānta texts, for the reason that they have a seen fruit. That the knowledge thereof has a different purport has been explained at length (v. 23 *et seq.*).

Those texts in which there is no mention of fruit may have syntactical unity with those wherein a fruit is mentioned, and they may be subsidiary to the latter. The Upaniṣads, however, do have a fruit and that too a seen fruit (*dṛṣṭa-phala*), and not an unseen fruit like *Svarga*. Therefore, it is clear that the Vedānta texts have a purport other than what the ritual-sections have.

NTV—na co 'paniṣad-gatāni padāny adṛṣṭārthīni bhavanti. na hi vedāntaiḥ pratyag-advaye brahmaṇy avagate jñātavyam āptavyaṁ vā 'vaśiṣyate.

[276a]

अन्यार्थानुपपत्तेश्च वेदान्तवचसां तथा ।

And because for the Vedānta texts, being for the sake of another is unintelligible.

The texts about *Prayāja* (fore-sacrifice), etc., are auxiliary to the texts about *Darśapūrṇamāsa* rites because the fore-sacrifices are helpful in regard to the *Darśapūrṇamāsa* rites yielding their fruit. But there is no such relation between the Vedānta texts and the ritual texts. The self which is known through Vedānta receives no help from *karma*. And so, Vedānta is not subsidiary to *karma-kāṇḍa*.

[276b-277a]

अर्थैकत्वगतौ सत्यां वाक्यभेदप्रकल्पना ॥ २७६ ॥

न न्याय्या सेति दृष्टत्वाद्देवस्य त्वादिवाक्यवत् ।

"When there is unity of sense, to postulate sentence-split is not proper, as it is seen in the text: (At the impulse) of the divine (Savitṛ, I take) thee, etc.

Pūrvapakṣa—Where syntactical unity (*ekavākyatā*) is possible, sentence-split (*vākyabheda*) is improper. This is the rule. As there is syntactical unity between the *Prayāja* text and the *Darśapūrṇamāsa* text, so is there syntactical unity between the Vedānta texts and the ritual-texts. The reason for this is that they have a unitary sense. As an instance may be cited the syntactical unity between '*devasya tvā savituḥ*' and '*nirvapāmi*' in the text 'At the impulse (*prasavana*) of the divine Savitṛ, I take thee with the arms of the Aśvins, with the hands of Pūṣan, thee, agreeable to Agni!' ((*Vājasaneyi-saṁhitā*, i. 10). See *Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa*, *SBE*, vol. xii, p. 16.

NKL—karma-jñānayoḥ prayāja-darśapūrṇamāsavad aṅgāṅgitvāt tatkāṇḍayos tad-vākya-vedakārthayor ekavākyatva-saṁbhave tad-bhedo na kalpyo gauravād ity arthaḥ.

[277b-278a]

तथैव पृथगर्थत्वगतौ भिन्नवचस्त्वतः ॥ २७७ ॥

इषे त्वादिषु दृष्टत्वान्न न्याय्यैकार्थकल्पना ।

Even so, where there is difference in sense, there must be sentence-split. This is seen in *iṣe tvā*, etc. So the postulation of unity of sense is not proper.

Siddhānta—There is no unity of sense. Where there is difference of sense, sentence-split has to be admitted. As an illustration may be cited the text '*iṣe tvā, ūrje tvā*' [For the sake of growth, thee (I cut); for the sake of strength, thee (I plane)] (*Vājaṣaneyi-saṁhitā*, I, i). These *mantras* are addressed to the presiding deity of the *palāśa* tree as it is being cut and planed. The question here is whether '*iṣe tvā, ūrje tvā*' is one *mantra* or two. The answer is that they are two *mantras*, even though they are found together. See *PM*, II, i, 47: 'When the sentences are equally independent (of one another) they should be treated as syntactically distinct (sentences).'

[278b-279a]

ज्ञानकाण्डार्थशेषत्वं कर्मकाण्डस्य यत्पुनः ॥ २७८ ॥
विनियोजकहेत्वेतत्तयोर्वाक्यैकवाक्यतः ।

As for the subsidiariness of the ritual section to the sense of the knowledge-section, that is accounted for as a case of syntactical unity with sentence, because of (the *vividiṣā* text) being the applicatory text.

We do admit that the ritual section (*karma-kāṇḍa*) is auxiliary to the knowledge-section (*jñāna-kāṇḍa*) through purification of the mind. This is evidenced by the *vividiṣā* text. But this does not mean that the two sections have an identical sense. The unity here is as between two different sentences which are related as the helper and the helped. It is not like the syntactical unity of *mantras* and *arthavādas*, which have no independent purport, with injunction (*vidhi*). Just as the injunction to earn wealth is related to the injunction to perform sacrifice, so is *karma-kāṇḍa to jñāna-kāṇḍa*

Wealth may be used for purposes other than the performance of sacrifice. Similarly, *karma* may be the means to ends other than *jñāna*. What the *vividiṣā* text says is that *karma* is to be used as a means to *jñāna*. So, there is, as between the two *kāṇḍas*, syntactical unity of sentence with a sentence (*vākyaikavākyatā*.)

NTV—etad uktaṁ bhavati—tam etaṁ vedānuvacanenetyādi viniyojaka-vaśāt saṁskāra-dvāreṇa vividiṣā-dvāreṇa vā jñānotpatti-śeṣatvam eva karmaṇāṁ, na mokṣa-śeṣatvaṁ, ato bhinnārthatvāt naikavākyatvaṁ karma-vijñāna-kāṇḍayor iti.

[279b-280]

न्यायेन वक्ष्यमाणेन भूयोऽप्येतत्प्रवक्ष्यते ॥ २७९ ॥
पार्थगर्थ्यमतः सिद्धमपास्तविधिलक्षणम् ।
सर्वोपनिषदां चाऽऽत्मज्ञानं कैवल्यसाधनम् ॥ २८० ॥

By the reasoning to be hereafter set forth, this will be stated again (i.e. that the Upaniṣads have a fruit of their own). Therefore, for all the Upaniṣads there is a different sense. This is self-knowledge which has no characteristic of injunction and is the means to release (*kaivalya*).

There may be *vākyaikavākyatā* between two sentences each of which has a fruit of its own. The Upaniṣad texts have as their fruit self-knowledge. So, they have a sense different from that of the ritual texts.

[281]

निःशेषवाङ्मनःकायप्रवृत्त्युपरमात्मिका ।
तन्निष्ठा चेह विज्ञेया यथोक्तन्यायवर्त्मना ॥ २८१ ॥

The discipline (of knowledge) is of the nature of the quiescence of all activity, of speech, mind and body. This is to be known by the reasoning already set forth.

It is only for those who are endowed with quiescence, self-control, etc., that the Upaniṣads reveal knowledge.

AVS—niṣṭhā-śabdena śravaṇādy atra gṛhyate, tad eva jñāna-sādhanam ity arthaḥ.

[282]

अधिकारोऽपि तस्यां च सिद्धोऽशेषक्रियात्यजः ।
जिज्ञासोरेव कर्तुस्तु न सिषाधयिषोः सदा ॥ २८२ ॥

Eligibility therefor (*viz.*, the discipline) is also established only for him who has renounced all activity and who desires knowledge; and not for the agent who always seeks to accomplish something.

The eligibility for the path of knowledge, viz. *śravaṇa*, etc., does not depend on *niyoga*. It is the *sannyāsin* that is the eligible person for *jñāna*, and not the agent of actions.

[283]

ब्रह्मात्मतत्त्वव्युत्पत्तिमात्रेणाप्यधिकारिता ।
भवत्येवाल जिज्ञासोरज्ञस्यापि मुमुक्षुतः ॥ २८३ ॥

Eligibility results even for him who, although ignorant, possesses a general knowledge about the truth of the Brahman-self, and who desires knowledge and release.

It may be argued that eligibility for knowledge is not possible for the one who does not know Brahman, and is not necessary for

the one who already knows it. The reply is that the one who desires release learns from the Vedāntas a preliminary and quite general knowledge about Brahman, and thus gains eligibility for *śravaṇa*, etc.

[284]

मैवं प्रक्रमसंहारपर्यालोचनया पुरा ।
वेदस्यैकार्थ्यतात्पर्यमेकवाक्यतयोदितम् ॥ २८४ ॥

"Not thus. It has been stated already that, on a consideration of the initial and concluding passages, the Veda has one sense and purport; and so, there is syntactical unity.

Pūrvapakṣa—Through a study of the initial and concluding texts of the Veda, it is learnt that the Veda has *kārya* alone for purport. So, we must infer that the Vedāntas have syntactical unity with the *karma-kāṇḍa*. That being so, there cannot be a difference of eligibility for the Vedāntas.

[285]

तेन निःशेषवेदोक्तकारिणोऽत्राधिकारिता ।
सिद्धे ह्यनेकवाक्यत्वे कल्प्या भिन्नाधिकारिता ॥ २८५ ॥

"Therefore, eligibility, here, is for the one who does all that is enjoined by the Veda. For, it is only when the diversity of context has been established, that there is need for assuming difference in eligibility."

Since the two *kāṇḍas* have syntactical unity, there is no difference in eligibility. He who has performed all the rites and sacrifices, follows *jñāna-niyoga* and attains *mokṣa*.

[286]

मैवं भिन्नैकवाक्यत्वे प्रागस्माभिः समर्थिते ।
ततश्च भवदुक्तस्य चोद्यस्येह न संभवः ॥ २८६ ॥

Not thus. When we have already established that there is syntactical unity of only what are different there is no occasion for raising your objection.

Siddhānta—We have already shown that the two *kāṇḍas* have different fruits, that the *karma-kāṇḍa* may become subsidiary to the *jñāna-kāṇḍa*, and that in this sense alone there may be syntactical unity.

[287]

नापि निःशेषवेदार्थमनुष्ठातुं क्षमो नरः ।
पुमायुषाऽपि येन स्यादात्मज्ञानेऽधिकारिता ॥ २८७ ॥

Nor is it possible for a man to perform all that is enjoined in the Vedas, even though he may strive all through his life (of one hundred years) in which case alone (according to you) there could be eligibility for self-knowledge.

Moreover, the condition precedent for adopting the path of *jñāna* laid down by you is impossible of achievement. No one can perform all the rites and sacrifices.

NKL—sandhyāvandanam-ārabhya-sahasrasaṁvatsara-paryantānāṁ karmaṇām ānantyād ity arthaḥ.

[288]

संपदां चार्थवादत्वं तेन वेदान्तगोचरे ।
ज्ञानेऽधिकारिणोऽभावत्प्रामाण्यं क्षिप्यते स्वतः ॥ २८८ ॥

Attaining prosperity (*sampat*) is an eulogy; therefore as there would be no eligible persons for knowledge

having as its sphere the Vedānta, the intrinsic validity (of the Veda) would have to go.

If it be said that there is the same eligible person for the two *kāṇḍas*, we ask, who is this eligible person ? Is it the one who desires *Svarga*, etc., or the one who desires *jñāna*? It cannot be the first, for sacrifice, etc., are auxiliary to *jñāna*, and the supposed fruits thereof, viz. *Svarga*, etc., are not intended to be the fruits. Nor the second, for, as it is not possible for any single person to perform all the rites and sacrifices, there would be no eligible person for *jñāna*.

AVS—saṁpac-chabdena upāsanā-'bhidhīyata iti kecit. teṣām ayam abhiprāyaḥ aśvemedhādi-karmā-'nadhikṛtānāṁ tat-phalārthināṁ saṁpad upadiśyate. yadi sakala-vedārthādhikāriṇaḥ jñānādhikāraḥ tadā saṁpad avivakṣitā bhaved iti.

[289]

किंच मानादविज्ञाता विमुक्तिः काम्यते न च ।
ज्ञातायां स्वात्मरूपत्वात्सुतरां नास्ति कामना ॥ २८९ ॥

"Now, if release is not known through a means of valid knowledge, it cannot be desired; if known, since it is the nature of one's own self, there cannot be still desire (therefor).

Pūrvapakṣa—The distinctive feature about the eligible person is said to be his desire for *mokṣa*. Does he desire *mokṣa* even without knowing it, or after knowing it ? Without knowing it, he cannot desire; after knowing it, there is no need for desire.

In this verse *kiṁca* is used in the sense of *nanu*. See *NKL: nanvarthe kiṁceti prayogaḥ ātmano brahmabhūyaṁ kaivalyam anavagataṁcen na kāmyeta jñānakāryatvād kāmanāyāḥ avagataṁcet siddhatvāt kāmanāṁ nirundhyād ato mumukṣur nādhikārīty abhisandhiḥ.*

AVS—athavā kiñceti-ślokaḥ pūrvapakṣaḥ. nanu kiñceti samuccaye gamyamāne pūrvapakṣatvaṁ katham siddhāntokty-anantaram nāyaṁ doṣaḥ anekārthatvān-nipātitānāṁ kiñca nanu ity arthaḥ. ayam arthaḥ. yathā asmat-pakṣe adhikāry-abhāvāt veda-prāmāṇyākṣepaḥ evam tvat-pakṣepi syāt mokṣakāmas tavādhikārī mokṣe ca kāmo no saṁbhavatīty uktam.

[290]

न युक्तं कामना मुक्तौ पुंसां नास्तीति भाषितुम् ।
देशकालानवच्छिन्नसुखाद्यर्थित्वदर्शनात् ॥ २९० ॥

It is not proper to say that there is no desire on the part of man for release; for there is seen desire for happiness unconditioned by space and time.

Siddhānta—In our view, the possibility of the desire for *mokṣa* is stated thus: every living being wants happiness and shuns misery, and so the desire is possible for *mokṣa* which is the same as the self—the unlimited happiness marked by the total absence of misery. Although *mokṣa* is our own nature, we do not know it through *pramāṇa* before the rise of knowledge. Hence the need for Vedānta. And, the one who is eligible for Vedānta does not require the *karma-kāṇḍa.*

NTV—sukhaṁ me syād duḥkhaṁ me mābhūd iti deśakālāspṛṣṭaṁ sukhamātraṁ duḥkhanivṛtti-mātraṁ vā kāmayamānās sarve puruṣā dṛśyante.

NKL—mābhūd aṇvapi me duḥkhaṁ, sukhy eva syām ahaṁ sadeti, niratiśayānanda-niḥśeṣānarthanivṛtti-prārthanā-darśanāt.

[291]

किंच ज्ञानमदृष्टार्थमग्निहोत्रादिवद्यदि ।
ततोऽधिकारिचिन्ता स्यात्कृतेऽप्यफलशङ्क्या ॥ २९१ ॥

Further, if knowledge were to have an unseen fruit, like *Agnihotra*, etc., then there might be the doubt whether there is an eligible person or not, because of doubt as regards something done not fructifying.

For the following reason also, in our view there results the eligible person for *jñāna*: *jñāna*, for us, has a seen fruit, and not an unseen fruit as for you. If it be an unseen fruit, there may be the doubt if it would result or not. If there be that doubt, the eligibility will not be certain. Since, in our view, *jñāna* is a seen fruit, like the fruit of agriculture, the desire for it as well as the eligibility are established.

[292]

कामिनाऽप्यग्निहोत्रादि शूद्रेणानधिकारिणा ।
कृतमप्यफलं तेन यत्नात्तत्र निरूप्यते ॥ २९२ ॥

Agnihotra, etc., performed by a *Śūdra*, who is not eligible, though having desire (for heaven), do not yield fruit. Hence, there eligibility is determined with care.

Where the fruit is unseen, as in the case of *Agnihotra*, there is need to inquire as to who is eligible and who is not. Mere desire, here, for an end will not do.

[293]

अविद्याध्वस्मरज्ञानजन्ममात्रावलम्बिनः ।
पुमर्थस्याधिकं शास्त्रात्किंचिदत्र तु नार्थ्यते ॥ २९३ ॥

But, here, nothing more is sought from Scripture than the human goal which depends only on the rise of knowledge which destroys ignorance.

As far as Vedānta is concerned, no unseen fruit is desired. What Scripture does here is to dispel ignorance; and when ignorance is dispelled, the human goal is reached.

[294]

कुतस्तज्ज्ञानमिति चेत्तद्धि बन्धपरिक्षयात् ।
असावपि च भूतो वा भावी वा वर्ततेऽथवा ॥ २९४ ॥

"Whence that knowledge?" If thus it be asked (it is replied): That, indeed, is from the removal of obstacle.

"Even that is either past, future, or present".

Pūrvapakṣa—The aforesaid *jñāna* does not arise from Scripture, for we see that to be the case with many who are learned in Scripture.

Siddhānta—In the case of those who are free from sin, there is the rise of true knowledge from the 'hearing', etc., of Scripture.

Pūrvapakṣa—Is that sin (obstacle) past, present, or future? The sin that is past cannot stand as an obstacle. Nor the sin that is going to be in the future. As for present sin, that is impossible in the case of one who has followed the path of *jñāna*.

AVS—anuṣṭhita-sādhanasyāpi jñānotpatti-pratibandha-pāpādi-kṣaya-vyatirekeṇa jñānaṁ na saṁbhavati.

[295]

अधीतवेदवेदाऽर्थोप्यत एव न मुच्यते ।
हिरण्यनिधिदृष्टान्तादिदमेव च दर्शितम् ॥ २९५ ॥

Therefore it is that even though one might have studied the Veda and its meaning, one is not released. This has been shown (in the *Chāndogya*) by the illustration of buried treasure.

Siddhānta—Present sin serves as an obstacle to the rise of Brahman-knowledge. There may be the causal aggregate for knowledge, and yet knowledge may not arise because of some obstacle. The *Chāndogya* text (VIII, iii, 2), which says that though all beings go to Brahman in sleep, they do not know it, is cited here as evidence. The Upaniṣad compares this to a person not knowing a buried treasure even though he may be walking over it.

[296]

भिद्यते हृदयग्रन्थिरिछद्यन्ते सर्वसंशयाः ।
क्षीयन्ते चास्य कर्माणि तस्मिन्दृष्टे परावरे ॥ २९६ ॥

'The knot of the heart is cut, all doubts are dispelled, his *karmas* are destroyed, when that than which there is nothing higher is seen.'

To show that *jñāna* is a seen fruit, the evidence of the experience of the wise ones is given. The Upaniṣad text quoted refers to this experience. See *MU*, II, ii, 8.

[297]

इत्यादिनाऽपि विज्ञानं नादृष्टार्थमितीरितम् ।
तथा स ब्रह्मणः केन स्याद्येनेति प्रदर्शितम् ॥ २९७ ॥

In this and other texts it is said that knowledge is not an unseen fruit. Even so, it is shown in the text 'By what does he become a Brāhmaṇa,' etc.

From the texts quoted we learn that *jñāna* has a seen fruit.

[298]

आत्यन्तिकसुखानर्थप्राप्तिविच्छेदकाङ्क्षिणः ।
प्रीत्युत्कर्षोऽपि लोकेऽस्मिन्दृष्टः स किं न काम्यते ॥ २९८ ॥

"There is seen in the world intense pleasure in the case of those who desire the attainment of absolute happiness and the removal of evil. So, why should it (release) not be desired?

Pūrvapakṣa—(Here, the *Pūrvapakṣa* is not Mīmāṁsā but a school of Vedānta which advocates combination of *karma* and *jñāna*). Even though *ātma-jñāna* has a seen fruit, is it settled that he who desires *mokṣa* has eligibility for it, or is it not settled? If it is not settled, even he who desires *Svarga* may want *jñāna*. If it is settled, then, the principle on which you have settled it may hold good in my view also. *Mokṣa*, according to you, is attainment of happiness and freedom from misery. He who desires that is the eligible person. That is possible in my view too. So, both the sections of the Veda are authoritative.

AVS—prīty-utkarṣo mokṣaḥ tad viṣayā kāmano 'palabhyamānā nivārayituṁ na śakyate.

[299]

दृष्टादृष्टार्थसंबन्धिप्रीत्युत्कर्षाविशेषतः ।
नाऽऽनन्दादन्यतो मुख्यात्पण्डितः पर्यवस्यति ॥ २९९ ॥

"Since there is no difference in degree as between the pleasure relating to the seen and that relating to the unseen fruit, the wise man chooses nothing other than the principal bliss.

The intelligent person chooses *mokṣa* in preference to *Svarga*, because it is the highest bliss. Even in my view that is so.

[300]

किंतु साधनसाध्यत्वादनित्यं कर्मजं सुखम् ।
अभिव्यञ्जकतन्त्रस्तु मोक्षस्तेनाक्षयो मतः ॥ ३०० ॥

" Moreover, the happiness born of action is non-eternal since it is accomplished through a means; release, however, is dependent only on what manifests it, therefore, it is admitted to be imperishable.

The reason why *mokṣa* is preferred is that it is eternal while heavenly happiness, etc., are non-eternal. *Mokṣa* is not produced by anything; it is only manifested.

NTV—tasmād deśa-kāla-vastvaparicchinna-pratyagātmā mukhyānanda iti bhāvaḥ.

[301]

संस्कारमात्रकारित्वं सर्वेषामपि कर्मणाम् ।
ज्ञानकाण्डे प्रवेशो वा तेषां नार्थान्तरं ततः ॥ ३०१ ॥

" All rites effect only purification; or, they are to be regarded as subsidiary to the knowledge-section. Thus, there is no different purport for them.

Karmas purify the soul. Because of this, *karma-kāṇḍa* is subsidiary to *jñāna-kāṇḍa. Karma* has no aim other than *mokṣa.* So, it is part of the means to release. Only, *jñāna* is the principal, and *karma* is the subsidiary.

NKL—saṁskāro 'ntaḥkaraṇa-śuddhiḥ, praveśo vividiṣā-dvāreṇa, mokṣābhivyañjakatvaṁ na tu sākṣād ity arthaḥ.

AVS—saṁskāra-śabdena antaḥkaraṇa-śuddhir vivakṣyate praveśa-śabdena vividiṣā tad-dvāreṇa mokṣābhivyañjakatvaṁ na sākṣād ity arthaḥ.

[302-303a]

एवमत्रैकवाक्यत्वं नानुष्ठेयसमाप्तितः ।
असारफलसंप्राप्तिः पुमर्थो नेष्यते यतः ॥ ३०२ ॥
तृष्णया साधयन्प्रीतिं न प्रीतिलवमिच्छति ।

Thus is the syntactical unity here, and not by way of the completion of what is to be performed. As the attainment of an essence-less fruit is not accepted as the human goal, he who thirsts for accomplishing (the highest) pleasure does not desire fragmentary pleasure.

Thus, the two sections have syntactical unity, because the means to *mokṣa* is a combination of *jñāna* and *karma*. It is not as if one should finish performing all *karmas* and then pursue the path of *jñāna*. He who desires *mokṣa* performs *karmas* for the sake of *mokṣa*, and also seeks *jñāna*. He does not attain *Svarga* because *Svarga* which yields only limited happiness is not desired by him. As his aim is *mokṣa*, that alone he attains through *karmas* combined with *jñāna*.

NKL—alpīyaḥ phala-saṁprāptiḥ svargo neṣyate yatotaḥ svarga-kāmo mumukṣur eve 'ty arthaḥ.

AVS—asāraphala-saṁprāptiḥ kṣudraphala-saṁprāptiḥ puruṣārtho neṣyate svargakāmo yajeta ity atra svargo neṣyata ity arthaḥ.

[303b-304a]

प्रीतेः श्रुतः प्रकर्षोऽपि स्वर्गस्वाराज्यभेदतः ॥ ३०३ ॥
नापि प्रीतेरियत्तायाः स्वर्गशब्दोऽस्ति वाचकः ।

"The supreme pleasure is declared in Scripture differently as 'heaven', 'autonomy', etc. Nor does the word 'heaven' connote that the pleasure is this much alone."

On the view of combination as between *jñāna* and *karma*, it has now been stated that as there is eligibility for *jñāna*, there is no non-authoritativeness of the Veda, nor difference of eligible person, etc.,

as between the two sections. Here, another reason is given for showing that there is no difference in means, etc., taught in the two sections. In texts such as 'He who desires *Svarga* is to sacrifice', etc., the term *Svarga* means *mokṣa*. It does not mean anything less than the highest happiness. So, it is clear that *mokṣa* is to be accomplished through *karma*.

[304 b]

न चाजानन्स्वसाध्यार्थं विद्वान्कश्चित्प्रवर्तते ॥ ३०४ ॥

"Nor does a wise man exert himself (in respect of rites) without knowing what he has to accomplish."

Although those who are ignorant may understand by the word *Svarga* happiness in another world, and perform sacrifices, etc., for the sake of that, he who is wise inquires into the true meaning of that word, understands that it means *mokṣa*, and for the sake of attaining that performs *karma*. Thus, there is no difference in means, etc., as between the two sections.

NKL—niratiśaya-sukhasya svargatvāt tasya mokṣatvāt tat-sādhanatvena yāgādi-vidhānāt na sādhanādi-bhedaḥ.

AVS—eṣa samudāyārthaḥ. niratiśaya-prīteḥ svargatvāt tasyāś ca mokṣatvāt tat-sādhanatvena yāgadānādi-vidhānāt na sādhanā-'dhikāri-bhedaḥ iti.

[305]

प्रीतिर्या काचिदिष्टा चेत्स्वर्गशब्देन भण्यते ।
चित्राग्निष्टोमयागादेः पश्वादिफलसंकरः ॥ ३०५ ॥

If some undefined pleasure is accepted as what is connoted by the word 'heaven', there would be confusion of the fruit, cattle, etc., of the *citrā* and *Agniṣṭoma* sacrifices.

Siddhānta—If it is your view that by *Svarga* what is meant is some undefined happiness, then he who has performed the *Citrā* sacrifice will not be prompted to perform the *Jyotiṣṭoma;* for having derived happiness by drinking the milk which is the fruit of the *Citrā* sacrifice, there is no need for him to perform the *Jyotiṣṭoma* for the sake of *Svarga*. But we do find that a distinction is made between the fruits of the two sacrifices. So, *Svarga* cannot mean mere undefined happiness.

[306-307]

विशेषो वाञ्छितश्चेत्स्यात्पुत्रपश्वाद्युपाधितः ।
न तावत्संभवेत्स्वर्गो ज्ञातोपाधिवियोगतः ॥ ३०६ ॥
मुक्तौ काम्यफलेऽभीष्टे सकृत्करण एव च ।
अनवच्छिन्नरूपायाः प्रीतेरासौ कृतार्थता ॥ ३०७ ॥

If it (i.e., heaven) be accepted as something more excellent than (the pleasure) which results from adjuncts like son, cattle, etc., that (the supreme happiness) cannot be heaven, because it is free from any known adjunct. If release be accepted as the fruit of optional rites, then, since by a single performance of a rite there would be the attainment of unconditioned happiness, there would be (final) accomplishment.

If *Svarga* be taken to mean some distinctive happiness which is other than that derived from son, cattle, etc., is it, we ask, conditioned happiness or unconditioned happiness? If it is conditioned happiness, it cannot be the same as *mokṣa*. It cannot be unconditioned happiness, for we do not know of any instance where the word *Svarga* is used to mean such happiness. *Svarga* is not a self-established or self-revealed experience. If it is self-established or self-revealed,

it would not require *karma* for its attainment. Therefore, the *Svarga* that is accomplished through *karma* is not *mokṣa*. And, there is no identity of means, etc., for the two sections.

Even granting that *Svarga* means *mokṣa* and that it is attained through *karma*, we can show that your view is not intelligible. If *mokṣa* is the result of an optional rite, then the mere performance of a rite once must yield *mokṣa*, in which case the injunctions in regard to all other rites would become futile.

AVS—etad api vārtikadvayam [305-6] pūrvapakṣa eveti kecit.

[308]

प्लवा ह्येते परीक्ष्येति तथा तद्य इहेति च।
कर्मभ्यो निर्वृतिर्नास्तीत्यादिवाक्यैः प्रदर्शितम् ॥ ३०८ ॥

That through rites there is no perfection is shown in the texts: 'These are transitory'[1], 'Having examined'[2], 'As here'[3], etc.

Three texts from the Upaniṣads are quoted here in support of the view that *karma* is not the means to *mokṣa*.

1. *MU*, I, ii, 7. 'Unsteady, verily, are these boats of the eighteen sacrificial forms, which are declared to be inferior *karma*. Those misguided men who acclaim this with superior joy fall again into old age and death.'*

2. *MU*, I, ii, 12. 'Deeply pondering over the worlds that are won by *karma*, let a Brahmin arrive at non-attachment. That (Brahman-world) which is not made, cannot be (won) through works. For the sake of this knowledge, let him only approach, with sacrificial fuel in hand, a preceptor who is learned in Scripture and who is firmly established in Brahman.'†

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* T.M.P. Mahadevan, *The Upanishads* (Selections), G.A. Natesan & Co., Madras, 4th edn., 1950, p. 98.

†*Ibid.*, p. 100.

3. *CHU*, V, x, 7. 'Those whose conduct here has been good will soon attain a good birth,' etc.

NTV—tasmāt jñānam eva kevalaṁ mokṣa-sādhanaṁ na karma, tasmiṁśca jñāne avidhitantratvāt nādhikāraḥ, kiṁtu tatsādhana-saṁnyāsādāv adhikāra iti.

[309]

प्रत्यक्षश्रुतिविध्यन्तविहितानामकारणात् ।
त्यागोऽतिसाहसं मन्ये ननु यागादिकर्मणाम् ॥ ३०९ ॥

"Now, to reject, without (sufficient) reason, actions like sacrifices, which are enjoined by the direct injunctions[1] of Scripture, would be rashness, I think."

Pūrvapakṣa—Injunctive texts are stronger than *arthavāda* texts. Therefore, *mokṣa* must be regarded as the fruit of action, in which case the two sections will have the same eligible person.

The text, 'As long as one lives, one must offer the *Agnihotra*,' is a direct and principal text. In view of this, to teach that one must renounce would be the height of rashness. And, *Agnihotra*, etc., are the means to *mokṣa* through being subsidiary to *jñāna*.

1. *Vidhyanta* means *vidhi* here, as *svapnānta* means *svapna* in *BU*, IV, iii, 13. See the present writer's *Gauḍapāda: A Study in Early Advaita* (2nd ed., University of Madras, 1954), p. 67.

[310]

प्रत्यक्षोपनिषद्वाक्यविहितायास्ततोऽपि तु ।
ऐकात्म्यज्ञाननिष्ठायास्त्यागोऽतीव हि साहसम् ॥ ३१० ॥

A far greater rashness it is to reject the knowledge-discipline of the one self which is directly enjoined in the Upaniṣad texts.

Siddhānta—The Upaniṣad texts such as *BU*, IV, iv, 23 (See v. 216) enjoin directly renunciation for one who has detachment. For such a one 'hearing', etc., are prescribed. If the view of combination of *karma* and *jñāna* be accepted, all those texts would have to be rejected, which is much worse than the renunciation of *karma*. The text about *Agnihotra* cited above refers only to those who have not yet developed a sense of detachment.

NKL—sādhana-catuṣṭaya-viśiṣṭasya śravanādy-anuṣṭhānam aikātmya-niṣṭhā sarva-vedānta-siddhānta ity arthaḥ.

[311-312 a]

विचार्यमाणे यत्नेन त्वधिकारे यथाश्रुति ।
न किंचित्साहसं त्वत्र प्रत्यक्षश्रुतिवाक्यतः ॥ ३११ ॥
अधिकारविभागस्य प्रसिद्धेरेव कारणात् ।

If inquiry as regards eligibility be made with care, in accordance with what is declared in Scripture, there would, indeed be no rashness here; for the reason that difference in eligibility is established in Scripture by direct statements.

There is no rashness as alleged by the *pūrvapakṣin*. Nor is there conflict between the two sections. For one who inquires, the position becomes very clear. A person in whom there is non-attachment is eligible to renounce all actions including the obligatory rites. Actions are only for those in whom there is ignorance. Scripture is definite on this point.

AVS—bibhīṣikāṁ kurvato bibhīṣikayaiva uttaram uktam. idānīṁ sākṣād uttaram āha.

[312 b]

तस्मात्सिद्धोऽधिकारोऽत्र ब्रह्मरूपं विविक्षिताम् ॥ ३१२ ॥

Therefore, eligibility has been established here for those who desire entry into Brahman-nature.

It has now been settled that eligibility, etc., for the two sections are different. The seeker after release is eligible to study the *jñāna-kāṇḍa*; for he wants to realize Brahman which is of the nature of eternal happiness and consciousness. The means to that is only the knowledge of the one self. *Karma* is the means to prosperity (*abhyudaya*); it cannot effect release.

[313]

तस्यास्य कर्मकाण्डेन संबन्ध इति भाष्यकृत् ।
प्रतिज्ञायापि संबन्धं कस्मात्तन्नोक्तवान्स्फुटम् ॥ ३१३ ॥

" Even though premising the relation thus, ' Of that (viz., the knowledge-section) the relation to the ritual-section (will be declared,)' why has not the commentator (i.e., Śaṅkara) stated the relation explicitly ?

Pūrvapakṣa—why is it that the commentator, Śaṅkara, has not stated clearly the relation between the two sections ?

[314]

अभिधीयत इत्यादिवचसाऽपि स नोच्यते ।
सिद्धे वस्तुनि वेदस्य मानत्वं तेन भण्यते ॥ ३१४ ॥

" Even in the words ' It will be declared,' etc., it (the specific relation) is not stated. What is stated there is the evidence of the Veda in respect of the existent reality."

Śaṅkara merely shows that the Veda is *pramāṇa* for the self which is an existent reality.

[315]

वेदान्तोक्तेः प्रमाणत्वे सति संबन्ध उच्यते ।
प्रामाण्यायैव तेनाऽऽदौ सर्वोऽपीत्यादि भण्यते ॥ ३१५ ॥

After establishing the evidentiary character of the Vedānta texts, the relation is stated. It is for establishing the evidentiary character that it is stated first 'Even all,' etc.

Siddhānta—After premising the relation between the two sections, the commentator seeks to establish the validity of the Vedānta texts. Then he will proceed to specify the relation. This is the proper procedure. Unless it is shown that Vedānta is valid, what is the use of relating it to the *karma-kāṇḍa*?

[316]

आक्षिप्यते वा संबन्धः संबन्धो नाभिधीयते ।
सप्तम्यन्तपदच्छेदात्कथं चेदिति भण्यते ॥ ३१६ ॥

Or, the relation is objected to (thus): 'The relation is not declared', by splitting the word (*karmakāṇḍena* into *karmakāṇḍe na*) (and taking the first word) as having the seventh case-ending. If it be asked 'How?', it is explained.

This is an alternative explanation of the words of the commentator. He is of the view that there is no relation of *jñāna-kāṇḍa* with *karma-kāṇḍa*.

[317]

भिन्नार्थयोर्न संबन्धो ह्यन्योन्यार्थानपेक्षतः ।
ऐकार्थ्ये चैकवाक्यत्वात्कर्मविज्ञानकाण्डयोः ॥ ३१७ ॥

If the ritual- and knowledge–sections have different senses, then, since each is not expectant of the sense of the other, there is no relation; if they have unity of sense, even then (there is no relation) because of syntactical unity.

Do the two sections have different senses or a non-different sense? If the former be the case, there cannot be any relation between them; if the latter, there would be syntactical unity between them, and so there would be no need for a relation.

[318]

तथा तयोरमानत्वे संबन्धोक्तिर्न युज्यते ।
द्वयोरेकस्य वा मात्वे न संबन्धादि शस्यते ॥ ३१८ ॥

Similarly, if the two have no validity, it is not proper to state a relation (between them); so also, if both or either of them be valid, no relation fits in.

Again, are both the sections invalid, or valid? If both are invalid, they cannot be related, even as there can be no coherence between two sets of insane statements. If both are valid, they would be independent and hence there can be no relation between them. If either alone be valid, even then there is no question of a relation between the two. Surely, there can be no relation between a valid statement and an invalid statement.

AVS—ity-etad-vārtika-trayaṁ (316-8) *pūrvapakṣaḥ, kathaṁ gamyate, atra sarvaprakāra-saṁbandha-nirākaraṇāt tasya ca aniṣṭatvāt, ato vārtika-trayaṁ pūrvapakṣa eva. siddhānta iti kecit.*

[319]

श्रुत्यैव तस्य चोक्तत्वात्तमेतमिति यत्नतः ।
इति चेतसि संधाय संबन्धं नोक्तवान्गुरुः ॥ ३१९ ॥

And, because that (relation) has been stated by Scripture itself with care in the text 'That, this one', etc., bearing this in mind, the Preceptor did not state the relation.

It may be stated that the relation between the two sections is the unintelligibility of any invariable sequence. If that be the relation, then it is stated in *BU*, IV, iv, 22. See note on v. 14.

[320]

प्रसाध्य वा प्रमाणत्वं वेदान्तानां प्रयत्नतः ।
संबन्धं कर्मकाण्डेन पश्चात्सम्यक्प्रवक्ष्यते ॥ ३२० ॥

Or, after establishing with care the validity of the Vedāntas, he does explain well, later on, the relation to the ritual-section.

The commentator will explain later on the specific relation—the relation as taught in *BU*, IV, iv, 22.

[321]

वेदानुवचनादीनामैकात्म्यज्ञानजन्मने ।
तमेतमिति वाक्येन नित्यानां वक्ष्यते विधिः ॥ ३२१ ॥

"In the text 'That, this one', etc., it is the obligatory rites such as the recitation of the Veda that are declared by the injunction to be (the means) for the rise of the knowledge of the one self."

The discussion now is about the *vividiṣā* text, *BU*, IV, iv, 22.

Pūrvapakṣa—The text under reference regards only the obligatory and occasioned rites as the means to the rise of *jñāna*. This means that the optional rites are of no use for *jñāna*. If that be so, there is no relation of the *jñāna-kāṇḍa* with the entire *karma-kāṇḍa*.

[322]

यद्वा विविदिषार्थत्वं सर्वेषामपि कर्मणाम् ।
तमेतमिति वाक्येन संयोगस्य पृथक्त्वतः ॥ ३२२ ॥

Or, in the text, 'That, this one', etc., all rites are stated to be for the sake of (generating) the desire for knowledge, because of a difference in relation.

Siddhānta—Because the general term *yajña* is used in the text, all *karmas* become the means to *jñāna* through generating the desire for knowledge (*vividiṣā*). It is true that the optional rites have other ends. But they can also have the generation of the desire for knowledge as their end.

For example, in the context of the *Agnihotra*, we read '*dadhnā juhoti*' (one should offer curds), and again '*dadhnā indriyakāmasya juhuyāt*' (for him who desires efficient sense-organs, one should offer curds). The former of these texts refers to an obligatory rite, and the latter to an optional rite. The question is whether the material to be used in these two rites is different or the same. The objector suggests that the material should be different. The Pūrvamīmāṁsā-siddhānta is that the material—viz. curds—is the same. That is, in

the case of the obligatory injunction, the connection of the material, the curds, is with all *homa*; and in the case of the optional injunction, the connection is only with that *homa* which is performed for a man desiring efficient sense-organs, and there is disconnection from all other *homa* (See *PM*, IV, iii, 5). Similarly, the *karmas* that are related to *Svarga* may subserve the purpose of generating the desire for knowledge, if the fruit, viz. *Svarga*, is given up; and thus the entire *karma-kāṇḍa* may be related to *jñāna-kāṇḍa*.

[323]

लोकतः सिद्धमादाय पशुव्रीह्यादिसाधनम् ।
इदं कार्यमिदं नेति कर्मकाण्डश्रुतेर्गतिः ॥ ३२३ ॥

"Taking what are well-established in the world, viz., the means like animals, rice-grains, etc., the way of Scripture in the ritual-section is (to teach) 'This is to be done,' 'This is not (to be done).'

Pūrvapakṣa—How can there be relation between the *karma-kāṇḍa* which teaches difference of causative factors such as animal, etc., and the *jñāna-kāṇḍa* whose purport is the non-dual Brahman? The purport of *karma-kāṇḍa* is injunction.

[324]

मानान्तरेण संप्राप्तां साध्यसाधनसंगतिम् ।
कर्मशास्त्रं व्यनक्तीति न तु वस्त्ववबोधकृत् ॥ ३२४ ॥

"The teaching about ritual states the relation of ends and means for what have been obtained through other means of knowledge; it is not, however, what makes known the existent."

It cannot be said that *karma-kāṇḍa* is invalid because it re-states the differences existing in the universe or the rites and rituals. The *karma-kāṇḍa* is not invalid, because it teaches a relation which remains otherwise unknown—viz. the relation of the soul to heaven. Scripture is valid, not because it reveals an existent entity such as the self, but because it makes known a relation which is otherwise unknown.

[325]

वेदो हि सर्व एवायमैकात्म्यज्ञानसिद्धये ।
अतो नान्योऽभिसंबन्धः कर्मविज्ञानकाण्डयोः ॥ ३२५ ॥

The entire Veda is, indeed, for the sake of gaining knowledge of the one self. Therefore, no other relation there is between the ritual- and knowledge-sections.

Siddhānta—We say that the purport of the entire Veda is the non-dual self. The *jñāna-kāṇḍa* teaches it directly, the *karma-kāṇḍa* indirectly. No other relation between the two sections is possible.

NTV—vividiṣā saṁskārapakṣayoḥ śuddhi-dvāreṇa jñāna-sādhanatvaṁ karma-kāṇḍasya, upaniṣadāṁ tu sākṣāt-jñāna-sādhanatvam iti sarvasya vedasya jñāna-sādhanatvaṁ saṁbandhaḥ nāto 'nya ity arthaḥ.

NKL—śuddhi-dvāreṇa jñāna-sādhanatvaṁ karmaṇām, upaniṣadāṁ tu sākṣād dhī-hetutvam ity evaṁ kṛtsna-vedasya jñāna-hetutvaṁ saṁbandhaḥ śruti-siddhaḥ.

[326]

नित्यनैमित्तिकानीह कर्तृसंस्कारतो यतः ।
नान्यत्र पर्यवस्यन्ति ज्ञानादैकात्म्यगोचरात् ॥ ३२६ ॥

"The obligatory and occasioned rites culminate in nothing other than the sphere of the one self, through purifying the agent.

The *pūrvapakṣin* does not like the statement that the *entire* Veda has for purport the non-dual self. So, he argues that the obligatory and occasioned rites alone purify the soul and make it eligible for *jñāna*—not the optional rites.

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प्लवा ह्येते परीक्ष्येति तथा तद्य इहेति च ।
निन्दाश्रुतेर्न काम्यानां कार्यताऽध्यवसीयते ॥ ३२७ ॥

"That the optional rites ought to be done is not made known, because of the condemnatory texts, 'These are transitory'[1], 'Having examined'[2], and 'They, like those here'[3]."

The *pūrvapakṣin* cites a few scriptural texts in his favour. All of them teach the futility of Vedic rites so far as self-knowledge is concerned.

These are the same as the texts quoted by the *siddhāntin* in v. 308.

1. *MU*, I, ii, 7.
2. *MU*, I, ii, 12.
3. *CHU*, V, x, 7.

AVS—ayam arthaḥ. śuddhy-utpādana-dvāreṇa jñāna-sādhanatvaṁ nitya-naimittika-karmaṇāṁ bhavaty eva, kāmyānāṁ nindā-śravaṇāt kartavyataiva nāsti, kathaṁ jñāna-sādhanatvaṁ. ato yadvā vividiṣārthatvam iti pakṣo 'nupapannaḥ iti.

[328]

विधिनिन्दासमावेशो नैवमप्युपपद्यते ।
फलाभिसंधिमात्रे तु निन्दायामेव युज्यते ॥ ३२८ ॥

Even thus, the co-presence of injunction and condemnation is not intelligible. If, however, the condemnation relates to the desire for fruit, it is intelligible.

Siddhānta—It cannot be said that optional rites ought not to be performed, for they are enjoined. It is true that they are also condemned. But the condemnation refers only to the attachment to their fruit. When there is freedom from such attachment, the optional rites also can serve as the means to *jñāna*.

NTV—yat-tu kāmyānāṁ phalārthatayā coditatvāt tāni phalam eva ārabhante na śuddhim ity uktam, tan na, pramāṇābhāvāt, na hi śāstrād anyat kāmyakarmāṇi phalam ārabhanta ity atra pramāṇam asti, śāstraṁ tu phalecchor eva kāmyānām api phalāraṁbhakatvam āha. phalecchāyāś ca niṣiddhatvāt ananuṣṭheyatvam uktam. tasmāt phalāraṁbhakatve pramāṇābhāvāt śuddhyāraṁbhakatve vividiṣantīti śāstrasya pramāṇatvāt, śuddhir eva kāmyānām api phalam.

[329]

उपासनं च यत्किंचिद्विद्याप्रकरणे श्रुतम् ।
तदप्यैकात्म्यविज्ञानयोग्यत्वायैव कल्प्यते ॥ ३२९ ॥

And, whatever meditation is taught in the knowledge section—that also is for making one fit for the knowledge of the one self.

'Let the *karmas* be the means to *jñāna* through purification, etc. What about the meditations (*upāsanas*) which are taught in the *jñāna-kāṇḍa ?* They can well be the direct means along with *jñāna*.'

The reply to this suggestion is : no. The meditations are either for the fulfilment of *karmas*, or for achieving prosperity, or for gaining release in sequence (*krama-mukti*). What we have already said with regard to *karmas* holds good as regards meditations also. In the *vividiṣā*-text (*BU*, IV, iv, 22) the word *tapas* stands for meditations.

[330]

विमुच्यमान इत्युक्तेरर्चिराद्युक्तितस्तथा ।
स्वार्थमात्रावसायित्वं नोपास्तीनां प्रतीयते ॥ ३३० ॥

Because of the text, ' Being released, '[1] and because of the text about the path of light,[2] it is seen that the meditations do not directly lead to release.

Upāsanas are not the direct means to release ; they are the means only in sequence. As evidence, two scriptural texts are cited :

1. *BU*, IV, ii, 1.
2. *BU*, VI, ii, 15; *CHU*, V, x, 1.

NTV—tad āhuḥ paurāṇikāḥ—brahmaṇā saha te sarve saṁprāpte pratisañcare, parasyānte kṛtātmānaḥ praviśanti paraṁ padam-iti.

AVS—arcirādivākyodāharaṇam upāsanānām krama-mukti-phalatva-dyotanāya. svārtha-śabdena viriñcyādi-phala-grahaṇam.

[331]

इत्येवमभिसंबन्धः कर्मकाण्डस्य युज्यते ।
इतोऽन्यथाऽभिसंबन्धे न किंचिन्मानमीक्ष्यते ॥ ३३१ ॥

Thus is the relation of the ritual-section (to knowedge) intelligible. In regard to any relation other than this, there is no evidence.

Karmas are the means to *jñāna* through purification; the Upaniṣads, however, are the direct means.

There is no evidence for the opposite view that the *jñāna-kāṇḍa* is an auxiliary to *karma-kāṇḍa* through purifying the agent.

NTV—śuddhidvāreṇa jñāna-sādhanatvaṁ karma-jñāna-kāṇḍa-saṁbandha ity arthaḥ.

[332]

न चोद्गीथादिविषयज्ञानवत्कर्मसंगतिः ।
ऐकात्म्यबुद्धेस्तद्बुद्धिद्वारं नैव निरीक्ष्यते ॥ ३३२ ॥

Nor is there relation to ritual, as for the knowledge of the *udgītha*, etc.; for the knowledge of the one self, dependence on a knowledge of that (viz., ritual) is, certainly, not seen.

It cannot be held that self-knowledge enters into *karma*, even as the knowledge of *udgītha*, etc., is a part of *karma*, because it is Vedic knowledge. May be that the knowledge of the *udgītha* is a part of *karma;* for even though it is not an auxiliary thereof, it is related to an auxiliary. But there is no way by which self-knowledge can become a part of *karma.*

NTV—udgīthādeḥ karmāṅgasya svaviṣayajñānamantareṇa prayogānupapatteḥ taj-jñānaṁ karmāṅgam iti yujyate, iha tv aupaniṣadātmajñānam-antareṇa anupapattyabhāvāt karma-vidhayaḥ taj-jñānaṁ nākṣipatīty arthaḥ.

[333–334 a]

श्रुत्या नैकात्म्यविज्ञानं विनियुक्तं श्रुतौ क्वचित् ।
उपस्थानं यथैन्द्र्या स्यान्नापि लिङ्गेन संगतिः ॥ ३३३ ॥

बर्हिर्देवसदनं दामीत्यादौ च यथा तथा ।

The knowledge of the one self is not applied anywhere in Scripture (as an auxiliary to ritual) by express statement (*śruti*), as the *upasthāna* (i. e. the worship of the *Gārhapatya* fire) is (served) by the *Aindrī* hymn. Nor is there relation by the capacity of words (*liṅga*), as in 'I cut the *barhis* as the seat for the deity,' etc.

If self-knowledge is an auxiliary of *karma*, it must be capable of application in *karma*. For determining the application there are six *pramāṇas* (modes-of-evidence). [See note on v. 123 b–124 a.] By none of these six modes-of-evidence can it be shown that self-knowledge is an auxiliary of *karma*.

The first mode-of-evidence is express statement *(śruti)*. A case where express statement decides the application is as follows: There is the text 'With the *Aindrī-mantra* one worships the *Gārhapatya* fire' (*aindryā gārhapatyam upatiṣṭhate*). [*Maitrāyaṇīya Saṁhitā*, III, ii, 4.] Here the problem is: What is the object of worship? Is it *Indra*, as signified by the word *aindryā?* Or, is it the *Gārhapatya* fire, as indicated by the word *gārhapatyam?* The answer is that the object of worship is the *Gārhapatya* fire, because of the express statement 'one worships the *Gārhapatya* fire.' The second case-ending in *gārhapatyam* indicates expressly that the fire is the object of worship. [See *PM*, III, ii, 3.] There is no such express statement to show that self-knowledge is to be applied in *karma*.

The second mode-of-evidence is word-capacity (*liṅga*). In connection with the *Darśapūrṇamāsa* rites there is the text 'I cut the *barhis* as the seat for the deity.' (*barhir deva-sadanam dāmi.*) From this we learn that the formula of the text is a subsidiary of the act of cutting, which is made known by word-capacity. The meaning of the words is that *barhis* is to be cut. And so, we understand that the formula is to be used while cutting the *barhis*. [See *PM*, III, ii, 1.] But no such word-capacity is seen for relating self-knowledge to *karma*. There is no formula through the meaning of whose words we may conclude that self-knowledge is subsidiary to *karma*.

NTV—śruti-liṅga-vākya-sthāna-prakaraṇa-samākhyānāṁ śeṣa-śeṣi-pramāṇānām abhāvāc ca na jñānasya karmāṅgatvam ity āha—śrutyety ādinā.

[334 b–335 a]

न चापि वाक्याद्विज्ञानं कर्तृद्वारेण गच्छति ॥ ३३४ ॥
कर्मण्यप्रक्रियास्थं सज्जुहूपर्णमयीत्ववत् ।

Nor can knowledge be related (as auxiliary) to ritual by syntactical unity (*vākya*), through the agent, though it is not in the context (of ritual), as the state of being the *parṇa*-wood (is related to the ladle).

The third mode-of-evidence is syntactical connection (*vākya*). There is a text which reads 'He who has a ladle made of *parṇa*-wood hears no evil sound' (*yasya parṇamayī juhūr bhavati na sa pāpaṁ ślokaṁ śruṇoti*). (*Taittirīya-saṁhitā*, III, v, 7, 1.) Here, there is no express statement of a case-ending, such as accusative, etc.; only the ladle and the being-made-of-*parṇa*-wood are mentioned together. From their syntactical connection, it is inferred that being-made-of-*parṇa*-wood is subsidiary to (i. e. qualifies) the ladle. [See

PM, III, vi, 1.] In this manner it is not possible to determine from such statements as 'The self is to be known' that self-knowledge is subsidiary to *karma*.

[335 b–336 a]

जुह्वाद्याकृतिसंपत्तिव्यपेक्षापूरणक्षमम् ॥ ३३५ ॥
विशेत्पर्णमयीत्वादि प्रकृत्युपनयात्क्रतुम् ।

By bringing in the primary material (*prakṛti*), 'being-made-of-*parṇa*-wood,' etc., may serve the rite, because it fulfils the expectancy about the form of the ladle.

In the case of the ladle, one would require to know of what material it should be made. So, from the text 'a ladle made of *parṇa*-wood' the expectancy is fulfilled, and being-made-of-*parṇa*-wood becomes a qualification of the ladle, thus serving the purpose of the rite.

[336 b–337 a]

कर्मापेक्षितकर्त्रादिरूपविध्वंसकृन्न तु ॥ ३३६ ॥
ऐकात्म्यज्ञानमन्वेति स्वातन्त्र्येऽप्यर्थवत्त्वतः ।

The knowledge of the one self, however, which destroys the nature of agency, etc., required by ritual, cannot be the auxiliary (of ritual), for even independently it has purport.

The case of self-knowledge is quite different. It cannot help the cause of rites in any way. For the performance of rites there is needed an agent. The knowledge, of which we are speaking, is of the self as non-agent.

Moreover, the text about the ladle made of *parṇa*-wood has no independent purport of its own, whereas the texts relating to self-knowledge have their own purport.

[337 b–338 a]

जुह्वाद्यव्यभिचारित्वात्प्रत्युपस्थापयेत्क्रतुम् ॥ ३३७ ॥
कर्ताऽन्यत्रापि सद्भावान्नाऽऽक्षेप्ता व्यभिचारतः ।

The ladle, etc., because of non-inconstancy may serve as auxiliary to rite; but because the agent is elsewhere too, he does not bring in (rite as the principal), as there is inconstancy.

'Being-made-of-*parṇa*-wood' becomes subsidiary to the rites through the ladle, because the ladle is indispensable for the rites. The agent, however, does not necessarily bring in *karma* as the principal of knowledge; for, agency is related not exclusively to Vedic *karma*. Even for secular acts, agency is required.

[338 b–339]

अनारभ्योक्तितश्चापि नेह प्रकरणग्रहः ॥ ३३८ ॥
सिद्धे सामान्यतो लिङ्गात्संबन्धे कर्मभिस्ततः ।
विशेषावगतिर्नाम्नः क्रमाच्चेति व्यवस्थितम् ॥ ३३९ ॥

Since, having commenced (to expound ritual) (the knowledge of self) is not taught, there is not here the application of context (*prakaraṇa*). When a relation, in general, with rites has been established through the capacity of words (*liṅga*), then a specific knowledge may result through name (*nāma*) and order (*krama*); thus has it been settled.

The fourth mode-of-evidence is context (*prakaraṇa*). Context is interdependence or mutual requirement. When a certain statement (i. e. injunction of action) stands in need of the statement of the *modus operandi*, and when this need is supplied by a statement which is found in close proximity with the original statement, then there is connection between the two statements. For example, in connection with the *Darśapūrṇamāsa*, we read '*samidho yajati, tanūnapātaṁ yajati, iḍo yajati, barhir yajati, svāhākāraṁ yajati*' (*Taittirīya-saṁhitā*, II, vi, I, 1). This text speaks of the five fore-sacrifices (*prayājas*). Now, the question is: in the context of which set of rites are these fore-sacrifices to be performed? The text about them is to be found in close proximity to the statement about *Darśapūrṇamāsa*. The two statements stand in mutual need. In the injunction of the *Darśapūrṇamāsa* rites, there is felt a requirement of the *modus operandi*: how is the fruit of the rites to be accomplished? In the statement of the fore-sacrifices there is felt a requirement of the fruit to be gained. What is the end to be achieved by them? Since the statement of the fore-sacrifices is to be found in the proximity of the injunction of *Darśapūrṇamāsa*, it is to be inferred that the fore-sacrifices are the subsidiaries of the *Darśapūrṇamāsa* rites. (*PM*, III, iii, 11.)

Applying the principle of context (*prakaraṇa*), it cannot be said that *jñāna* is subsidiary to *karma*. The context of *jñāna* is different from that of *karma*. And, self-knowledge is nowhere taught in the context of *karma*.

The last two modes-of-evidence are order or position (*krama, sthāna*) and name (*nāma, samākhyā*). Order or position means common-location. It may refer to either common-location in the text or common-location in the performance. For instance, if there is the mention of a series of ritual acts followed by the recital of a set of *mantras*, the problem would be: which *mantra* is to be uttered in which sacrifice? The answer is that the first *mantra* should be connected with the first sacrifice, the second with the second, and so on. Similarly, there may arise the question, in connection with a

sacrifice, as to whether a particular act is to be performed on one day or on the other. The question is to be decided by reference to the commonness of place in the performance. (*PM*, III, iii, 42.) The last mode-of-evidence which is name means a word understood in its literal or etymological sense. For example, the word '*hotṛcamasa*' means 'the cup from which the *hotṛ*-priest drinks.' From this it is to be understood that the *hotṛ* is subsidiary to the drinking of the contents of the cup. (*PM*, III, iii, 13.)

With regard to the application of word-capacity, order and name, there is the following discussion under *PM*, III, ii, 19. There is a section of the Veda bearing the heading 'kāmya-yājyānuvākyas.' Here a set of verses called *kāmya-yājyānuvākyas* (verses of sacrifice and invitation) are to be found, beginning with '*indrāgnī rocanā divaḥ*' (Indra-Agni are the two light-spaces of heaven), etc. Then we have certain *kāmya* sacrifices mentioned in a definite order, such as '*indrāgnam ekādaśakapālaṁ nirvapet*' (He shall distribute a cake for Indra-Agni on eleven potsherds), '*vaiśvānaraṁ dvādaśakapālaṁ nirvapet*' (He shall distribute a cake for Vaiśvānara on twelve potsherds), etc. Now, the question is whether the *yājyānuvākya* is connected with all the sacrifices that are offered to Indra-Agni, or only with that particular *kāmya* sacrifice enjoined in the text '*indrāgnam ekādaśakapālaṁ nirvapet*'. The answer is that it is connected with only that particular *kāmya* sacrifice. This is established on the evidence of word-capacity, order and name. The word-capacity of the *yājyānuvākya*, *indrāgnī*, etc., and also its order, are the same as those of the said sacrifice. The name '*yājyānuvākya*' also indicates that the verse is subsidiary to the *kāmya* sacrifice. Thus, through the combined force of word-capacity, order and name, the subsidiariness of the *yājyānuvākya* to the *kāmya* sacrifice is established.

In the next verse it is shown that the case of self-knowledge is not similar to that of the *kāmyayājyeṣṭi*.

[340]

इह त्वैकात्म्यधीयोगः काम्ययाज्येष्टिवन्न हि ।
तस्मात्कर्माभिसंबन्धो नैवैकात्म्याधियोऽमितेः ॥ ३४० ॥

But here, the relation of the knowledge of the one self is not like that of the *kāmya-yājyeṣṭi*; therefore, the knowledge of the one self is not related to rites (as their auxiliary), as there is no (other) means (of stating the relation).

Self-knowledge is not subsidiary to *karma*, as *yājyānuvākya* is to the *kāmya* sacrifice. So, the last two modes-of-evidence, order and name, are not helpful here in establishing the subsidiariness of self-knowledge to *karma*. And, there is no other mode-of-evidence to determine the principal-subsidiary relation.

[341]

न चाप्यस्यार्थवादत्वं विधिना वाक्यभेदतः ।
दृष्टार्थत्वाच्च तद्बुद्धेः पाठान्नादृष्टकल्पना ॥ ३४१ ॥

Nor is this (viz. the text about the fruit of self-knowledge) an eulogy, because there would then be sentence-split with the injunction. And, because that knowledge has a seen fruit, an unseen fruit cannot be postulated for the study (of the Vedānta).

It may be held that the text which declares the fruit of self-knowledge is an eulogy, on the analogy of the text about the ladle being made of *parṇa*-wood. But that is not correct because there is no syntactical unity of the Upaniṣad text with the ritual text which is mandatory.

Moreover, the fruit of Vedānta which is the destruction of all sorrow is a seen fruit, whereas the fruit of ritual action is an unseen fruit. Therefore, the Vedānta text cannot be subsidiary to *karma-kāṇḍa*.

NTV—na ca kartṛ-stāvakatvena karma-viśeṣatvaṁ vedāntānām.

[342 a]

तमेतमिति वाक्यात्तु यागादेः प्रत्युताङ्गता ।

From the text, 'That, this one', etc., it is (learnt), on the contrary, that sacrifice, etc., are auxiliary (to knowledge).

It has been shown that there is no evidence for *jñāna* being subsidiary to *karma*. Here, the *siddhānta* view already set forth is repeated, viz., that *karma* is auxiliary to *jñāna*. The evidence for this is the *vividiṣā* text (*BU*, IV, iv, 22).

NTV—kiṁca ātmajñānasya kartṛ-śeṣatve na kevalaṁ pramāṇā-bhāva eva, pratyuta karmaṇāṁ jñāna-śeṣatve pramāṇam asti.

[342 b–343 a]

अन्ये त्वाहुर्न शक्नोति कामसंदूषिताशयः ॥ ३४२ ॥
द्रष्टुं तत्परमद्वैतं सर्वकामासमाप्तितः ।

Others say: "One cannot realize the supreme non-duality, if his mind is defiled by desire and if every desire of his has not been fulfilled.

This objection is that of the *kāmavilaya-vādin*. While admitting that *karma* is auxiliary to *jñāna*, he contends that it is so, not through generating the desire to know (*vividiṣā*), but through resolving desire (*kāmavilaya*). And, desires are to be resolved through enjoyment. It is only when all desires are resolved that one obtains eligibility for knowledge. All desires including that for heaven should be first fulfilled, and then there would be no more attachment to them. When there is complete non-attachment, one becomes fit for the path of knowledge.

[343 b–344 a]

द्वैतैकत्वमतीहाभिः सूत्रान्तं फलमाप्य ना ॥ ३४३ ॥
प्राजापत्यं पदं भुक्त्वा तदैकात्म्यं प्रपद्यते ।

"By the contemplation of unity in duality (i. e. the *Sūtrātman*), one attains fruits ranging from human-ness to the status of the *Sūtrātman*, and after enjoying the status of *Prajāpati* attains the one self."

The *kāmavilaya-vādin* continues: By meditating on the *Sūtrātman* and by performing all the rites beginning with *Darvi-homa* and ending with *Satra*, one attains all the grades of pleasures, ranging from those of the human species to those of the *Sūtrātman*. After that there will be nothing more to enjoy. So, one becomes detached from all desires, attains identity with *Prajāpati*, and eventually realizes the non-dual self.

NKL–pūrva-pūrva-kṣudratara-karmānuṣṭhānena kṣudraphalaprāptyā tato–nivṛtta-rāgo nityānuṣṭhāna–samuccita–hiraṇyagarbhopāsanāt tat-padaṁ prāpya tatrāpi jāta-vairāgyo brahmabhūyaṁ gacchatīty arthaḥ.

[344 b–345 a]

नैवं न कामसंप्राप्त्या तन्नाशोऽब्दशतैरपि ॥ ३४४ ॥
तत्सेवातोऽतिवृद्धिः स्यान्निवृत्तिर्दोषदर्शनात् ।

Not thus. Desire is not destroyed by fulfilment even in hundreds of years; it only increases enormously by being served; it is removed only when its defect is seen.

The *Siddhāntin* replies: Not through enjoyment will desires cease. On the contrary, they will increase. It is only when their defect is seen that there will be non-attachment.

NKL — bhogasya rāgavṛddhihetor na tannivartakatvam iti dūṣayati.

AVS—na bhogāt kāma-nivṛttiḥ, kintu doṣa-darśanād eva.

[345 b–346 a]

न जातु कामः कामानामुपभोगेन शाम्यति ॥ ३४५ ॥
हविषा कृष्णवर्त्मेव भूय एवाभिवर्धते ।

Never does desire cease by the enjoyment of desires; it only increases, like fire (fed) by oblation.

This is a verse from *Manu* (ii, 94).

NKL refers to this verse as *Parāśara-vacanam.*

[346 b–347 a]

निवर्तेतापि कामेभ्यस्तदुपायाप्रसिद्धितः ॥ ३४६ ॥
सर्वक्लेशोपशान्त्यात्मज्ञानं चापि समाश्रयेत् ।

One should, indeed, turn away from desires, for they are not the means; and one should resort to the knowledge of self through the quiescence of afflictions.

Karmas cannot remove attachment. The knowledge of *karmas* and their performance are not the way for the one who wants to break the vicious circle of *saṁsāra.* Just as enjoyment does not free one from desire, so also performance of action does not destroy

desire. It is only when there is cessation from desire and action that there is a possibility of acquiring self-knowledge. So, the afflictions (*kleśas*) must go.

[347 b–348 a]

अथाऽऽनन्दः श्रुतः साक्षान्मानेनाविषयीकृतः ॥ ३४७ ॥

दृष्टानन्दाभिलाषं स न मन्दीकर्तुमप्यलम् ।

The happiness, which is heard of in Scripture but not realized through direct evidence, is not sufficient to diminish the longing for happiness derived from objects.

He who has attained the status of *Prajāpati* cannot even 'hear' from the *Śāstras* about Brahman-bliss; for only human beings are eligible to study the *Śāstras*. Even supposing that, somehow, he 'hears,' he will not develop a longing for that bliss while he is actually enjoying the pleasures of *Prajāpati*.

[348 b–349 a]

कामप्रविलयायातस्तद्विपक्षार्थभावनम् ॥ ३४८ ॥

विधयस्तत्क्रियाणां स्युस्तद्विपर्ययहेतवः ।

For resolving desire, the contemplation of what is contrary thereto (is the means). Injunctions of rites are the means to what is opposed to it.

The way to resolve desires is to constantly remember the defects of all sense-objects. If there is perception of the defects of objects, there will be no desire for them. Performance of actions will never lead to this end. Even obligatory rites result in the enjoyment of certain ends.

NKL—karma-vidhayaḥ kāma-vṛddhi-hetavaḥ ity arthaḥ.

[349 b–350 a]

द्वारं न नियतं मुक्तेः प्राजापत्यं पदं भवेत् ॥ ३४९ ॥
नह्युपाधिषु तत्त्वस्य विशेषः कश्चिदीक्ष्यते ।

The state of *Prajāpati* is not an invariable door to release; nor is any excellence of the real seen among adjuncts.

The state of *Prajāpati* is not the means to true knowledge; nor is it the means to the augmentation of truth. Where the adjuncts such as Prajāpati-hood function, there can never be the excellence of truth. So far as the highest truth is concerned, the adjuncts are all the same.

NTV—upādhīnām anirvācyatvāt teṣu viśeṣāpi anirvācyā eveti tattvasya na tāttvika-viśeṣaḥ. ṣaviśeṣatve ca tattvaṁ na syād ity arthaḥ.

[350 b–351 a]

नाऽऽकाशस्य विशेषोऽस्ति कुम्भद्रोण्याद्युपाधिषु ॥ ३५० ॥
दूरान्तिकादिभिन्नेषु कल्पिताकल्पितेष्वपि ।

There is no excellence for ether as regards its adjuncts such as a pot or a valley, different as being distant or near, imaginary or non-imaginary.

That there is no excellence among adjuncts is explained with the help of the ether-analogy. The ether of a pot does not differ from the ether of a valley; for ether is the same, no matter what the adjunct is.

[351 b–352 a]

सत्तत्त्वापेक्षयाऽभेदो भावानां नाभ्युपेयते ॥ ३५१ ॥
स्वभावहानादन्योन्यं विशेषो बाह्य एव सः ।

Non-difference of objects is not admitted as dependent on *the nature of being* (*sat-tattva*), for then, the nature of things would be destroyed. The mutual particularity (of things) is but external.

It cannot be said that the adjuncts, viz., objects, are all non-different because of their nature as being. If that were so, they will cease to be the objects. Nor can they be different from being, for, then, they would be non-being. So what is called particularity or plurality is superimposed on Brahman.

NTV—sattattvād bāhyaḥ kalpita evety arthaḥ nahi kalpitena viśeṣeṇa tattvaṁ saviśeṣaṁ bhavati.

[352 b–353 a]

कार्यकारणपक्षेऽपि कार्यं नान्यत्र कारणात् ॥ ३५२ ॥
न च तत्त्वे विशेषोऽस्ति कटकादीव हेमनि ।

Even on the view of cause and effect, the effect is not from what is other than the cause; nor is there any particularity in the real, as bracelet, etc., in gold.

Even admitting that Brahman is the cause and the world is its effect, there could be no absolute difference between the two. Nor is there any evidence to show that the world of plurality makes any difference in or for Brahman. In gold there is no difference such as between a bracelet and a necklace. So also, in Brahman there is no difference. There is no real difference either between the particulars that constitute the world, for they are appearances like the rope-snake.

NTV—vastutas tu kāryaṁ kāraṇaṁ cā 'tmani kalpitam iti na saviśeṣatva-śaṅkāpīty arthaḥ.

NKL—kaṭakādi vartulatvādi viśeṣepi hemarūpasya nirviśeṣatvāt brahmāpi nirviśeṣam ity arthaḥ.

AVS—kāryaṁ-tāvat kāraṇān na bhinnam, bhede ghaṭa-paṭavat kārya-kāraṇatva-hānāt, abhede'pi tad-hānāt, bhedābhedasya nirastatvāt, kāryaṁ-tāvat kalpitam, tathā kāraṇam api, ato nirviśeṣaṁ brahma.

[353 b-354 a]

अतः प्रजापतौ तत्त्वं कृमौ वा न विशिष्यते ॥ ३५३ ॥
तर्कादागमतश्चापि तद्धो य इति हीदृशात् ।

Therefore, reality is not different in *Prajāpati* or in a worm ; this is established through reasoning and from the Scriptural texts like 'And whoever (among the gods) (knew) it,'[1] etc.

Brahman is distinctionless (*nirviśeṣa*). Distinctions such as between genus and species do not apply to Brahman. Reality does not differ. There can be no excess or diminution for it. It is the same whether in *Prajāpati* or a worm. This truth is known both through logic and Scriptural testimony.

1. *BU*, I, iv, 10. 'And whoever among the gods knew it also became that.'

[354 b-355 a]

यदा सर्वे प्रमुच्यन्ते कामा येऽस्य हृदि श्रिताः ॥ ३५४ ॥
अथ मर्त्योऽमृतो भवत्यत्र ब्रह्म समश्नुते ।

'When are shed all the desires lodged in his heart, then the mortal becomes immortal; he reaches Brahman here'.[1]

To show that Brahman is distinctionless, that it is the same in all adjuncts, another Scriptural text is cited.

1. *BU*, IV, iv, 7; *KU*, vi, 14.

[355 b-356 a]

एको देवः सर्वभूतेषु गूढः सर्वव्यापी सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा ॥ ३५५ ॥
कर्माध्यक्षः सर्वभूताधिवासः साक्षी चेता केवलो निर्गुणश्च ।

'The one God, hidden in all beings, all-pervading, the inner self of all beings, the one who presides over *karma*, the support of all beings, the witness, the sole intelligence, without attributes'.[1]

The meaning of this Scriptural text is that Brahman is of one essence, free from all distinctions.

1. *ŚU*, vi, 11.

[356 b-357 a]

विज्ञानकर्मणोस्त्रेधा यद्युच्येत समुच्चयः ॥ ३५६ ॥
पूर्वोक्तैकात्म्यतात्पर्याद्भेदस्यासौ न युज्यते ।

If it be said that as between knowledge and action three ways of combination are possible, (we reply) it is not proper, for, as pointed out earlier, Veda[1] has for purport the oneness of self.

At this stage, the *samuccaya-vādin* (the combination-theorist) appears and says that the combination of *karma* and knowledge is the means to *mokṣa*. Three ways of combination are possible:

(1) *jñāna* is the principal and *karma* is its subsidiary; (2) *karma* is the principal and *jñāna* is its subsidiary; (3) both are equal.

Now, the *Siddhāntin* asks: What is the *pramāṇa* for combination, in whichever of the three ways it may be? Is it the *karma-kāṇḍa*? or, is it the *jñāna-kāṇḍa*? It cannot be the first, for *karma-kāṇḍa* only teaches that *karmas* are the means to *Svarga*, etc. Nor the second, for the purport of the *jñāna-kāṇḍa* is the one self (*Vide* v. 16.)

1. 'Veda' here means 'Upaniṣad'.

NKL—iñānaṁ pradhānaṁ karmopasarjanaṁ, karma pradhānaṁ jñānam upasarjanaṁ, dvayoḥ samaprādhānyaṁ ceti traividhyam.

sākṣāt-pāramparyābhyāṁ kṛtsna-vedasya advaita-paratvād avidyā-darśita-dvaitasya vidyāmātrāpanodyatvāt na trividhopi samuccayaḥ.

[357 b-358 a]

एकवाक्यावशीभावात्साध्यैक्यायोगतस्तथा ॥ ३५७ ॥

समुच्चयः कुतो द्रव्यगुणवज्ज्ञानकर्मणोः ।

Because they do not admit of being included in the same sentence, and because the end is not the same for both, how can there be combination of knowledge and action, as in the case of the material and the auxiliary?

There can be no combination of *karma* and *jñāna* as equals, as there is between the new-moon and full-moon rites (*Darśapūrṇamāsa*). In the example taken from Pūrvamīmāṁsā, the question is whether the two texts '*ya evaṁ vidvān paurṇamāsīṁ yajate*' and '*ya evaṁ vidvān amāvāsyāṁ yajate*' lay down two distinct and independent acts or the same set of rites to be performed at diffierent times, viz. the new-moon and the full-moon. The conclusion is that they refer to the same set of rites called *Darśapūrṇamāsa*. The new-moon rites and the full-moon rites are of equal strength, and together they give rise to the unseen potency which leads to heaven. (See *PM*, II, ii, 3.) The case of *karma* and *jñāna* is not like that. The texts relating to them have no syntactical unity as the texts of new-moon and full-moon rites have.

There is another reason for saying that there is no parity between *karma* and *jñāna*, on the one hand, and the *Darśapūrṇamāsa* rites, on the other. The *Darśapūrṇamāsa* consists of six main sacrifices, the *Āgneya*, etc. Though there are six sacrifices, they are to be regarded as one act, because they are related to the same fruit. As evidence

for this may be cited the text, 'Desiring heaven, one should perform the *Darśapūrṇamāsa* sacrifices'. Heaven is the common fruit of the six sacrifices, even as when it is said 'The well should be dug by the village' we understand that the well is to be the fruit of the collective labour of the villagers. (See *PM*, XI, i, 1.) *Karma* and *jñāna* do not have the same fruit. How could there be combination between them?

A contrary example is now given to show that *karma* and *jñāna* cannot be related as principal and subsidiary. In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice, it is laid down 'One purchases *Soma* with a tawny-eyed and one-year-old (cow), which is *red*' (*aruṇayā piṅgākṣyā ekahāyanyā somaṁ krīṇāti*). In regard to this, the question is: Does the property of redness go with the entire context, qualifying all that is mentioned therein? Or, does it go with the *one-year-old cow* only, and that too in connection with the act of *purchasing*? The answer given by the Mīmāṁsaka is that, as the cow which is the substance and redness which is its property serve the same purpose and have the same function, both of them should be connected with the act of purchasing. In other words, what is enjoined here is the purchase, and this purchase is qualified, not by each of the two factors, substance and property, severally, but by both collectively (*PM*, III, i, 12.). The case of *karma* and *jñāna* is quite different. There cannot be a combination between them, as there should be between the one-year-old cow and redness.

(358 b-359 a)

भेदाभेदाश्रयत्वेन ह्यैकात्म्यज्ञानकर्मणोः ॥ ३५८ ॥

परस्परोपकारित्वहानात्कीदृक्समुच्चयः ।

Knowledge of the one self is dependent on non-difference; and action is dependent on difference; as there is no mutual helpfulness, how can there be combination?

There can be combination only between what are helpful to each other. Such a relation cannot exist between *karma* which is dependent on distinctions such as agency, etc., and self-knowledge which is devoid of all distinctions.

NTV—kiṁca kartṛtvādi-bhedāśritaṁ karma, tad-rahitādvayātma-viṣayaṁ jñānam atas tamaḥ-prakāśavat paraspara-viruddhayor upakāryopakārakatvābhāvān na sarvaprakāras-samuccayaḥ.

(359 b-360 a)

देवताद्रव्ययाथात्म्यज्ञानं कर्माङ्गतां गतम् ॥ ३५९ ॥
तावदेव हि तत्कर्म नाज्ञातद्रव्यदैवतम् ।

The knowledge of the nature of the deity and the material is auxiliary to ritual; with this much, indeed, is it ritual, and not when there is no knowledge of the deity and the material.

It cannot be argued that there can be combination between self-knowledge and *karma* even as there is between the knowledge of deity, etc., and ritual action. For, the knowledge of deity, etc., falls entirely within ritual action, and therefore it requires no combination therewith. There can be no ritual action without the knowledge of deity, etc. Such knowledge is part and parcel of *karma*.

[360 b-361 a]

तद्विशेषेऽङ्गभूयस्त्वात्फलभूयस्त्वमित्यतः ॥ ३६० ॥
समुच्चयो न तस्य स्यान्नाङ्गेनाङ्गिसमुच्चयः ।

When there is that excellence (i.e. knowledge of the deity, etc.) there is an increase in parts and consequently an increase in fruit. Therefore, of that there can be no combination; for there is no combination of the part with the whole.

Knowledge of the true nature of the deity, etc., is a part of *karma*. When that knowledge increases and becomes more adequate, *karma* itself increases and yields more fruit. Knowledge of the deity, etc., is not outside *karma*. A part does not require to be united with the whole.

[361 b-362 a]

यच्चाप्यैकात्म्यविज्ञानं तदज्ञानैकघस्मरम् ॥ ३६१ ॥
तस्मिन्सति कुतः कर्म का वाऽपेक्षाऽस्य गोचरे ।

That which is called knowledge of the one self is entirely destructive of ignorance (*ajñāna*). When that is present, how can there be action? And in the sphere of this (viz. knowledge), how can there be the expectation of anything?

Here is a syllogism: What is in dispute, viz., self-knowledge, does not combine with *karma*, because it is opposed to karma; what is opposed to another does not combine with that other, as light with darkness. The sphere of knowledge is the Brahman-self, viz., *mokṣa*. That does not depend on anything else.

NKL—ātma-dhīr na karma-samuccitā tan-nivarttakatvāt prāyaścittādivat.

AVS—jñāna-karmaṇo'ḥ parasparopakārābhāvāt na samuccayaḥ.

[362 b-363 a]

ब्राह्मणत्वादिविज्ञानमग्निहोत्रादिकर्मणाम् ॥ ३६२ ॥
यद्दृष्टं साध्यसिद्ध्यै तु कर्मानुगुणमेव तत् ।

The knowledge of Brahmanhood, etc., which is seen in the case of rites like *Agnihotra*, for the sake of attaining the end, is only in the nature of aiding ritual.

The knowledge of Brahminhood, etc., is certainly helpful to *karma*. But that does not mean that self-knowledge is auxiliary to *karma*.

[363 b-364 a]

ऐकात्म्यवस्तुयाथात्म्यबोधे जात्यादिबाधनात् ॥ ३६३ ॥

न केवलं क्रिया न स्यात्कर्मणां प्रत्युताक्रिया ।

When there is knowledge of the true nature of the one self, caste, etc., get sublated ; and so then, there is not only no performance of ritual but there is no action at all.

With what *karma* is *jñāna* to be combined? (1) Is it with the actions subsequent to the rise of *jñāna*? (2) Or, is it with the fruit of those actions performed in previous births? (3) Or, with those earned in this life prior to the rise of *jñāna*?

Not the first. When there is the knowledge of the true self, ignorance is destroyed along with its effects, viz., place, caste, etc. After the destruction of ignorance, there can be no action.

Nor the second. When through the direct experience of the self ignorance has been destroyed, there can be no *karma* acquired in previous births.

[364 b-365 a]

अयथावस्तुसर्पादिज्ञानं हेतुः पलायने ॥ ३६४ ॥

रज्जुज्ञाने ऽहिधीध्वस्तौ कृतमप्यनुशोचति ।

The knowledge of illusory objects like the serpent is the cause of running away, etc. But, when by the knowledge of rope the cognition of serpent is destroyed one repents for one's past actions.

Ignorance is the cause of *karma*, even as mistaking the rope for the snake causes one to run, etc. When the nature of the rope is known, one feels ashamed of one's earlier running, etc. Similarly, when self-knowledge is gained, the illusory character of the earlier actions is realized. So, the third alternative also is not possible.

AVS—evaṁ jñānād ajñāna-kṣaye karma-kṣayāt, na jñānasya karmā'nuguṇatvam ity arthaḥ.

[365 b-366 a]

न कर्मव्यापृतिर्मुक्तावाप्त्यादीनामभावतः ॥ ३६५ ॥
न च श्रुत्यादयस्तत्र तेन स्यान्न समुच्चयः ।

There is no empirical usage of action in release, because of the absence of attainment (*āpti*), etc. Nor are Scripture, etc. (the evidence) there (i.e., for combination); therefore, there is no combination.

Scripture does not teach combination of *karma* and *jñāna*. The only combination—if it may be called combination—is one of sequence (*krama-samuccaya*) between the two. That is, *jñāna* succeeds *karma*.

NTV—paripakva-jñānasya acodya-svarūpatvāt vidyamānāyāḥ snānādi - pravṛtteḥ saṁskāra - nibandhanatvāt dvaita - pratyayavat, tasmād aikātmya-vastu-bodho jātyādi-bādhanāt, akartābhoktā-'nubhūtyaikaraso-'dvaya ātmāvatiṣṭhate. mokṣasya karma-sādhyat-vābhāvāc ca ātma-jñānam na karmāṅgatayā samuccīyate.

NKL—evaṁ jñāna-svarūpa-paryālocanayā samuccayaṁ nirasya, pramāṇa-prayojanayor abhāvenāpi nirācaṣṭe.

AVS—śrutyādaya iti śruti-liṅgādi-grahaṇaṁ veda-smṛtyādi-grahaṇaṁ vā.

[366 b-367 a]

अन्तरङ्गं हि विज्ञानं प्रत्यङ्मात्रैकसंश्रयात् ॥ ३६६ ॥
बहिरङ्गं तु कर्म स्याद्बाह्यद्रव्याश्रयत्वतः ।

Knowledge is the internal means (*antaraṅga*) because it relates to the inner self alone; action, however, is an external means (*bahiraṅga*), because it depends on external materials.

Jñāna is the internal means to *mokṣa*, while *karma* is the external means. As between the internal and external means, the internal is stronger. And, there can be no combination between the strong and the weak.

NTV—sattva-śuddhiḥ karma-phalaṁ, jñāna-phalam-ajñāna-nivṛttiḥ.

NKL—antaraṅgasya bahiraṅgāt prabalatvāt, prabalena durbalasya bādho yukta ity arthaḥ.

[367 b-368 a]

सत्यन्तरङ्गे विज्ञाने बहिरङ्गं न सिध्यति ॥ ३६७ ॥
संस्कारकं तु कर्म स्याज्ज्ञानात्त्वज्ञाननिह्नुतिः ।

When there is knowledge, the internal means, there cannot be the external means. Ritual can be the purifier (*saṁskāraka*). By knowledge, however, there is removal of ignorance.

When the internal means, viz., *jñāna*, is present, the external means, viz., *karma*, cannot stand. When *jñāna* is there, ignorance is not there; and when ignorance is not there, *karma* cannot be. *Karma* can only purify the mind. *Jñāna* destroys ignorance.

NKL—pratyak - prāvaṇya-kāraṇā-'ntaḥkaraṇa - śuddhiḥ karma-phalam.

AVS—sādhya-bhedāc ca jñāna-karmaṇor na samuccayaḥ...śuddhiḥ karma-phalam ajñāna-nivṛttiḥ jñāna-phalam ity arthaḥ.

[368 b-369 a]

यथावस्त्वात्मविज्ञानं मोहमात्राश्रयाः क्रियाः ॥ ३६८ ॥
सम्यग्ज्ञाने कुतः कर्म कर्महेतूपमर्दनात् ।

Knowledge of the self is (knowledge of) reality; rituals rest on delusion alone. When there is true knowledge, how can there be action, since the cause of action (delusion) has been destroyed?

Karma cannot remove ignorance; for it depends on ignorance. When *jñāna* removes ignorance, it removes *karma* as well.

NKL—brahma-jñānaṁ na karma-nivarttakaṁ jñānatvāt jñānāntaravad ity atrāha—yatheti—brahmajñānam adhyasta-nivarttakaṁ tattvadhītvāt śukti-tattva-jñānavad iti satpratipakṣam āha.

AVS—brahma-jñānasya yathābhūtātma-viṣayatvena karmaṇas tanmohāśrayatvena jñānodaye karmāsaṁbhavāc ca na samuccayaḥ.

[369 b-370 a]

नित्यप्राप्तं च विज्ञानं प्रतीचः संनिधेः सदा ॥ ३६९ ॥
कर्मानित्यं पृथग्रूपं नित्यं चानित्यबाधकम् ।

Knowledge is eternally attained, since it is ever of the nature of the inner self. Action is non-eternal and varied. And, what is eternal is sublative of the non-eternal.

There is no parity between *jñāna* and *karma*. *Jñāna* is the self, of the nature of intelligence-light, and is eternal. *Karma* is non-eternal, because it is dependent on a plurality of causal agents, and because it is itself plural. Thus the two have divergent natures; and so, there can be no combination between them.

NTV—ātma-jñānasya nitya-prāptatvāt karmaṇas tad abhāvāt anityatvāt, nityena anitya-bādhopapatteś ca na samuccayaḥ.

NKL—jñānaṁ na karma-hetu-nivarttakaṁ kāryatvād ghaṭavad ity āśaṅkya hetvasiddhim āha—nityeti.

AVS—ātma-jñānasya nitya - prāptatvāt karmaṇas tad-abhāvāt nityena anitya-bādhopapatteś ca na samuccayaḥ.

[370 b-371 a]

क्षयी कर्मार्जितो लोकः स्वराड्ब्रह्मावबोधतः ॥ ३७० ॥
लब्धे त्रैलोक्यराज्ये ना भिक्षामाद्रियते तु कः ।

The enjoyment (*loka*) earned by action perishes; by Brahman-knowledge one becomes the lord of oneself (*svarāṭ*). Who would hug beggary, when there is rulership of the three worlds at hand?

It is not possible to combine *jñāna* with *karma*, because the results of the two are different, even as it is not possible to combine the *Citrā* rite with the *Darśapūrṇamāsa* for the same reason.

NTV—jñāna-phalaṁ svārājyam iti jñāninaḥ karma-phale prepsābhāvāc ca na samuccayaḥ...yat sādhyaṁ tat kṣayīti vyāpti-niyamāt.

AVS—karmaphalasya anityatvāt jñānaphalasya nityatvāc ca na samuccayaḥ.

[371 b-372 a]

भिन्नप्रकरणं ज्ञानं काङ्क्षितं न च कर्मणा ॥ ३७१ ॥
विरोधाच्च स्वतन्त्रं तद्गुणभूतं न कस्यचित् ।

Knowledge belongs to a different context; nor is it needed by action. Because of opposition, that (*viz.* knowledge) which is independent is not an auxiliary of anything.

Jñāna and *karma* belong to different contexts. *Karma* does not require *jñāna*. They are not related as helper and helped. They have contrary natures. So, there can be no combination. *Jñāna* is independent, and, therefore, is not an auxiliary of *karma*.

[372 b-373 a]

यतो वस्त्वनुरोध्येतन्न ज्ञातृवशवर्त्यतः ॥ ३७२ ॥

अज्ञानोच्छित्तये ज्ञानं स्वतन्त्रं तेन भण्यते ।

As it (*viz.* knowledge) is dependent on reality, it is not dependent on the knower. Knowledge is for the purpose of removing ignorance; therefore it is said to be independent.

Why is *jñāna* said to be independent? It is not dependent on the knower, as *karma* is dependent on the doer. *Jñāna*, it is true, is dependent on the real (*vastu*). Yet, it is independent in so far as it yields its fruit without depending on any other means.

NTV—brahma-jñānaṁ svatantram, na karmāpekṣam.

[373 b-374 a]

अनावृत्तिश्च कर्मभ्यो न क्वचिच्छ्रूयते स्फुटम् ॥ ३७३ ॥

ज्ञानादेव त्वनावृत्तिः श्रूयते बहुशः श्रुतौ ।

Nowhere is it clearly stated in Scripture that by ritual one attains the state of non-return (i.e., release); many Scriptural texts, however, declare that by knowledge alone there is non-return.

There is no combination of *jñāna* as the principal with *karma* as the subsidiary; for, *jñāna* which is the means to release does not require the assistance of *karmas* which are not the means thereto. It is nowhere declared that through *karmas* one could reach the status of non-return. Scripture teaches repeatedly that *jñāna* is the path to perfection.

[374 b-375 a]

एकरूपं च विज्ञानमेकरूपात्ममेयतः ॥ ३७४ ॥
भिन्नरूपाणि कर्माणि बहुकारकसंश्रयात् ।

Knowledge is uniform because its content is the self which is of one-form; actions are multiform, because they depend on many causal correlates.

There can be no combination of *jñāna* and *karma* as equals. The two are different: *jñāna* is uniform, whereas *karma* is multiform.

NTV—jñāna-karmaṇor ekāneka-rūpatayā mokṣa-sādhanatve virodhāc ca na karma itikartavyatva-lakṣaṇas samuccayaḥ.

[375 b-376 a]

एकरूपस्य मोक्षस्य भिन्नरूपं न साधनम् ॥ ३७५ ॥
एकरूपस्य मोक्षस्य ह्येकरूपं हि साधनम् ।

For release which is uniform, what is multiform cannot be the means; for release which is uniform, what is uniform is, indeed, the means.

As is the end, so should be the means. For release which is one, *jñāna* should be the means, and not *karma*.

AVS—mokṣasyaikarūpatvāt jñānasyāpi tad-viṣayatvena ekarūpatvāt, karmaṇo 'neka-kārakāśritatvena anekātmakatvāt taj-jñānasyāpi tathātvāt, ekarūpasya mokṣasya ekarūpam eva jñānam sādhanam ucitam, netarat.

[376 b-377 a]

तस्मात्कर्मफलं नाना नानाकर्मसमुद्भवम् ॥ ३७६ ॥
देवमानुषतिर्यक्षु कर्तुः शास्त्रैर्निदर्शितम् ।

Therefore, the fruit of action is varied, being produced by various deeds; (this is) for the agent in the forms of gods, men and animals. This has been shown by the Scriptures.

The fruits of *karma* are many. It is these fruits that constitute *saṁsāra*. And, they are enjoyed by the different kinds of beings.

[377 b-378 a]

अन्ये तु मन्वते केचिद्गम्भीरन्यायवादिनः ॥ ३७७ ॥
भेदस्य विलयो वेदे गम्यते कस्यचित्कचित् ।

Some others who argue bravely, however, think that the resolution of some difference (*bheda*) or other is taught somewhere in the Veda.

Here, attention is turned to the view known as *prapañcavilaya-vāda*. According to it, *karma* is auxiliary to *jñāna* through effecting the resolution of the world.

[378 b-379 a]

देहात्मभावविलयः स्वर्गकामपदे यथा ॥ ३७८ ॥
देहाद्भिन्नोऽधिकार्यत्र स्वर्गभोग्यवगम्यते ।

For example, in (the text containing) the expression 'desire for heaven', there is seen the resolution of the notion that the body is the self; for, the eligible person

who is different from the body is known here as the enjoyer in heaven.

The *prapañcavilaya-vādin* argues as follows: The text 'He who desires heaven should sacrifice' conveys the resolution of the idea that the physical body is the self, for it is not this body that is to enjoy heaven.

[379 b-380 a]

गोदोहनेनेत्यत्रापि विलयोऽन्याधिकारिणः ॥ ३७९ ॥

अधिकृताधिकारित्वान्नान्योऽधिक्रियते यतः ।

Even in the text 'with the milk pail' there is seen resolution for one who is eligible in respect of another rite; for here there is eligibility for one who is already eligible (*adhikṛta-adhikāritva*); no one else is eligible here.

The text about 'the milk pail' also teaches resolution—resolution of independent eligibility for the act indicated by this text in the eligibility for the *Darśapūrṇamāsa*.

In connection with the *Darśapūrṇamāsa* there is the text 'With the *camasa* (cup) he is to sprinkle the water'. Here sprinkling is enjoined. There is a further text which says, 'With the milk pail for him who desires cattle'.* This, evidently, does not enjoin any principal rite. In the case of one who is already eligible for the *Darśapūrṇamāsa*, for its own fruit, here there is the injunction, incidentally, of another subsidiary for a further fruit.

[380 b-381 a]

रागाद्युत्थप्रवृत्तीनां निषेधेषु लयोऽञ्जसा ॥ ३८० ॥

विधिष्वपि लयस्तासां कार्यान्तरनियोगतः ।

In prohibitions, there is the resolution, in no time, of activities roused by attachment, etc.; even in injunctions there is their resolution because of the prompting in respect of other activities.

The prohibition texts too have resolution for their purport—the resolution of activities prompted by attachment, etc. So do the texts enjoining obligatory and occasioned rites. Here also, there is the resolution of natural and instinctive acts.

[381 b-382 a]

लोकेऽपि चानभिप्रेतात्पथः साक्षान्निवारणम् ॥ ३८१ ॥
मार्गान्तरोपदेशाद्वा वेदेऽप्येवं प्रतीयताम् ।

Even in the world, a path that is not intended is prohibited either directly or by teaching another path ; similarly let it be understood as regards the Veda.

The prohibitions and injunctions of the Veda are similar to those that belong to empirical usage. The latter too involve resolution—preventing the performance of an act, or changing the course of action.

[382 b-383 a]

एवं रागादिहेतूत्थप्रवृत्तिलयवर्त्मना ॥ ३८२ ॥
आत्मज्ञानाधिकारार्था निःशेषा विधयः स्थिताः ।

Thus all injunctions without exception are for making one eligible for self-knowledge, through the resolution of actions roused by attachment, etc.

Thus, concludes the *prapañcavilaya-vādin*, all the texts of the *karma-kāṇḍa* make one fit for *jñāna* through the resolution of the world.

[383 b-384 a]

नैतदेवं यतोऽशेषा न कर्मविधयः श्रुतौ ॥ ३८३ ॥
स्ववाक्यावगतात्कार्यादपेक्षन्ते फलान्तरम् ।

This is not so ; for no injunctions of the Scripture relating to ritual are expectant of a fruit other than the *kārya* which is made known by the texts of the injunctions themselves.

The *siddhāntin* replies : For whom do the injunctive texts declare the resolution of the world ? Is it (1) for the one who seeks release, or (2) for the one who desires heaven, or (3) for the one who wishes for only the absence of the world, or (4) for the one who wants to know the content of *jñāna-niyoga ?*

(1) The injunctions of rites that are to be found in the Veda declare *Svarga* as the fruit. They, therefore, cannot be related to *mokṣa* which is quite a different fruit. To say that the ritual texts teach the resolution of the world for the sake of him who seeks release carries no sense at all.

[384 b-385 a]

वेदेऽनुष्ठानतात्पर्यान्न लयो गम्यते क्वचित् ॥ ३८४ ॥
फलश्रुतेरभावो हि साध्यः स्यादफलः कथम् ।

As, in the Veda, the performance is the purport, resolution is nowhere taught ; for, a fruit is declared in Scripture (for each rite). How, indeed, can non-existence which is no fruit be what is to be accomplished ?

(2) For him who desires heaven, the Veda does not teach the resolution of the world, for such resolution is not the means to heaven. What the Veda teaches in his case is the performance of rites.

(3) No one can desire a non-existence. The non-existence of the world is not what is to be accomplished, because it is a non-existence, like tortoise-hair. Also it cannot serve as a human goal, even as the non-existence of son, etc., is not a human goal.

[385 b-386 a]

वस्तुनोऽवगतिर्नापि लयाद्भवति कुत्रचित् ॥ ३८५ ॥
अभावेऽप्युपपन्नत्वात्सुषुप्ते चाप्यनीक्षणात् ।

Nor is the perception of the real brought about anywhere by resolution; for even where there is absence (of resolution) there is perception, and in deep sleep (where there is resolution) there is no perception (of the real).

(4) The content of *jñāna-niyoga* is *jñāna* as the means to release. But the non-existence of the world is not what causes *jñāna*. Through resolution, the real is never known. Even when the world is seen to exist, it is possible to know the real. Just as, even while two moons appear, one may know that there is only one moon through the words of a trustworthy person, etc., so also even while the body lasts one may realize Brahman through the study of Scripture, etc. The resolution of the world does not necessarily mean the realization of truth. In sleep, swoon, etc., there is no world, but there is no Brahman-knowledge either.

NKL—prapañca-laye satyapi supti-pralayayor brahmānavagamāc ca. anādi-bhāvasya ātmavad anivarttyatvād upādāna-nivṛttim-antareṇa kāryasyātyantika-layāsiddhes tatkāraṇājñāna-nivarttaka-jñānam eva āśrayaṇīyam ity āśayaḥ.

[386 b-387 a]

स्वाभाविकः प्रपञ्चश्चेत्स निरोद्धुं न शक्यते ॥ ३८६ ॥
कार्यश्चेत्कारणोच्छेदे कार्योच्छेदः स्वतो न हि ।

If the universe is natural (*svābhāvika*), it is not possible to remove it; if it is an effect, there would be removal of the effect when there is removal of the cause, and not of itself.

Whether the world be beginningless or with a beginning, its resolution cannot be the content of *jñāna-niyoga*. If it is beginningless like the self, it cannot be removed at all. If it is a product, then it will be destroyed only when its cause is destroyed. The cause of the world is ignorance; and that can be removed only by knowledge. So, it is not right to say that the resolution of the world leads to knowledge.

NTV—nahi svabhāvo bhāvānāṁ vyāvartyeta auṣṇyavad raveḥ, svabhāvād vinivṛttortho niḥsvabhāvaḥ, kha-puṣpavad iti hy uktaṁ, nityasya layābhyupagame ātmanopi laya-prasaṅga iti bhāvaḥ.

[387 b-388 a]

कृत्स्नप्रपञ्चविलयः कर्तुं शक्यो न केनचित् ॥ ३८७ ॥
स्वेन्द्रियादिलयः स्वापे स्वत एव न शास्त्रतः ।

It is not possible for anyone to resolve the entire universe by anything (except knowledge); the resolution of one's own sense-organs, etc., in sleep is of their own accord, and not from the sacred teaching.

Is the destruction of the entire universe along with its cause said to be the content of *jñāna-niyoga*, or only of a part thereof? The entire universe with its cause cannot be destroyed except by self-knowledge. If the destruction of a part of the universe be the content, what is this part? Is it any part of the universe, or that belonging to the individual such as sense-organ, etc.? If the destruction of any part would do, there is the contingence of the rise

of knowledge in one who has destroyed a part. As for the resolution of sense organ, etc., that happens automatically in sleep, etc., and there is no need for *niyoga*.

[388 b-389 a]

उत्थितस्य पुनर्भावादनुच्छेदोऽथ शङ्क्यते ॥ ३८८ ॥
आयातस्तर्ह्यनाश्वासस्त्वदभ्युपगतावपि ।

If it be doubted that there is no absolute resolution (of the sense-organs in sleep) as they come into being again when one wakes up, then there would result lack of trust even in what you maintain.

It may be thought that, as in sleep sense-organ, etc., are not altogether destroyed, there is need for *niyoga* to bring about their destruction. But what guarantee is there that in the resolution taught by the *prapañcavilayavādin* sense-organ, etc., are completely destroyed? For aught we know, they may remain there in an unmanifest form.

NTV—pravilīnasya punar-bhāvād anucchedaścet, niyogataḥ pravilīnasyāpi punar-udbhava-saṁbhavāt tatra prayāso vyarthaḥ.

[389 b-390 a]

प्रपञ्चनाशनेनाथ नाश्यते भेदकारणम् ॥ ३८९ ॥
नैवं न कार्यनाशेन कारणं नश्यति क्वचित् ।

"Then, by the destruction of the universe the cause of difference is destroyed." Not thus; nowhere is the cause destroyed by the destruction of the effect.

It may be said that in sleep the cause of sense-organ, etc., is not destroyed, and that as the cause persists, sense-organ, etc., reappear on waking. But we ask: What is it that removes this cause? Surely,

it cannot be the destruction of the universe. The universe is only an effect. With the destruction of the effect, the cause is not necessarily destroyed.

AVS—na hi kuṇḍala-vilayāt prayatna-sādhyād api suvarṇalayaḥ, tathā prapañcalayāt prayatna-sādhyān na tat-kāraṇa-laya iti.

[390 b-391 a]

कारणस्याप्यविद्याया वस्तुबोधाद्विनाशतः ॥ ३९० ॥
यतोऽतोऽविद्यानाशार्थं प्रपञ्चविलयोऽफलः ।

As nescience which is the cause is destroyed by the knowledge of reality, resolution of the universe is useless for the sake of destroying nescience.

For the destruction of the cause, viz., nescience, what is required is the knowledge of truth; therefore, the resolution of the universe is useless.

[391 b-392 a]

रज्जुज्ञानाद्धि सर्पादिप्रपञ्चविलयो यतः ॥ ३९१ ॥
सर्पाभासलयेऽपीयं रज्जुस्तमसि नेक्ष्यते ।

It is by the knowledge of rope that there is resolution of the appearance of serpent, etc., for even when the snake-appearance is resolved in darkness the rope is not seen.

What was stated above is here explained with the help of the rope-snake illustration.

[392 b-393 a]

लयनिष्ठे प्रमाणे नो वस्तुगोचरभेदतः ॥ ३९२ ॥
अथ वस्तुनि तन्मानं न लये स्यान्न च द्वये ।

If the evidence (of Scripture) be in regard to resolution, then reality cannot be its sphere, because of difference; if, then, it be evidence for reality, it cannot be (evidence) for resolution; nor for both.

What does Scripture teach—is it the resolution of the universe, or the nature of reality, or both? If Scripture teaches the resolution, reality cannot be its purport. Nor can both be its purport, for, then, there would be sentence-split.

[393 b-394 a]

भाव्युच्छेत्तुमशक्यस्ते भूतोऽप्युपरतः स्वतः ॥ ३९३ ॥
प्रपञ्चो वर्तमानस्तु कार्यत्वान्नश्यति स्वतः ।

For you, of what is yet to be (*bhāvī*) destruction is not possible; nor of what is past, for it has ceased to be of its own accord; and the universe that is present, because it is an effect, will by itself cease to be.

Moreover, which universe is it that is sought to be resolved—the future, the past, or the present? The past universe has ceased to be; the future universe is not yet; the present, because it is an effect, will disappear of its own accord. Hence there is no need for a *niyoga* to bring about the resolution of the world.

[394 b-395 a]

श्रुतेर्विलयतात्पर्ये फलमाकस्मिकं भवेत् ॥ ३९४ ॥
फलार्था चेल्लये न स्यान्नोभयं वाक्यभेदतः ।

If Scripture has resolution for purport, the fruit will become accidental; if it has the fruit for purport, it cannot have resolution (for purport); nor both, because of sentence-split.

It may be contended that the ritual texts have the resolution of the world as their purport. But, if that were so, the attainment of heaven, etc., which is declared to be the human goal would become accidental. If the ritual texts teach the relation between heaven, etc., and sacrifice, etc., as ends and means, the resolution of the world cannot be their purport. The ritual texts cannot have both as their purport, for, then, there would be sentence-split.

[395 b-396 a]

प्रपञ्चविलयेनैव सर्वानर्थप्रहाणतः ॥ ३९५ ॥
पुरुषार्थस्य संसिद्धेर्विद्या नैष्फल्यमापतेत् ।

If by the resolution of the universe itself, there be the destruction of all evil, then, as the human goal has been accomplished, there would be futility for knowledge.

If the ritual texts have the resolution of the world for purport, and if by this the human goal is reached, where is the need for knowledge?

[396 b-397 a]

अत ऐकात्म्ययाथात्म्यज्ञानादज्ञानहानतः ॥ ३९६ ॥
सिद्धे पुमर्थे विलयकल्पना निष्प्रयोजना ।

Therefore, since by the true knowledge of the one self ignorance is destroyed, and thereby the human goal is accomplished, the postulation of resolution is useless.

It is by knowledge that ignorance is destroyed. With the destruction of ignorance, all evil is removed. Therefore, there is not required the resolution of the world.

[397 b-398 a]

स्वकार्योपक्षयादेव विधीनां च परस्परम् ॥ ३९७ ॥
कुत एकाधिकारत्वमपेक्षाभावतो वद ।

As injunctions are exhausted with their own (respective) *kāryas*, and as there is no mutual expectancy, say, how can there be singleness of eligibility?

The eligibility for the *karma-* and *jñāna-kāṇḍas* cannot be the same. It is only in the case of what are related as principal and subsidiary that the same person is eligible for both. *Karma* and knowledge are not so related. Each of these results in its own fruit; therefore, the eligibility for each is different.

NKL—karma - kāṇḍasya jñāna-kāṇḍavat svaphalopakṣīṇatvāt parasparānapekṣatvān na karma-vidhīnāṁ jñāna-niyoga-śeṣatvam.

[398 b-399]

विधीनां चापि सर्वेषां निषेधवचसां तथा ॥ ३९८ ॥
नामादिलयनिष्ठत्वे ह्यभ्युपेतेऽप्रमाणके ।
अनिमित्तोऽपवर्गोऽपि शास्त्रं चैवमनर्थकम् ॥ ३९९ ॥

If it be admitted that all injunctions and prohibitions too have for purport the resolution of name, etc., which is not authorized (by the Scriptural texts), then release would be accidental and the sacred teaching would be futile.

If injunctions and prohibitions have for purport the resolution of the world, there would be no *śravaṇa*, etc., which are known as the means to *mokṣa*. Then, *mokṣa* too, like heaven, etc., would become accidental. And, Scripture would lose its value.

[400-403 a]

स्वर्गादिकार्यमार्गेण मन्यसे यदि कर्मणाम् ।
सोपानपङ्क्तिगत्येव हर्म्यपृष्ठाधिरोहणम् ॥ ४०० ॥

आत्मज्ञानाधिकारानुप्रवेशित्वं भविष्यति ।
यथैव नगराध्वस्थग्रामगत्युपदेशनम् ॥ ४०१ ॥

नगराध्वोपदेशस्य शेषत्वं प्रतिपद्यते ।
नाकामितत्वाद्ग्रामादिगतेर्युक्तैव शेषता ॥ ४०२ ॥

स्वर्गादेर्न तु शेषत्वं पुरुषार्थत्वहेतुतः ।

If you should think thus: "Just as one climbs to the terrace of a house by a flight of stairs, so the ritual acts serve to introduce one into eligibility for self-knowledge through the instrumentality of *kāryas* like heaven, etc., even as the direction for going to a village which is on the way to a town becomes auxiliary to the direction for going to the town;" it is not so, because as going to the village is not what is desired, it can well be ancillary; heaven, etc., however, connot be ancillary, since they are human goals.

Pūrvapakṣa—The two *kāṇḍas* have the same fruit which is release; and heaven, etc., are not accidental results, as they constitute the channel to release. Heaven, etc., may be compared to the rungs of a ladder leading to the terrace, or to a village that is on the way to a town. So, one has to pass through heaven, etc., in order to attain *mokṣa*. The present argument may by expressed in the following syllogistic form : What are in dispute, viz. heaven, etc., are

auxiliaries to *jñāna-niyoga*, because they are taught for the sake of him who seeks knowledge; what is taught for the sake of a seeker is auxiliary to what he seeks; just as the teaching about going to a village with reference to a person who wants to go to a town is auxiliary to going to that town.

Siddhānta—The reasoning is fallacious. In the instances cited as examples, there is no particular fruit attached to the rungs of the ladder or to the wayside village. So, they may well serve as auxiliaries to go up to the terrace and to reach the town, respectively. Not so are heaven, etc. These are desired as ends-in-themselves.

AVS—grāma-gamanopadeśeṣu puruṣārthasyāśravaṇāt phalavan nagara-gamanopadeśa-śeṣatvaṁ ghaṭata eva, svargādeḥ phalasya śravaṇān nānya-śeṣatvaṁ karma-vidhīnām iti.

[403 b-405 a]

अथोपच्छन्दनार्थानि स्वर्गादीनि विमुक्तये ॥ ४०३ ॥
नगरादौ तदध्वस्थग्रामादिगुणगीरिव ।

नैवं मान्तरतः सिद्धेर्नृवाक्ये तत्समञ्जसम् ॥ ४०४ ॥
वेदे तु वक्तृभावत्वादभिप्रायाद्यसंभवः ।

"Heaven, etc., are inducements to release, even as extolling the excellences of the village, etc., that are on the way is for reaching the town." If thus it be said, not so; for, as there are other evidences possible in the case of a man's statement, that is all right (i.e., praising the excellence of the village, etc., may be determined to be ancillary by other means of valid knowledge); but as regards the Veda, there is no speaker, and so it is not possible to determine the intention, etc.

Pūrvapakṣa—Heaven, etc., are not intrinsic ends. They are praised only in order to inspire those who have no longing for release. In other words, they are offered as baits to entice the worldly people away from their empirical attachments. This is just like extolling the wayside village. A boy that refuses to move may be induced to move by telling him that there are food, etc., available in plenty in that particular village. The objective, however, is to lead the boy to the town.

Siddhānta—How is the auxiliariness of ritual-commands to *jñāna-niyoga* known? Is it known by some other *pramāṇa*? Or, by verbal testimony? In the example, it is possible to determine the true intention of the person who extols the village through means other than his words. But, in the case of the Veda, such a procedure is not possible. The Veda is not a human composition; and there is no question of determininig the intention through means other than the words of the Veda.

[405 b-406 a]

यद्वा तत्रैव तात्पर्यं यत्रोपच्छन्द्य नीयते ॥ ४०५ ॥
नगरादौ तु मानाभावात्प्रयतेत पुमान्कुतः ।

Or, if that itself were the purport (i.e. going to the village) where one is led to by persuasion, then since there is no evidence as regards reaching the town, how could a man strive for it?

If the words alone constitute the *pramāṇa*, then, in the example, going to the village will have to be declared as the end, and not going to the town. The boy who hears the praise of the village will regard the village as his destination, and not the town. Similarly, from the texts of the Veda, it cannot be determined that the injunctions of ritual are for the sake of eligibility for *jñāna*.

[406 b-407 a]

यदाऽपि वस्तुवृत्तेन नगरावाप्तिसाधनम् ॥ ४०६ ॥
ग्रामाप्तिर्नगरप्राप्तिस्तदाऽप्यर्थान्न मानतः ।

Even if, by the nature of things, reaching the village is the means for reaching the town, reaching the town (by that means) is by implication (*arthāt*) and not by a means of valid knowledge (*mānatah*).

In the example, going to the village is ascertained to be auxiliary to reaching the town, not from the express words which are only in praise of the village, but by implication. In the case of the ritual-commands, however, these are said to be auxiliary to *jñāna-niyoga* on the strength of testimony. Hence, there is disparity between the illustration and the illustrated.

[407 b-408 a]

अर्थादपि न तात्पर्यं द्रव्यार्जनविधेरिव ॥ ४०७ ॥
शब्दमात्रानुसारेण वेदे तात्पर्यधीर्यतः ।

Even by implication it is not the purport, as in the case of the injunction to gather money ; for the cognition of purport as regards the Veda must follow the simple words.

Even by implication, the injunctions and prohibitions do not have *jñāna-niyoga* as their purport ; for they are not unintelligible without postulating the latter. An example is given to show that *karma-kāṇḍa* is not for the sake of *jñāna-niyoga*. In the *Pūrva-mīmāṁsā-sūtra* (IV, i, 2) distinction is made between what is a human end (*puruṣārtha*) and what is for the sake of a sacrifice (*kratvartha*). *Puruṣārtha* is that upon which follows man's happiness:

whereas *kratvartha* is that which is required for the performance of a sacrifice and is to be learnt from Scriptural injunction alone. Now, there is a text relating to the acquisition of property which says: 'For the *brāhmaṇa*, by means of receiving gifts; for the *kṣatriya*, by means of conquest, etc.; and for the *vaiśya*, by means of agriculture, etc.' The question with regard to this text is whether the acquisition of property is a *puruṣārtha* or *kratvartha*. The answer is that the acquisition of property is for the purpose of bringing about happiness which is the human end. It is not necessary, therefore, to include this acquisition in the injunction of the performance of the sacrifice. Similarly, *karma-kāṇḍa* has its own end. Why, then, should it be regarded as auxiliary to *jñāna-niyoga*?

[408 b-409 a]

स्वर्गादौ यदि तात्पर्यं न स्यादैकात्म्यबोधने ॥ ४०८ ॥
मुक्तौ चेन्न भवेत्स्वर्गे वाक्यभेदान्न च द्वये ।

If the purport be in respect of heaven, etc., it cannot be in respect of the knowledge of the one self; if (the purport be) as regards release, it cannot be as regards heaven; nor can it be in regard to both because of sentence-split.

Moreover, if *karma-kāṇḍa* be auxiliary to *jñāna-niyoga*, it must be stated whether the purport of *karma-kāṇḍa* is heaven, etc., or release, or both. If the purport be the first, the *kāṇḍa* cannot be auxiliary to *jñāna-niyoga*. If the purport be release, then there is contradiction with the cognition that *karma-kāṇḍa* is related to what is unknown, viz., heaven. The third alternative is impossible because if both heaven and release be the purport there would be sentence-split.

[409 b-410 a]

न च स्वर्गादिकार्याणां प्रयाजार्थसमानता ॥ ४०९ ॥

अनुप्रवेशः कल्प्येत येन कार्यान्तरं प्रति ।

What are to be accomplished, like heaven, etc., are not similar to the fore–sacrifices (*prayājas*) in which case they may be assumed to be included in some other thing to be accomplished.

Karma-kāṇḍa cannot be treated as an *arthavāda*, because we hear in it of fruit like heaven. Heaven, etc., cannot be compared to the fore-sarcrifices, because they are ends-in-themselves.

NTV—prayājādiṣu varma vā etad yajñasya kriyate ity-ādi śrūyamāṇārthavādika-phalavan na svargādi-phalaṁ, prayājādivad agniṣṭomādīnāṁ ātma-jñānāṅgatvasya adyāpy aprasiddheḥ ity arthaḥ.

[410 b-412 a]

वक्तव्यं च कथं त्वेते दृष्टेनैवोपकारिणः ॥ ४१० ॥

आत्मज्ञानाधिकारस्य यदि तावदिदं मतम् ।

रागाद्याक्षिप्तदृष्टार्थप्रवृत्तिप्रतिषेधतः ॥ ४११ ॥

अस्त्वेवं प्रतिषेधेषु निवृत्तेरुपकारतः ।

"Somehow, these (injunctions and prohibitions) must be stated (to be auxiliary to *jñāna-niyoga*) because they are seen to be helpful to eligibility for self–knowledge." If this be your view, let this be so in the case of prohibitions, for they help turning away (*nivṛtti*) by banning activity towards seen objects brought about by attachment, etc.

If it be said that injunctions and prohibitions are helpful to *jñāna-niyoga* in so far as they make one turn away from too much activity, the *siddhāntin* replies that such is the case only with regard to prohibition.

[412 b-413 a]

विधयस्तु कथं रागं निरुन्धन्तीति भण्यताम् ॥ ४१२ ॥

न हि ते परिसंख्यार्था नापि चैते नियामकाः ।

But how is it possible to say that injunctions destroy attachment? They are not for the sake of exclusion (*parisaṅkhyā*); nor are they restrainers (*niyāmakāḥ*).

How can injunctions serve to remove attachment and thus make one turn away from activity?

There are three types of injunction—the injunction of the novel (*apūrva-vidhi*), the restrictively complementary injunction (*niyama-vidhi*), and the exclusive injunction (*parisaṅkhyā-vidhi*).

(1) *Apūrva-vidhi* is that injunction whose fruit is the establishment of what is not established in any other way; e.g. "He sprinkles the paddy-grains." Here, what is enjoined is the purificatory act of sprinkling the paddy-grains. This is not established by any other evidence, the injunction being the only authority. (2) *Niyama-vidhi* is that injunction whose fruit is the complementation of the unestablished element, in respect of what is established in part; e.g. "He pounds the paddy-grains." Here, even in the absence of injunction, pounding of the paddy-grains would result in order to get the rice which is the basic material of the sacrificial cake (*puroḍāśa*). But the pounding is established only in part, for there are other means of producing the rice such as husking with the nails. And so, the purpose of the injunction is to restrict the means to producing the rice by pounding. (3) *Parisaṅkhyā-vidhi* is that injunction which excludes one of two alternatives

that are simultaneously established or are available. For example, in the *Agnicayana* two acts are to be observed, viz. taking hold of the reins of a horse and taking hold of the reins of a donkey. Here there is an injunction which says, 'He takes hold of the reins of the horse with the words "they seized the bridle of the right". Since there are two animals connected with this sacrifice, the words "they seized," etc., may refer to the act of holding the reins of either a horse or a donkey. The purpose of the injunction is to exclude the possibility of taking hold of the reins of a donkey.

If the *karma-kāṇḍa* is held to be helpful to *jñāna-niyoga* by removing attachment, etc., it must be of the nature either of *parisaṅkhyā-vidhi* or of *niyama-vidhi*. But neither can be the case. There are no alternatives here, nor establishment in part.

[413 b-414 a]

अत्यन्ताप्राप्तमर्थं हि विधयो बोधयन्ति नः ॥ ४१३ ॥
प्राप्तार्थो यो विधिः सोऽन्यनिवृत्तिफल इष्यते ।

Injunctions, indeed, teach us what is not absolutely accomplished (otherwise). That injunction which relates to an accomplished object is in effect for excluding something else.

The main purpose of *karma-kāṇḍa* is to enjoin what is novel. It teaches what is not established by any other means. Restriction and exclusion are possible only in the case of what have been already established either in part or as alternatives.

[414 b-415 a]

सेवासांग्रहणीहावत्तुल्यकार्यतया न च ॥ ४१४ ॥
यतोऽनियतकालीनफला वैधी क्रियेष्यते ।

Nor is there similarity of being accomplished as for service (of the king) and the *Sāṅgrahaṇī* rite (in the matter of acquiring a village) ; for the activity consequent on Vedic injunction does not yield its fruit in a fixed time.

It may be contended that, even though the injunctions of ritual have what is novel as their content, they make one turn away from something else. For example, service to a king and the *Sāṅgrahaṇī* rite have the same fruit which is acquiring possession of a desired village ; the adoption of one of these means, by implication, makes one not seek the other means. Similarly, activity that is prompted by attachment, etc., and the empirical usage prompted by Scripture result in transmigration ; in the case of one who has recourse to the latter, the former is removed. So, even though the injunctions of ritual relate to what is not established otherwise, they do serve to remove activity prompted by natural desire.

In reply to the above contention it is stated that there is no parity between the illustration and the illustrated. While service may yield its fruit immediately, the *Sāṅgrahaṇī* may fructify in the future.

[415 b-416 a]

अदृष्टार्था हि दृष्टार्था रागाद्युत्थाः प्रवृत्तयः ॥ ४१५ ॥
ग्रामोपायेन सेवायाः सांग्रहण्याऽविरुद्धता ।

For (the activity consequent on Vedic injunction) has unseen fruit ; whereas actions prompted by desire, etc., have seen fruits. And, there is no opposition between the *Sāṅgrahaṇī* and service as means for gaining a village.

Scripture-prompted activity and activity prompted by natural desire, etc., do, it is true, result in transmigration. Yet, there is a difference between them in regard to intermediary results. So, the illustration of service, etc., is not apt.

Service and the *Sāṅgrahaṇī* do not have the same fruit. There is Scriptural evidence for the *Sāṅgrahaṇī* leading to the possession of a village. There is no such evidence for service resulting in the same fruit. Since there is no mutual conflict between the two, the adoption of one does not necessarily mean the rejection of the other.

[416 b-417]

क्रियातः फलमित्येवं शास्त्रमेतावति प्रमा ॥ ४१६ ॥
क्रमेण युगपद्वाऽतः सेवासांग्रहणीहयोः ।
नानुष्ठाने विरोधोऽस्ति फलभूमार्थिनः क्वचित् ॥ ४१७ ॥

"Through rite (*kriyā*) the fruit." This much alone Scripture makes known validly. Whether in sequence or simultaneously, if service and the *Sāṅgrahaṇī* be performed, there is nothing incongruous; they may well be performed by him who desires more of the fruit.

The text which declares, "He who desires a village is to perform the *Sāṅgrahaṇī*," merely says that he who performs this rite along with its auxiliaries obtains the village; it does not say that service is not a means to that end.

There is no disjunction between service and the *Sāṅgrahaṇī*. One may perform them both on the same day or on different days. Therefore, the *Sāṅgrahaṇī* does not exclude service.

In addition to the *Sāṅgrahaṇī* one may perform service in order to acquire more of the fruit. The former results in the acquisition of a village. When service is added, one may acquire a bigger village.

[418]

रागाद्युत्थप्रवृत्तीनां कात्स्न्र्येन च विरोधतः ।
नैयोगिक्योऽपि नैव स्युर्द्रव्याभावात्प्रवृत्तयः ॥ ४१८ ॥

If there be opposition to all activities prompted by desire, etc., then there would be no activity at all as prompted by *niyoga*, because of the absence of money.

Does the Scripture-prompted activity remove all activity prompted by natural desire? If that were so, then the activity for earning wealth will also be removed. And if there is no wealth, no Scripture-ordained rite can be performed. There will, therefore, be no activity based on Scriptural injunction; and *karma-kāṇḍa.* will become invalid.

[419]

दृष्टादृष्टप्रवृत्त्योश्च न विशेषोऽस्ति कश्चन ।
उपायत्वेन काम्यानां रागाद्याक्षिप्तहेतुतः ४१९ ॥

There is no difference (*viśeṣa*) whatever between activity in respect of a seen fruit and that in respect of an unseen fruit, for the reason that both are means to what one desired, and are brought about by attachment, etc.

Activity born of natural desire and Scripture-prompted activity are equal in the sense that they are adopted as means to an end that is desired. Desire is the root of both the types of activity. Without the desire for heaven, etc., there cannot, indeed, be Scripture-prompted activity.

[420]

प्रपञ्चाभिनिवेशित्वहेतौ तुल्येऽपि चानयोः ।
कं विशेषमपेक्ष्यैका चेष्टा मुक्त्यनुरोधिनी ॥ ४२० ॥

Since both of them are equal as being the means for developing attachment to the universe, depending on what difference can it be said that one of them is ancillary to release ?

Both types of activity bind one to the world. So, it cannot be stated that one of them, viz. Scripture-prompted activity, is the means to release.

[421]

कामोपायत्वमेवाथ नेष्टं यदि च कर्मणाम् ।
उक्तो न्यायः प्रहीयेत फलं चाऽऽकस्मिकं भवेत् ॥ ४२१ ॥

If you do not accept that actions are means to the accomplishment of desires, then the rule set forth (in the Mīmāṁsā Śāstra) would be destroyed, and the fruit would be accidental.

In texts such as 'He who desires heaven is to offer sacrifice,' etc., heaven is seen to be the principal and sacrifice to be the subsidiary (vide *PM*, VI, i, 2). So, it is clear that the fruit of ritual acts is heaven, etc. If that were not the case, the attainment of heaven, etc., would become a matter of accident.

[422]

सर्वकामाशनेनाथ कृत्स्नकामलयाध्वना ।
यान्ति मुक्त्यानुगुण्यं चेद्विधयो वार्त्तमेव तत् ॥ ४२२ ॥

"By the enjoyment of all desires, all desires get destroyed; and through this means the injunctions become ancillary to release"—this is without substance.

The *kāmadhvaṁsa-vādin* argues thus: "The injunctions of ritual prompt a man to perform ritual acts; and when a man performs those acts, they cause him to enjoy the appropriate fruit; and by causing him to enjoy, they remove his desire for that fruit. Through this procedure, the injunctions culminate in making that man eligible for *jñāna*."

The *siddhāntin* finds no sense in this argument.

[423-424]

यन्निमित्ता प्रवृत्तिः स्यात्सा कथं तन्निवर्तिका ।
प्रवृत्तोऽपि निवर्तेत न कामोपायकर्मतः ॥ ४२३ ॥

उद्विजेताथवा ज्ञानात्सर्वपुंभोगघस्मरात् ।
अपि वृन्दावने शून्य इति कामिवचस्तथा ॥ ४२४ ॥

That for the sake of which (or, that caused by which) there is activity, how can that (activity or enjoyment) remove that? He who has begun to be active will turn away from the activity that is the means to the desired end; and there will be no activity.

Or, he who has desires will abhor knowledge which is destructive of all human enjoyments. Thus the statement of the man of desires: "Even in the deserted *Vṛndāvana*, etc."

What removes the desire for fruit? Is it activity? Or, is it the enjoyment of that fruit? Activity cannot remove the desire for fruit, for it is the desire for fruit that prompts activity; and how

can activity remove its own aim ? If what removes the desire for fruit is enjoyment, it must be stated whether enjoyment removes desire during the time it lasts, or during the time of its prior non-existence, or during the time of its destruction. Not the first; when there is enjoyment, that only increases desire and cannot remove it. Nor the second ; if enjoyment of fruit were to remove the desire for fruit even before its commencement, then one would turn away, at the very same time, from activities that are the means to the desired fruit, although one might have started being active. In other words, one would cease from all activity. The third alternative, that enjoyment of fruit removes the desire for fruit when it is destroyed, is also unacceptable. It is seen that when a man has enjoyed the object of his desire he does not cease from desire. On the contrary, desire only increases. If any one tells him at that time about self-knowledge, etc., he is greatly displeased.

SP gives also another interpretation of these two verses. According to this interpretation, the rendering of the first *śloka* would be: 'That for the sake of which there is activity—how can that (activity) be the remover thereof ? He who has begun to be active will not turn away from the activity which is the means to the desired end.'

The second *śloka* proceeds to say : In the case of such a person, it cannot be maintained that there is cessation of activity through self-knowledge. He would not stand even the talk about self-knowledge. The following statement about the passionate soul is cited :—

api vṛndāvane śūnye śṛgālatvam sa icchati,

na tu nirviṣayaṁ mokṣaṁ kadācid api gautama.

'Even in a deserted Vṛndāvana, he desires to be as a jackal; not, indeed, (does he desire) at any time, O Gautama, the contentless *mokṣa*.'

This verse is referred to by the commentator as *kāmi-gīta*.

There is a similar verse which is in criticism of the Nyāya view of *mokṣa :*

varaṁ vṛndāvane ramye śṛgālatvaṁ sa icchatu,

gautamābhihitāṁ muktiṁ gautamo gantum arhati.

(*Nyāya-siddhānta-dīpa-prabhā, p.* 232.)

NTV—iti rāgi-vacaḥ pramāṇam.

NKL—yataḥ kāraṇāt pravṛttiḥ sā sva-kāraṇasya kāmasya kathaṁ nivarttikā ity arthaḥ.....bhogasya na kevalaṁ jñānānuguṇyābhāvaḥ prātikūlyam api.

NKL—iti rāgi-gītam atra pramāṇam.

AVS—yataḥ kāmāt kāmāśanapravṛttiḥ sā kathaṁ sva-kāraṇasya kāmasya nivartiketi. athavā yathā bhukte kāmotpattiḥ sā bhuktiḥ kathaṁ tasya kāmasya nivartiketi.

yadi bhogāt kāma-kṣayas tadā punar-bhogasādhane karmaṇi na pravarteta, pravartate ca, ato na bhogāt kāma-kṣaya iti.

[425]

उक्तं यदपि वेदेऽस्मिन्कस्यचिद्विलयः क्वचित् ।
तन्नातत्परतस्तूक्तेर्न देहादिलयस्ततः ॥ ४२५ ॥

As for what was said that, in the Veda, somewhere the resolution of something or other is understood, that is not sound; for the texts of the Veda do not have that for purport. From those (texts) there is no resolution of body, etc.

Karma-kāṇḍa does not have the destruction of difference for its purport. For its purport is only the relation to what is unknown, viz. heaven. Nor is the destruction of difference the purport of *jñāna-kāṇḍa*; for the purport of that is the distinctionless Reality. So, the resolution of the world of duality is not the purport of the Veda.

The texts 'He who desires heaven,' etc., do not teach the resolution of body, etc. What they teach is the relation between heaven, etc., and sacrifice, etc. (*Vide* v. 3776 b f.)

NTV—svargakāmo yajetety evam-ādīnāṁ na prapañcavilaya-paratvaṁ kiṁtu sādhya-sādhana-saṁbandha-vidhiparatvaṁ, atas tato vākyāt na dehātmabhāvādi-vilayas siddhyati.

[426]

श्रुतेऽपि स्वर्गतात्पर्ये कल्पना चेल्लयेऽर्थतः ।
तन्न प्रत्यक्षवचनाद्देहादिलयसिद्धितः ॥ ४२६ ॥

"Even though Scripture has heaven for purport, the resolution is assumed by implication." If thus it be said, no; for the resolution of body, etc., is established by direct statements.

It cannot be said that, even though the relation between sacrifice and heaven is the purport of *karma-kāṇḍa*, the resolution of body, etc., is to be assumed, as otherwise no man would be active in respect of the other world. For, assumption is necessary only of what is not established otherwise; the resolution of body is established on the strength of other evidence; and it is on that that otherworldly activity is based.

[427]

साक्षाद्धस्तिनि दृष्टेऽपि नहि हस्तिपदानुमा ।
अस्थूलादिवचः साक्षाद्देहादिप्रतिषेधकृत् ॥ ४२७ ॥

When an elephant is directly seen, the elephant is not, indeed, inferred. The text "not-gross,"[1] etc., directly negates body, etc.

The resolution of body, etc., is declared by Scripture directly; so, there is no need to assume it.

1. *BU*, III, viii, 8. 'He (Yājñavalkya) said: O Gārgi, the knowers of Brahman declare, this immutable (Brahman) is, verily, that. It is not gross nor subtle, not short nor long, not red nor sticking, not shadowed nor dark, not airy nor aetherial, without attachment, without taste, without odour, without eyes, without ears, without speech, without mind, without light, without the vital air, without mouth, without measure, and without inside or outside. Not that does eat anything; nor does that anything eat.'

[428]

विपर्ययेण येऽप्याहुर्यथोक्तज्ञानकर्मणोः ।
एकाधिकारितां वाच्यं मानं तैर्ज्ञानसंगतौ ॥ ४२८ ॥

As for those who maintain the view that there is contrary relation as between knowledge and action, as aforesaid, and that there is identity of eligibility, they must produce evidence for so relating knowledge.

The contrary relation is that *karma* is the principal and *jñāna* is the subsidiary. There is no use in merely asserting that there is such a relation; evidence must be produced.

[429]

न तावत्प्रक्रियेहास्ति व्रीह्यादिप्रोक्षणे यथा ।
प्रकृतापूर्वसंबन्धलक्षणापरतः स्थितेः ॥ ४२९ ॥

As in the case of sprinkling the paddy-grains, etc., here there is no context, because the paddy-grains there suggest by implication the relation to the *apūrva* under reference.

Context (*prakaraṇa*) is not the evidence for making out that *jñāna* is subsidiary to *karma*. That the sprinkling of paddy-grains is subsidiary to the *Darśapūrṇamāsa* is known through context. Nothing like that obtains in the present case.

[430]

व्रीहिशब्दस्य हि व्रीहिस्वरूपे तु निरर्थकम् ।
प्रकृतापूर्वसंबन्धं बोधयेदिति युज्यते ॥ ४३० ॥

If the word 'paddy-grain' (denote) the paddy-grain itself, then it is futile. It is but proper to say that it makes known the relation to the *apūrva* under reference.

The expression 'paddy-grains' in the illustration does not denote paddy-grains as such; because it is not possible to sprinkle paddy-grains as such, and it is not necessary also. So, the expression refers to the relation to the *apūrva* in the context of *Darśapūrṇamāsa*. The sprinkling generates an unseen potency which is related to the supreme unseen potency of the *Darśapūrṇamāsa* rites.

[431-432 a]

नापि वाक्येन संबन्धो जुहूपर्णमयीत्ववत् ।
जुह्वाद्यव्यभिचारित्वकर्मसंगतिकारणात् ॥ ४३१ ॥
विनाऽपि प्रक्रियां तेन कर्मोपस्थापयेद्ध्रुवम् ।

Nor can that relation be established through *vākya*, as in the case of the ladle being made of *parṇa*-wood; because the ladle is invariably related to ritual, even without the context, (the nature of being made of *parṇa*-wood) will surely be related to ritual because of that (viz. *vākya*).

Syntactical connection (*vākya*) too is no evidence for establishing the subsidiariness of *jñāna* to *karma*. Through syntactical connection it is known that 'being-made-of-*parṇa*-wood' is subsidiary to the ladle. (See note on v 334 b-335 a.) And thus it comes to be related to the rite. This is intelligible because the material of the ladle, etc., is invariably related to the rite. But no such relation between *jñāna* and *karma* is known through syntactical connection.

[432 b-433 a]

वाक्येनैवाभिसंबन्धस्तत्र तस्येति वर्णितम् ॥ ४३२ ॥
आत्मज्ञानं तु नैवं स्यान्न तत्प्रकरणे श्रुतम् ।

There (in the third *adhyāya*) it was declared that the relation (of *parṇa*-wood to ritual) is by *vākya* itself. But self-knowledge is not thus; it is not declared in that context.

Unlike 'sprinkling,' self-knowledge is not auxiliary to *karma*, because it is not taught in that context (*prakaraṇa*).

[433 b-434 a]

नापि चाव्यभिचारित्वमात्मनः कर्मणेक्ष्यते ॥ ४३३ ॥
तेनास्य कर्मसंबन्धो न मानेनोपपद्यते ।

Nor is there seen non-inconstancy as between the self and action; the relation of that (knowledge) with action is not intelligible on any evidence (*māna*).

Syntactical connection (*vākya*) too is not the evidence; nor express statement (*śruti*), etc. Even as empirical action is not unintelligible without self-knowledge, so also Scripture-ordained action is not unintelligible without that knowledge.

[434 b-435 a]

एवं चाज्ञातपारार्थ्ये नार्थवादः फलश्रुतिः ॥ ४३४ ॥
पृथगेवाधिकारोऽतो यथोक्तज्ञानकर्मणोः ।

Thus, when it (knowledge) is not known to be for the sake of something else, the declaration of the fruit thereof is not eulogy ; therefore, the eligibility is different for knowledge and action, as aforesaid.

Thus, self-knowledge is not a subsidiary of anything else ; and so the declaration of its fruit is not an *arthavāda*. *Jñāna* is the means to *mokṣa*; not *karma*. Therefore, the two *kāṇḍas* have different eligible persons, etc.

[435 b-436 a]

अर्थाक्षेपोऽपि योग्यस्य कर्तुर्भोक्तुश्च युज्यते ॥ ४३५ ॥
न तु विध्वस्तभेदस्य स्यादौपनिषदस्य सः ।

Postulation by implication (*arthākṣepaḥ*) is intelligible, of what is competent therefor, *viz*., the agent and enjoyer ; but that is not possible of the self, to be known through the *Upaniṣads* alone, which is devoid of difference.

It may be claimed that there is evidence for stating the subsidiariness of *jñāna* to *karma*—the evidence being postulation (*arthāpatti*). Without knowing the nature of self, it is not possible for one to engage oneself in acts relating to the other world ; hence self-knowledge is a subsidiary of *karma*.

Here, the objector is to be asked: What is the kind of self-knowledge you are thinking of—is it the knowledge of the self as agent, or of the self as non-agent? The first alternative is acceptable to us. The second is not possible. The self which is to be known through the Upaniṣads as the real without any distinctions is of no use at all for *karma*.

NKL—kartrādy - ātma - jñānaṁ karmāṅgam, na aśanāyādyatītā--tma - jñānam, anupayogāt, virodhāc ca.

AVS—yādṛśātma-jñānaṁ vinā karmānuṣṭhātuṁ na śakyate, tādṛgātmajñānasya karma - śeṣatvaṁ bhavatu, aupaniṣadātmajñānasya kartṛtvādy - aśeṣa - viśeṣopamardakatvāt tac - cheṣatvaṁ na ghaṭate.

[436 b-437 a]

प्रत्यक्षवेदवचनप्रामाण्याद्याश्रयत्वतः ॥ ४३६ ॥

आदौ संन्याससंसिद्धेर्ऋणानीति ह्यपस्मृतिः ।

Because, depending on the evidence of the direct statement of the Veda, renunciation even at the beginning is established, the Traditional Code ' Debts, etc.,' is no evidence.

Some may believe that the texts of the traditional code which speak of the three debts every man has to discharge are evidence for making *karma* subsidiary to *jñāna-niyoga*. The text referred to in this verse is from *Manu* (vi, 35). Besides this, the glossator quotes the *Taittirīya-saṁhitā* (VI, iii, 11).

The *siddhāntin* maintains that all such texts are of no avai against the express declaration of *Śruti* that one may renounce even from the student's stage in life (See *Jābāla*, 4). The texts quoted above only mean that one should discharge the three debts some time or other, not necessarily in the present life.

[437 b-438 a]

न च केवलकर्मभ्यो मुक्तिर्युक्त्योपपद्यते ॥ ४३७ ॥
तथा च वक्ष्यते स्पष्टमतो मुक्तिर्न कर्मतः ।

Nor is it possible to show by reasoning that release is through mere action ; how this is so will be explained clearly later ; therefore, release is not through action.

The words of the *Bhagavad-gītā* that 'By *karma* alone Janaka, etc., attained *saṁsiddhi*' (iii, 20) cannot be quoted in support of the view that *karma* alone is the means to *mokṣa*. For, these and similar words cannot make the Scriptural statement that *jñāna* is the means to *mokṣa* invalid. What they really mean is that *karma* purifies the mind and thus helps in the rise of *jñāna*. Scripture declares explicitly : 'Not by *karma*, not by progeny, nor by wealth, but by renunciation alone some attained immortality' (*Mahānārāyaṇa*, X, 5 ; *Kaivalya*, 2). This is corroborated by the experience of the wise. The reasoning in support of this will be stated later on.

[438 b-439 a]

न चैकात्म्यपरिज्ञानमभ्यासापेक्षमिष्यते ॥ ४३८ ॥
मुक्तये भावनार्थं वा तथा चोर्ध्वं प्रवक्ष्यते ।

Nor is knowledge of the one self dependent on practice (*abhyāsa*) ; nor is it expectant of meditation (*bhāvanā*) for the sake of release ; this will be explained later (iii, 3).

Jñāna does not require repeated practice (*abhyāsa*). Nor does it stand in need of continued meditation (*bhāvanā*). It is the teaching of Scripture that *jñāna* is the sole and independent means to release.

[439 b-440 a]

स्वतोऽनुभवतः सिद्धेरैकात्म्याख्यस्य वस्तुनः ॥ ४३९ ॥
न स्यात्सांपादिकं ज्ञानमित्येतच्चापि वक्ष्यते ।

The reality which is called the one self is self-established in experience. Hence knowledge is not that which produces it (*sāmpādika*); this also will be stated.

It cannot be said that self-knowledge is not valid, because it is generated by the Upaniṣads, like the knowledge that woman is fire (*CHU*, V, viii, I; *BU*, VI, ii, 13): for, in the latter case, which is cited as illustration, the content is something which is superimposed and is therefore illusory; not so is self-knowledge whose content is the supreme truth. Even here, it must be remembered that the self is not produced, but only revealed by the Upaniṣads.

[440 b-441 a]

अन्य आहुः पदार्थत्वात्प्रमाणान्तरगम्यताम् ॥ ४४० ॥
आत्मनो नाऽऽगमात्सिद्धिर्व्रीह्याद्यन्यपदार्थवत् ।

Others say: "Because the self is an entity, it is known through *pramāṇas* other than Scripture. It is not established (through Scripture) even as other entities like paddy-grains (are not so established).

The view here set forth is as follows : As the self is an established entity, there is no need to depend on Scripture for knowing it. What is enjoined in the Vedāntas is the suppression of the residual impressions of waking and other states or the suppression of mind. Injunctions of *karma* are auxiliary thereto.

NKL—ātmā āgamātiriktamāgamyaḥ siddhavastutvāt ghaṭavad ity arthaḥ.....vrīhyādeḥ pratyakṣādi-siddhatvena avidheyatvād yathā kartavyatāparaṁ vrīhibhir yajate ityādi-vākyaṁ, tathā vedāntavākyam api. itarathā anuvādāpātād ity arthaḥ.

[441 b-442]

अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्तितः ॥ ४४१ ॥

विविच्यातः स्वमात्मानं प्रत्यभिज्ञानतस्तथा ।

माव्यापारसमाप्तत्वान्न भूयस्तदपेक्षिता ॥ ४४२ ॥

" Enquiring into waking, dream and deep sleep by co-presence and co-absence, thence one recognizes one's self; as the functioning of the means of valid knowledge is complete (with this), there is no need of it again.

The evidence for the self is such reasoning as is based on co-presence and co-absence. An inquiry into the states of experience reveals that the witness-self is constant, while the objects are inconstant. As a result of this inquiry the self is realized. So, Scripture is unnecessary.

NKL—avasthātraya-sākṣitvena ātma-sphuraṇāt, avasthā-trayasya vyabhicārat, ātma-svarūpatva-taddharma tayor ayogāt, yo 'ham pūrvedyuḥ so 'ham idānīm iti pratyabhijñānāc ca ātmānaṁ vivicyāvasthitasya punar mānāpekṣā vedāntāpekṣā vā na syād ity arthaḥ.

AVS—avasthātraya-sākṣitvena ātmanaḥ sphuraṇāt, avasthātrayasya vyabhicārāc ca, ātmasvarūpatvadharmatvā-'yogāt, pratyabhijñā-balenaikyena ātmānaṁ vivicya sthitasya punar mānāpekṣā vedāpekṣā vā na bhaved iti yata ukta-prakāreṇa pramāṇāntara-siddham ātma-vastu ato vedāntānāṁ tatra pramāṇatvāyogāt, vāsanānirodhe vedāntavākyaiḥ pumān niyujyate, mano-nirodhe vā.

[443-444 a]

तद्वासनानिरोधेऽतः पुमाञ्श्रुत्या नियुज्यते ।
मनसो वा निरोधेऽसौ न तु वस्त्ववबोधने ॥ ४४३ ॥
मानान्तरेण तात्सिद्धेर्नात्र व्याप्रियते वचः ।

" Therefore, man is prompted by Scripture to control the residual impression thereof (i.e., the three states), or to control the mind, and not in respect of knowing reality; for, that having been established by other means of valid knowledge, the words (of Scripture) do not function here.

What Scripture does is to lay down the means which consists in suppressing the residual impression of the three states of the mind. The glossator cites here *KU* iii, 13, 'Let the wise man resolve speech into mind, resolve that into the intelligence-self, resolve intelligence into the great-self, and resolve that into the peaceful self.'

NTV—kṛtisādhyo hi niyoga-viṣayaḥ ātmavastu-vivekāvabodho mānāntarasiddhas tena kṛtisādhyatvābhāvāt tatra na niyoga ity arthaḥ.

[444 b-445 a]

स्वयंज्योतिःस्वभावत्वान्निरुद्धस्वान्तवासनः ॥ ४४४ ॥
प्रमान्तरानपेक्षोऽपि स्वयमात्मा प्रकाशते ।

" Beacuse the self is self-luminous, when the residual impression of the mind has been removed, it shines of itself without depending on any other means of valid knowledge.

When the impressions of the mind have all been removed, the self which is self-luminous shines of its own accord. Hence too, it is not proper to say that the self is known through the Vedāntas.

NKL—vāsanāsu niruddhāsu svayam evā 'tmā siddhyati sva-prakāśatvāt.

[445 b-446 a]

एवं कार्यमुखेनैव ज्योतिष्टोमादिवाक्यवत् ॥ ४४५ ॥
वेदान्तानां प्रमाणत्वं नाक्षवद्वस्तुनीष्यते ।

"Thus the validity of the Vedāntas is only by way of what-is-to-be-done (*kārya*), as that of the text relating to the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, etc.; it is not required in respect of an entity, as the sense of sight.

The Vedāntas are not *pramāṇa* in respect of the self. They have validity only through enjoining something-to-be-done (*niyoga*). What is to be done here is the suppression of the mind.

[446 b-447 a]

वासनामात्रहेतुत्वादात्मनोऽनर्थसंगतेः॥ ४४६ ॥
अन्योपाये सत्यसति निरोधादेव मुक्तता ।

"Since for the conjunction of the self with evil (*anartha*) the residual impression is alone the cause, whether a different means (*upāya*) is present or not release results from (mind-) control alone.

That which joins the self to evil (*anartha*, i.e., *saṁsāra*) is residual impression (*vāsanā*). When that is suppressed, there is release. It is not proper to say, therefore, that release is through

jñāna. It is seen that even *jñānīs* have *saṁsāra*. The sole means (*upāya*) to *mokṣa* is the suppression of residual impressions. Scripture and Traditional Code have this alone as their purport.

NKL—viduṣopi saṁsāra-darśanāt, nāsau ajñāna-kṛtaḥ, vāsanā-mātra-kṛta eva ity arthaḥ.

AVS—yadyapi jñānasya mokṣa-sādhanatvaṁ śrūyate, tathāpi jñāninopi saṁsāra-darśanād vāsanā-nirodha eva mokṣa-sādhanam ity arthaḥ.

[447 b-448 a]

संभाव्यं नानपेक्षत्वं नियोगविरहात्कचित् ॥ ४४७ ॥
शाब्दप्रवृत्तेः सिद्धे च न नियोगस्य संभवः ।

"The functioning of words (*laukika* and *vaidika*) is not possible independently, without *niyoga* (mandatory force), and *niyoga* is not possible as regards what is an existent.

There is also another reason why the Vedāntas are valid only as being auxiliary to the injunction of suppression (*nirodha-vidhi*). Words, secular or sacred, become valid only through *niyoga* (command). *Niyoga* relates to what-is-to-be-done. It is of no use in respect of an established entity (*siddha-vastu*). The Vedāntas which are auxiliary to *niyoga* cannot, therefore, teach something which is already an established entity.

AVS—śabda-prayogasya anapekṣaṁ prāmāṇyaṁ niyoga-vyatirekeṇa tāvan na saṁbhavati, siddhe ca na niyogaḥ saṁbhavati, sādhya-viṣayatvān niyogasya, ato na siddhe vedānta-vākyānāṁ prāmāṇyam.

[448 b-449 a]

न च वस्तुनि मानत्व उदाहरणमिष्यते ॥ ४४८ ॥
विधिर्गुणार्थस्तस्यापि व्यापारविषयत्वतः ।

"*Guṇa-vidhi* is not an example for (the Vedāntas) being the means of valid knowledge in regard to an existent; for that too has for content an operation.

Nor may it be argued that the Vedāntas have an established entity for purport, even though they may be auxiliary to injunction, even as the text 'One who is desirous of sense-efficiency should offer oblations of curds' (*dadhnā indriya-kāmasya juhuyāt*), although having *niyoga* for purport, has as its content an established entity. (*PM*, II, ii, 25.) In the example cited, the problem is whether the text in question enjoins another act (i.e. an act other than *Agnihotra*) as qualified by an auxiliary, or whether it enjoins an auxiliary belonging to the present act (*Agnihotra*) itself for the sake of a fruit (here, sense-efficiency). The conclusion is that the text does the latter. But the example does not serve the purpose here. For, even there the content of injunction is not a bare entity but a subsidiary material as governed by an operation. So, operation is the principal, not an established entity.

[449 b-450 a]

किंचानुभूयमानस्य ह्यर्थस्य पुरुषार्थता ॥ ४४९ ॥
सर्वत्र गम्यते वेदे नानुभूतेः कथंचन ।

"Further, only a thing that is to-be-experienced can be a human end; this is seen everywhere in the Veda; by no means can experience be a human end.

Another reason for saying that the Veda cannot be *pramāṇa* in respect of what is pure (*suddha*) and established (*siddha*): everywhere in the world it is seen that only what-is-to-be-experienced is a human end. The mere self-luminous self cannot be the human end. So, the Vedāntas are *pramāṇa* only as being auxiliary to a fruitful *niyoga.*

NTV — adhyayanavidhyupātta-vedāntavākyasya puruṣārthaparatā svīkartavyā, anubhūti-lakṣaṇaṁ ca siddhaṁ brahma na pumarthaḥ, anubhūyamānasyaiva pumarthatva-niyamāt, atopi nirodha-niyoga-paratā vaktavyā.

AVS—anubhāvyasyaiva modakādeḥ puruṣārthatvaṁ, na anubhūter ity arthaḥ.

[450 b-451 a]

ततश्च प्रतिभामात्रं शाब्दादिति न मानतः ॥ ४५० ॥
प्रतीयमान एवातः पुरुषार्थः प्रसिद्धितः ।

"So from the words (of Scripture) there is only awareness (*pratibhā*), and not validity. It is only that which is experienced that can be a human end. This is settled.

Texts like 'intelligence, bliss' (*BU*, III, ix, 28), etc., merely generate insight. They do not become *pramāṇa* thereby. It is only what is being experienced that can become a human end, not experience as such.

[451 b-452 a]

अप्युपादीयमानं च सिद्धं वस्तु न कर्मणि ॥ ४५१ ॥
पुमर्थं साधयद्दृष्टमनिर्ज्ञाताङ्गभावकम् ।

"Even though an existent entity be taught (in the Veda), it is not seen to be taught as a human end unless it is known to be an auxiliary to an act.

Veda does not have for purport any pure existent entity. Such entities are certainly mentioned in the Veda, but only as auxiliaries of action.

[452 b-453 a]

अनुपादीयमानश्च न च ज्ञाताङ्गभावकः ॥ ४५२ ॥
आत्मा चेन्नास्य शेषत्वं विधिं प्रत्युपपद्यते ।

"If the self be not taught in the Veda (because it is of the nature of self-luminous experience), and if it is not known to be auxiliary, then it cannot be subsidiary to injunction.

If it is true that the self is of the nature of self-luminous experience, it cannot be taught in the Veda. Also, it cannot become a human end by being an auxiliary of injunction.

[453 b-454 a]

उपासीत स्वमात्मानमिति साक्षाद्वचःश्रवात् ॥ ५५३ ॥
तत्राङ्गभाव इति चेन्मत्पन्थानं भवानितः ।

"If you say that there is subsidiariness (for the self) to the injunction of meditation because it is declared in Scripture 'Meditate on your own self,' then you adopt my view.

If it is your view that the self is taught as the content of the injunction of meditation, then you are adopting my position which is *niyoga-vāda*, relinquishing your doctrine that the *Vedāntas* are *pramāṇa* in respect of the pure self-established self.

AVS—tarhi bhavat-siddhānto hataḥ, asmat-siddhāntaḥ siddhaḥ.

[454 b-455 a]

क्रियाविधिपरत्वेन प्रामाण्यं वचसः स्थितम् ॥ ४५४ ॥

इति व्याचक्षते केचिन्नियोगार्थैकरागिणः ।

"Thus it is settled that words have validity only as having for purport injunction to act."

Thus say some who are attached to the sense of *niyoga*.

Here the *niyoga-vādin* concludes the presentation of his case: The Vedāntas are auxiliary to the injunction of suppression (*nirodha-vidhi*). Karmas are also auxiliary to injunction. Thus there is connection between the two *kāṇḍas*.

[455 b-456 a]

नैतत्साध्वभ्यधाय्युच्चैर्नियोगविरहादपि ॥ ४५५ ॥

कामितार्थस्य संसिद्धेर्लौकिकादेव मानतः ।

What you have loudly proclaimed is not good. Even without *niyoga* we find the accomplishment of desired ends by empirical means of valid knowledge alone.

Siddhānta.—It is not right to say that release is through suppression alone. If suppression of mental impressions alone were the means, then it could be accomplished even through empirical *pramāṇas*; and there would be futility of Vedic injunction.

NTV—karma-nirodhayos samuccayān mokṣa iti pūrvottara-kāṇḍa-saṁbandhaṁ nirākaroti.

[456 b-457 a]

तद्भावभावतो लिङ्गाद्वासनैकसमाश्रयात् ॥ ४५६ ॥
ज्ञातोऽनर्थेन संबन्ध आत्मनो न तु वास्तवः ।

It is known that the relation of the self to evil is as dependent on residual impression (*vāsanā*) and it is not real. This is known through reasoning, *viz.*, when that (*vāsanā*) is, the other (relation to evil) is.

Through empirical reasoning it is possible to establish the causal relation between residual impressions and the evil called *saṁsāra*. The reasoning, here, is based on co-presence and co-absence. What is the use, then, of the Veda?

NTV—jāgradādau vāsanodbhave saṁsārodbhava-darśanāt, suṣuptādau vāsanābhibhave saṁsārābhibhava-darśanād ity arthaḥ.

[457 b-458 a]

तस्मात्संसारसंबन्धनिदानस्य प्रसिद्धितः ॥ ४५७ ॥
लिङ्गादेव ततस्तस्य ध्वंसेऽनर्थो निवर्तते ।

Therefore, since the cause of the relation to transmigration is established through reasoning itself (*liṅga*), when that (cause) is destroyed, evil is removed. (This is also known by the same reasoning.)

Just as through reasoning the cause of transmigration is determined, so also through reasoning it can be known that the suppression of the cause will result in the destruction of the effect.

Thus even without the help of Scripture, the human end can be achieved.

NKL—nirodha-vādinā saṁsārasya anvayādinā vāsanā-kṛtatvaṁ vācyam. ataś ca tan-nivartaka-nirodhasyā 'pi lokata eva siddhir ity arthaḥ.

[458 b-459 a]

अन्तरेणापि वचनं बौद्धादेरिव सिद्धितः ॥ ४५८ ॥
मोक्षस्य पुरुषार्थस्य वचोऽतो निष्फलं भवेत् ।

Since for you, as for the Bauddhas, etc., the human end which is release is accomplished even without the word (The Veda), the word (the Veda) would be futile.

If there is no help from Scripture, Scripture is futile. And, you would be joining the ranks of the *nāstikas*.

NTV—yathā bauddhādīnām mate mokṣo 'numānenaiva siddho nāgamam apekṣate tadvad ity arthaḥ.

[459 b-460 a]

व्यतीतानेकजन्मोत्थवासनानामनन्ततः ॥ ४५९ ॥
तासां निरोधोऽसंभाव्यो जन्मन्येकत्र मानवैः ।

As the residual impressions given rise to by the past several lives are endless, it is not possible for men to destroy them in a single life.

It may be said that man is prompted to suppress the residual impressions by Scripture. Even, then, it must be stated whether the residual impressions to be suppressed are of the past, the present, or the future. The past impressions are endless and, therefore, cannot

be suppressed. The present impressions are occasional, and do not stand in need of an injunction for suppression. The future impressions are not yet, and so how can they be suppressed ?

[460 b-461 a]

साक्षादात्मावबोधेन प्रत्यग्ध्वान्तच्छिदा न चेत् ॥ ४६० ॥
दुःखादिभावना ध्वस्ता कथं तद्भावना नुदेत् ।

If by the direct intuition of the self there is no destruction of the inner darkness, how can it be removed by continued meditation (*bhāvanā*) which is itself destroyed by the contemplation of sorrow, etc.

If you believe that direct self-knowledge destroys ignorance, that that destruction suppresses mental impressions, and that through that there is release, you are virtually adopting our view. Or, if you think that the direct knowledge of the self cannot destroy ignorance, and that continued meditation is needed, we ask you, how is this intelligible ? If self-knowledge cannot destroy ignorance, continued meditation (*bhāvanā*) which is itself destroyed cannot destroy it.

NTV—sākṣād ātmāvabodhaḥ pratyak-dhvāntam ajñānaṁ bhinaiti tattva - jñānasya ajñāna - nivartakatva-niyama - darśanāt. tatra yadi duḥkhādi-vāsanā dhvastāḥ kāraṇe dhvaste tatkāryasya anavasthānaniyamāt, kathaṁ tarhi jñānottarakālaṁ, tad-dhvaṁsanāya upāsanāni vidhīyate.

[461 b-462 a]

नियोगवर्त्मना चेय यथा मुक्तिर्न सिध्यति ॥ ४६१ ॥
स्पष्टेन न्यायमार्गेण वक्ष्यामोऽवसरे तथा ।

Later on, in its proper place, we shall show clearly through reasoning how release is not accomplished through the path of *niyoga*.

The view that release is obtained through the injunction of the practice of *jñāna*, we shall refute later (*vide* v. 762 f.).

[462 b-463 a]

न पदार्थो न वाक्यार्थ आत्माऽयं वस्तुतो यतः ॥ ४६२ ॥
तत्प्रत्याख्यानश्रुत्यैव तद्याथात्म्यावबोधनात् ।

The self, really, is not the sense of either a word or a sentence; its true nature is understood only from the Scriptual texts which deny that.

It was stated in v. 440 b-441a that because the self is an entity, like paddy-grains, it is known through *pramāṇas* other than Scripture.

With reference to that contention, it is explained here how Scripture becomes evidence in respect of the self. The true nature of the self cannot be known through the literal sense of words or sentences. Scripture indicates the nature of the self through the exclusion or denial of the superimposed particulars constitutive of the world; also through denying that the self is the content of words or sentences.

NTV—brahmātmany eva pramāṇam uttara-kāṇḍam iti samudāyārthaḥ.....neti-netyādinā sakala-padārtha-vākyārtha-pratyākhyānena ātma-yāthātmyaṁ pratipādyata ity arthaḥ.

tena pramāṇāntara-gamyatvābhāvāt ātma-yāthātmyasya āgamād eva vidhiḥ yuktam, vrīhyādīnāṁ pada-vācyatvāt pramāṇāntara-gamyatvam, ātma-yāthātmyasya tvam-pada-vācyatvāt avākyārthatvāc ca na pramāṇāntara-gamyatvam iti vaiṣamyam.

[463 b-464 a]

वासनानामभावेऽपि सुषुप्त्यादौ न मुक्तता ॥ ४६३ ॥
मानव्यापारविरहात्प्रथनं वा दृगात्मनः ।

In sleep, etc., even though there are no residual impressions, there is no release ; nor in the absence of the functioning of the means of valid knowledge in that state does the inner self manifest itself.

By the mere suppression of residual impressions one cannot attain release. There are no residual impressions in sleep ; but sleep is not release. It cannot be said that there are residual impressions in sleep, for if that were so, sleep would not be sleep. If it be urged that in sleep the impressions remain in the form of their cause, viz. nescience, then it is only the removal of that cause that would lead to release. And the removal of nescience is possible only through knowledge.

As for what was said that even without the functioning of *pramāṇas* the self shines when the impressions are removed, we have to make this observation, viz. that without *pramāṇa* the self-manifestation of the self cannot be known.

NTV—vāsanā-nirodhān na muktatā suṣuptyādau vyabhicārāt, nāpi svānta-vāsanā-nirodhāt ātmā svayam eva prakāśate vāsanā-śūnye suṣuptyādau dṛg-ātmanaḥ pṛthag adarśanāt.

[464 b-465 a]

सर्वानर्थाभिसंबन्धे ह्यविद्यैवास्य कारणम् ॥ ४६४ ॥
वासनानामपि युतौ सैव यस्मादपेक्ष्यते ।

For the relation (of the self) to all evil, nescience alone is the cause; for conjunction with residual impressions nescience alone is required.

Nescience is the cause of residual impressions and of bondage.

NTV—ādhyātmikādhibhautikādhidaivikā-'nartha-saṁbandhe mūla-kāraṇam avidyaiva, na ca tasyās sattvam asattvam vā yena tan-nirodhaka-prayatnāpekṣā kimtv anirvācyāyā jñānādeva nivṛttiḥ, tena vedāntānām tattva-jñānotpādakam eva.

[465 b-466 a]

संभाव्यतेऽनपेक्षत्वं नियोगविरहादपि ॥ ४६५ ॥
यथा तथा च वक्ष्यामः स्पष्टेन न्यायवर्त्मना ।

As to how independence (as means of knowledge) is possible (for Scripture) even without *niyoga*, we shall explain clearly through reasoning.

Scripture is *pramāṇa* even without dependence on *niyoga*.

NTV — siddhe vastuni niyogā-'saṁbhavasya tvayaivoktatvāt nirapekṣa-pramāṇa-bhāvena vedāntena kevalaṁ brahmaiva pratīyate na niyogaḥ, nirviṣayatvād ity arthaḥ.

[466 b-467 a]

स्वानुभूतिबलादेव भवताऽपि विभाव्यते ॥ ४६६ ॥
नियोगादिः प्रमाणार्थो नानुभूतिर्नियोगतः ।

Even by you *niyoga*, etc., are known only on the strength of self-experience; experience is not known through *niyoga*.

Even the *niyoga-vādin* is able to understand the sense of *niyoga* which is inert only on the strength of the self which is consciousness. So, the self which is consciousness is self-established, and does not stand in need of *niyoga*. The impossibility of *niyoga* in its case is, therefore, not a defect. Surely, the sun which illumines colour, etc., does not shine as being dependent thereon.

NTV—niyogādeḥ jaḍasya anubhavaḥ siddhāv apekṣyate, anubhavasiddhau tu na niyogapekṣā asti, anubhūtir eva ātmā ity arthaḥ.

[467 b-468 a]

यस्याप्रसिद्धिर्नाज्ञानात्प्रसिद्धिर्नापि मानतः ॥ ४६७ ॥
तस्यानुभवतत्त्वस्य कुतः सापेक्षतोच्यते ।

That of which there is neither non-establishment through ignorance nor establishment through means of knowledge—how can that experience-reality be said to be dependent ?

The self does not require to be established by *pramāṇa* ; nor does it become unestablished on account of ignorance. It neither rises nor sets. It is immutable and is of the nature of the one consistency of intelligence. Hence there is no need of *niyoga*.

[468 b-469 a]

स्वप्रधानात्मबुद्ध्यैव तदन्यस्य प्रसिद्धितः ॥ ४६८ ॥
कार्यबुद्धिव्यपेक्षातो नानुभूत्यात्मवस्तुनः ।

Because all other things are established only through self-knowledge which is independent, there is no dependence of the experience-self on the cognition of what-is-to-be-done.

The self is primary and independent. On it depend the entire host of things constituting the not-self. For its establishment, it does not depend on anything, even as the rope-cognition does not depend on the snake-cognition.

[469 b-470 a]

क्व नु प्रतीयमानस्य पुमर्थत्वं समीक्षितम् ॥ ४६९ ॥
मानान्मानफलस्यैव पुमर्थत्वसमन्वयात् ।

Where, indeed, is it validly seen that what is being experienced is the human end? The constant human end is only the fruit of the means of knowledge (*viz.* experience).

It was stated by the *pūrvapakṣin* that what-is-enjoyed alone is the human end. But that cannot be. What is enjoyed or experienced varies. Enjoyment or experience alone is constant. What is inconstant and contingent cannot be the human goal. Only that which is constant and unconditioned can be the goal.

[470 b-471 a]

प्रतीतेर्माफलत्वाच्च कथं मेयैकनिष्ठता ॥ ४७० ॥
साक्रियाफलयोगोऽयं यतो मातरि भोक्तरि ।

Because experience is the fruit of means of knowledge, how can it have the object alone for basis? The cognitive activity is in the cognizer; the fruit is related to the enjoyer. (These two are not different.)

It cannot be said that experience is dependent on the experienced object, even as the colour of the object is; for, experience is the fruit of *pramāṇa*, and the cognized object cannot be its locus, as the

object is inert. Surely, as between what is inert and what is not inert, there is not the relation of locus and the located.

Nor may it be urged that a fruit cannot be independent, and therefore experience must depend on the object ; for, the fruit of *pramāṇa* depends on the cognizer, and the fruit of action on the enjoyer ; and the two—cognizer and enjoyer—are not different. To speak of experience as the fruit of *pramāṇa* is only in the figurative sense. Experience is the self.

NTV—anubhavasyaiva svayamprakāśatvāt anubhāvyasya ca jaḍatvāt na anubhāvyāśrayā pratītir ity arthaḥ. na kevalaṁ pratīteḥ hetoḥ na meyaika-niṣṭhā anubhūtiḥ, kiṁtu māna-phalatvāc ca tataś ca bhoktari phalaṁ tat bhoktā ca pramātaiva.

AVS—anubhavasya māna-phalatvāt prameyasya jaḍatvāc ca anubhavo na meyāśrayaḥ, kiṁtv ātmāśraya iti.

[471 b-472 a]

न चाऽऽत्मानुभवादन्यो विषयः कश्चिदिष्यते ॥ ४७१ ॥
अपि सर्वप्रमाणानां किमु वेदान्तशासने ।

Nothing other than self-experience is the content of all means of knowledge—what, then, of Vedānta-teaching!

The self which is experience is the content of all *pramāṇas*, for there is nothing other than the self which is unknown. So, it requires no special effort to know that for the *Vedāntas* there is no content other than the experience-self which is the human goal.

NTV—anavagatārtha-gantṛ pramāṇam iti lakṣanād ajñānanivartakaṁ pramāṇaṁ, tac ca ajñānaṁ jaḍe ghaṭādau na sambhavati, tathā ca anubhūter eva ajñānaviṣayatvena anavagatatvāt tasyā eva meyatvam pumarthatvaṁ ceti yadā jaḍa-niṣṭhānām api pramāṇānām evaṁ gatiḥ, tadā kimu vaktavyam anubhava niṣṭānām vedāntānām.

[472 b-473 a]

लौकिको वैदिकः सर्वो व्यवहारो जगत्यपि ॥ ४७२ ॥
भोक्त्रर्थ एव नान्योऽतः प्रधानं भोक्तुरिष्यते ।

All usage in the world, whether empirical or Scriptural, is for the sake of the enjoyer, and not for anything else—so, the enjoyer is the principal.

Here is another reason for saying that the *Vedānta* is *pramāṇa* in respect of the supreme consciousness-self which is the ultimate human goal, untouched by *niyoga* :

All empirical usage in the world is for the sake of the enjoyer-self. The self which is experience and which is of the nature of bliss is the principal ; all else is subsidiary. Hence, it is the goal of *Vedānta-pramāṇa.*

NTV—kiṁca sarvasya ātmārthatvena priyatvād ātmā niratiśaya-sukham, anubhūtir eva ātmā iti saiva pumarthaḥ.

[473 b-474 a]

न वा अरे पत्युरिति तदेतत्प्रेय इत्यपि ॥ ४७३ ॥
निखिलेऽपि जगत्यस्मिन्प्रधानं नाऽऽत्मनोऽपरः ।

From texts like " Not for the sake of the husband, etc." [1] and " So this is dearer, etc.,"[2] it is learnt that everywhere in the world there is nothing superior to the self.

1. *BU*, II, iv, 5 ; IV, v, 6 : 'Not indeed for the love of a husband is the husband dear ; but, for the love of the self is the husband dear.'

2. *BU*, I, iv, 8 : 'This which is the self is dearer than a son, dearer than wealth, dearer than everything else, and is innermost.'

That the inner self is of the nature of unexcellable bliss is taught in Scripture. The self is the principal; it is the sphere of unconditioned love; hence, it is of the nature of supreme bliss.

NKL—yadartham sarvam upādīyate yac ca nānyārtham tat sukham iti lakṣaṇam ātmani paripūrṇam ity arthaḥ. nirupādhiprema gocaratvādapy ātmanaḥ sukha-rūpatvam sādhayitum para-prema-gocaratve śrutim udāharati.

[474 b-475 a]

न प्रमाता प्रमाणं वा क्रियामेयफलानि वा ॥ ४७४ ॥
प्राधान्यायेह कल्पन्ते भोक्तुरेव प्रधानतः ।

Neither the cognizer, nor the means of cognition, nor activity, object, or fruit, can be assumed to be the principal here (in the empirical state), for the enjoyer alone is the principal.

The enjoyer alone is the principal; everything else is for his sake.

[475 b-476 a]

आत्मनः कर्त्रवस्थाऽपि भोक्त्रर्थमिति निश्चयः ॥ ४७५ ॥
यतोऽतोऽपरमप्येतद्भोक्त्रर्थं विनियुज्यते ।

Even the state of agency for the self is certainly for the sake of the enjoyer; for all other things subserve the purposes of the enjoyer.

Even agency is secondary. Agency is for the sake of enjoyership. The enjoyer-self is not subsidiary to anything else. If it imagines that it is subsidiary, such imagination is born of delusion.

[476 b-477 a]

नापि चाऽऽत्मातिरेकेण वस्त्वन्यन्मानभूमिगम् ॥ ४७६ ॥
संभाव्यते यथा चैतत्तथोदर्के प्रवक्ष्यते ।

Nothing other than the self can be the sphere of cognition ; how this is so will be explained later.

The self alone is the content of valid knowledge. What is other than that is illusorily posited.

NKL—udarke uparişţād avyākṛta-vicāradau ity arthaḥ.

[477 b-478 a]

अनादृत्य यथोक्तार्थं नियोगार्थैकरागतः ॥ ४७७ ॥
केचित्कार्यैकनिष्ठत्वं वेदान्तानां प्रचक्षते ।

Setting aside the sense we have explained, some, because of exclusive attachment to the sense of *niyoga*, maintain that the Vedāntas have for their sole purport what-is-to-be-done.

So far it has been shown that the Vedāntas are not auxiliary to the injunction of suppression. Those who would not brook this view say that the Vedāntas culminate only in what-is-to-be-done (*kārya*).

[478 b-479 a]

कार्यैकमात्रनिष्ठत्वात्प्रमाणस्याऽऽगमात्मनः ॥ ४७८ ॥
कुत ऐकात्म्यनिष्ठत्वं त्वया यदुदितं पुरा ।

" Since Scripture as means of knowledge has for its sole purport what-is-to-be-done alone, how can it have for purport what you have stated, viz. the one self ?

Pūrvapakṣa.—All Vedic texts, including 'That thou art,' etc., have *kārya* as their purport. Even when existent entities are mentioned, it is only with the intention of making them auxiliary to *kārya.*

NTV—āgamo hi śāstratvāt pravṛtti-nivṛtty-upadeśaparaḥ, vedānta-vākyamapy āgamaḥ, tena asyāpi pravṛtti-nivṛtti-paratā vācyā. tad uktam :

pravṛttir vā nivṛttir vā nityena kṛtakena vā, pumsāṁ yenopadiśyeta tat-śāstram abhidhīyate, iti.

[479 b-480 a]

नहि तस्यानपेक्षत्वं सिद्धवस्त्ववबोधनात् ॥ ४७९ ॥
यतो मानान्तरमितं सिद्धं वस्त्विति भण्यते ।

"That (Scripture) would not be independent if it taught an existent entity, for an existent entity is known through other means of knowledge.

Existent entities can be known through *pramāṇas* other than Scripture. If Scripture gave information about these alone, it would be dependent and stale. *Kārya* is known only through Scripture ; so, that alone constitutes its purport.

NTV—vedāntānāṁ siddhe vastuni anapekṣatayā prāmāṇyaṁ na sambhavati. siddhaṁ hi pramāṇāntareṇa pramitam ity ucyate. tena vedāntānāṁ kāryaparatorīkartavyā.

[480 b-481 a]

शब्दसामर्थ्यनियमो लोकादेवावगम्यते ॥ ४८० ॥
लोके मान्तरसिद्धोऽर्थः कार्यायैवाभिधीयते ।

"The rule regarding capacity of words is understood from the world (secular practice) alone; and in

the world an existent entity which is known through other means of knowledge is referred to by words only for the sake of what-is-to-be-done.

The capacity of words is learnt from the usage of elders ; and all words point to some *kārya* or other. Moreover, in empirical usage, the things that are established through perception, etc., are made to subserve a *kārya*.

NTV—kiṁca lokādeva śabda--sāmarthyādhigamaḥ, tatra hi kāryaparatayaiva vākyāni prayujyante, ataḥ kāryaparatvam eva vedāntānām api.

[481 b-482 a]

न प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिभ्यां शून्यस्य वचसो यतः ॥ ४८१ ॥
कश्चिदर्थोऽत्र दृष्टोऽतो वस्तुनि स्यान्न मानता ।

"For a word which is void of either activity or withdrawal there is no meaning seen here ; therefore, there is no validity in respect of an existent.

Testimony as a means of valid knowledge depends on purport ; purport refers to a human end ; such an end is to be accomplished by appetition or desistance ; these are prompted by injunctions and prohibitions ; and they are what-are-to-be-done. Hence also the Veda does not have the existent for purport.

NTV—śrotuḥ prayojanaṁ vivakṣan prekṣāvān padāni prayuṅte, prayojanaṁ ca pravṛtti-nivṛtti-sādhyaṁ bhavati, pravṛtti-nivṛttī ca kāryatā-'bhijñānāt bhavata iti tat-paratayaiva sakala-padānāṁ prayoga ity arthaḥ.

[482 b-484 a]

संबन्धावगमो नापि शब्दाद्भूतार्थवाचिनः ॥ ४८२ ॥
प्रवर्तकात्प्रवृत्त्याऽर्थे प्रत्ययो ह्यनुमीयते ।

ततः शब्दस्य सामर्थ्यं प्रतीतेरवधार्यते ॥ ४८३ ॥

कार्यैकविषयैवेयं वाक्यस्यातः प्रमाणतः ।

"Nor is there cognition of relation in the case of a word which expresses an existent entity. It is by the activity prompted by a prompter that the meaning in respect of a particular thing is inferred.

Thence the capacity of a word to signify certain things (through what-is-to-be-done) is determined. Thus it is settled through means of knowledge that a sentence has for its sole content what-is-to-be-done.

In the absence of activity, words do not convey meaning. Let us see how a child learns the meanings of words. The superior elder (say, the grand-father) commands the intermediate elder (his son) to do something. When the latter obeys the command, the child looks on ; and then the child infers the meanings of the words contained in the command. Thus action is the important factor. It is as associated with action that words become meaningful.

NTV—tathā ca pravṛtti-saṁbandha-rahiteṣu bhūtārtheṣū na śabdānāṁ śaktir gamyate, tathāsaty anavagata-sāmarthyāś śabdāḥ bhūterthe kathaṁ tam avabodhayeyuḥ, mama punaḥ kāryatā-jñānād eva pravṛttiḥ, na kriyāmātra-jñānāt, nāpi phalamātra-jñānāt, nacāpi kriyā-phalayoḥ sādhya-sādhana-saṁbandhāvagamāt, ataḥ kāryatā-jñānād eva asyāpi pravṛttir ity anumimīte.

[484 b-485 a]

क्रियाकारकसंबन्धो वाक्यार्थो यैरपीष्यते ॥ ४८४ ॥

अनुवादविसंवादात्तेषामुक्तेरमानता ।

"As for those who say that the sense of a sentence is the relation between action and agent, their statement is not valid, because of the method of agreement and difference.

It cannot be said that the sense of a sentence is the relation between an action and an agent, as in the case of the sentence 'He cooks food.' For, in the example cited, the relation of agent to action is known through other means, such as perception and inference. So, it is not 'sentence', or testimony that is the evidence here. We can only say in such cases that the testimony is either in agreement with or differs from the other *pramāṇas*. Hence, *kārya* alone should be taken as the sentence-sense.

NKL—pacatītyādau kriyā-kāraka-saṁbandhasya māntara-yogyatvāt tat siddha-bodhakatve anuvādakatvam, anyathā yogyānupalambha-virodhān mithyā-bodhakatvam, ato niyoge prāmāṇyaṁ vākyasya ity arthaḥ.

[485 b-486 a]

मान्तरानुप्रवेशित्वं कार्यस्य तु न शङ्क्यते ॥ ४८५ ॥

शब्दादेव हि कार्यार्थप्रतिपत्तिर्न लोकतः ।

"It cannot be doubted that even for what-is-to-be-done there may be some other evidence; for the sense of what-is-to-be-done is known from the Veda alone, and not from the world.

Kārya cannot be known by any other means. That is why it is called *mānāntarāpūrva*. Vedic sentence, of the nature of command, is the only means for knowing *kārya*.

NTV—svargakāmādi-padānāṁ niyojya-samarpakatvena na tatsamabhivyāhṛtānāṁ liṅādi-padānāṁ niyojyānvita-kāryābhidhāyināṁ

alaukikāpūrva-kārya-vācakatvābhyupagamāt na anuvādatā-prasaṅgaḥ .....niyojya-saṁbandha-samarthaḥ liṅādibhiḥ kāryaṁ kālāntara-sthāyi kriyāto bhinnam abhidhīyate ity anaṣṭasyāpūrvakāryasya svarga-janakatvāt na mānāntara-virodhaḥ.

[486 b-487 a]

प्रवर्तनां वदञ्शाब्दः प्रवर्तक इतीर्यते ॥ ४८६ ॥

ज्ञापकत्वात्प्रमाणस्य प्रेरयन्कारको भवेत् ।

"Because the Vedic statement speaks of activity, it is called that which teaches activity; for, the purpose of a means of knowledge is to make known; if it actually prompted one to activity, it would be a causative agent (like desire or passion).

Here, the following objection may be raised : Śabara says that a command (*codanā*) means a statement which prompts activity. Therefore, that alone should be regarded as the cause of activity (*pravṛtti-hetu*). How, then, can *kārya* be inferred through activity as the *probans*, or *liṅ*, etc., connote *kārya*? And also how can there be the apprehension of the sense of *apūrva-kārya* from 'sentence' alone?

The reply is : 'Sentence' does not become directly the prompter. If it were to prompt directly, all those who hear the words, *liṅ*, etc., would begin to act. It is only as indicating an activity that a sentence becomes a prompter.

NKL—vācya-vācakayor abhedopacāreṇa prerayan śabdaḥ pravartaka ity ukto bhāṣyakāreṇa ity arthaḥ.

[487 b-488 a]

शब्दात्प्रवर्तनाबुद्धौ रागादिर्न च शङ्क्यते ॥ ४८७ ॥

रागादिः प्रेरणाकारी प्रेरणाज्ञापको ध्वनिः ।

"It cannot be doubted that desire, etc., are the cause in generating the cognition of activity from word (*liṅādi-śabda*); desire, etc., are what lead to prompting; sound (*i.e. liṅādi-śabda*) makes known prompting.

It cannot be said that appetition, etc., are responsible for knowing activity from 'word' (verbal testimony); for they may only lead to a command; that which makes command known is the word.

NKL — śabdāt pratipannasya pravartakasya janako rāgādir iti bhāvaḥ.

[488 b-489 a]

आज्ञापितार्थनिष्पत्तौ कृतिमत्त्वेक्षणात्प्रभोः ॥ ४८८ ॥

रागाद्यर्थस्य चासिद्धौ कर्तृवृत्तिर्न रागतः ।

"Since we see activity for accomplishing something enjoined by a master, and since here appetition, etc., are not possible, the activity of the agent is not due to appetition.

It has been said that what prompts activity is neither appetition, etc., nor the word, and that it must only be the *kārya*. For example, commanded by the teacher, a student performs an action. Here, there is nothing like appetition, etc., on the part of the student. He acts merely as impelled by the power of the teacher's command, i. e. out of a sense of obligatoriness.

[489 b-490 a]

स्वामिकोपप्रसादादिहृदयाकूतवेदनात् ॥ ४८९ ॥
नापि श्रोतुः प्रवृत्तिः स्याच्छब्दात्कोपाद्यवेदनात् ।

"Nor is the activity of the hearer prompted by a knowledge of the inner intentions like anger, pleasure, etc., of the master; for anger, etc., are not known from the word.

Nor may it be said that anger, etc., present in the one who issues the command are what prompt one to activity; for they cannot be known directly, as the *niyoga* or *kārya* is known from *liṅ*, etc.

[490 b-491 a]

लिङादयो न कोपादेः स्मर्यन्ते प्रतिपादकाः ॥ ४९० ॥
मानान्तरमिताः सन्तस्ते हि पुंसां प्रवर्तकाः ।

"The potential ending, *liṅ*, etc., are not taught to be the indicators of anger, etc. They, viz., anger, etc., become prompters of men's activity only as known through other means of knowledge.

The suffixes *liṅ*, etc., make known command, and not the anger, etc., of the speaker. These latter are known through other means.

[491 b-492 a]

धिगङ्गाद्यभिधानैस्तु लिङ्गभूतैरिहेङ्गिताः ॥ ४९१ ॥
रागादयो नियोगस्य सिद्ध्यै विषयसाधनाः ।

"They (anger, etc.) are inferred from *probans* like the expressions 'Fie', 'Dear one', etc; appetition, etc.,

establish the content (*viṣaya*) and thereby make *niyoga* possible.

Anger, etc., are inferred from such expressions as 'Fie!,' etc.; they are not directly expressed by words.

If *kārya* is what prompts one to activity, and not *liṅ*, etc., or appetition, etc., why was it said that attachment, etc., are what cause prompting? The reply is: attachment, etc., establish the stem-sense which in turn establishes the *niyoga*. Hence it is that they are said to cause the command.

NKL—dhātvartha-sādhakatvena niyoga-sādhakā ity arthaḥ.

[492 b-493 a]

अत एव च रागादिसंसृष्टोऽपि विविच्यते ॥ ४९२ ॥

लोडाद्यर्थो व्रजेत्युक्तो याति स्वार्थं विना यतः ।

"Therefore, because, when the word (sense of the imperative ending, *loṭ*) 'go' (*vraja*) is uttered, he goes even without any purpose of his own, the meaning of the imperative ending *loṭ*, though mixed up with appetition, etc., is discriminated.

It cannot be said that in the case of empirical injunctive statements the *niyoga* is always associated with appetition, etc., for when his master says 'go,' the servant is seen to go even without appetition, etc. So, it is only the invariable *niyoga* that is the prompter, and not appetition, etc.

NKL—phala-rāgaṁ vināpi kaścit pravartate ato yatra śabdānantara-pravṛttau rāgādi-saṁbhāvanā tatrāpi niyogasyaiva pravartakatva-niścaya ity arthaḥ.

[493 b-494 a]

ननु दानादिसंबद्धमहावाक्यानुमानतः ॥ ४९३ ॥

गच्छेत्याद्येकदेशोक्तौ लोभादेव प्रवर्तते ।

"Now, it may be said that when a part of a sentence 'go' is uttered, one infers a full sentence (*mahāvākya*) relating to reward, etc., and so one acts from avarice alone.

It may be contended thus: One does not act without expectation of reward, etc. When one hears the word 'go,' one supplies the missing words 'to the village,' etc., and understands that some benefit will accrue from that action. And so, activity does not proceed merely from *niyoga*.

[494 b-495 a]

महावाक्यप्रयोगेऽपि पदार्थप्रविवेचने ॥ ४९४ ॥

पुंस्प्रवृत्तिस्तु दृष्टेयं लोडादेरेव नान्यतः ।

"(It is not so.) Even where a full sentence is used, when the word-senses are distinguished, it is seen that men's activity is from the imperative ending *loṭ*, etc., alone, and not from anything else.

To the above contention, the reply is as follows: Even when the full sentence is used, on analysis it will be found that the person who is commanded acts not because of appetition, etc., but because of the *niyoga* which is the sense of the imperative *loṭ*, etc.

NKL—mahāvākyānumānepi niyogaḥ pravartako rāgoveti vicāre, niyogād eva pravṛttir niścīyata ity arthaḥ.

[495 b-496 a]

लोडादेरेव श्रवणाद्यत्र रागाद्यसंभवः ॥ ४९५ ॥

बालः प्रवर्तते तत्र ज्ञायते प्रेरणार्थता ।

"Where appetition, etc., are impossible and *loṭ*, etc., alone are heard, a boy acts; here we know that *loṭ*, etc., are for the sake of prompting.

It is observed that children sometimes obey commands issued to them even without appetition, etc.

[496 b-497 a]

आह मानान्तरेणासौ किल नार्थोऽवगम्यते ॥ ४९६ ॥

शाब्दाच्च ज्ञायतेऽज्ञातसंबन्धादिति चित्रता ।

"It is said: 'This sense, indeed, is not known through any other means of knowledge; it is known through word alone; and its relation has not been known; so it is curious.

Here an objection is raised: If the *niyoga* is not known through any other *pramāṇa*, it cannot be known through *liṅ*, etc. For, the relation of *liṅ*, etc., to something unknown is not possible. And, how can even a child act without knowing the *niyoga* which is not a word-sense?

NTV—agṛhīta-sāmarthyāt śabdāt niyogaḥ pratīyata ity-anupapannam iti codyam udbhāvayati.

[497 b-498 a]

यद्यनिर्ज्ञातसंबन्धोऽप्यर्थं शाब्दः प्रबोधयेत् ॥ ४९७ ॥

को द्वेषोऽस्मासु भवतो येनोपालम्भ ईर्यते ।

" 'If the word can make known a sense whose relation has not been determined, then why is this hostility because of which you censure us?'

If *liṅ*, etc., may convey a sense, though their relation to their contents is not grasped, why should not the words 'Brahman,' etc., do so? If it is insisted that only words whose relation to their contents is grasped can convey a sense, then Brahman would become an object of other *pramāṇas*, and *Vedānta* would then cease to be authoritative.

An alternative interpretation is given in *AVS* and *NTV*, taking the verse to contain a plea of the *pūrvapakṣin*. Then the meaning of the verse would be this: The *pūrvapakṣin* says, "We do not hold that words whose relation to their senses is unknown can convey knowledge. Or, even if we held that a word whose relation to its sense is not known conveys knowledge, why should you, O calm *Vedāntin*, get provoked, since it is you who believe that the word 'Brahman,' whose relation to its content is not known, conveys a sense of its own?"

NTV—brahmātmādi-padānām ayaṁ mahimā yadagṛhītaśaktayopi svārthaṁ bodhayantīti samaṁ samādhānam ity arthaḥ.....

athavā yady anirjñātasaṁbandha ity ārabhya pūrvavādinaḥ parihāraḥ. ayam arthaḥ. nirjñāta-saṁbandheṣu gavādi-śabdeṣu artham abhidadhat svanirjñāta-saṁbandhā api brahmādi-śabdā artham abhidadhīran ity abhyupagacchato bhavato asmāsu liṅādiśabdā agṛhīta-saṁbandhā evārthaṁ bruvantīti abhyupagacchatsu kaḥ pradveṣaḥ.

AVS—athavā yady anirjñāta-saṁbandha ity ārabhya pūrvavādinaḥ parihāraḥ. ayam arthaḥ. na hy anirjñāta-saṁbandhasya śabdasya bodhakatvam asmābhir iṣyate, yady api liṅarthe pramāntaraṁ na saṁbhavati. bhavatu vā agṛhīta-sambandhasya śabdasya bodhakatvaṁ, tathāpi kaḥ pradveṣo bhavataḥ, śānta-darpasya nirastakrodha-nidānasya sannyāsino 'smāsu, yenākṣepas tvayā kriyata iti.

[498 b-499 a]

यदाऽवगम्यते नान्यत्प्रवृत्तेः कारणान्तरम् ॥ ४९८ ॥
शब्दश्च गम्यते स्पष्टस्तदाऽर्थः प्रविविच्यते ।

"When for activity there is no other cause known, and when the word is clearly known to be the cause, then the sense (of *niyoga*) is to be distinguished.

The *pūrvapakṣin* replies: As there is no other cause discernible for action which follows a command, and as it is known that suffixes such as *liṅ*, etc., are remembrancers of the cause of activity, so it is ascertained that the *niyoga* which is the sense of *liṅ*, etc., is the cause of activity, as distinct from words which are names, etc.

NTV—yadā pravṛtteḥ kāraṇāntaraṁ rāgādiḥ na dṛśyate pūrvaṁ nirastatvāt, kārya-jñānaṁ ca pravṛtteḥ kāraṇaṁ svātmani dṛṣṭaṁ pravṛtti-liṅgena avagamyate, śabdaś ca taj-janako 'nvaya-vyatirekābhyām avagamyate, tadā artho niyogaḥ pravivicyate nāma-padārthebhyaḥ.

[499 b-500 a]

अन्वयव्यतिरेकौ तु वाक्यार्थज्ञानपूर्वकौ ॥ ४९९ ॥
वाक्यार्थस्तु तदायत्तो नेत्यन्येभ्यो विशिष्टता ।

"Co-presence and co-absence, however, are preceded by cognition of sentence-sense; but the sentence-sense is not dependent on them; thus it is to be distinguished from the rest.

It may be objected that as the *kārya* is known from words by the application of the method of agreement and difference (co-presence and co-absence), it is not unknown by means other than verbal testimony.

The reply is that *kārya* is known only from word. It is only as thus known that it becomes the content of inference based on the method of agreement and difference. It is just like Rāhu becoming the content of perception only in association with the moon. So, *kārya* or *niyoga* should be distinguished from nouns, etc.

NTV—etad uktaṁ bhavati yathā śāstraika-samadhigamyo rāhuś candrādityādi-sampṛkta eva pratyakṣa-gocaro na svarūpeṇa, evaṁ niyogopi praiṣaṇādhyeṣaṇādy-upādhika eva pramāṇāntara-gocaraḥ na svarūpeṇa, evam upādhidvāreṇa niyoge pramāṇāntarānupraveśāt.

NKL—anvaya-vyatirekau vyāpta-liṅgajam anumānaṁ vākyārtho niyogaḥ. iyaṁ pravṛttiḥ pravṛttyabhāva-virodhi-dhī-pūrvikā svatantra-pravṛttitvāt madīya-pravṛttivat, iti, madhyama-vṛddhasya śābdam pratyayam anumāya madhyama-vṛddhena śābdāvagater niyoge bālena saṅgati-grahāt, na niyogasya māntara-gocaratvam ityarthaḥ..... candrādi-biṁboparaktasyaiva rāhor akṣa-gocaratvavat, niyogasya ājñādhyeṣaṇādy-upādhikasyaiva māntara-gocaratvaṁ na svarūpeṇety arthaḥ.

[500 b-501 a]

कर्तव्यताविवक्षैव नृवाक्येभ्योऽपि गम्यते ॥ ५०० ॥

विवक्षाया न कार्यत्वं शाब्दार्थविषया हि सा ।

"It is the intention of duty that is understood even from human statements; for mere intention there is no obligatoriness; that is the content of the sense of words.

It may be contended that even though appetition, etc., are not the sense of *liṅ*, etc., *niyoga* is not their sense, because their sense is the intention of the speaker. The reply to this contention is as follows: Is intention alone the sense of *liṅ*, etc.,? Or, is the sense the intention as qualified by obligatoriness ? Not the first; for in the

case of the Veda which has no author there can be no intention. Even as regards human statements or commands, intention appears only as qualified by obligatoriness. Nor the second ; for in the case of the Veda, the observation made above holds good. And as for human statements, it is prolix to assume that intention as qualified by obligatoriness is the sense, while obligatoriness may well be the sense. The two, intention and obligatoriness, are not the same.

[501 b-502 a]

तद्वशान्न तु शाब्दार्थः स हि पूर्वं प्रतीयते ॥ ५०१ ॥

अतः प्रैषादिसंसृष्टोऽप्यर्थः सिद्धो विवेकतः ।

" The word-sense (*i.e.* obligatoriness) is not dependent on that (intention) ; for it is known even earlier ; therefore, though related to the direction, the sense (obligatoriness) is settled by discrimination.

Activity is not governed by the intention of the speaker ; for it is seen that one acts on hearing the words even without knowing the intention of the speaker. So, the determination of the sense of words is not dependent on the intention. That, indeed, depends on the capacity of the words. Moreover, it has already been pointed out that in the case of the Veda intention is not possible. Hence, obligatoriness and intention are different.

Even direction is not the sense of *liṅ*, etc. For, in direction too what persists uniformly is *kārya*.

NKL—vivakṣāyādi-saṁsṛṣṭopi niyogo vivakṣāder anyaḥ.

[502 b-503 a]

शाब्दार्थोपाधयो ह्येते पुरुषाशयपातिनः ॥ ५०२ ॥

प्रैषादयो न शाब्दार्था न चानेकार्थता मता ।

"These which fall on the side of human intentions, direction, etc., are the adjuncts of word-sense (obligatoriness); they are not the word-sense; nor could there be many senses (for word).

Direction, etc., are not known as the sense of *liṅ*, etc. In worldly sentences they are known only as the adjuncts of *niyoga* which is the sense of *liṅ*, etc. In the case of the Veda, such direction, etc., are not possible. Also, instead of assuming many directions as the sense of *liṅ*, etc., it is in keeping with the rule of parsimony to take the constant *kārya* (i.e. *niyoga*) as the sense of *liṅ*, etc.

NKL—niyogopādhitvena praiṣādīnāṁ laukika-liṅādi-śabdānvaya-vyatirekavatvaṁ, na tad-arthataye 'ty arthaḥ.

[503 b-504 a]

अभिप्रायवतोऽभावादभिप्रायानुपातिनः ॥ ५०३ ॥

शङ्क्यतेऽपि न वेदे तु कार्यं वाच्यमिति स्थितम् ।

"Since there is no one who intends in the case of the Veda (which is not of human origin), it is not even possible to doubt those (direction, etc.), which fall within intention; hence it is settled that in the Veda the express sense of the word is what-is-to-be-done.

In the ease of the Veda, as has been pointed out already, there is no one who intends or directs.

NTV—kiṁca bhavet pauruṣeya-vākye praiṣādeś śabdārthatvā-'śaṅkā, vede tv apauruṣeyatvāt āśaṅkaiva nāsti, ato niyoga eva liṅādy artha iti.

[504 b-505 a]

प्रयोगविधिशेषत्वात्तन्मूला एव नाऽऽशयात् ॥ ५०४ ॥
वेदे प्रैषास्तु ये दृष्टा अग्नीदग्नीनितीदृशाः ।

"Directions such as 'Agnīd, draw off the fires' which are found in the Veda are auxiliary to procedural injunctions; they are occasioned by them and not by any intention.

It is true that commands such as these are to be found in the Veda: 'Agnīd, draw off the fires, spread the strew, make ready the sacrificial cake.'* But they do not imply any person with intention commanding. It is *niyoga* that prompts one to perform a principal rite with all its auxiliaries. A procedural injunction is subsidiary to it. And so, the operations of this nature that are observed in the Veda do not imply any human intention or command.

[505 b-506 a]

प्रैषादिभ्यो यथैवेयं भिन्ना कर्तव्यतेक्ष्यते ॥ ५०५ ॥
शाब्दशक्तिवशात्तद्वत्क्रियादेरपि वीक्ष्यताम् ।

"Just as the obligatoriness is seen to be different from direction, etc., because of the nature of the potency of the word, even so it should be understood to be different from action, etc.

Even as command, etc., are not the meaning of *liṅ*, etc., action, etc., are not their meaning. These latter also, like the former, are different from *niyoga*. And, it has already been shown that *niyoga* is the constant connotation of *liṅ*, etc.

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* *The Veda of the Black Yajus School entitled Taittirīya Saṁhitā* (Part II translated by A. B. Keith, Harvard Oriental Series, (Cambridge), Massachusetts, 1914), Vol. 19, p. 514.

[506 b-507 a]

नानिष्पन्नस्वभावोऽपि भावः कर्तव्यता यतः ॥ ५०६ ॥

लडादिश्रवणात्तस्यां अप्रतीतिर्लिङादिवत् ।

"Though the stem-sense (*i.e.* action) is of the nature of what-is-to-be-accomplished, as is obligatoriness, it is not (identical therewith); for that (the latter) is not expressed in *laṭ*, etc., (*pacati*, present tense, etc.), as it is expressed in *liṅ*, etc.

It may be asked: Since both action (*kriyā*) and *niyoga* are what are to be accomplished, and since there is no *niyoga* over and above action, why should not action be regarded as the sense of *liṅ*, etc.?

It is replied thus: Activity is not the same as obligatoriness (*niyoga*), although it too is what-is-to-be-accomplished. Therefore, the two are not identical. For example, when one hears the word '*pacati*' (he cooks), one does not cognize obligatoriness, although that word denotes action; it is only on hearing *liṅ*, etc., that there is the cognition of obligatoriness.

[507 b-508 a]

ननु कालोपबन्धोऽत्र कार्यबुद्धिविघातकृत् ॥ ५०७ ॥

नैतत्संदेह एवात्र विवेकाभावतस्तव ।

"'Now, here (in *pacati*, etc.) what impedes the cognition of obligatoriness is the obstruction in the form of (present) tense'. No; this doubt of yours, here, is due to lack of discrimination.

It cannot be said that in the case of *pacati* there is no cognition of obligatoriness because of the obstruction caused by the ending which is in the present tense (*laṭ*); for there is no conclusive argument for such a view.

[508 b-509 a]

कालोपबन्धः किंत्वत्र कार्यबुद्धिविघातकृत् ॥ ५०८ ॥

किं भावात्कार्यता भिन्ना लडादिर्यां न भाषते ।

"(The doubt is:) Is it the obstruction in the form of (present) tense that impedes the cognition of obligatoriness, or is obligatoriness different from the stem-sense because it is not expressed by *laṭ*, etc.?

The doubt is there, in the case of *pacati*, etc., whether the non-cognition of obligatoriness is due to the use of present tense, or to the fact that *laṭ*, etc., which are not expressive of obligatoriness, are different from the stem-sense which expresses activity.

[509 b-510 a]

कर्तव्यः कट इत्यादावव्यापारेऽपि कार्यता ॥ ५०९ ॥

वीक्ष्यतेऽतः पृथग्भावात्फलाच्च प्राक्प्रतीतितः ।

"In 'The mat is to be made', etc., even though there is no operation, there is seen obligatoriness; so there is difference (between the two); from fruit too (obligatoriness is different), because it is seen earlier.

In statements such as 'The mat is to be made', 'The village is to be gone to' the *tavya* suffix does not express an activity; yet there is cognition of obligatoriness. So, the stem-sense which is activity and the sense of the suffix which is *niyoga* are different.

The fruit (*phala*) also cannot be the sense of *liṅ*, etc.; for it is different from *niyoga*, and in the case of 'Go to the village,' etc., even before the appearance of the fruit, there is the cognition of obligatoriness.

[510 b-511 a]

ननु कर्मणि कृत्योऽयं तयोरेवेति शासनात् ॥ ५१० ॥

मैवं प्रैषादिवद्यस्मादुपाधित्वादवाच्यता ।

"'Now, this *kṛtya*-suffix denotes an object, as taught in (the *sūtra*) "*tayor eva*" (Pāṇini, III, iv, 70).' Not so; just like direction, etc., this (action) also is an adjunct, and is not the express sense.

The cognition of *niyoga* from the suffix *kartavyaḥ* (is-to-be-made) may be objected to thus: Pāṇini in his *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, III, iv, 70 (*tayor eva kṛtyaktakhalārthāḥ*) says that the *kṛtya* suffix has only the sense of an action (*bhāva*) or of an object (*karma*). So, it cannot have the sense of an imperative (*kārya* or *niyoga*).

The reply is as follows: Just as direction, etc. (*praiṣā*), may condition the sense of the imperative or optative suffix, as an adjunct, so also action and object may figuratively condition the meaning of the *kṛtya*-suffix because they are the adjuncts of the *niyoga* which is the sense of the suffix.

NTV—yathā praiṣādayo na liṅādy-arthāḥ, apitu liṅādy-arthopādhayaḥ, bhāva-karmaṇī api na kṛtyānām arthau, kiṁtu kṛtyārthopādhi iti pariharati maivam iti.

AVS—ayam arthaḥ-yathā praiṣādeḥ pratyayārthopādhitvāt pratyayārthopacāraḥ, evaṁ bhāvakarmaṇor api.

[511 b-512 a]

प्रषैादिष्वपि कृत्यानां तथा च स्मरणं मुनेः ॥ ५११ ॥

कृत्यानां युक्तितोऽपि स्यान्नैव कर्माभिधायिता ।

"Hence it is that the sage (Pāṇini) lays down *kṛtya*-suffixes in the case of direction, etc., also; so, even

through reasoning there is not for *kṛtya*-suffixes denotativeness in respect of object.

The case of direction (*praiṣā*) cited above is quite appropriate, because Pāṇini says (III, iii, 163 : *praiṣātisargaprāptakāleṣu kṛtyāśca*) that the *kṛtya* suffixes are used after verbs in the sense of direction also, as in the senses of impersonal action and object. Therefore, it cannot be said that these suffixes are used *only* in the senses of action and object.

Moreover, it can be shown through reasoning that the *kṛtya*-suffix does not directly denote object.

[512 b-513 a]

यथा कटं करोतीति कर्ममात्रावबोधनम् ॥ ५१२ ॥

कर्तव्यः कट इत्यत्र तथैव स्यान्न चेक्ष्यते ।

" As in ' He makes a mat ' the object alone is known, there may be the same in ' A mat is to be made '. But it is not so observed.

The reasoning is as follows : In ' He makes a mat ' (*kaṭaṁ karoti*), by the accusative case-ending (*kaṭam*) the objectivity of the mat is made known. Not so in ' A mat is to be made ' (*kaṭaḥ kartavyaḥ*). Here what is conveyed is direction. Hence, the view that the *kṛtya* suffix denotes object and impersonal action alone is not sound.

[513 b-514 a]

कर्तव्यत्वादभीष्टत्वसिद्धौ कर्मार्थलाभतः ॥ ५१३ ॥

साक्षादनभिधानेऽपि न द्वितीया प्रसज्यते ।

" When the nature of being what is desired is accomplished from the nature of being what is to be

done, the sense of object is achieved (by implication), even though it is not directly expressed; there is no contingence of accusative case.

In the case of transitive verbs when the suffix does not express the object, the accusative case-ending is used, as in *kaṭaṁ karoti*. In *kartavyaḥ kaṭaḥ*, since the *tavya*-suffix is not held to denote the object, should not the noun *kaṭa* take on the accusative case-ending, it may be asked. The answer is: No; because of the fact that the term *kartavyaḥ* implies that the mat is desired to be made, thereby suggesting the objective status of the mat. It is to be noted, therefore, that the accusative case-ending is to be used only where the objective status is altogether unexpressed.

[514 b-515 a]

न चाभीष्टत्वकार्यत्वमभिन्नं व्यतिरेकतः ॥ ५१४ ॥

इच्छेदेष्टव्यमित्येवं तत्रापि प्रत्ययो यतः ।

"Nor are the nature of being what is desired and the nature of being what is to be done identical, for there is difference in 'He shall desire', 'It should be desired'; also, there is difference in sense.

It may be objected thus: You say that *kartavyaḥ* implies that the mat is desired to be made. But, in fact, there is no difference between having to be made (*kartavyaḥ*) and being desired (*eṣṭavyaḥ*).

The reply is: There is a difference between the two. So, it is legitimate to infer *iṣṭatva* (desiredness) from *kāryatva* (the status of having to be made). For example, in *icchet* (one may desire) and *eṣṭavyam* (ought to be desired), the sense of the suffix is different from the stem-sense. Otherwise, there would be infinite regress, as 'one may desire desire,' 'desire ought to be desired', etc. So, here the meaning would be 'desire is to be made', etc.

[515 b-516 a]

तस्मात्कर्तव्यतावेशात्क्रिया वा यदि वा फलम् ॥ ५१५ ॥
कारकं वाऽपि कार्यत्वं लभते न स्वतन्त्रतः ।

" Therefore, it is as dependent on obligatoriness that action, or fruit, or causative agent attains the status of what is to be done; not independently.

Obligatoriness is fundamental. The notion that action, etc., are to be done arises only as penetrated by the sense of obligatoriness.

[516 b-517 a]

लोकवन्ननु वेदेऽपि कार्यमात्रं न गम्यते ॥ ५१६ ॥
साधनेहानुबन्धस्य वेदे कार्यस्य बोधनात् ।

" 'Now, as in the world, even in the Veda, it is not merely what is obligatory that is taught; in the Veda, the obligatory as associated with the means in the form of effort is taught.

Here, an objection is raised against the view that *liṅ*, etc., denote *kārya* which is other than action, etc.

The objection is: Just as in worldly usage *kārya* is known only as in association with the stem-sense which has been established through other *pramāṇas*, so also in the Veda what is taught is not mere *kārya*, but *kārya* which is related to activity which is the means such as sacrifice, etc., established through other *pramāṇas*.

NTV—yathā loka iṣṭaphala-sādhanānubandhasyaiva kāryasyāvabodho na kevalasya, nāpy aniṣṭasādhanena, taduktam—kiṁtu svayaṁ kleśarūpaṁ karma yat-kāryatāṁ vrajet, phala-sādhanatā tatra kāraṇaṁ tena kāryate' ti.

.....tasmāl loke phalasādhanatānubandham eva kāryaṁ gamyate, evaṁ vedepi phalasādhanatānubandha eva kāryāvagama iti.

[517 b-518 a]

ततश्चाऽऽरोग्यकामस्य पथ्यभोजनवाक्यवत् ॥ ५१७ ॥

मानान्तरप्रवेशेन सापेक्षत्वं प्रसज्यते ।

"'Thence results (for the Veda) the nature of being dependent, because, as in the statement prescribing diet for him who desires health, there is dependence on some other means of valid knowledge.

The statement 'Let him who desires health eat restricted diet' depends for its sense on other means of valid knowledge. If in Vedic commands also, such as 'Let him sacrifice,' the *niyoga* has for its content the relation of end and means which is obtained through other *pramāṇas*, then it would become a dependent.

[518 b-519 a]

अतः प्रैषादितुल्योऽयं क्रियाफलनिबन्धनः ॥ ५१८ ॥

नियोगस्तदसंवादाच्चित्रादौ ते विहन्यते ।

" 'Hence, this *niyoga* which is bound up with action and fruit would be equal to direction, etc., and that (the authority of the Veda) in *Citra*, etc., will be destroyed for you, because there would be disparity.'

This dependence on other *pramāṇas* cannot be admitted in the case of sacrifices like the *Citra*. Here, there is no obvious relation between activity and fruitfulness. But *niyoga*, like direction (*praiṣā*), is based on the obviousness of the relation between action and fruit. Hence, *niyoga* cannot be admitted in the case of Vedic sacrifices.

[519 b-520 a]

नैवं मानान्तरावेशाल्लोके प्रैषाद्युपाधिकम् ॥ ५१९ ॥
कार्यं प्रयोजनार्थो च प्रवृत्तिरिति युज्यते ।

"Not so; it is intelligible that, in the world, obligatoriness, dependent as it is on other means of valid knowledge, should be conditioned by the adjuncts, such as direction, etc., and that activity should be for the sake of fruit.

The upholder of the doctrine of *kārya* now replies: In the case of worldly sentences it is true that the *kārya* denoted by *liṅ*, etc., and having direction (*praiṣā*), etc., as adjunct, has as its principal the procedure made known by other *pramāṇas*. Here, the sentences are uttered by human beings, and their purpose is to serve as the cause for bringing about some fruit.

NTV—yuktaṁ laukika-vākyānāṁ pauruṣeyāṇāṁ vaktṛ-jñānānumāpakatayā kārye prāmāṇyameva vaktṛ-jñānasyaiva tatra prāmāṇyāt..... tathā ca yadāyaṁ pramāṇād artham avagamya vacanāny-uccāritavān iti dhīs tadā tāny artha-bodham ādadhatīti mānāntarāveśāt kāryaṁ pratīyate, tac ca māntaram praiṣādy-upādhikaṁ praiṣādikam eva vā kāryaṁ gamayati. tad uktam—

śaṅkyamānā yathārthatva-racanaṁ tena puṁ-vacaḥ,
śrutamātrakam evārthe na tāvan niścayāvaham.
yāvad vaktur avijñātam pūrvabhāvi pramāntaram,
vivakṣitārtha-viṣayam indriyādi nibandhanam.

—iti.....

evaṁ ca saty anuvādakaṁ vākyaṁ bhavet. tad uktam—

tatrārthe niścite paścāt so'rtho vākyasya gamyate,
tasyāṁ daśāyāṁ vākyasya tasya syād anuvādatā.

—iti.

NKL—pauruṣeyaṁ pravartaka-vākyaṁ mānāntara-siddha-praiṣādy-upādhika-kārya-bodhakaṁ, tad-arthe māntara-saṁbhavāt.

[520 b-521 a]

साध्यसाधनसंबन्धविषयत्वं पुमर्थतः ॥ ५२० ॥
नियोगस्यात एवात्र कर्तृत्वेन नियुज्यते ।

" The (secular) *niyoga* has for content the relation between ends and means, as it refers to a human end ; therefore, the (secular) *niyoga*, here, construes with the agent.

The secular *niyoga* has for its content the relation of means and end—a relation that is established by other *pramāṇas :* e.g. that the eating of *harītakī* is a means to health is known through experience. When a physician prescribes it, he only sets forth the procedure, as to who should adopt it, etc.

[521 b-522 a]

स्वत एव प्रवृत्तत्वात्कर्तुरेवाधिकारिता ॥ ५२१ ॥
पदं चाऽऽरोग्यकामादि भवेत्कर्तृविशेषणम् ।

" Because he is active of his own accord, eligibility is for the agent alone ; and the words ' He who desires health', etc., are a qualification of the agent.

In the present example ' He who desires health ought to eat *harītakī* ', the verb construes primarily with the agent. Here the agent is active of his own accord, even without waiting for the command. The command in such cases has for its content only the procedure. And the expression ' he who desires health ' does not indicate primarily the *niyojya* (one who is prompted by the command) or the *adhikārin* (the eligible person), but the agent.

NTV—loke ārogyakāmādi-padaṁ kartṛ-samarpakaṁ na niyojya-samarpakam.

NKL—harītakī bhakṣayed ity-ādau niyogasya māntara-siddha-viniyoga-viṣayatvāt kartṛtvena anvayaḥ, na adhikāritvena.

[522 b-523 a]

वेदे तु सकलाक्षादिप्रमाणागोचरत्वतः ॥ ५२२ ॥
साध्यसाधनताज्ञानं नियोगादेव नान्यतः ।

"In the Veda, however, the knowledge of end and means is not gained through any other means of valid knowledge like perception, etc.; it is gained from the *niyoga* alone, not otherwise.

Vedic injunctions are not like secular commands. The *niyoga* here is not the sphere of any other *pramāṇa;* the relation between sacrifice, etc., and heaven, etc., is known solely from the *niyoga.*

NTV—niyogasya pratyakṣādi-sakala-pramāṇāgocaratvāt.

AVS—eṣorthaḥ–vede pratīyamāna-sādhya-sādhana-bhāvasya veda-vyatirikta-sarva-pramāṇāviṣayatvāt vaidika-niyogād eva tat siddhiḥ.

[523 b-524 a]

तथा ह्यकारकः कामी स्वर्गकामपदार्पितः ॥ ५२३ ॥
नियोगात्कर्मसंबन्धे पश्चाद्यातीह कर्तृताम् ।

"Thus, indeed, the one who desires, as made known by the words 'He who desires heaven,' is not a causal agent; when there is relation to an object (known) through the *niyoga*, thereafter one (the desirer) attains the status of being an agent.

In regard to Vedic injunctions, the relation of means and end is not established through any other *pramāṇa.* The *niyoga*, therefore, is

known from the Veda alone. The expression 'He who desires heaven' indicates the *niyojya* and *adhikārin*, and not the agent. Here 'desire' is not a qualification of the agent, but serves only to indicate the *niyojya*.

NKL—svarga-kāmo yajeta iti pratyayāt pratīta-niyogākāṅkṣayā svarga-kāmo mamāyaṁ niyoga iti niyojyatvena anvīya niyogaviṣaye karaṇe karmaṇy aiśvaryam adhikāram pratipadyata ity arthaḥ..... sāṅge karmaṇi mamāyaṁ niyoga iti niyoga-svāmitvena anvito niyogaḥ mayā sādhyata iti niyoga-dvāreṇa niyoga-viṣaya-bhāvārthenā 'pi kartṛtvena saṁbandhata ity arthaḥ.

[524 b-525 a]

कामस्य च प्रधानत्वात्तत्प्राधान्यानपायतः ॥ ५२४ ॥

पुंविशेषणता तस्माद्भोगी कामी न कारकः ।

"Since desire is the principal, without prejudice to its own importance it may become a qualification of man; therefore, the enjoyer is the desirer, and not the causal agent.

Another reason is given as to why desire is not a qualification of the agent: Desire is the principal, for it has the fruit for its content. Without losing its nature as principal, it becomes the qualification of man. It cannot be the qualification of the agent, for the agent is a subsidiary of action; and if desire were a qualification of the agent it would become a subsidiary of a subsidiary. This will not happen if desire were a qualification of the *adhikārin*, for the *adhikārin* is the master and not a subsidiary.

[525 b-526 a]

अप्रवृत्तप्रवृत्तेश्च कारकत्वं न युज्यते ॥ ५२५ ॥

प्रवृत्तस्य णिचोक्तिः स्यात्पचन्तं पाचयेद्यथा ।

" Being causal agent is not intelligible in the case of the activity of one who has not been active ; as for one who has been active, there would be the causative form (*ṇicoktiḥ*) as in ' Make him cook, who is cooking.'

The causative suffix *ṇic* may not be used to indicate the primary action of an agent in the world who can know the relation of what is to be accomplished (*sādhya*) and what can accomplish it (*sādhana*). Such activity is not prompted by *niyoga*. But as regards Vedic actions, one cannot know them through means other than the Veda. So, here, the Veda alone may prompt one to act, having made that one the *niyojya*. Had agency in regard to Vedic action been independent of *niyoga*, and had an agent acting independently been the *niyojya* of the Vedic command, the form of that command would be not *svarga-kāmo yajeta* (Let one desirous of heaven offer sacrifice), but *svarga-kāmo yājayet* (Cause him who desires heaven to offer sacrifice) as in *pācayet* (Cause him to cook) in regard to a man independently starting to cook.

NTV—kiṁca loke phala-sādhane pravṛtta eva pravarttate, vaidike tu niyoge apravṛtta eva pravarttate, atopi niyojyatvam eva svargakāminaḥ na kartṛtvam.....pacaṁtaṁ pācayed-itivad yajaṁtaṁ yājayed iti ṇiñ na śrūyate ity-arthaḥ.

NKL—yāgādau śabdāt-prāk pravṛttiścet prayojaka-bhūta-niyogasya yājayed iti ṇij-antena vacanaṁ syād ity arthaḥ.

AVS—na cātra ṇicoktiḥ, tasmād apravṛtta-pravartanāt kāmy-adhikāry eva na karte 'ti.

[526 b-527 a]

अक्रियाकर्तृसंबन्धे ननु षष्ठी प्रसज्जते ॥ ५२६ ॥

नैवं नाम्नोः सदा योगे षष्ठीयं शैषिकी यतः ।

"'Now, if the relation is not that between the activity and the agent, there is the contingence of the genitive case.' Not so; for, the residual genitive is laid down exclusively for the relation between nouns.

If the relation between the agent and act is given up in favour of that between seeker after heaven (*adhikārin*) and act, should there not be the genitive case used in the text thus: *svarga-kāmasya yajeta?*

No; for the genitive case can come in only when the relata are nouns (e. g. *rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ*, the king's man), and not when one of the relata is a verb.

AVS—nanu kāmī kartṛtvena niyogena na sambadhyate svāmitvena sambadhyate cet, devadattasya vastram itivat svarga-kāmasya niyoga iti ṣaṣṭhī prāpnotīty āha.

[527 b-528 a]

क्रियाकारकयोगे च द्वितीयादिर्लडादि तु ॥ ५२७ ॥

स्यात्प्रातिपदिकार्थस्य भावार्थेनेत्यसंकरः ।

"The other cases like the accusative, etc., are used to express the relation between the act and the accessories thereof. And, the tenses like the present, etc., are used to express the meaning of the noun-stem and that of the root. Thus there is no confusion.

The accusative case, etc., are used to indicate the relation between verb and accessories—*kārakas* like agent, object, etc., (e. g. *vṛkṣaḥ tiṣṭhati, taṁ paśyet;* the tree stands, look at it). Verbal suffixes are used to indicate the relation of verbs to nouns (e. g. *pācakaḥ pacati*, the cook cooks).

[528 b-529 a]

नीलोत्पले तु नामार्थावपहाय परस्परम् ॥ ५२८ ॥
भेदमेकात्मतां यातावितिषष्ठी न संमता ।

"The words 'blue' and 'lily' though having the meaning of nouns, have attained identity by giving up their mutual difference; so, in their case the genitive case is not accepted.

It was stated in v. 526 b-527 a that the genitive case applies only when the relata are nouns. As against this observation, it may be asked why in the case of the 'blue lily' the genitive case is not used. The reply is: In such cases, the genitive case is ruled out because the denotations of the two component names have become one. The genitive case is possible only where there is difference, and not where there is identity of locus.

[529 b-530 a]

लिङर्थे युज्यमानस्य कर्मत्वं न च कामिनः ॥ ५२९ ॥
अक्रियात्वान्नियोगस्य द्वितीया चेद्भवेत्तथा ।

"The desirer who is prompted by the use of the potential mood (the sense of *liṅ*) is not the object of the verb; because the *niyoga* is not action; if it were so, then the accusative case would be used.

Objection—Even though the genitive case is not possible, can we not use the accusative case and say *svargakāmaṁ yajeta*, as we say *grāmaṁ gacchati* (he goes to the village)?

Reply—No; for, the heaven-seeker is not an object, and the *niyoga* is not an act, but what is brought about by action.

[530 b-531 a]

तस्मादकारकः कामी स्वनियोगप्रसिद्धये ॥ ५३० ॥
नियुज्यमान एवेह विषयं साध्यमीक्षते ।

"Therefore, the desirer who is not a causal agent, only as being prompted in order that the *niyoga* relating to him may be established, perceives the object which has to be accomplished.

Thus, the *svarga-kāma* (heaven-seeker) is, first, related to *niyoga* as the one prompted by it. At that time, he has no sense of agency. He only recognizes his eligibility. And then, he comes to look about for the object of action, its instruments, etc.

[531 b-532 a]

राजादिषु प्रसिद्धश्च नियोगः साध्यगोचरः ॥ ५३१ ॥
भावार्थस्य च साध्यत्वमिति तेनापि युज्यते ।

"It is well known that in the case of kings, etc., the *niyoga* has what is to be accomplished for its sphere; and the stem-sense (action) is what is to be accomplished; thus he (the desirer of release) is related to that (the stem-sense) also.

Objection—There is no rule that the content of *niyoga* should be what-is-to-be-accomplished (*sādhya*). In the text, 'For him who desires efficient sense-organs, one should offer curds,' curds, which constitute what-are-already-established (*siddha*), are seen to be the content of *niyoga*.

Reply—The content of *niyoga* must always be what-is-to-be-accomplished. Curds, etc., get related only as auxiliaries of what-is-

to-be-accomplished. What-is-to-be-accomplished is always of the nature of activity, in the first instance. After having been, first, related to *niyoga*, the *svarga-kāma* gets related, next, to action. Without the action that perishes soon and which is the stem-sense (*dhātvartha*), *niyoga* cannot lead to the desired goal; and that cannot come about without the stem-sense; and also without itself coming into being, it cannot lead to heaven.

NTV—modakaṁ bhakṣayed iti hi niyogaḥ; na ākāśaṁ bhakṣayed iti tat kasya hetoḥ? modaka-bhakṣaṇasya sādhyatvāt.

[532 b-533 a]

आविवक्षितमप्येवं लिङ्गसंख्यं विवक्ष्यते ॥ ५३२ ॥

पश्चाद्विषयसिद्ध्यर्थं कारकादि च यच्छ्रुतम् ।

"Though the gender and number are not (apparently) intended, they, in fact, are; later, causal agents, etc., are declared (in Scripture) in order that the object may be accomplished.

Although gender and number in the expression '*svarga-kāma*' are not of the essence of the injunction (*svarga-kāmo yajeta*), both must be treated as significant as they find a place in the injunction.

There are such texts as the following: 'On being initiated, he sacrifices the *animal* dedicated to Agni and Soma' (*Taittirīya-saṁhitā*, V, i, 11, 6). 'He yokes the *two* bulls.' 'To the Spring, he sacrifices the partridges' (*Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa*, I, v, 1, 13). Here the question is whether the *number* (one, two, many) has any bearing on the sacrifice. The opponent of the Pūrva-mīmāṁsā says that it has no bearing because it is only an auxiliary to the object (in the texts quoted, to the animal, to the two bulls, and to the partridges). (*PM*, IV, *i*. 11.)

The Mīmāṁsaka replies to this by saying that the *number* has a bearing. On hearing the sentence 'Bring the animal,' one brings *one* animal; and on hearing the sentence 'Bring the animals,' one brings *several* animals. This only means that *number* is taken into account. Hence, in the case of the text 'He sacrifices the animal' (*paśum ālabheta*), what is understood from the words is the *sacrificing* (denoted by the verb '*ālabheta*') as qualified by the two qualifying adjuncts (the *animal* denoted by the noun '*paśu*' and the *number* 'one' as denoted by the singular case-ending in '*paśum*'). Thus, it follows that *number* has a bearing on the sacrifice. (*PM*, IV, i, 15.) What is true of *number* is true of *gender* also. For example, there is the text: 'In spring, he sacrifices, in the morning, the black-necked animal (*kṛṣṇa-grīvām*) dedicated to Agni; in summer, he sacrifices, at noon, the lioness (*simhīm*) dedicated to Indra; in autumn, he sacrifices, in the afternoon, the white animal (*śvetām*) dedicated to Bṛhaspati' (*Taittirīya-saṁhitā*, II, i, 2, 5). Then follow the words 'These animals are pregnant' (*garbhiṇyo bhavanti*). It is clear, here, that what are meant in the text are *female* animals. (*PM*, IV, i, 17.)

In the expression *svarga-kāma*, therefore, *number* and *gender* are indicated. So also are the fruit, etc., indicated in the injunction. For, without these performance of sacrifice is not possible.

It cannot be said that if the fruit, etc., are also intended besides *niyoga*, there would be sentence-split; for, although the *niyoga* is the primary significance of the injunction, the other factors also come in, being related to *niyoga*.

[533 b-534 a]

ततश्च स्वर्गकामो यः स्वनियोगं स साधयेत् ॥ ५३३ ॥
केन यागादिनिर्वृत्त्येत्येतच्छास्त्रात्प्रतीयते ।

"Therefore, he alone who desires heaven should accomplish his *niyoga*. How? By the performance of sacrifice, etc. This is understood from Scripture.

So, the meaning of the injunction is that the person (*masculine, singular*) who desires heaven is the *adhikārin*, and that he should accomplish his own *niyoga* through the performance of the Vedic rite.

NTV—svarga-kāmo niyogaṁ bhāvayed ity arthaḥ.

[534 b-535 a]

न चानपनयन्यागः कामिनः स्वर्गकामिताम् ॥ ५३४ ॥
साधनं स्वाधिकारस्य भवतीह् कथंचन ।

"Without removing the desire-for-heaven of the person who desires it, by bringing it (heaven) about, the sacrifice cannot be the means to accomplish its *niyoga* (*adhikāra*).

It cannot be said that if sacrifice, etc., are the means to *niyoga* there would be no means to heaven, and if *niyoga* be the means thereto it would cease to be the principal; for, the sacrifice cannot be the means to the *niyoga* if it does not fulfil the desire of the seeker after heaven by leading him to heaven, and so, the sacrifice generates heaven through *niyoga* and thus removes the desire of the *adhikārin*.

[535 b-536 a]

अनुन्मृदितकामो हि पूर्वावस्थाविशेषतः ॥ ५३५ ॥
निष्पादिताधिकारोऽपि नियोगार्हः पुनर्भवेत् ।

"If the desire has not been removed then even though one has accomplished his *niyoga* (*adhikāra*), his state being not different from the former state, again he would be subjected to *niyoga*.

If the sacrifice does not remove the desire for heaven, then the person would have to strive for *niyoga* again, even though he has acquired *niyoga*. Therefore, it is but proper to hold that the sacrifice gives rise to heaven through *niyoga*, and removes the desire relating thereto in the person.

AVS — yataḥ kāme 'nivṛtte yāgena niṣpādita-niyogo'pi punar niyogārho bhavet, pūrvāvasthato 'viśiṣṭatvāt.

[536 b-537 a]

अधिकारः स्वसिद्ध्यर्थमतः कामस्य साध्यताम् ॥ ५३६ ॥
यागेनाऽऽपाद्य संसिध्यन्विषयस्यैति साध्यताम् ।

"Thus *niyoga*, in order to accomplish itself, makes the desired object an end to be accomplished, by sacrifice, and having thus getting itself established, it attains the status of what is to be accomplished in relation to the object.

If the sacrifice generates heaven, and through that removes the desire relating thereto, where is the need, it may be asked, for *niyoga ?*

The sacrifice perishes soon; and heaven is to come hereafter. Therefore, *niyoga* is to be admitted as the link. *Niyoga* cannot accomplish itself if there is no *niyojya*. In order to have a *niyojya*, it makes heaven what-is-to-be-accomplished. And through the performance of the sacrifice by the *niyojya*, it establishes itself. Thus, *niyoga* is the principal; in order that it may have a *niyojya*, it must be helpful to the accomplishment of the fruit (viz. heaven).

[537 b-538 a]

नानन्तरफलाभावे विसंवादोऽत्र शङ्क्यते ॥ ५३७ ॥
क्रियासाध्ये फले स स्याल्लिङर्थस्त्वक्रियात्मकः ।

"Nor may lack of agreement be feared if there be no immediate fruit; it may be so in the case of a fruit accomplished by action; but the *niyoga* which is the sense of the potential mood (*liṅartha*) is not action.

Now, it may be said that, as no fruit is seen immediately after the performance of the sacrifice, the text about desire-for-heaven is invalid.

The reply is that the text is not invalid. Even in the case of sacrifices such as the *Citrā*, etc., which are performed for the sake of gaining cattle, etc., no immediate fruit is seen. Yet the texts enjoining them are quite valid. If a fruit were to result from mere action such as eating, then, if after the action there is no result, we may say that the injunction relating to the action is invalid. But, that does not apply in the present case. *Niyoga* is not action but the unseen potency (*apūrva*); and the fruit that is to be accomplished thereby need not be immediate.

NTV—citrayā yajeta paśukāma iti hi coditaṁ, na tv anantara-paśuphala-sādhanatvaṁ coditam ity arthaḥ.

[538 b-539 a]

प्रत्यर्थिनि च शब्देऽस्मिन्नाभावोऽनुपलब्धितः ॥ ५३८ ॥

मानाभावे ह्यसौ मानमानन्तर्यं त्वचोदितम् ।

"When there is the Scriptural statement about the fruit, the absence of that (fruit) cannot be suspected on the ground of non-cognition. This (non-cognition) is evidence only in the absence of (positive) evidence. Immediate sequence, however, is not declared (in Scripture).

Nor may it be said that, as the fruit is not seen immediately after the sacrifice, it must be concluded that there is no fruit on the ground of non-cognition of the competent (*yogyānupalabdhi*); for, there is not here non-cognition of the competent. Scripture declares that there is fruit. The *niyoga* given rise to by sacrifice, etc., should necessarily lead to its fruit. But it is not necessary that the fruit should result immediately. What Scripture teaches is that the fruit comes about surely through *apūrva*.

AVS — anuṣṭhita-sādhanasya phalānupalabdhir na phalābhāvaṁ sādhayati. ... bhāva-pramāṇābhāve anupalabdhiḥ pramāṇam, śabdas tu bhāva-pramāṇam, ataḥ śabdād idaṁ phalaṁ bhavatīty avagamyate, nānupalabdhyā phalābhāva iti.

[539 b-540 a]

अतः कृताधिकारोऽपि यो विद्यादकृतार्थताम् ॥ ५३९ ॥

तस्य शास्त्रानभिज्ञत्वान्नाधिकारोऽस्ति वैदिके ।

"Therefore, he who, through having accomplished the *adhikāra* (*niyoga*), thinks that he has not achieved his end, has no eligibility for the Vedic rites, for he does not know the Scripture.

A person may perform a sacrifice, and, seeing that no immediate fruit follows, may think that there is no fruit. Such a person, however, has no eligibility at all for Vedic rites. His scepticism can in no away affect the validity of Scripture.

[540 b-541 a]

मन्त्रार्थवादनाम्नां च कार्यार्थानुप्रवेशतः ॥ ५४० ॥

प्रामाण्यं न स्वतस्तस्मात्कार्ये वेदस्य मानता ।

"*Mantra, arthavāda* and names are valid by being included in those that are for the sake of what-is-to-be-accomplished, and not independently; therefore the Veda is evidence in respect of what-is-to-be-accomplished.

Mantras, arthavādas and names are auxiliaries to *kārya.*

In the *Mantrādhikaraṇa* (*PM*, I, ii, 31–53), it is established that the *mantras* serve the rites by conveying certain meanings. In the *Arthavādādhikaraṇa*, it is explained that the *arthavāda* texts have no purport independent of *kārya.* Names also have *kārya* for purport. There are names of sacrifices like *Udbhid*, *Abhijit*, *Viśvajit*, etc. These too are for the sake of *kārya*, as they fall within the scope of injunctions. (*PM*, I, iv, 1.) Thus, it is evident that *all* Veda has *kārya* for purport.

NKL—anuṣṭheya-smārakatayā mantrāṇāṁ tat-stāvakatvena artha-vādānāṁ tat-saṁjñātvena nāmnāṁ vidhinaikavākyatvāt prāmāṇyam ity arthaḥ.

[541 b-542 a]

वेदान्तानामतो वाच्यं कार्यार्थानुप्रवेशनम् ॥ ५४१ ॥
प्रामाण्यं वा निषेद्धव्यमत्र प्रतिविधीयते ।

"Therefore, of the Vedāntas, it must be said that they have validity only by being included in the accessories of what-is-to-be-accomplished; or their validity must be rejected." This view is now refuted.

The Vedānta texts also can be valid only by being accessory to *kārya.* If this view be not admitted, there would be invalidity for those texts.

In this verse, the *pūrvapakṣa* is concluded, and the *siddhāntin* promises to refute it.

NTV—udbhidā yajete' ty evam-ādi-nāma yasmāt kṛtsnasya vedasya kārye prāmāṇyaṁ, ato vedāntānām api pratipatti-kartavyatā-prāmāṇya-bhājāṁ tan-mukhena tad-anugata-bhūtārthātma-tattva-viṣaya-bodhakat-vaṁ, ataḥ tepi kārya-niṣṭhatāṁ nātivartata ity āha-vedāntānām iti.

[542 b-543 a]

निःशेषमातृतद्वृत्तिजन्मनां तद्विलक्षण– ॥ ५४२ ॥

स्वतःसिद्धात्मसंबोधव्याप्तिर्वस्त्वनुरोधतः ।

In accordance with the nature of reality, there is the pervasion (*vyāpti*) of the cognizer, its modes and their originations *in toto*, by the self-established self-consciousness which is different therefrom.

What is the reason for saying that there would be invalidity for Vedānta texts if they are not considered to be accessory to *kārya?* (1) Is it because the Vedānta texts have no content (*viṣaya*)*?* (2) Or, is it because words have no capacity to convey something already established (*siddhārtha*)*?*

(1) Not the first; for the witness-self is the content of the Vedāntas. The modifications of the intellect which bear reflections of the self are the cognizers. It is the self that pervades them, while being immutable. It is this that is to be realized through the Vedāntas.

NTV—ananta-pramātṛn tadvṛtti-janmādīnāṁś ca rāga-dveṣādīṁś ca sākṣāt paśyantam anubhūti-svarūpam ātmānaṁ konāma nādrīyeta, tad anādaraṇe niḥśeṣa-mātṛ-tadvṛttīnām ananubhava-prasaṅga ity arthaḥ.

NKL—kiṁ viṣayābhāvād aprāmāṇyam, siddhe śabda-sāmarthyā-'bhāvādvā.

[543 b-544 a]

वियद्वस्तुस्वभावानुरोधादेव न कारकात् ॥ ५४३ ॥

वियत्संपूर्णतोत्पत्तौ कुम्भस्येव दृशा धियाम् ।

Just as a pot when produced is already filled with ether, by virtue of the nature of the ether itself, and not because of any causal agents, even so the intellect (and its psychoses) are pervaded by the consciousness-self.

The ether example is given to show that the self is unchanging even though it pervades the intellect, etc.

[544 b-545 a]

घटदुःखादिरूपत्वं धियां धर्मादिहेतुतः ॥ ५४४ ॥

निर्हेतुत्वात्मसंबोधरूपित्वं वस्तुरूपतः ।

The intellect assumes the form of pot, misery, etc., because of merit, etc.; its assumption of the form of the causeless self-consciousness is because of the nature of the real itself.

It cannot be argued that, if the self could pervade the intellect, etc., without changing, the same must be possible for the intellect too; for, the intellect is of the nature of the inert, and its taking on of the form of the object is caused by *adṛṣṭa*; its taking on of the form of consciousness, however, is not caused by *adṛṣṭa*; but is on account of the constant pervasion by the unconditioned self.

NTV—jagat-vaicitryavat dhīvṛtti-vaicitryaṁ dharmādi-hetukam eva, anyathā tat-vaicitryānupapatteḥ.

[545 b-546 a]

बुद्धितद्वृत्तिभावोऽयमभावश्चाप्यनन्यमात् ॥ ५४५ ॥

यतः सिद्ध्यते सोऽर्थो ज्ञेयः सिद्धः स्वतः सदा ।

That reality by which both the existence and non-existence of the intellect and the psychoses are established, should be known as self-established always, as it is self-evident.

The self reveals the existence as well as the non-existence of the intellect and its modes. Hence, it is self-established and self-revealing, requiring no other revealer.

[546 b-547 a]

ननु प्रमाणविरहात्स्वतः सिद्धो यदीष्यते ॥ ५४६ ॥

वचसो बुद्धबोधित्वादप्रामाण्यं प्रसज्यते ।

" Now, if you believe that the self is self-established because there is no means of valid knowledge, then, the Vedāntic statements would be void of validity, because they would only be making known what has already been known."

Objection—If the immutable self is self-luminous, of what use are the Vedānta texts?

[547 b-548 a]

मैवमप्रतिपन्नत्वादनुभूत्यैव वस्तुनः ॥ ५४७ ॥

तद्व्युत्पत्तेः पुरा साक्षाद्बोधो व्युत्पत्तिमात्रतः ।

It is not so; because prior to a knowledge of the meaning of Scripture the reality is not known—and this is

a matter of experience—the direct knowledge thereof results from a knowledge of the meaning of Scripture alone.

Reply—Before the rise of the Vedānta-generated knowledge, everyone experiences ignorance of the form 'I am ignorant, I do not know myself.' So, although the self is self-luminous, it remains unknown. It is only through the 'hearing' (*śravaṇa*) of the Vedānta texts that it comes to be realized.

NTV—yady api svatas-siddha-ātmā, tathāpy 'aham ajño mām anyaṁ ca na jānāmīty anubhava-siddhā apratipattyā apratipannatvād apratipatti-nivartakatvena tatra prāmāṇyam upapadyata ity arthaḥ.

NKL—vākya-janitāparokṣa-jñānāt-prāg aham ajño na jānāmīty ātmanopratipannatvasya svānubhavenaiva siddhatvāt ... vedāntānām ajñāna-nivartakāparokṣadhī-janakatvam ayuktaṁ śabdasya parokṣadhī-hetutvād atrāha-sākṣād-iti.

[548 b-549 a]

बोधाबोधौ यतो दृष्टौ स्वानुभूत्यनुसारतः ॥ ५४८ ॥
दृष्टे चानुपपन्नत्वं किंबलादभिधीयते ।

Since, on the ground of one's own experience, both knowledge and non-knowledge (of the self) are seen, on the strength of what do you maintain the unintelligibility of what is observed?

In regard to the self-luminous self, there are both occasional knowledge and beginningless ignorance. Through reasoning based on constancy and inconstancy and from the experience of the wise ones, one has occasional knowledge of the self. Because of the experience 'I am ignorant,' there is beginningless ignorance also.

NTV—na hi khaṁ kṛṣṇam ity-ādi-dṛṣṭam anupapannatayā tyajata ity arthaḥ.

[549 b-550 a]

सुषुप्तादेश्च संसिद्धिर्मात्रादिविरहेऽपि या ॥ ५४९ ॥
साऽपीहान्तरसंबुद्धमेयमात्रव्यपाश्रयात् ।

The experience (*sphūrti*) here (in empirical state) of sleep, etc., even though cognizer, etc., were absent then, is made possible only on the ground of the inner uncognized object.

It may be asked how ignorance which is opposed to knowledge can have knowledge as its basis. In reply, the sleep-experience is adduced. In sleep, there are no cognizer, etc; yet there is experience. Similarly, ignorance is established even though it is opposed to knowledge.

[550 b-551 a]

न चाभावप्रमाणात्सा सति मातर्यभावमा ॥ ५५० ॥
मात्राद्यभावसंसिद्धिःकथं मात्रादिपूर्विका ।

Nor is that through the evidence of non-cognition; non-cognition is possible when there is a cognizer; how can the absence of cognizer, etc., be established when the cognizer, etc., are posited prior to it?

It cannot be said that the *pramāṇa* for sleep is non-cognition (*anupalabdhi*). When a person wakes up, he says, 'I did not know anything in sleep.' This is recollection of an experience. In sleep itself there is no cognizer; and so, no *pramāṇa* can function there. Hence, sleep is established by experience. Similarly, the establishment of ignorance is by experience.

NTV—ato 'nubhava-siddha-suṣuptyādi-nivartakatayā vacasāṁ prāmāṇyam apy ādartavyam iti bhāvaḥ.

[551 b-552 a]

यमप्रमीयमाणानि नानात्मानं प्रमिण्वते ॥ ५५१ ॥
वस्तुवृत्तानुरोधेन कथं तत्राप्रमा वचः ।

That without knowing which, in accordance with the nature of things, the not-self is not known (through) means of valid knowledge like perception, etc.)—in respect of that, how could the Vedāntic statements be unauthoritative?

That although the inner self is self-luminous, Vedānta is *pramāṇa* therefor, because both knowledge and ignorance are experienced with reference to it, has been stated. Here, an argument *a fortiori* is employed. Even empirical *pramāṇas* such as perception, etc., cannot function without revealing, basically, the self. How much more is this the case in regard to Vedānta whose specific content is the real self?

NTV—pratyakṣādi-pramāṇāni śabdādi-viṣaya-bodhanena caritārthāny apy ātmānamapi pramiṇvate, anyathā anātmānam api na pramiṇvate, kimu vaktavyaṁ vacasas tatra apramāṇaṁ na bhavatīti.

[552 b-553 a]

अमीमांसक इत्युच्चैरमीमांसक इत्यतः ॥ ५५२ ॥
आक्षिपन्ति यदज्ञानात्तच्छान्त्या उत्तरं वचः ।

Because of ignorance (of the self), they (the Mīmāṁsakas) loudly denounce (the Vedāntin) saying, 'He is not an inquirer, not an inquirer'. To silence them, the following reply is given (in the Commentary).

The Pūrvamīmāṁsakas say that the Vedāntin has no competence for inquiry, as he teaches that the purport of the Veda may be with

reference to existent things also. Their view is the result of their ignorance of the true nature of the self. In order to silence them, Śrī Śaṅkara says, '*sarvo 'pi vedaḥ*,' etc.

AVS—eṣo 'rthaḥ: amī mām ākṣipanti vedasya siddhavastuni prāmāṇyaṁ bruvan sa ko mīmāṁsakaḥ iti yadyasmād ajñānāt tasmāt tac-chāntyai syāj jñānasya śāntyai uttaraṁ vacaḥ ..... athavā yadyasya pratīcojñānād ākṣipanti tasya pratīco yadajñānaṁ tac-chāntyai uttaraṁ vacaḥ iti apara-vyākhyā.

[553 b-554 a]

सर्वोऽपि वेद इत्यादि यथोक्तपरिहारकृत् ॥ ५५३ ॥

गुरुराह वचः स्पष्टं दृढन्यायोपबृंहितम् ।

Making the said reply, the Master (*guruḥ*) declared the lucid words, "the entire Veda, etc.," full of sound reasoning.

Here the words of Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya* '*sarvo 'pi vedaḥ*' are quoted, and their purport is indicated.

[554 b-555 a]

मानस्वभावमाश्रित्य सर्वोऽपीत्याद्युदीरणम् ॥ ५५४ ॥

काण्डद्वयसमाख्या हि तत्प्रमेयानुरोधतः ।

The statement " the entire, etc.", is in view of the nature of the means of valid knowledge; the declaration regarding the two sections is in view of what are taught in them.

The Veda as such makes known what is unknown. This is true of both the sections of the Veda. And, both of them deal with the supersensuous. But the difference is that, while the *karma-kāṇḍa* is concerned with the *sādhya* (what-is-to-be-accomplished), the *jñāna-kāṇḍa* is about the eternally established reality.

[555 b-556 a]

मानं हि व्यञ्जकं लोके सिद्धे तच्च स्वकारणात् ॥ ५५५ ॥
स्वतः सिद्धेऽथवा नित्यं मेयमात्रं विशिष्यते ।

The function of a means of valid knowledge in the world is to manifest; it functions in relation to what is established by its cause, as also in relation to what is eternally self-established; the difference is only as regards the objects known.

The function of *pramāṇa* is to reveal. The *pramāṇa* can reveal only an object that is already there—which object may be a product, or an eternally established reality. *Pramāṇa* thus is only a revealer (*vyañjaka*), and not a producer (*kāraka*) of its own object.

NKL—svakāraṇāt siddhe ghaṭādau svataḥsiddhe gaganādau tacca bodhakatvam.

AVS—svato vā parato vā vidyamānasya mānaṁ bodhakam eva na kārakam.

[556 b-557 a]

अतः सर्वोऽपि वेदोऽयं प्रमाणत्वैकहेतुतः ॥ ५५६ ॥
प्रकाशनपरो ज्ञेयः सिद्धसाध्यात्मवस्तुनः ।

Therefore, the entire Veda, because it is the same means of valid knowledge throughout, must be understood as making known the established and the to-be-accomplished contents.

Veda which is *pramāṇa* makes known what was unknown. It consists of two sections: *karma* and *jñāna*. So far as their *pramāṇa*-nature is concerned, there is no difference between the two sections. The difference is only as regards their contents: the content of *karma*

is what is to be accomplished; that of *jñāna* is what is already established.

[557 b-558 a]

एकवाक्यत्वतो यद्वा सर्वोऽपीत्यादि भण्यते ॥ ५५७ ॥
पुरुषार्थावसायित्वाद्वेदाधीतिविधेरिति ।

Or, because the injunction to study the Veda culminates in the human end, there is syntactical unity; and so it is stated, "the entire, etc."

The meaning of the words of the Commentary may be stated differently also. The two sections are related, even as the *Prayāja* texts and the *Darśapūrṇamāsa* texts are. That is, they are related because they lead to the same human goal; only, while *jñāna* is the direct means, *karma* helps indirectly.

NKL — svādhyāyo 'dhyetavyaḥ, vedaḥ kṛtsno 'dhigantavyaḥ, sarahasyo dvijanmaneti cā 'dhyayana-vidher eka-mokṣa-pramāpaka-vedādhyayana-kartavyatā-bodhakatvāt.

[558 b-559 a]

निःशेषसुखसंप्राप्तेः सर्वानर्थह्नुतेस्तथा ॥ ५५८ ॥
मुक्तेरर्वाक्पुमर्थोऽन्यो नेह कश्चित्समीक्ष्यते ।

Nothing can here be the human end, which is lower than release which is the attainment of the highest happiness and the destruction of all evil.

It cannot be said that *svarga* (heaven) is the fruit of *karma-kāṇḍa*; for, nothing short of release could be the goal of Scripture. *Svarga* is but a pseudo-fruit.

NKL — svargāder anityatvena pumarthābhāsatvāt na tatra adhyayana-vidhi-tātparyam.

AVS — svargāder ādyantavattvena puruṣārthābhāsatvāt na tatra adhyayana-vidheḥ paryavasānam ity arthaḥ.

[559 b-560 a]

असिद्धार्थस्य वा सिद्धिरनुभूत्येकमात्रतः ॥ ५५९ ॥
सर्वोऽपीति वचः सिद्धिः सर्वा ह्यात्मैकसंविदः ।

Or, the words 'the entire Veda, etc.', mean that through experience (self) alone is established the non-established (world) (in respect of its existence and manifestation); indeed, all is established only through the one consciousness-self.

This is another meaning: *Veda* is the reality which is consciousness. The existence and manifestation that we attribute to the world are really the essence of the self. But for the self, the world has no status. So, consciousness is all this world; it is that which makes the world-appearance possible. All that which appears is in its root the consciousness which is the self; it is experience (*anubhava*) which is called the Veda.

AVS — asiddhārthasya jaḍa-prapañcasya siddhir anubhūtyaika-mātrataḥ anvaya-vyatirekābhāva-parihāreṇa anubhava-mātre antarbhāvo yathā tathā siddhiḥ sattopalabdhir ity arthaḥ.

[560 b-561 a]

यद्वाऽनवगतोऽतोऽन्यः संभाव्यो नाऽऽत्मनस्ततः ॥ ५६० ॥
सर्वोऽपीति वचः प्राह तथा चोर्ध्वं प्रवक्ष्यते ।

Or else, because nothing other than the self is unknown, it is stated 'the entire Veda, etc.' This will be explained later on.

A yet different meaning is here given. What is to be known is the self alone. The not-self cannot be the content of knowledge, for its very nature is nescience. Thus, in respect of the self alone is the entire Veda *pramāṇa*.

NTV—sarvopi jaḍa-vargo yathoktānubhūtir eve 'tyarthaḥ.

NKL—jaḍasya ajñāna-kāryasya ajñātatvāyogād ātmana eva tat saṁbhavād anubhava eva sarvo veda-rāśiḥ pramāṇam ity ucyate.

[561 b-562 a]

यद्धेतुकं प्रमाणत्वं वेदान्तानां समर्थ्यते ॥ ५६१ ॥
तेनैव हेतुना कर्मकाण्डस्यापि प्रमाणता ।

The ground on which the validity of the Vedāntas is established is no other than the ground on which there is validity for the ritual section.

The reason for regarding the two sections as *pramāṇa* is the same, viz. that they make known what is unknown (*ajñāta-jñāpakatva*).

[562 b-563 a]

वेदान्तानाममानत्वं येन वा हेतुनोच्यते ॥ ५६२ ॥
तेनैव हेतुना कर्मकाण्डस्यापि प्रसज्यते ।

The ground on which the Vedāntas are stated to be non-authoritative—the same ground occasions the non-authoritativeness of the ritual section also.

If *jñāna-kāṇḍa* be invalid, then *karma-kāṇḍa* too would be invalid.

NKL—dṛṣṭo hi tasyārthaḥ karmāvabodhanam iti śābara-bhāṣya-virodhād vedāntānāṁ na svārthe pramāṇam ity āśaṅkya, śāṅkara-bhāṣya-virodhāt karma-kāṇḍasya na svārthe mānatvam.

[563 b-564 a]

अपि सर्वप्रमाणानि स्वप्रमेयाभिसंगतेः ॥ ५६३ ॥

प्रमामेवेह कुर्वन्ति प्रामाण्यं यान्ति नान्यथा ।

And, all means of knowledge attain validity only by engendering valid knowledge through contact with the objects of knowledge, not otherwise.

The Vedāntas are *pramāṇa* in respect of their content, since they make known what is unknown, like perception. All *pramāṇas*, perception, etc., become valid by making known their respective contents. *Pramāṇa* is that which generates a cognition that is fruitful, determinate, and unsublated. This definition fits in with reference to the Vedāntas also.

NKL—pratyakṣādīny api pramāṁ kurvanty eva santi prāmāṇyaṁ yānti, anavagatārthādhigantṛtvena prāmāṇyam.

[564 b-565 a]

विधिनैवैकवाक्यत्वं यतो मन्त्रार्थवादयोः ॥ ५६४ ॥

ततो दर्शननिष्ठत्वं न तयोरुपपद्यते ।

As *mantras* and *arthavādas* have syntactical unity with injunctions, it is intelligible that they do not generate valid knowledge.

It cannot be said that since the Vedāntas are non-injunctive texts, like *mantras* and *arthavādas*, they are not *pramāṇa*. In the case of *mantras* and *arthavādas*, it is intelligible that they are not *pramāṇa*, because they have no fruit of their own. The case of the Vedāntas is not so.

NTV—vedānta-vākyānāṁ brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati ityādi-phalavatāṁ na vidhinaika-vākyatvam api tu vidhivākyānāṁ svārthe-niratiśaya-puruṣārthābhāvāt adhyayana-vidhi-balena vedāntaika-vākyat-vam upapadyate.

[565 b-566 a]

अर्थवादोक्तितो याऽपि प्रतिष्ठाकामिकल्पना ॥ ५६५ ॥
विध्यर्थसंगतावेव साऽपि नैव ततोऽन्यतः ।

The statement of the *arthavāda* by virtue of which (eligibility) of the one who desires reputation (as the reward) is assumed—that too becomes valid only as related to the sense of an injunction, not otherwise.

It may be objected that in the case of the *arthavāda* text, 'Those who have recourse to those sacrifices become famous' (*pratitiṣṭhanti ha vā ete ya etā upayanti*), there is the mention of fruit. [See *PM*, IV, iii, 17–18.] In reply we say that here the eligibility is assigned, not to the *svarga-kāma* (one who desires heaven), but to the *pratiṣṭhā-kāma* (one who desires fame), because this eulogistic text is associated with the injunction about the *Rātri-satra* sacrifice. This procedure is, however, not to be followed in the case of other texts such as the *mantras*, etc.

[566 b-567 a]

विध्यर्थशेषभावश्च ततश्चार्थान्तरोक्तिता ॥ ५६६ ॥
ऐकार्थ्याद्वचसोऽशक्या विरुद्धद्वयर्थकल्पना ।

Because a sentence has a single meaning, it is not possible to assume for it two opposed meanings, *viz.* that it is auxiliary to the sense of the injunction and that it has a different sense.

It is not proper to assume two purports of equal strength for a single text. The supreme purport (*mahā-tātparya*) of an *arthavāda* is that it is auxiliary to an injunction. It is only through this that the *arthavāda* has an intermediary purport (*avāntara-tātparya*) in regard to its own sense.

[567 b-568 a]

विरोधे गुणवादः स्यादनुवादोऽवधारिते ॥ ५६७ ॥
भूतार्थवादस्तद्धानादर्थवादस्त्रिधा मतः ।

Arthavāda is thought to be of three kinds: when there is contradiction, it is a case of figurative statement; if it relates to what has been determined, it is a re-statement; if it is neither, it is *bhūtārthavāda*.

Arthavāda is of three types: (1) *guṇa-vāda*, e. g., 'The sun, verily, is the sacrificial post' (*ādityo vai yūpaḥ*); (2) *anuvāda*, e. g., 'Fire is the medicine for snow' (*agnir himasya bheṣajam*); and (3) *bhūtārthavāda*, e. g., 'He who has the *Vajra*-weapon in his hand is Indra' (*vajra-hastaḥ purandharaḥ*). *Guṇa-vāda* states something which is in conflict with what is established through another *pramāṇa*; hence, the statement is figurative. *Anuvāda* is re-statement of what is established through another *pramāṇa*. *Bhūtārthavāda* relates to a matter which is neither established nor not-established through another *pramāṇa*.

[568 b-569 a]

विधिशेषोऽपि यद्यर्थमर्थवादः समर्पयेत् ॥ ५६८ ॥
अद्वैतविधिनाऽऽक्षिप्ता वेदान्ता नेति का मितिः ।

If even *arthavāda* which is auxiliary to injunction may convey its own meaning, what is there to show that the Vedānta texts which are brought in by the cognition

of non-duality are not authoritative (in respect of what is already established)?

It is admitted that the *arthavāda* texts have an intermediary purport, and so are authoritative. If this be so, why should not the Vedānta texts be authoritative? Surely, they are not void of meaning.

[569 b-570 a]

प्रत्यक्षाद्यभिधानेन सर्वमानोपलक्षणम् ॥ ५६९ ॥
मान्तरं नाऽऽगमादन्यद्यदैकात्म्यावबोधकृत् ।

The words 'perception, etc.', are indicative of all means of valid knowledge; for, other than Scripture there is no means of knowledge which makes known the unity of the self.

Here, the reference is to the words of the *Bhāṣya* which say that the Veda teaches the means to the ultimate goal which does not fall within the sphere of *pramāṇas* like perception and inference. To the category of these two *pramāṇas* belong the others also, such as comparison, etc.

AVS—āgamād anyasya pramāṇasya na gocaro brahma ity arthaḥ.

[570 b-571 a]

सिद्धेऽनवगते यस्मात्पुरस्ताद्व्यापृतिर्मितेः ॥ ५७० ॥
मानादज्ञाततासिद्धौ स्यादन्योन्यसमाश्रयः ।

And, the function of a means of valid knowledge is there (only) in regard to what is already established and unknown; if unknownness is established through a means of valid knowlege, there would be mutual dependence.

Perception, etc., have only empirical validity; they cannot serve as guides to the supreme truth. In fact, the definition of *pramāṇa* does not fit in at all in the case of perception, etc. *Pramāṇa* can function only in the case of an unknown object that is already established. If perception, etc., were to be regarded as *pramāṇa*, it must be known that their object is unknown before they start functioning. But, can this unknownness be known? Is it through *pramāṇa* or through *anubhava* (experience)? If the former, then there is mutual dependence as between *pramāṇa* and unknownness. Nor can the latter be the case, for that is not acceptable. Experience can establish only what is other than it, and what is superimposed thereon. The inert object and its unknownness, then, would be of the nature of the superimposed, like the rope-snake. If such stuff be the content of perception, etc., then perception, etc., cannot be considered to be true *pramāṇa*s.

NTV — jaḍasya ajñātatvaṁ na māna-siddhaṁ, nāpy anubhava-siddham anaṅgīkaraṇāt.

NKL—prameye 'navagate, prāgevāvagateḥ pramāṇaṁ pravartate, ataś ca pramāṇa-pravṛttau ajñāta-pramitiḥ tat-pramitau pramāṇa-pravṛttir iti itaretarāśrayāt na tattvāvedana-pramāṇatvaṁ pratyakṣādeḥ.

[571 b-572 a]

तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यस्य विरोधोऽतो न केनचित् ॥ ५७१ ॥
सर्वाश्रयत्वात्संवित्तेस्तथाऽऽत्मन्यप्रवृत्तितः ।

Therefore, there is no conflict of the text 'That thou art', etc., with anything, because consciousness (*saṁvit*) is the locus of all, and (perception, etc.) do not function in respect of the self.

Perception, etc., have no conflict with Vedānta. Experience is the basis even of perception, etc. And, as experience (viz., the self) is the content of Vedānta, Vedānta cannot be opposed to perception,

etc. The basic *pramāṇa* is Vedānta; what are superimposed thereon, perception, etc., cannot sublate it.

Moreover, perception, etc., reveal things that are coloured, etc. As the self is devoid of colour, etc., perception, etc., cannot be *pramāṇas* in respect thereto.

NTV — pratyakṣāder anumānatvāt tattvamasyādi-vākyasya na kenāpi-pramāṇena visaṁvāda iti ... na pratyakṣādi svāśrayaṁ bodhayati bādhate vā, itopi pratyakṣādi-saṁvāda-visaṁvādābhyāṁ na tattvamādi-vākyasya aprāmāṇyam.

NKL—anubhavasya sakala-pramāṇa-viṣayādhiṣṭhānatvād āgamasya anubhava-viṣayatvāt, pratyakṣāder anātma-viṣayatvena bhinna-viṣayatvāc ca no virodhaḥ.

[572 b-573 a]

कृत्स्नेष्टार्थस्य संप्राप्तिः कृत्स्नानर्थहनुतिस्तथा ॥ ५७२ ॥
आत्मस्वरूपान्नान्यत्र संभाव्या सा हि मानतः ।

The attainment of the entire desired end and the destruction of the entire evil are possible through self-nature, not through anything else; and that (the attainment of the self) indeed is through means of valid knowledge.

Self-realization is the supreme goal. That is accomplished through Vedānta. So, Vedānta is pre-eminently fruitful. There is nothing to be attained after the self is attained; there is nothing to be avoided either.

[573 b-574 a]

इत्येवमादिभाष्यार्थः क्रमेणैकात्म्यवस्तुनि ॥ ५७३ ॥
यत्नेन वक्ष्यते न्यायात्पूर्वपक्षनिरासतः ।

The meaning of (the words) 'this and other statements' of the Commentary as relating to the one self, will be explained logically in sequence, through a refutation of the *prima facie* views.

The thesis set forth above will be strengthened through a refutation of the *prima facie* views in the *Bhāṣya*.

[574 b-575 a]

वेदान्तवचसां स्वार्थे प्रामाण्यं न विहन्यते ॥ ५७४ ॥
मानलक्षणसद्भावाज्ज्योतिष्टोमादिवाक्यवत् ।

The authority of the Vedānta-texts in respect of their own sense is not destroyed, for they bear the characteristic of being a means of valid knowledge, like the *Jyotiṣṭoma* text.

The Vedānta texts are valid because their content, the self, is not the content of any other *pramāṇa*; and they reveal what is unknown otherwise.

NKL — vedāntaḥ svārthe pramāṇaṁ tatra phalavad-vedatvāt jyotiṣṭomena yajeteti-vākyavat.

[575 b-576 a]

नवै कार्यैकनिष्ठानि व्यवहारे वचांसि हि ॥ ५७५ ॥
नियमेन प्रयुज्यन्त इत्यत्र मितिरस्ति ते ।

There is no evidence for you to show that as a rule in empirical usage words are used only with reference to what is to be accomplished.

It cannot be said that the Vedānta texts are not purportful because they do not relate to *kārya*; for, there is no rule that words should be construed only with *kārya*.

NTV—na hi kāryaika-niṣṭhāny eva loke vacāṁsī 'ti niyame pramāṇam asti, siddhaparāṇām api vākyānāṁ prayoga-darśanāt.

[576 b-577 a]

दिष्ट्या त्वं वर्धसे भद्र जातः पुत्रस्तवर्धिमान् ॥ ५७६ ॥
इति नेदं प्रवृत्त्यर्थं वचो नापि निवृत्तये ।

'You are happy, my friend, by God's grace! A son is born to you, who will be prosperous.' This sentence is neither for the sake of activity nor for the sake of avoiding activity.

In the statement about the birth of a son, there is no mention of any act to be done; and yet the statement is meaningful.

[577 b-578 a]

सुखाद्युत्पत्तिहेतूनि दृश्यन्तेऽकार्यवन्त्यपि ॥ ५७७ ॥
वचनानि व्रज ग्राममित्यादीनि यथा तथा ।

Statements which do not imply what is to be accomplished are seen to produce happiness, even as the statement 'Go to the village'.

As injunctive statements are fruitful, so are non-injunctive statements.

[578 b-579 a]

सुख्येधीति न चानेन प्रवृत्तिरुपदिश्यते ॥ ५७८ ॥
सुखीभवनमस्यार्थान्नोपदेशाव्यपेक्षया ।

By the statement 'Be happy,' no activity is enjoined. His (the father's) becoming happy follows from the sense of the statement, and not because of any command.

It cannot be maintained that in the statement about the birth of a son there is an implicit injunction of the form 'Be happy.' The father becomes happy not because of any injunction, but because of the news conveyed by the statement.

[579 b-580 a]

विशेषोऽस्ति प्रवृत्तेश्चेत्तात्पर्यं वचसोऽपि च ॥ ५७९ ॥

नैवं सुखादिसंभूतावर्थवत्त्वोपपत्तितः ।

"There is special activity (in the form of *jātakarmā*, etc.) from the purport of the statement." If this be said, no; for, by the occasioning of happiness, etc., the statement becomes purportful; and this stands to reason.

It may be pointed out that the statement about the birth of a son is related to activity in the sense that the father begins to arrange for performing *jātakarmā*, etc.

But this is irrelevant. The statement becomes purportful by generating happiness in the father. It is not directly connected with the performance of birth-rites, etc.

[580 b-581 a]

आनर्थक्यभयादेव श्रुतादन्यत्र कल्प्यते ॥ ५८० ॥

तात्पर्यं प्रोक्षणाद्युक्तेर्न स्वतन्त्रेऽधिकारवत् ।

It is because of the fear of futility that in the case of the text about sprinkling, etc., a purport other than what is declared is assumed; this is not the case as regards a text which is independent like the text about eligibility.

It may be said that the text 'That thou art' has no purport of its own, like the text about sprinkling. In the context of the *Darśa-pūrṇamāsa* there is the text: 'One threshes the corn with pestle and mortar that have been besprinkled; one pounds it with the pounding slab and stone that have been besprinkled.' The question here is whether the 'sprinkling' is prompted by the *threshing* and the *pounding*, or by the transcendental potency (*apūrva*). It is decided in Mīmāṁsā that the sprinkling is connected with the *apūrva*, because it is undertaken for the sake of gaining the objective (*apūrva*) of the primary act which is the sacrifice. (*PM*, IX, i, 2–3). If 'sprinkling' is construed with the *threshing* and the *pounding*, it is without fruit; it is only when it is construed with the *apūrva* that it becomes fruitful.

Siddhānta—There is no parity between the Vedānta text 'That thou art' and the text about sprinkling. The Vedānta text is fruitful in its own sense, and is not prompted by anything else.

Nor is the knowledge generated by the Vedānta text 'That thou art' on a par with the subsidiary acts such as threshing and pounding. These subsidiary acts are prompted by *apūrva*, and are to be construed therewith, not directly but through the act of purification. Not so is Vedānta-knowledge, since it leads to its fruit independently. The Vedānta text, therefore, is a primary text, even as the text 'He who desires heaven should sacrifice' is. (See *PM*, II, i, 6, 9–10).

[581 b-582 a]

किंचोपायेऽप्रवृत्तः सन्पुरुषोऽयं प्रवर्त्यते ॥ ५८१ ॥

ज्ञातोपायत्वतो यद्वा विधिनोपेयसिद्धये ।

Moreover, does this (statement about the birth of a son) prompt the man to activity, as he is not active in respect of the means, or does it prompt him, who has understood the means, in order that the object may be achieved through the injunction?

It cannot be said that, like the text of eligibility for heaven, the Vedānta text should be injunctive; for, it is non-injunctive like the news about the birth of a son. The statement regarding the birth of a son is not an injunction, even if it includes the words 'Be happy'. If it be an injunction, then the hearer (the father), on hearing it, should be active either in respect of the means which is the birth of a son, or in respect of achieving the end (viz. happiness).

[582 b-583 a]

तत्रेह तावन्नोपाये पुत्रजन्मादिलक्षणे ॥ ५८२ ॥

तस्य निष्पन्नरूपत्वान्नाप्युपेये सुखे तथा ।

Of these here, there is no (activity) in respect of the means, of the nature of the birth of the son, etc., for that is already accomplished; nor in respect of the object, *viz.* happiness, for the same reason.

Neither of the alternatives mentioned above is possible. The son is already born; and so there is no need for activity in respect thereof. Happiness results from hearing the news, and not from any further activity.

NTV—natāvat upāye putrajanmani tasya niṣpannatvāt, nopeye sukhe tadartha-vyāpārāntarābhāvāt.

[583 b-584 a]

न व्यापारान्तरं यस्मात्सुखार्थं किंचिदीक्ष्यते ॥ ५८३ ॥

पुत्रजन्मोक्तिमात्रेण पुरुषार्थावसानतः ।

For the sake of happiness no other operation is required; because the mere statement about the birth of a son culminates in the human end.

The father is happy just on knowing the meaning of the statement he hears; he does not engage himself in any activity for becoming happy.

[584 b-585 a]

किंचाध्यस्ताहिदष्टस्य तद्विषव्याप्तचेतसः ॥ ५८४ ॥

स्रगियं न फणीत्युक्ते दृष्टा विषनिराक्रिया ।

Moreover, in the case of a man who has been bitten by an illusory snake and whose imagination is full of the poison thereof, it is seen that the poison is removed when he is told that it is a garland and not a snake.

Another example is given for showing that there is no rule that a statement should prompt activity. This example relates to the removal of misery.

[585 b-586 a]

मा भैषीरिति चोक्तेऽपि न नियोगः प्रतीयते ॥ ५८५ ॥

स्रगुक्तेरेव निःशेषसाध्वसध्वंसलाभतः ।

Even if it be stated 'Be not afraid', there is not seen a *niyoga*; for the mere mention of garland destroys the entire fear.

When the deluded person is told 'This is not a snake; it is only a garland,' he becomes rid of fear. Even if he is exhorted thus: 'Be not afraid,' it is not because of the exhortation that he relinquishes fear. Fear goes automatically when he knows that there is no snake before him.

[586 b-587 a]

न्याय्यो नियोगस्तत्रैव यत्र बुद्धाऽस्य कार्यताम् ॥ ५८६ ॥
अनन्तरं प्रवृत्तिः स्याद्विषये तस्य सिद्धये ।

A *niyoga* is properly there only where a person, having known that something is to be done, begins subsequently to be active in respect of it in order that he may attain the object of the *niyoga*.

Niyoga is possible only where a person knows that something is to be accomplished by him, and then begins to be active in respect thereof.

[587 b-588 a]

इह त्वैकात्म्यवाक्येषु तत्त्वमात्रावबोधतः ॥ ५८७ ॥
सद्यः पुमर्थसंसिद्धेः कार्यसिद्धिर्न वीक्ष्यते ।

But, here, however, in the case of the texts about the one self, the human goal is accomplished immediately from the knowledge of the truth; there is not observed any accomplishment of what-is-to-be-accomplished.

When one knows the Vedānta text and realizes its truth, one attains the final goal. There is nothing that one should do thereafter.

[588 b-589 a]

कुतूहलवतां तद्वन्निर्वृत्ताख्यानमात्रतः ॥ ५८८ ॥
दृष्टा नराणां निःशेषकुतूहलनिराक्रिया ।

Similarly, it is seen that in the case of persons who are curious, the mere narration of what is actually established removes their entire curiosity.

It is not in Vedānta alone that the texts relate to what-is-established; the stories that are told in Scripture and Traditional Codes are of the same character.

[589 b-590 a]

वस्तुमात्रावसायित्वात्तद्वचांसि न कानिचित् ॥ ५८९ ॥
उपादानाय वाऽलं स्युर्नापि हानाय तद्विदः ।

Those statements relate merely to facts; and so he who understands them has neither anything to take nor anything to leave.

These statements merely convey knowledge. They do not aim at making the hearer active.

[590 b-592 a]

यत्रापि च प्रतीयेते हानादाने वचःश्रवात् ॥ ५९० ॥
अयं चोराकुलः पन्था देशोऽयं निधिमानिति ।
तत्रापि नैव शब्दस्य व्यापारः सिद्धवेदनात् ॥ ५९१ ॥
कृतार्थत्वान्नरस्यापि रागादेव प्रवृत्तितः ।

Even where activity in the form of leaving or taking is found on hearing statements like "This road is infested with robbers," "This spot contains a treasure-trove", the operation does not belong to the words, for those words make known what is established, and thus have accomplished their purpose; the activity of the person concerned is from his desire alone.

A man may be active after hearing certain statements of facts. Even then, the activity is not an effect of those statements; it is prompted by the desire, etc., present in the man.

[592 b-593 a]

कामैकपाशाकृष्टः सन्निच्छयैव प्रवर्तते ॥ ५९२ ॥
निवर्तते च तद्द्वेषान्न शब्दव्यापृतेर्नरः ।

Man is active, because of desire, being impelled by greed, and turns away from an object because of aversion. Here, there is no functioning of words.

Positive activity and negative activity are caused, not by prescription and prohibition, but by appetition and aversion.

NTV—ayam arthaḥ : śabdāt bhūtam artham pratipadya taj-jātīyasya pramāṇāntarād upakārahetutām apakāra-hetutāṁ vā avagatāṁ samsmṛtya taj-jātīyasyāpi tam anumāya icchayā pravartante dveṣeṇa ca nivartanta iti.

[593 b-594 a]

नन्वप्रयुक्तमप्येतद्वक्त्रा वाक्यं विवक्षितम् ॥ ५९३ ॥
न गन्तव्यं पथाऽनेन गृह्याणेमं निधिं तथा ।

"But, though not uttered, does not the informant intend to say, 'Do not go along this road', 'Take this treasure'?"

Objection—Is there not an injunction implied in a statement like 'This road is infested with robbers'? Does not the speaker of this statement intend to say 'Do not go this way.'?

[594 b-595 a]

मैवं न वक्त्रभिप्रायाच्छब्दार्थत्वं प्रकल्पते ॥ ५९४ ॥
शब्दसामर्थ्यतो यस्मात्तादर्थ्यं नान्यहेतुकम् ।

Not so; the sense of words is settled not from the intention of the speaker, but from the capacity of the words; so, that is not caused by anything else.

Reply—The sense of a statement is what is declared by it, and not what is intended by the speaker.

[595 b-596 a]

भवद्भिरपि चैवैतदभ्युपेयं प्रयत्नतः ॥ ५९५ ॥
वक्तृतन्त्रे हि शब्दार्थे न विश्वासः श्रुतेर्भवेत् ।

Even by you this must be admitted per force, for if the sense of words depended on the speaker, there would be no faith in (the determination of the sense of) Scripture.

The observation made above, the Mīmāṁsaka should necessarily accept; for the Veda has no speaker, according to him.

[596 b-597 a]

नानाविधपुमर्थाप्तिरापि वक्तुः समीहिता ॥ ५९६ ॥
तस्या अपि त्वदुक्त्यैवं शब्दार्थत्वं प्रसज्यते ।

And, since the attainment of many kinds of human ends may be intended by the speaker, all that would have to become the sense of the words, if what you say is true.

Moreover, there may be no limit to the intentions of the speaker. Surely, all these cannot be regarded as the sense of his statement.

[597 b-599 a]

प्रवृत्तिं वा निवृत्तिं वा यदाऽभिप्रेत्य चेतसा ॥ ५९७ ॥
किंचिज्जिज्ञास्यते ज्ञात्वा प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणतः ।
अभिप्रेताऽपि न तदा प्रवृत्तिर्यदि वेतरा ॥ ५९८ ॥
प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमेयेति शक्या वक्तुं विपश्चिता ।

Having in mind the intention of activity or turning away, a person knows something through the means of knowledge, perception, etc.; but no one who is wise would say in this case that the intended activity or turning away is the object of perception.

The illustration of other *pramāṇas* is given. A person *sees* a thing, with the intention either of grasping it or of rejecting it. Here it cannot be said that the *seeing* is the cause of grasping or rejecting; *seeing* gives only knowledge of the thing. Therewith its function ends.

[599 b-601 a]

इतश्चाभ्युपगन्तव्यमेतत्तुल्येऽपि वस्तुनि ॥ ५९९ ॥
एकस्य हानधीस्तस्मिन्नुपादित्सा परस्य च ।
शब्दार्थत्वे हि सर्वेषामादानायैव धीर्भवेत् ॥ ६०० ॥
नोपेक्षायां प्रहाणे वा न चानेकार्थता मता ।

What we have stated must be admitted for this reason also: with reference to one and the same object, for one there is cognition of avoiding it, and for another the desire to attain it. If (the intention) were the meaning of words, then for all there must be the cognition for attaining it, not the cognition for either indifference or rejection; for there cannot be a plurality of senses.

That the intention is not the meaning of words may be shown thus also: hearing a set of words, one acts for gaining something, another strives to avoid it, and a third is indifferent to it. All these cannot be the meanings of the identical set of words.

NTV — nidhimān eṣa bhūbhāga ity ukte kasyacit svata eva viraktasya hānadhīḥ kasyacid rāgāndhasya ādānadhīḥ kasyacit śokāsahiṣṇoḥ jighṛkṣābuddhir upajāyate, tatra ādānaṁcet vaktrā vivakṣitaḥ śabdārthaḥ sarveṣāṁ śruta-vākyānām ādānabuddhir eva bhavet, nopekṣāhāna-buddhī bhavetām.

[601 b-602 a]

न च प्रवर्तकत्वेऽपि वाक्यस्याङ्गीकृते त्वया ॥ ६०१ ॥
शक्यो विधायिनोऽन्येषां पदानां वक्तुमन्वयः ।

Even admitting that a sentence prompts one to activity, you cannot explain the syntactical construction of words which are other than injunctive.

Even if we admit that a sentence prompts the hearer to activity, it is impossible for the *pūrvapakṣin* to show that the non-injunctive words of the sentence are to be construed only in relation to the verb.

NTV—vidhāyakapadātirikta-padānāṁ na kāryānvaya-paratayā prayogaḥ, nāpi tatra sāmarthya-grahaḥ, kiṁtu yogyetarānvite sāmarthya-grahaḥ.

[602 b-603 a]

किं स्वार्थमात्रनिष्ठत्वमुत कार्यैकनिष्ठता ॥ ६०२ ॥
पदार्थमात्रसंसर्गपरता किंत्वितीर्यताम् ।

You must say whether (words) refer merely to their own sense, or to what-is-to-be-accomplished alone, or whether they have for purport the relation of word-senses alone.

To show that in the *pūrvapakṣa* view it is difficult to construe words other than verbs, certain alternatives are set forth here:

(1) When a boy learns the meaning of words through the activity of the intermediate elder, being commanded by the superior elder, how does he do so? To him, do the words convey their individual meanings alone? In other words, do words have capacity only in respect of their own senses, without mutual relation?

(2) Or, because the capacity of words is understood as construed with the verb (expressing what-is-to-be-done), do the words have that (what-is-to-be-done) as purport?

(3) Or, because the words as construed with what-is-to-be-accomplished have capacity in regard to their own senses, do they have their own senses as their purport?

(4) Or, do the words have capacity to indicate what has direct relation to the *kārya* which is the meaning of the sentence as a whole?

(5) Or, do the words convey their senses as associated with other words such as are fit to be so associated, whether these latter be verbs or non-verbs?

[603 b-604 a]

स्वार्थमात्रावसायित्वे वाक्यार्थप्रत्ययः कुतः ॥ ६०३ ॥
वैयर्थ्यं च प्रयोगस्य व्यवहाराक्षमत्वतः ।

If words end merely with conveying their own senses, then how could the sentence-sense be understood? The application (*prayoga*) also would be futile, for it would not be fit for empirical usage.

(1) The first alternative is not possible. If the words convey their own senses without mutual relation, there would not, then, be the cognition of the sentence-sense on the part of the hearer. Nor can the sentence as a whole convey the sentence-sense. Does the sentence, in that case, need the denotative capacity of each word?

If it does, it cannot express any distinctive meaning of its own. If it does not, why seek to grasp the meaning of the words at all? If words do not jointly express a unified sense, why use them in the form of a sentence?

[604 b-605 a]

पदार्थमात्रसंसर्गे कार्यार्थविरहेऽपि ते ॥ ६०४ ॥
व्यवहारस्य संसिद्धेर्व्यर्था कार्यप्रकल्पना ।

If the words convey the relation to other congruous word-senses even in the absence of the sense of what-is-to-be-accomplished, then, since empirical usage is accomplished, the assumption of what-is-to-be-accomplished is futile for you.

(5) On the fifth alternative, the *pūrvapakṣa* view will have to be abandoned, and the *siddhānta* view will result. Words as related with other congruous words convey their meaning. These other words need not be verbs.

[605 b-606 a]

कार्यैकव्यतिषङ्गे च वाक्याद्भूतानुवादकात् ॥ ६०५ ॥
प्रतीतिः स्यान्न वाक्यार्थे स्यादुक्तेर्व्यर्थताऽपि च ।

If the sentence-sense be the relation (of words) to what-is-to-be-accomplished alone, then there would be no meaning for sentences which convey something existent; and there would also be the futility of such statements.

(2–3) As regards the second and third alternatives, the following difficulty arises: If all words have capacity in respect of a single *kārya*, they would become synonyms. And, if no sentence without

an injunctive suffix conveys sense, then statements of facts would become futile, and no hearer would make any sense out of them.

[606 b-607 a]

कार्यान्तरस्य चाभावात्कार्यार्थैकाभिधायिनः ॥ ६०६ ॥

संबन्धो न भवेदन्यैः साधनाद्यभिधायिभिः ।

And, for the word which conveys the sense of *kārya* alone there would be no relation with other words signifying means, etc., for there is no other *kārya*.

(4) The word which denotes action itself is not related to yet other word or words expressive of action, for they are not to be found in any given sentence. Nor is it related to the sense expressed by itself, for the Prābhākara does not favour the *abhihitānvaya-vāda*. Again, the word expressive of action is not related to its sense, which in its turn, is related to an accomplished entity. Finally, it is not related to something which is itself related to the action denoted by the sentence as a whole ; for this relation may not be conceived of as either an adjective or an adjunct of the word in question. And, if the relation of the word expressive of action is not to be determined, it remains suspended, as it were.

NTV—kārya-padasya kāryāntarānvita-svārthābhidhāna-niyamānupapatteḥ, kāryasya kāryāntarābhāvāt.

NKL—vivāda-padāni padāni na kāryānvita-svārtha-niyata-sāmarthyāni, padatvāt, kārya-padavat.

gām ānaya daṇḍena ity-ādau kāryāntarābhāvāt tad-anvita-svārthābhidhāyītvāyogāt, arthāntarānvita-svārthābhidhāyakatvā-'nabhyupagame daṇḍene'tyādibhiḥ saṁbandho na bhavet. ataḥ kārya-padam anvitamātrābhidhāyīty arthaḥ.

[607 b-608 a]

कार्यान्वयित्वे सर्वेषामपि चेह् परस्परम् ॥ ६०७ ॥

पदार्थानामसंबन्धोऽनपेक्षत्वाद्ध्रुवेद्ध्रुवम् ।

If all words were related to *kārya*, then there would certainly be no mutual relation among them, because of absence of expectancy.

If every word had capacity for a sense, only as related to *kārya*, there would be no mutual relation among words.

[608 b-609 a]

नियोगो न प्रतीयेत विशिष्टविषयस्तथा ॥ ६०८ ॥

तदा चैकपदार्थस्य नियोगः साध्यतामियात् ।

Then, there would not be understood *niyoga* as the content of what is qualified; and the *niyoga* would become what is accomplished by each single word-sense.

If the senses of the words had no mutual relation, then a sentence such as 'Sacrifice with the *soma*' will not have for purport a *niyoga* whose content is the sacrifice as qualified by *soma*. The *niyoga* would then become the content of each of the constituent words.

[609 b-610 a]

अथ सोमादिसंबद्धे यागादौ विषये मतः ॥ ६०९ ॥

नियोगः कस्ततः पूर्वं संबन्धे हेतुरुच्यताम् ।

If the *niyoga* is thought to be the content of sacrifice, etc., as related to *Soma*, etc., it must be stated what before that is the cause of the relation.

If it be held that the *niyoga* is conveyed by the sentence as a whole, it must be stated how this is done. How are the qualifying words like '*soma*' and others like '*yāga*' related? If their mutual 'fitness' relates them, the insistence on *niyoga* as the hub of relation may be discarded. *Niyoga* becomes equally superfluous, if the cause of relation of the words be held to be either their status as accessories to action or the fruit they point to.

[610 b-611 a]

सिद्धेऽसति विशिष्टे न विषये कार्यमिष्यते ॥ ६१० ॥
अथ क्रियैव प्राक्कार्यात्सिद्धं नो यत्समीहितम् ।

If the established qualified content be not there, there would be no *kārya*; if that relation were established through the activity itself even before the *kārya*, then there results what is acceptable to us.

So, the *niyoga* cannot function without the mutually related words denoting a qualified action. If it is held that the action itself (viz. *yāga*, etc.), before *niyoga* operates, relates adjectives like '*soma*' to '*yāga*,' etc., that would be accepting our position.

NTV—vināpi kāryaṁ yogyetarānvite sarva-padānāṁ sāmarthyaṁ tātparyaṁ ca siddham ity arthaḥ.

[611 b-613 a]

तदेतरत्तदर्थमित्येवं चैतत्समञ्जसम् ॥ ६११ ॥
विषये यदि कार्यत्वं कार्यावगमपूर्वकम् ।
कार्ये कार्यान्तराभावात्कार्यबुद्धिः कुतोभवेत ॥ ६१२ ॥
तदभावादनुष्ठेयो विषयोऽपि न ते भवेत् ।

And the words of the Commentary "Then the other for the sake of that," etc., would then fit in; if there be the nature of being *kārya* in respect of the content even before knowing the *kārya*, then, since there is no other *kārya* in respect of the *kārya*, whence could there be the cognition of *kārya*? Because it is not there, even the content will not become for you what-is-to-be-done.

The principle that all other words contribute to the *apūrva* denoted by any one word, in a sentence, also supports our position, viz., that a word construes with a sense with which other words construe. Words first express senses which are compatible with those expressed by others in the same sentence; only then they may be subordinated to some other special sense. If it is held that a precedent knowledge of *niyoga* is needed to associate 'the ought' with *yāga*, etc., it may be asked whether this knowledge of *niyoga* also is preceded by the knowledge of another *niyoga*, and so on. And, in the absence of the knowledge of *niyoga*, no action is there for you to perform.

NKL—atra śābara-bhāṣyaṁ jñāpakam āha-tadeti. pratipadādhikaraṇe kiṁ sarveṣāṁ padārthānāṁ pratyekaṁ niyogenā 'nvayaḥ, utaikenaiva niyogene 'ti saṁdehe, pratyekam iti pūrvapakṣayitvā yadekasmād apūrvaṁ tadetarat tadarthaṁ syād iti siddhāntitaṁ saṁgataṁ syād ity arthaḥ.

[613 b]

कार्यार्थिता ततश्चेष्टा हीयेतानुष्ठितिं विना ॥ ६१३ ॥

Then, without performance the sense of *kārya* which you desire will be destroyed.

And, when you cannot perform *yāga*, etc., *yāga* will cease to be the object of *niyoga*.

[614-616 a]

अथ कार्यान्तराभावेऽप्यस्य कार्यत्वमिष्यते ।
विषयस्यापि कार्यत्वं स्वत एव भवेत्तथा ॥ ६१४ ॥
विषयोऽकार्यरूपत्वात्स्वसिद्ध्यै यद्यपेक्षते ।
कार्यं तदपि विषयमीक्षेतासाध्यरूपतः ॥ ६१५ ॥
कार्येऽपि कार्यतैवं च भवेद्विषयहेतुका ।

If you think that there is the nature of being *kārya* for this even in the absence of another *kārya*, then there would be the nature of being *kārya* for the content also of its own accord. If the content, because it is not of the nature of *kārya*, requires the *kārya* for its own accomplishment, then, even the *kārya* would require the content because it is not of the nature of something to be accomplished. Thus, even the *kārya*-ness of the *kārya* will have to be caused by the content.

If you say that *niyoga* can operate without requiring another *niyoga*, we reply that what applies to *niyoga* must equally apply to *yāga*, etc. If you should say, "*Yāga*, etc., require *niyoga* because in themselves they involve trouble and would not be carried out without the sense of *niyoga*," we reply: A sense of mere oughtness does not make sense; to give it sense it has to be related to the content of the verbal roots like *yajeta*, etc.

NTV—iṣṭopāyatā-dhiyā hi mamedaṁ kāryam iti buddhvā svatantraḥ pravartate, iṣṭopāyatā-dhīta eva kleśarūpasya kāryatā iti ca.

[616 b-617 a]

अन्योन्याश्रयतो च स्यान्न च कार्यप्रधानता ॥ ६१६ ॥
पुंव्यापारव्यपेक्षायां स्वसिद्धौ कार्यमुच्यते ।

And, there would be reciprocal dependence; and the *kārya* would not be the principal.

That is called *kārya* which for its own establishment stands in need of human effort.

Also, there would be mutual dependence between *niyoga* and the sense of the verbal roots like *yāga*, etc. Thus, *niyoga* would cease to be more important than those root-senses.

Properly speaking, obligatoriness is for *yāga* alone, not for *niyoga*. For, what is *kārya*? It is that which needs human effort for being accomplished.

AVS—niyoga-kartavyatve viṣayakartavyatvam, viṣaya-kartavyatve niyogakartavyatvam iti itaretarāśrayatvam, niyoga-prādhānya-kṣatiś ceti.

NKL—niyogasya dhātvartha-kāryatva-siddhyarthatvāt prādhānyaṁ ca na syād ity arthaḥ.

[617 b- 618 a]

यागादिः स च नो कार्यं स्वतः कार्यैकरूपतः ॥ ६१७ ॥

कार्यस्यैव न कार्यत्वमकार्ये कार्यतेष्यते ।

That (*kārya*) is sacrifice, etc.; the *niyoga* is not *kārya*, because (according to you) it is itself the nature of *kārya*.

For the *kārya* itself there is no *kārya*-ness; there is *kārya*-ness only for what is not *kārya*.

And, that is *yāga*; for it has the nature of being accomplished. *Niyoga*, on the contrary, does not satisfy the definition of *kārya*. The *niyogavādin* contends that *niyoga* is *kārya* by itself, and that it does not depend on human effort. So, if *niyoga is* obligatoriness, (*kāryatva*), it cannot *have* obligatoriness; for one and the same thing cannot be the locus and the located. Thus, it is only *yāga*, etc., which are by themselves not *kāryatā*, that become obligatory on account of injunction.

AVS—niyogasya kāryatvaṁ svataḥsiddham, na puruṣa-vyāpārādhīnam, anyathā ghaṭa-tulyatvaṁ niyogasye 'ty arthaḥ.

[618 b-620]

न शौक्ल्ये शुक्लतापत्तिः पटादेः सा विधीयते ॥ ६१८ ॥
घटकार्ययजत्यादि स्वस्वभावतया स्थितम् ।
सिद्धसाध्यादिभेदेन स्वशब्देनाभिधीयते ॥ ६१९ ॥
यदा तदा ध्वनेर्न स्यादज्ञातार्थावबोधने ।
विशेषः कश्चिदित्येवं न प्रवृत्तिर्विधेर्भवेत् ॥ ६२० ॥

There is no contingency of whiteness in whiteness; that is predicated only of cloth, etc.

When 'pot', '*kārya*', 'sacrifice', etc., each of which has its own nature, are expressed by their respective words differentiated as accomplished or to-be-accomplished, then, there is seen to be difference as regards making known an unknown sense by the sounds; thus activity is not the result of injunction.

It was stated above that there is *kāryatva* only for what is not *kārya*. An example of this is that there is no whiteness for whiteness, but only for cloth, etc.

The result of this discussion is this: Words relate to senses which are not related to *kārya*. According to their varying capacities, they denote either accomplished entities like pots, etc., or yet-to-be-accomplished activities like *yāga*, etc., or qualities like whiteness, etc. They denote what they are 'fit' to denote. So, sentences made up of words, also, may denote either accomplished entities, or activities yet to be accomplished. *Niyoga* comes nowhere into this picture.

[621]

अवबुद्धे तु शब्दार्थे पुरुषार्थानुरोधतः ।
स्वत एव प्रवृत्तिः स्यान्न शब्दान्नार्थतस्तथा ॥ ६२१ ॥

When the sense of the word has been understood, there is activity of its own accord, in accordance with the desired human end; it is neither from the word nor from the sense.

If it be asked how there is activity after hearing the words, we reply: the activity springs from desire. When an unknown object has been known from words, a man begins to be active because he *desires* that object. Another who does not desire it is not active even though he comes to know of it from words.

NTV—pravṛttiḥ pravartaka-pūrvikā pravṛttitvāt madīya-pravṛttivad iti, sa ca rāga eva pravṛtti-hetutvāt madīya-prvṛttihetubhūta-rāgavad iti. sa ca rāga iṣṭasādhanatā-jñānahetuko rāgatvāt madīya-rāgavad iti.

AVS—na śabdaḥ pravartakaḥ, nāpi niyogaḥ, rāga eva pravartakaḥ.

[622]

साधनादित्रयाद्बाह्यं पुरुषार्थबहिष्कृतम् ।
क एतत्साधयेद्धीमान्किं वा रूपमितीर्यताम् ॥ ६२२ ॥

That which is outside the three, means, etc., and also other than the human end—which wise man will accomplish it? And what is its nature? Let it be stated.

So far, assuming that *niyoga* is of the nature of *sādhya*, it was argued that it is not what prompts activity. Now, it is sought to be shown that *niyoga* is not *sādhya* at all. There is no *kārya* other than the means (*karaṇa*), the *modus operandi* (*itikartavyatā*), and what

is to be accomplished (*bhāvya*). *Niyoga* is not the same as *bhāvya*; for the *bhāvya* (that which is to be accomplished) is either happiness or destruction of sorrow, which is the human end.

And, it is not possible to define *niyoga*. (1) Is *niyoga* a direction (*preraṇā*)? (2) Is it internal effort? (3) Is it action (*kriyā*)? (4) Is it fruit? (5) Is it instrument (*kāraka*)? (6) Or, is it something else? (7) Is it that which is unrelated to three times? (8) Or, is it something supersensible?

AVS—na yāgādī-sādhanaṁ niyogaḥ, nāpi prayājādītikartavyatā, nāpi brāhmaṇādy-adhikārī, nāpi sukha-duḥkhanivṛttir vā phalaṁ, evaṁ lakṣaṇam niyogam kaḥ sādhayet, prekṣāpūrvakāri-svarūpaṁ ca tasya kiṁ bhaṇyatām ity arthaḥ.

[623]

न तावत्प्रेरणा कार्यं कार्यार्थविषया हि सा ।
नाऽऽन्तरोऽपि प्रयत्नः स्यान्मानान्तरगतेस्तथा ॥ ६२३ ॥

Kārya cannot be direction, for that (direction) has for content the sense of *kārya*; nor internal effort, for, then, it would be known through other *pramāṇa*.

(1) *Niyoga* is not direction, for direction which is word-function is the content or object of *niyoga*, and as between the content and the container there is difference.

(2) Nor is *niyoga* internal effort; for effort is mental, and if *niyoga* were to be that, there would be no *apūrvatva* for it.

[624]

न क्रिया कर्तृसंबन्धात्फलं नानिष्टरूपतः ।
कारकं नाप्यसिद्धत्वान्नाप्यन्यदनिरूपणात् ॥ ६२४ ॥

It is not activity, because activity is related to the agent; nor the fruit, because the *niyoga* is not what is

desired ; nor what accomplishes the act, because the *niyoga* is not what has been established ; nor something else because it is not clearly stated.

(3) *Niyoga* is not activity; for activity is related to the agent, whereas *niyoga* relates to the prompted person, and the two—agent and prompted person—are not the same.

(4) Nor is *niyoga* the fruit; for it is not a human end, as it is not what is desired.

(5) Nor is it an instrument; for an instrument is an accomplished thing, whereas *niyoga* is what-is-to-be-accomplished.

(6) Nor is it any other; for there is no evidence therefor.

[625]

न च कालत्रयास्पर्शवाच्यत्वं कार्यलक्षणम् ।
घटशब्दाद्घटे मा भूत्कालास्पर्शेन कार्यता ॥ ६२५ ॥

Nor is the definition of *kārya* that which is expressed without being touched by the three times, lest from the word 'pot' the pot would be understood as *kārya* (*niyoga*), because it is untouched by time.

(7) The non-relation of *niyoga* with the three times—is it from word, or from sense? Not the first; for if that were so, when it is said 'pot', there would be *niyogatā* for pot, for the word itself does not mention any relation to time. Nor the second; for, the word 'pot' has for its sense the broad-bellied object, and has no capacity to indicate relation to time as such.

NKL—ghaṭa ity ukte kālatrayasyā-'spṛṣṭo ghaṭo bhāti. itarathā ghaṭostītyādau laḍādy-arthasya dvirabhidhāna-prasaṅgād ato ghaṭe kāryatā mā bhūt tatrā 'tivyāvtir iti bhāvaḥ.

[626]

नियोगोऽपि नियोज्यस्य व्यापारः स कथं भवेत् ।
अतीन्द्रियो लिङाद्यर्थः सिद्धिश्चास्य कथं भवेत् ॥ ६२६ ॥

And, the *niyoga* is the operation of him who is prompted; how can that be the sense of the potential mood (*liṅ*), etc., which is super-sensuous? And how can that be accomplished?

(8) Just as sacrifice, etc., constitute the activity of the agent, the *niyoga* too forms an operation of the one prompted; and so, it cannot be super-sensuous.

[627]

सिद्धिर्विषयसिद्धौ चेन्नैवं स्यात्कर्मणा न हि ।
आप्त्युत्पत्त्यादिकं शक्यमनारोप्यस्वभावतः ॥ ६२७ ॥

If it be said that the *niyoga* is accomplished when the object is accomplished, not so; attainment, origination, etc., are not possible through activity, for the *niyoga* is not of the nature of the superimposed.

It cannot be said that sacrifice, etc., when accomplished, accomplish *niyoga*; for the usual results of action, viz. origination, attainment, purification, and modification, cannot be brought about for *niyoga*, as those who advocate the doctrine of *niyoga* believe that no excellence can be imposed on *niyoga*; and also it would be a contradiction to say that *niyoga* is eternal and that it is what-is-to-be-accomplished.

NKL—āpty-utpatti-vikāra-saṁskārā na niyogasya karma-sādhyāḥ tasyā 'nāropya-svabhāvataḥ anādheyātiśayatvena svīkārād ity arthaḥ.

[628]

कार्यं स्वेनाऽऽत्मना सिद्धं पुमर्थं साधयेद्यदि ।

सर्वदा तस्य तादृक्त्वात्पुमर्थः सर्वदा भवेत् ॥ ६२८ ॥

If the *kārya*, which being self-accomplished, were to accomplish the human end, then because the *kārya* is always of that nature, the human end also will be always there.

Having shown that *niyoga* is not accomplished by anything, it is now argued that *niyoga* does not accomplish anything.

Does *niyoga* (i.e. *kārya*), being already there, accomplish heaven, etc.? Or, does it come into being through human effort, and then accomplish heaven, etc.?

On the first alternative, heaven, etc., will always be there, as *niyoga* is admitted to be there always, and there would be no need for accomplishing heaven, etc.

[629]

पुंव्यापारप्रसिद्ध्याऽथ सिद्धं स्वार्थकरं मतम् ।

तस्यानाधेयरूपत्वान्न कदाचित्फलं भवेत् ॥ ६२९ ॥

If it be thought that the *kārya* having been accomplished by human effort produces its fruit, it can never bear fruit as it is of the nature of what is not an effect.

The other alternative is also not possible; for it has already been shown that *niyoga* does not admit of the imposition of any excellence. As *niyoga* is not accomplished through human activity, never can heaven, etc., come into being as dependent thereon.

[630]

संभाव्यमानसिद्धेर्हि यागादेः कार्यता मता ।
व्योमतत्पुष्पयोर्न स्यात्सिद्धात्यन्ताप्रसिद्धयोः ॥ ६३० ॥

There is the nature of being *kārya* only for sacrifice, etc., which have the prospect of being accomplished; that is not possible in the case of the already-accomplished like the sky or the entirely non-existent like the sky-flowers.

The nature of being accomplished (*kāryatā*) can belong only to a positive entity whose origination is through human activity, and not to *niyoga* which is not of that nature. *Niyoga* which is of the nature of absolute non-existence, like the sky-flower, cannot be accomplished.

[631]

कर्तव्यो याग इत्येवं यागाद्भिन्ना यथेक्ष्यते ।
कर्तव्यं कार्यमित्येवं ततोऽपि व्यतिरिच्यते ॥ ६३१ ॥

If it be said that in the statement 'The sacrifice is to be performed', what is to be performed is something different from the sacrifice, then even in 'What is to be performed is *kārya*' what is to be performed will be different from that.

If it be said that in the usage 'The sacrifice is to be performed', the sacrifice figures as something different from *kārya*, then on the strength of the usage '*kārya* (i.e. *niyoga*) is to be performed' we must say that *niyoga* is different from *kārya*.

[632]

कार्यकर्तव्यता कार्येत्येवमेवातिरिच्यते ।
तस्मान्न वस्तुधर्मोऽयं शब्दादेव प्रकर्षतः ॥ ६३२ ॥

There is a similar transcendence in "the to-be-accomplished nature of the *kārya* is to be performed". Therefore, this is not a characteristic of reality, because the difference is only in word.

It may be said that *kāryatā* (nature of being what-is-to-be-done) is not *niyoga*, but its attribute (*dharma*), and that *kāryatā* is not the attribute of sacrifice, etc.

But we ask: the *kāryatā* of the *niyoga* which is *kārya*—is that to be done or not?

If that is to be done, then that would be different from *niyoga*. This will lead to an infinite regress.

If *kāryatā* is not what-is-to-be-done, then it would be similar to what is prohibited.

Thus *kāryatā* can be neither the nature nor the attribute of *niyoga*. It is only a verbal expression.

NKL—śaśa-śṛṅgaṁ gagana-kusumam itivac chābda-vikalpa-mātram ity arthaḥ.

[633]

अतो यदेव साध्यार्थसाधनत्वेन गम्यते ।
वेदात्तदेव साध्यत्वात्कार्यं नान्यत्ततः पृथक् ॥ ६३३ ॥

Hence that alone, which is understood from the Veda as being the means to the accomplishment of what is to be accomplished, is the *kārya*, because it has to be accomplished, and nothing else apart from it.

What is *kārya* is sacrifice, etc., alone which are the means to the end, viz. heaven, etc.

[634]

लिङादिः प्रेरणावाची कुतः कार्यमितीर्यताम् ।
विषयत्वेन नाऽऽक्षेपो भावार्थो विषयो मतः ॥ ६३४ ॥

The potential mood, etc., express direction. Whence, then, the *kārya*? The *kārya* cannot be regarded as the object either; for, the object is the stem-sense.

According to the Bhāṭṭas, the potential mood, *liṅ*, etc., express direction (*preraṇā*). *Niyoga* is not the content of direction; sacrifice, etc., are the content.

[635]

प्रेरणाऽपीह नैव स्यादज्ञातज्ञापनात्पृथक् ।
समस्तकार्यदोषोक्तिप्रसङ्गान्मित्यभावतः ॥ ६३५ ॥

Even direction here is not different from the making known of what is unknown; for it involves all the possible defects pertaining to the *kārya*; and there is no evidence to the contrary.

It is wrong to say that even direction is the meaning of the potential mood, *liṅ*, etc. For, what is direction? Is it different from making known what is unknown? Or, is it not different?

It cannot be different; for, if it were so, all the defects pointed out earlier in the case of *kārya* would appear here also.

[636]

न स्वरूपं लिङादीनां प्रेरणाज्ञापकत्वतः ।
अन्योन्यरूपभेदेऽपि प्रेरणानुगमात्तथा ॥ ६३६ ॥

Direction is not the nature of the potential mood (*liṅ*), etc., for the potential mood is for making known (the unknown) and direction is understood even where there are different forms (like *leṭ*).

Moreover, if direction is different, what is it? Is it the nature of *liṅ*, etc.? Or, is it some potency? Or, is it some particular operation?

It cannot be the first; for, *liṅ*, etc., are what make known, and direction, you say, is not of that nature. Moreover, although there are different forms such as *yajeta*, *juhoti*, etc., employing *liṅ*, *leṭ*, etc., there is no difference so far as their sense, direction, is concerned; and if direction is the nature of *liṅ*, it cannot be the nature of *leṭ*, etc.

[637]

शक्तेरनभिधेयत्वात्तद्व्यापारोऽपि नेष्यते ।
प्रेरकाभावतो वेदे तद्व्यापारोऽपि नेरणा ॥ ६३७ ॥

(Direction cannot be) the capacity (*śakti*) (of *liṅ*, etc.), for then it would not be what is expressed; nor can it be the operation thereof; nor can prompting be the operation of the director, for in respect of the Veda there is no director.

Nor is direction some potency or capacity of *liṅ*, etc.; for those who argue against us hold that direction is expressed by *liṅ*, etc. If they hold, at the same time, that direction is their potency, they would be contradicting themselves; for, as potency and the potent are non-different, if direction is the potency of *liṅ*, etc., it cannot be what is expressed (*vācya*) by them.

If direction is to be regarded as some particular operation, whereof is it an operation—of *liṅ*, etc., or of the director?

If it is the operation of *liṅ*, etc., what is this operation? Is it movement (*spanda*)? Or, effort (*yatna*)? Not the first, because *liṅ*, etc., are all-pervading. Nor the other, because effort is an attribute of the conscious, and *liṅ*, etc., are unconscious.

If direction is the operation of the director, who is this director? Is it a person? Or, is it the Veda?

It cannot be a person, for the Veda has no human author, and it can have no director.

[638]

अतः समीहितोपायतया वस्त्ववबोधयन् ।
अबुद्धं प्रेरको वेदो ज्ञापना प्रेरणा मता ॥ ६३८ ॥

Therefore, the director is the Veda which makes known a reality which was unknown, as the means to the desired end; and the making known is direction.

Therefore, it must be admitted that direction is not different from making known what is unknown, and that the director is the Veda.

[639]

तथा च वस्तुयाथात्म्यज्ञापनेन प्रमाणता ।
न प्रेरकतया सा स्यात्प्रत्यक्षादेरनीक्षणात् ॥ ६३९ ॥

And thus, there is validity only as making known the real nature of things, and not as directing activity; for this latter is not seen in perception, etc.

Perception, etc., simply make known what is unknown; they do not direct activity. Similarly, the Veda too is valid, not as directing, but as making known.

NKL—vedaḥ abuddha-bodhakatvenaiva pramāṇaṁ pramāṇatvāt pratyakṣādivat.

AVS—pratyakṣādivat vedasya prāmāṇyam abuddha-bodhakatvena siddham, na prerakatvena ity arthaḥ.

[640]

निष्पादितनियोगस्य वेदप्रामाण्यतो यथा ।
नियमेन फलं तद्वत्साधनानुष्ठितेर्भवेत् ॥ ६४० ॥

Just as (according to the *niyoga-vāda*) the *niyoga* carried out invariably bears fruit from the authority of the Veda, so also may it result through the performance of the means (*viz.*, sacrifice).

Although neither *niyoga* nor direction is the meaning of *liṅ*, etc., these latter can convey the meaning of instrumentality to the desired. Just as in the *niyoga-vāda* it is maintained that the *niyoga* that is acquired by performing the stem-sense (viz. sacrifice) leads to the fruit on the strength of the text 'He who desires heaven,' etc., even so we may legitimately hold that the same sacrifice, when performed, results in bringing in the fruit through the intermediary operation of an unseen potency (*apūrva*). Thus, it is possible for us to say that the sense of *liṅ*, etc., viz. sacrifice, etc., constitute the means to what is desired, i.e. heaven, etc.

[641]

विसंवादोऽपि नाऽऽशङ्क्यो नियोगार्थे यथा तथा ।
वैदिकत्वादुपायेऽपि नृतन्त्रे व्यभिचारिता ॥ ६४१ ॥

Just as, if the *niyoga* be the sense (of *liṅ*, etc.), failure of fruitful result cannot be doubted, even so, if the means (sacrifice) be the sense, for it is declared by the Veda; there is inconstancy only in what depends on man.

It cannot be said that if the instrumentality of sacrifice, etc., to heaven, etc., be the sense of *liṅ*, etc., the *Svarga-kāma* text would become invalid, as immediately after the performance of sacrifice, heavenly enjoyment is not observed; for, the situation is the same in the case of both the views, viz. the view that *niyoga* is the sense of *liṅ*, etc., and the view that sacrifice is the sense.

Just as even if *niyoga* be the sense of *liṅ*, etc., there is no futility even though no immediate fruit is seen, and there is no invalidity for the Vedic text, so also if sacrifice, etc., be the sense of *liṅ*, etc., there is no contingence of the suspected defects. The instrumentality of sacrifice to heaven is to be ascertained from the Veda alone. And, the Veda is unlike human statements, and so cannot miscarry. It has no human author, and is free from defects.

NTV—pauruṣeya-vākyasya hi mānāntara-visaṁvādāt prāmāṇya-vyabhicāritā, pramāṇāntara-nibandhanatvāt tat-pramāṇasya.

AVS—vedaika-samadhigamyatvād upāyatvasya na pauruṣeya-vākyārthavad vyabhicārāśaṅkā ity arthaḥ.

[642]

नानन्तरफलो यागो दृष्टो लोकेऽपि हि क्वचित् ।
अतः सामान्यतोऽदृष्टं क्रियात्वादित्यदूषणम् ॥ ६४२ ॥

Sacrifice does not yield immediate fruit, for even in the world some cases of action do not yield immediate fruit (e.g. service); so the *sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa* probans 'because it is an act' cannot be (adduced as) a defect.

It canot be argued thus: 'Sacrifice, etc., must have immediate fruit, because they are acts, like the act of churning'; for not all acts yield their fruit immediately, e.g. service.

NTV — na hi loke 'nantara-phalo yāgaḥ prasiddho 'sti, tasyā 'laukikas-svarūpatvāt, vaidikasya tu kārīryādi-yāgasya yady api dṛṣṭaphalatā, tathāpi nā 'nantara-phalatva-niyamo 'sti, tasmāt vyāpti-grahaṇābhāvāt yāgatvād anataraphalo yāga ity anumānā 'nupapattir ity arthaḥ.

AVS—atra yāga-śabdena kriyā ucyate.

[643]

स्वसामर्थ्याद्यथा कार्यं कालास्पृष्टं प्रभाषते ।
लिङादिर्यागमप्येवं वक्ष्यतीत्यविशिष्टता ॥ ६४३ ॥

Just as *liṅ*, etc., by their own capacity, are said to mean *kārya* untouched by time, even so sacrifice is said to be the meaning; thus there is no difference.

It may be argued thus: If sacrifice, etc., which are the means to heaven, etc., be the sense of *liṅ*, etc., it must be stated if sacrifice, etc., are related to time or not. If they are related to time, then they cannot be performed because of relation to past time, etc. On the second alternative, if from word there is no relation to time, they would be like pot, etc.; and if from sense there is non-relation to time, they would be non-existent.

The reply is: It is true that there is similarity between *niyoga* and sacrifice, etc. But there is this difference: sacrifice is not non-existent, although it is not related to time. Even though as instrument to the desired, sacrifice is not related to time, by nature (i.e. as sacrifice) it is related to time; whereas *niyoga*, even by natūre, is not temporal.

[644]

साक्षादेवं च संबन्धः साध्यसाधनयोर्भवेत् ।
नातिरिक्तलिङाद्यर्थव्यवधानविडम्बना ॥ ६४४ ॥

And thus, there would be a direct relation between end and means; and there would be no farce of interposing something which is other than these, the sense of *liṅ*, etc.

There is another reason why we say that sacrifice, etc., which are the instrument to the desired, are the sense of *liṅ*, etc.

If this be the case, there is established an immediate relation between means and end. If, on the contrary, *niyoga* be the sense, there will be an interposition between them. This, however, is not proper, as, in this case, an immediate relation is possible.

[645]

साक्षादसति संबन्धे पारम्पर्यं न तु क्वचित् ।
गतौ सत्यां तदप्यत्र नान्यत्रेवोपलभ्यते ॥ ६४५ ॥

Where there is no direct relation, there may be sequence (*pāramparyam*); and not where there is such a way (direct relation); even that (the former) is not seen here, as elsewhere.

Where immediate relation is not possible, then relation in sequence is to be admitted. In the case of the *svarga-kāma* text there is no need to postulate relation in sequence, for there is seen immediate relation.

AVS—avyavadhānena sambandhe asati pāramparyaṁ, natu sati, tac ca pāramparyam atra nāsti, yathā aruṇayā krīṇātīty atra vidyata ity arthaḥ.

[646]

श्रुत्या क्रयाभिसंबन्धो व्यवच्छिद्यैव साधनम् ।
अरुणः साधको दृष्टो नानपेक्षो वृथा च सः ॥ ६४६ ॥

By the express statement, it is known that the tawny colour, though related to buying, becomes what accomplishes only by interposing the means (the cow). It is not independent, for, if so, it would be useless.

The contrary example is now given. When the scriptural text says, 'With the tawny he buys', what is the relation between 'tawny' and 'buying'? There cannot be a direct relation; 'tawny' becomes the instrument of buying only as qualifying the cow. The meaning of the text is: with the tawny cow he buys *soma*.

The *svarga-kāma* text is not like this; for, here a direct relation is seen between the means and the end.

NKL—aruṇayā krīṇātīti tṛtīyā śrutyā aruṇo guṇaḥ kriyāyām viniyuktopi paśu-dravyaṁ viśeṣyaiva soma-krayasya sādhakaḥ, guṇasya asvatantratvād anyathā kevalasya guṇasya sādhakatvāyogāt vṛthā syād ity arthaḥ.

[647]

याग: कार्याभिसंबन्धोऽप्यनुत्पाद्य फलं न ते ।
कथंचित्साधयत्कार्यं तच्च नास्तीत्यसाधक: ॥ ६४७ ॥

Sacrifice, though related to *kārya*, does not accomplish the *kārya* for you without accomplishing the fruit; but that it does not, and so it cannot be what accomplishes (in respect of *kārya*).

It was stated that sacrifice, etc., are related to heaven, etc., and not to *niyoga*. Here, it is pointed out that even if their relation to *niyoga* be admitted, there will be defect.

Does the sacrifice that is related to *niyoga* generate it without or with an intermediary operation? It cannot be without an intermediary operation, for there can be no instrumentation without operation. If it be with an intermediary operation, what is that

operation? Is it the generation of fruit? Or, some other operation? If it be the former then without generating heaven first, sacrifice would not bring about the *niyoga* that you desire. But in the case of no one is heaven seen immediately after a sacrifice. And so, sacrifice is not what establishes *niyoga*.

[648]

नचान्या व्यापृतिस्तस्य कार्यसिद्धौ त्वयेष्यते ।

फलानुत्पत्तितस्तस्मान्न कार्येणापि संगतिः ॥ ६४८ ॥

Nor do you accept any other operation in order that the *kārya* may be accomplished; because the fruit has not been produced, the *niyoga* cannot be even connected with the *kārya* (sacrifice).

Any other operation is not admitted by you.

As the fruit (viz. heaven) is not seen immediately after the performance of sacrifice, etc., these latter cannot be related to *niyoga* through the generation of fruit.

[649]

अथ शास्त्रप्रमाणत्वाददृष्टाऽप्यभ्युपेयते ।

फलोत्पत्तिर्ममाप्येवं तथा सति भविष्यति ॥ ६४९ ॥

If you admit on the authority of Scripture that an unseen (*adṛṣṭa*) fruit is generated, then even for me that happens so.

If you say, on the authority of Scripture, that an unseen potency is generated by the sacrifice, that is acceptable to us. And, even thus, there would be no need for *niyoga*.

[650]

मम शास्त्रप्रमाणत्वात्पश्चादपि भवेत्फलम् ।
पूर्वं तु भवतो न्याय्यं तदभावे ह्यसाधकम् ॥ ६५० ॥

Because I accept the authority of Scripture, for me the fruit may come even late; for you it is but proper that it must come earlier, for in its absence the *niyoga* will not be what accomplishes.

In our view, the fruit may come about even some time after the performance of sacrifice, the authority for this being the *svarga-kāma* text. But for you the fruit must be immediate, because in the absence of the intermediary operation (which is heaven) *niyoga* will not be established.

As, on the authority of Scripture, the fruit results from the sacrifice itself, it is futile to assume *niyoga*.

AVS—tad-abhāve svargābhāve kāryaṁ sādhaka-śūnyam ity arthaḥ.

[651]

कार्यसिद्ध्या फलावाप्तावशेषफलसंभवः ।
सकृत्करण एव स्यात्कार्यस्याभेदतस्तव ॥ ६५१ ॥

If by accomplishing the *kārya* the fruit be obtained, then by once performing (the sacrifice) all fruits must result; for according to you the *kārya* is non-different.

If on the accomplishment of sacrifice, etc., there is the accomplishment of *niyoga*, and thence result heaven, etc., then as *niyoga* comes about by the performance, even once, of a sacrifice, there should be no need for other sacrifices or for repeating the same sacrifice. By the single performance of a sacrifice one must then be able to reap all possible kinds of fruit.

[652]

अनुबन्धाभिसंबन्धात्फलं चेत्स्याद्व्यवस्थया ।
तत एव न कार्यात्स्यात्तदा तद्भावभावतः ॥ ६५२ ॥

If it be said that there is the settlement of the difference in fruit due to the relation (of the *niyoga*) with the adjunct (viz., the particular rite), then, because of that very reason the fruit is not from the *kārya* (*niyoga*), for it is determined by that (rite).

It may be said that although *niyoga* is one by itself, it becomes different on account of the sacrifices with which it is associated, and that the difference in fruit may thus be accounted for.

If this be the case, then the difference in fruit is conditioned by the difference in sacrifice. And so, what is the use of *niyoga?*

AVS—kiṁ niyogena ajāgalastana-kalpena?

[653]

औपाधिकश्च मिथ्या स्यात्साध्यसाधनलक्षणः ।
व्यवहारः श्रुतेर्ज्ञातः परमार्थैकवादिनः ॥ ६५३ ॥

And, it would have to be recognized that for him (the Pūrvamīmāṁsaka) who says that all (*Svarga*, etc.) is real, the Scriptural usage consisting in means and ends conditioned by adjuncts is illusory.

If there be difference in *niyoga* because of difference in sacrifice, there will result another defect also. The *niyoga* as conditioned by sacrifice will be the means; and heaven, etc., will be the ends. Then the conditioned *niyoga* will have to be declared illusory, like the redness of the crystal. That being the case, heaven, etc., brought

about thereby will also be illusory. This, however, is not acceptable to the Mīmāṁsaka who maintains that all means and ends, such as sacrifice, etc., and heaven, etc., are absolutely real.

[654]

एवं ते कर्मकाण्डेऽपि कार्यं तावन्न युज्यते ।
ऐकात्म्ये तु यथा नास्ति विशेषेणोच्यते तथा ॥ ६५४ ॥

Thus for you the *kārya* is not intelligible even in the ritual-section; as to how it is not intelligible in respect of the one self (*jñānakāṇḍa*) it will be stated in detail.

It has been shown that there is no need for postulating *niyoga* in the *karma-kāṇḍa*. That such a postulation is not necessary in the *jñāna-kāṇḍa* will be demonstrated hereafter.

[655]

प्रतिपत्तिविधिस्तावन्नाऽऽत्मा द्रष्टव्य इत्ययम् ।
तस्य भावार्थनिष्ठत्वाद्वस्तुन्यनुपपत्तितः ॥ ६५५ ॥

The text 'The self is to be seen' is not a command for knowing; for that (the command) relates to the sense of the verb, and that is unintelligible as regards the real.

In the Upaniṣads there is the text, 'The Self is to be seen.' Does this not imply *niyoga*, it may be asked.

Now, in regard to what is there *niyoga?* Is it in regard to the reality, i.e. the self, or in regard to the knowledge thereof? It cannot be the first, because the command relates to knowing; and as regards the self, which is eternal, no command is intelligible.

AVS — nāyam ātmani vidhiḥ, vidheḥ kriyāviṣayatvād vastuny ayogāc ca.

[656]

सिद्धेऽसिद्धेऽथ वैकात्म्ये विधिर्नैवोपपद्यते ।
नाऽऽकाशे नापि तत्पुष्पे पुंव्यापारानपेक्षता ॥ ६५६ ॥

Whether the one self is existent or non-existent (*siddha* or *asiddha*), injunction is unintelligible; as in the case of the sky or the sky-flower, because there is no dependence on human effort in either.

As the one-self is an established reality, there can be no command with reference to it, even as there is nothing to be commanded about either. Even if the one-self be regarded as unestablished, like the sky-flower, it must be admitted that a command would be futile. In either case there is no place for human operation.

[657]

न विधिर्दर्शनेऽपि स्यादन्योन्याश्रयदोषतः ।
दर्शनाद्विधिसंसिद्धेर्विधेर्दर्शनसिद्धितः ॥ ६५७ ॥

Nor is there injunction in respect of seeing; for there would be the defect of reciprocal dependence thus: the injunction is established from the seeing, and the seeing is established from the injunction.

Nor may it be held that the injunction is with reference to seeing; for, that is not intelligible. Is the injunction in regard to seeing as such, or in regard to seeing Brahman (i.e. Brahman-knowledge)? If the first be the case, there is the contingence of injunction in regard to pot-cognition also. On the second alternative, there would be the defect of reciprocal dependence thus: for enjoining knowledge as qualified by Brahman, there must be the earlier knowledge of Brahman, and from the injunction of Brahman-knowledge

there is that knowledge: when Brahman is known, there is the injunction for that knowledge, and from that injunction there is the knowledge of Brahman.

NTV—aikātmya-siddhau tadviśeṣita-darśane vidhis siddhyati, tadvidhi-siddhau balād aikātmya-siddhir ity anyonyāśrayatā.

[658]

न च यूपादिवच्छक्यं वेदेनैव समर्पणम् ।
ऐकात्म्यस्य स्वतः सिद्धेः साध्यत्वाद्यूपवस्तुनः ॥ ६५८ ॥

Nor is the oneness of self a contribution made by the Veda itself, as in the case of the sacrificial post (as auxiliary to injunction); for the oneness of self is self-established whereas the sacrificial post is what is to be accomplished.

It may be argued that the Veda offers Brahman as an auxiliary to the injunction of seeing, even as it offers the sacrificial post as an auxiliary to the injunctions of sacrifice.

But this argument is not sound. The sacrificial post is a product of action. Not so is Brahman which is the eternally established reality.

NKL—prakṛti-dravyasya siddhatvepi yūpākārasya asiddhatvād aikātmyasya tu kūṭastha-nityatvād rūpāntara-rahitatvād vā ity arthaḥ.

AVS—yūpasya vastutvepi sādhyatvād vidheyatvaṁ ghaṭate, na tathaikātmyasya, kūṭastha-siddhatvāt.

[659]

सिद्धं चेद्दर्शयेद्भेदः प्रसिद्धं दर्शनं तथा ।
तन्निष्ठं च भवेद्वाक्यं व्यर्थता च विधेस्तदा ॥ ६५९ ॥

If the Veda reveals what is existent, then our view is established, and the text (*satyam*, etc.) will signify that (Brahman); so, the injunction would be useless.

So, the Veda offers Brahman, not as an auxiliary of injunctions but as the eternally established reality. By applying the sixfold marks of interpretation, it is learnt that the texts like 'Reality, intelligence, infinitude,'[1] etc., have Brahman for purport. If the Vedāntic texts have reality for purport, there is futility of injunction in regard to knowledge thereof.

[1] *Tait.*, II, i, 1.

[660]

सर्वमात्मेति वाक्यस्य न च वस्तुन्यसंभवः ।
येनार्थस्यासमाप्तत्वात्क्रियेताध्याहृतिः पदे ॥ ६६० ॥

In the text 'All is self'[1] it is not impossible that the teaching is about the real. It is only where the sense is incomplete that a word implying (an action) is to be imported.

It may be contended that, without injunction, a sentence cannot make reality known.

This is not right. For one who knows the meaning of words such a sentence does convey sense.

1. See *CHU*, VII, xxv, 2; *BU*, II, iv, 6; *Maitrī*, vi, 7.

NTV quotes the text: *idam sarvam yad ayam ātmā* (*BU*, II, iv, 6).

[661]

आत्मा ब्रह्मेति विज्ञानं विधिं नैव व्यपेक्षते ।
यस्मात्तच्छ्रुतवाक्यस्य स्वयमेवोपजायते ॥ ६६१ ॥

The knowledge from the text 'The self is Brahman' is not expectant of an injunction; for it arises of its own accord in him who has heard the text.

Further, if it be held that Brahman-knowledge is enjoined, it must be stated what type of Brahman-knowledge is the content of the injunction. (1) Is it verbal knowledge of the text (*śābda*)? (2) Or, is it of the nature of contemplation (*bhāvanā*)? (3) Or, is it of the character of direct intuition (*sākṣātkāra*)? In the first alternative, there are the following sub-divisions: (a) Is the injunction for the sake of the generation of the verbal knowledge? (b) Is it for determining the content of the knowledge that has arisen? (c) Is it for the sake of the purport of the text? (d) Is it for making the knowledge subserve the human goal? (e) Is it because Brahman is not the object of any other *pramāṇa*? (f) Is it for relating the word-senses?

(1a) There is no need for an injunction to generate verbal knowledge. As soon as texts like 'The self is Brahman'[1] are heard, the knowledge of those texts arises without depending on an injunction.

[1] *BU*, II, v, 19; IV, iv, 5; *Māṇḍ*, 2.

[662]

यजेतेतिविधिज्ञानं न विध्यन्तरमीक्षते ।
विध्यन्तरेऽनवस्था स्यान्न चायं कर्मणि स्थितेः ॥ ६६२ ॥

The knowledge of the injunction 'Perform the sacrifice' does not depend on another injunction, for if it did, there would be infinite regress; nor does that other injunction require this, for it relates to action.

For one who has studied the Veda, even from the text there arises the knowledge that the self is Brahman; and there is no dependence on an injunction. This is just like the rise of knowledge from the *Svarga-kāma* text without dependence on another injunction. If this be not admitted, there would be infinite regress.

Thus, just as the knowledge of the obligation to perform a sacrifice arises from the text, even so Brahman-knowledge arises from the Vedänta-text.

[663]

प्रतिपन्ने विधेयार्थे प्रवृत्तिः फलमिष्यते ।
प्रवृत्तेश्च विधिज्ञानमेवमन्योन्यसंश्रयः ॥ ६६३ ॥

When the sense enjoined is known, there is the fruit, viz. activity; and when there is activity, there is knowledge of the injunction—thus there is reciprocal dependence.

There is another defect in the view that there is the need of injunction for the generation of the verbal knowledge of Brahman. The defect is reciprocal dependence as between the generation of knowledge and activity caused by injunction.

NTV—draṣṭavya-vidhivākyārthāvabodhe sati tatra pravṛttiḥ, pravṛttasya ca tad-arthāvabodho jāyata iti, itaretarāśrayatā syād ity arthaḥ anyonya-saṁśraya ity upalakṣaṇam śabdārthāvabodhād eva śabdārthāvabodha ity ātmāśrayasyāpi.

AVS—brahma-jñāne jāte tatra vidhiḥ, vidhitaḥ pravṛttasya tajjñānam iti itaretarāśrayatvam iti.

[664]

बोधेऽस्मिञ्शब्दतो जाते न प्रवर्त्योऽफलत्वतः ।
अनुत्पन्ने च नितरां प्रवृत्तेर्हेत्वसंभवात् ॥ ६६४ ॥

If the knowledge of this (self) has been generated from the word, then there is no need to be prompted, for that has no fruit; and much less if it has not arisen, for there is no cause for activity.

Further, does the knowledge of Brahman arise from verbal testimony or not? If it does arise, then a person does not require the prompting of an injunction. If it does not arise, then, in the absence of a content, how can injunction function?

[665]

अथ निश्चयसिद्ध्यर्थमुत्पन्नेऽपि प्रवर्त्यते ।
स निश्चयो वः किं शब्दादथान्यस्मादितीर्यताम् ॥ ६६५ ॥

If it be held that even though the knowledge has arisen, there must be the prompting of activity in order that the knowledge may become certain, then it must be stated whether that certainty for you results from the word or from something else.

(1b) If it be said that even though verbal knowledge arises from the text, an injunction is necessary for making that knowledge determinate, we ask, is that determination born of verbal testimony itself, or of some other *pramāṇa?*

[666]

शब्दाद्यदि तदेवेदमायातं पूर्वदूषणम् ।
अन्यस्मिन्निष्यमाणे च सापेक्षत्वं प्रसज्यते ॥ ६६६ ॥

If it is from the word, then the defect mentioned earlier would result (i.e. *vidhi-vaiyarthya*); if something else is desired, then, the Veda would become dependent.

If the determination of the content of knowledge is from the text itself, an injunction is futile. If another *pramāṇa* is required, the self-validity of the Veda will be destroyed.

[667]

अविवक्षितनुत्त्यर्थमथात्र विधिरिष्यते ।
अयं ज्ञेयोऽर्थ इत्युक्तौ स्याद्विवक्षितधीर्यतः ॥ ६६७ ॥

"Now, the injunction here is required for removing the unintended sense, for when it is stated 'This sense is to be known' there would be the knowledge of what is intended."

(1c) *Pūrvapakṣa*—The injunction in regard to the knowledge generated by the text is for the sake of the purport of the text which is reality. In other words, the injunction makes the purport of the text the content of the knowledge resulting from the text. Negatively, what is not the purport will not become the content of the knowledge.

[668]

नैवमुत्सर्गतो यस्माच्छब्दानां लोकवेदयोः ।
विशिष्टार्थैकनिष्ठत्वं स्वतो न विधिहेतुतः ॥ ६६८ ॥

Not so; for words, both secular and sacred, as a rule, convey their qualified sense by their own capacity, and not because of any injunction.

Siddhānta—Words have their senses for purport, of their own accord, without depending on injunction.

[669]

अविशिष्टश्च वाक्यार्थस्तथा लौकिकवैदिक-
वाक्ययोर्गम्यते यस्माद्विधिर्नातो विवक्षितः ॥ ६६९ ॥

The same is the case with sentence-sense also; i.e., similarly the meaning of sentence, secular or sacred, is known; and so, there is no need for injunction.

The same is the case with sentences.

AVS—loke vede ca padasya vākyasya ca sva-sāmarthya-kṛtaṁ na vidhikṛtam.

[670]

अपि दृष्टार्थतैकात्म्ये कर्मस्विव न भिद्यते ।
वेदाधीतिविधेस्तस्माद्विधिरत्र निरर्थकः ॥ ६७० ॥

From the injunction to study the Veda, there is the seen fruit (i.e. knowledge) in respect of oneness of self as in the case of actions; therefore, injunction is useless.

The injunction to study the Veda brings about its seen fruit which is knowledge. This is common to both the sections, *karma* and *jñāna*. Thus the Veda as such becomes purportful; and no injunction in regard to Brahman-knowledge is required.

[671]

विधेर्विध्यन्तरेऽभीष्टे कृत्स्नोऽप्यविवक्षितः ।
पूर्वोक्तेनैव न्यायेन नैव कल्प्यो विधिस्ततः ॥ ६७१ ॥

If for the injunction to study, another injunction be required, then the entire sense would go unintended; and by the reasoning mentioned earlier, an injunction need not be assumed.

It is settled that words as such have their senses for purport. Therefore, there is no need to assume an injunction in regard to Brahman-knowledge for the sake of that purport.

[672]

मतं पुमर्थसिद्ध्यर्थं ज्ञानस्य विधिरिष्यते ।
फलस्य विध्यधीनत्वादुपेक्षाफलताऽन्यथा ॥ ६७२ ॥

It may be thought that knowledge stands in need of injunction so that the human end may be accomplished; for fruit depends on injunction, as otherwise the fruit may be regarded as unintended.

(1d) It may be said that injunction in regard to Brahman-knowledge is for making it subserve the human goal. Even as it is the injunction that makes sacrifice, etc., yield their fruit, it may be argued, an injunction in regard to Brahman-knowledge is necessary in order that that knowledge may result in *mokṣa*.

[673]

ज्ञेयव्याप्त्यतिरेकेण न विज्ञानात्फलान्तरम् ।
इष्यते कर्मवन्नातस्तदर्थं विधिकल्पना ॥ ६७३ ॥

Other than the pervasion of the object of knowledge, there is no fruit of knowledge, as in action; therefore, for the sake of that there is no need for assuming injunction.

In reply, we ask, what is the fruit of knowledge? Is it the ascertainment of the object? Or, is it something else? There is no need of an injunction to ascertain the object. If the fruit is something else, does it occur in the object of knowledge or in the knower? The fruit of knowledge remains, of its own accord, in the knower; and that does not require any injunction.

NTV—jñānasya sva-viṣaya-niściti-vyatirekeṇa phalāntaraṁ nāsti.

[674]

यदाऽपि मातरि फलं तदाऽपि विधिनाऽत्र किम् ।
मातृमानप्रमेयादौ तत्सिद्धेर्विधिना विना ॥ ॥ ६७४ ॥

Even if the fruit be in the knower, then also, of what use is injunction? For without injunction, that (fruit) is established in cognizer, cognition, cognized object, etc.

Now, it may be said that in order to cause the fruit of *pramāṇa*, which is in the cognizer, to appear in the object there must be an injunction.

But, this is not necessary. Just as experience shines as making known the cognizer, it shines also as making known the *pramāṇa* and the object.

AVS—yathā māna-phalaṁ saṁvedanam anubhavo mātṛ-sādhakatvena bhāti, tathā māna-meya-sādhakatvenāpi bhāti, ato na tad-arthaṁ vidhi-kalpanā.

[675]

अथापि कार्यविरहात्सिद्धार्थमनुवादकम् ।
वचो नैव प्रमाणं स्यात्तस्य मान्तरसंगतेः ॥ ६७५ ॥

"Even then, because of the absence of *kārya* (injunction), a sentence which restates an existent fact would not be a *pramāṇa*, for of that, relation with other *pramāṇas* is possible.

(1e) It may be argued thus: A text that speaks of an existent entity will not become a *pramāṇa* in the absence of an injunction (*niyoga*); it will be only a re-statement of what is known through other *pramāṇas*.

[676]

विध्यर्थाङ्गीकृतौ त्वेतदनपेक्षं प्रमाणताम् ।
अश्नुते मान्तराभावाज्ज्योतिष्टोमादिवाक्यवत् ॥ ६७६ ॥

"But if the sense of injunction is accepted, this will attain to the status of an independent *pramāṇa*, because there is no other *pramāṇa*, as in the case of the *jyotiṣṭoma* text, etc."

If, however, an injunction is admitted, the text relating to an existent entity like Brahman will become a *pramāṇa*. Although by itself it may be only a restatement, it becomes unique on account of association with *niyoga*, and is to be classed with such texts as that about *Svarga-kāma*.

[677]

वस्तु मान्तरयोग्यं चेद्विधौ सत्यपि तत्तथा ।
अथ तन्मान्तरायोग्यं विध्यभावेऽपि तत्तथा ॥ ६७७ ॥

If the reality is capable of being known through other *pramāṇas*, that would be so even if there be injunction; if, on the contrary, it is not capable of being known through other *pramāṇas*, it would be so, even in the absence of injunction.

The reply to the above argument is as follows:—Is Brahman knowable through other *pramāṇas* or not? If it is knowable, it will remain so even in the presence of injunction. If it is not knowable through other *pramāṇas*, then also it will continue to be so even in the absence of injunction.

NKL—anātmatvaṁ māntara-yogyatve prayojakaṁ na siddhatvam ity abhisandhāya dūṣayati.

[678]

किं वाक्यस्यानुवादत्वं सिद्धेऽर्थे मान्तरेण वा ।
मिते तत्र न पूर्वस्मिन्सिद्धेऽप्यर्थेऽनुवादता ॥ ६७८ ॥

Is the sentence a re-statement because its sense is an existent reality or because the sense is known through some other *pramāṇa?* Here, even if the sense is known to be the first, *viz.* existent reality, there is no re-statement.

It was stated above by the *pūrvapakṣin* that the texts about existent entities like Brahman are re-statements. Is it contended that these texts are re-statements because they relate to an existent entity, or because their contents are known through other *pramāṇas*?

Although the Vedāntic texts teach about Brahman which is an existent entity, they are not re-statements.

[679]

मानान्तरानधिगतं सिद्धं वस्त्ववबोधयत् ।
मानं किं नानपेक्षं स्यात्पुमर्थश्च स्वरूपतः ॥ ६७९ ॥

The *pramāṇa* (*śruti*) which makes known an existent reality, not known through any other *pramāṇa*, why is that not an independent *pramāṇa?* And why is not that the human end, of its own accord?

The Vedāntic texts teach about a reality which is not knowable through any other means. So, they constitute an independent *pramāṇa*, like perception, etc. The knowledge of Brahman is not fruitless like the knowledge that there are seven continents in the world; for Brahman is of the nature of unexcellable bliss, and is the highest human goal. Therefore, the texts that have that for content cannot be invalid.

NTV—na ca siddhārthataiva mānāntarādhigatatvaṁ sāpekṣatvaṁ ca bodhayet, pratyakṣānumānayoḥ siddhārtha-vastvavabodhakayor api mānāntarānadhigata - nirapekṣārtha - bodhakatva - darśanāt, tasmāt siddhārthe kāryārthe vā adhigamāntara-saṁsparśaḥ pramāṇāntarā-

pekṣā-hetuḥ, smṛtau tathā darśanāt tasyādhigamāntara-saṁbhinnārthatvāt. tasmāt yathā kārya-vākyānāṁ mānāntarānadhigata-vastvavabodhakatvāt prāmāṇyam, evaṁ siddhārthānām api vedāntānāṁ prāmāṇyaṁ yuktam ity arthaḥ.

advayānandabodha-pratyagarthatvena tat jñānasya svarūpataḥ puruṣārthatvāt anuṣṭhānaṁ nāpekṣate.

NKL — anavagata - pariniṣpanna - vastu - gocara - pratyakṣāder iva vacasopi prāmāṇyam aviruddham iti bhāvaḥ.

[680]

पुंबुद्धिविषयो ह्यर्थो मानान्तरमपेक्षते ।
अभावात्पुरुषस्येह न तु सिद्धोऽपि वैदिकः ॥ ६८० ॥

It is only that sense which is the object of human intellect that stands in need of other *pramāṇa;* since, here, there is no human agency, that which is revealed by the Vedic text, though an existent, does not require other *pramāṇas.*

It may be argued thus : the text that is in dispute is a re-statement, because it is about an existent entity, like the statement about a fruit-bearing tree on the banks of a river.

The reply is : The example given is a human statement; and what it is about can be known through other *pramāṇas.* Not so is Brahman. The Veda is not a human composition; and even its teaching about an existent reality must be unique.

NTV—puruṣabuddhi-prabhavaṁ bhūtārthaṁ kāryārthaṁ vā vacanaṁ bhavati sāpekṣam, tena hi puruṣabuddhi-saṁbhinna evārthe pratyayo jāyate, na tvanapekṣita-pūrvādhigama-svātantryeṇārthe.

न च सिद्धत्वमात्रेण शङ्क्यते मान्तरं क्वचित् ।
शङ्क्यमानस्य मानस्य तुल्या सापेक्षता यतः ॥ ६८१ ॥

Nor, merely because of the existent nature, is other *pramāṇa* anywhere assumed; for dependence (on other *pramāṇa*) will be the same for the assumed *pramāṇa*.

The following argument may be urged against us: Brahman is knowable through other *pramāṇas*, because it is an existent reality, like pot.

Our reply is that pot is knowable through other *pramāṇas*, not because it is an existent, but because it is an inert object.

It may be said, 'Even though no other *pramāṇa* for Brahman is known, it is possible to assume that there is one.' But there is no end to such assumptions. If it be held that in view of the other assumed *pramāṇa*, verbal testimony is invalid, may one not maintain that in view of verbal testimony, the other *pramāṇa* is invalid?

NTV explains the meaning of the first line thus: If, because the sense of Vedānta is an established entity, it is contended that it is known through other *pramāṇa*, then the same may be said about what is to be accomplished, because in the world we find all words having as their content what is known through some other *pramāṇa*.

yadi siddhatva-mātreṇa vedāntārthe mānāntaram āśaṅkyeta, tarhi kāryatvenāpi mānāntaraṁ śakyam āśaṅkitum, loke sakala-śabdasya pramāṇāntarādhigata-viṣaye darśanāt.

As regards the second line, *NTV* says: *dvayor mānayor eka-viṣyatvena pramāṇāntara-saṁbhavāt, na śabda eva sāpekṣaḥ, tad api pramāṇāntaraṁ śabda-saṁbhavāt śabdāpekṣyam syāt.*

[682]

न च सापेक्षताऽप्यस्ति मितेर्मानत्वतः क्वचित् ।
मानान्तरानवबुद्धं हि बोधयन्मानमुच्यते ॥ ६८२ ॥

Nowhere is there dependence for a *pramāṇa* because it is a *pramāṇa*; for indeed, that is said to be a *pramāṇa* which makes known what is not known through another *pramāṇa.*

The Vedic text which has the existent reality for purport—is it valid in regard to its own sense or not? If it is valid in regard to its own sense, surely there is no dependence for it on another *pramāṇa.* It cannot be maintained that it is not valid in regard to its own sense; for it makes known what is otherwise unknown; and that is exactly the function of *pramāṇa.*

[683]

मानान्तरानपेक्षं चेन्मानं मेयं प्रबोधयेत् ।
मानमेव तदा तत्स्यान्नातोऽन्यन्मानलक्षणम् ॥ ६८३ ॥

If a *pramāṇa* makes known an object, without being dependent on another *pramāṇa*, then that is truly a *pramāṇa;* there is no other definition of *pramāṇa.*

The definition of *pramāṇa* is that it makes known what is otherwise unknown.

NTV—mānāntara-nirapekṣatayā meya-bodhakaṁ mānam.

NKL—ajñātam aikātmyam bodhayad vākyaṁ mānam eva, anavagatāvagantṛtvasya māna-lakṣaṇatvāt.

[684]

अथ मानान्तरापेक्षं तन्मानं मेयबोधकम् ।
द्वयोरेकक्रियावेशात्तथाऽप्यन्यानपेक्षता ॥ ६८४ ॥

If that *pramāṇa* makes known the object, depending on another *pramāṇa*, then because both are included in a single act, even then there is no dependence on another.

We have aleady stated that there is no possibility of other *pramāṇas* in respect of Brahman. But even granting that there may be other *pramāṇas*, we maintain, Vedāntic texts do not become invalid; nor need they depend on those other *pramāṇas*, Two *pramāṇas* such as perception and inference may make known fire. On that account, they do not become dependent on each other.

NKL—śabda-taditara mānayor ekasyāṁ vastu-bodhana-kriyāyām vyāpṛtatvād anapekṣatvaṁ tulyam iti pariharati.

[685]

अथानधिगताभावादुत्तरस्याप्रमाणता ।

तत्सद्भावात्तु पूर्वस्य ज्ञानस्यास्तु प्रमाणता ॥ ६८५ ॥

"If the latter is not a *pramāṇa* because there is no unknownness (of content), then, because there is that (unknownness) let the earlier knowledge have validity."

Objection:—The verbal testimony that arises after another *pramāṇa* does not have an unknown content; so it is not valid. The earlier *pramāṇa* has, an unknown content; hence it is valid.

NTV:—Verbal testimony functions in respect of a content which has been made known by another *pramāṇa*; and so, it is not valid.

nanv ekasminn arthe prathamam ekaṁ mānaṁ pravartate, śābda-mānaṁ tu tasminn evā 'rthe caramaṁ pravartate, tatra prathamam ajñāta-jñāpakatvāt pramāṇam, caramaṁ punaḥ śābdaṁ jñāta-jñāpakatvād apramāṇam eveti śaṅkate—atheti.

[686]

मातोऽनधिगतत्वस्य सिद्धिः स्यादथवाऽन्यतः ।
स्वतो वा ज्ञाततायाश्च कुतः सिद्धिरितीर्यताम् ॥ ६८६ ॥

How is the unknownness of a thing established—through a *pramāṇa*, or through some other means, or by itself? (Similarly) tell me, how is knownness of a thing established?

Reply:—It is not possible for you to distinguish between knownness and unknownness, for neither of them can be established in your view.

Is the unknownness in regard to a thing, prior to the functioning of a *pramāṇa*, established through *pramāṇa*, or through the eternal experience, or because of self-luminosity? A similar question may be asked about knownness also.

[687]

अज्ञातत्वस्य माव्याप्तेः पूर्वमेव प्रसिद्धितः ।
ततश्च मानतः सिद्धिर्नाज्ञातत्वस्य कुत्रचित् ॥ ६८७ ॥

Since unknownness is there only before the functioning of *pramāṇa*, nowhere is that unknownness established through *pramāṇa*.

The unknownness is not established through *pramāṇa*, either in respect of the self, or in respect of the not-self; for that is established only prior to the functioning of *pramāṇa*, and the functioning of *pramāṇa* is admitted only in respect of a thing that is unknown.

Nor is the unknownness established through eternal experience; for such an experience is not admitted by you.

Nor is the unknownness established by itself; for such a view is acceptable to neither of us.

NKL—ajñātatvaṁ na nivartakajātīya-prakāśyaṁ nivartatvāt tamovat.

[688]

मानव्याप्तिक्षमं चेत्स्यादज्ञातत्वं घटादिवत् ।
वास्तवं स्यात्तदा रूपमज्ञातं च सदा भवेत् ॥ ६८८ ॥

If unknownness, like that of pot, were capable of being pervaded by *pramāṇa*, then that would be the real nature (of things); and then everything would remain always unknown.

If unknownness were established through *pramāṇa*, then it would not be removed by *pramāṇa*, and the nature of a thing would remain unknown even after the functioning of *pramāṇa*, as before.

NTV—māna-siddhasya mānena nirākaraṇāyogāc cā 'jñātatvaṁ na māna-siddham.

[689]

तथा संशयमिथ्यात्वबुद्ध्योरेष यथोदितः ।
न्यायो वाच्यस्ततः सर्वो व्यवहारो न सिध्यति ॥ ६८९ ॥

Likewise, in the case of knowledge of doubt and falsity, the aforesaid reasoning can be stated; so no empirical usage (*vyavahāra*) will be possible.

The same argument applies in regard to the knowledge of doubt and falsity.

Doubt, etc., are not established by the witness; for you do not admit this. Nor are they self-established; for such a view is not acceptable to both of us. Nor are they established through *pramāṇa*; for *pramāṇa* is what removes them.

NTV — kiṁca saṁśaya - mithyājñānayor api svayaṁprakāśatvā 'naṅgīkaraṇāt, sākṣimātra-siddhatvasya ca parair anaṅgīkaraṇāt, pramāṇenaiva siddhir vaktavyā, tathā ca mānena nirākaraṇāyogāt, sarva-vyavahāralopa-prasaṅgaḥ.

[690]

अज्ञातत्वाविशेषेऽपि मानानां यदि मानता ।
ज्ञातस्याज्ञाततोऽन्यत्वात्तत्र स्यात्किं न मानता ॥ ६९० ॥

If there can be validity for *pramāṇa* even though there is no distinction in the unknownness, why should there be no validity in the case of knownness which is other than unkownness?

It may be argued thus: the unknownness of a thing remains the same both prior to and after the functioning of *pramāṇa*; yet this is not in conflict with the *pramāṇa*-nature of the *pramāṇa*; and so, without the removal of unknownness, the empirical usage of means and object of valid knowledge results.

This argument would, then, mean that the form as qualified by knownness and the form as qualified by unknownness have different contents; and so, even without causing any excellence in the unknown object, *pramāṇa* becomes valid. If this be so, then why should not verbal testimony be valid even without causing excellence in what has been known through some other *pramāṇa*?

[691]

एकार्थोपनिपातित्वात्सापेक्षत्वं यदीष्यते ।

तथा च सर्वमानानां सापेक्षत्वं प्रसज्यते ॥ ६९१ ॥

If dependence (for Scripture) be urged because the object is the same (as the one known by another *pramāṇa*), then all *pramāṇas* would be dependent.

If it be said that there would be invalidity for verbal testimony if it has the same content as other *pramāṇas*, then that would result for all *pramāṇas* having an identical content for their sphere; and all *pramāṇas* would become mutually dependent.

NTV — śabda-taditarapramāṇayor ekasminn arthe samāveśāt śabdasya sāpekṣatvam iṣyate, tathā ca pratyakṣādīnām api itareṣāṁ sarva-mānānām anyonyasmin gocare vṛtti-saṁbhavāt, anyonyāpekṣatvenā 'prāmāṇya-prasaṅgaḥ.

[692]

एकस्यामपि सत्तायां सर्वाक्षाणां प्रमाणता ।

द्रव्ये त्वक्चक्षुषोस्तद्वत्प्रसज्येताप्रमाणता ॥ ६९२ ॥

In respect of the very same existent all the sense-organs have validity; but in that case, there would be invalidity for the senses of touch and sight in respect of a substance.

If having the same content makes *pramāṇas* dependent and, therefore, invalid, then, visual and tactual perceptions of the same object must be invalid. But the latter is not the case; and so, it

must be admitted that even though Brahman is known through other *pramāṇas*, verbal testimony does not become invalid by being dependent.

NTV — kiṁca śrotra-tvak-cakṣur-jihvā-ghrāṇānāṁ sarva-pratyakṣāṇāṁ ekasyāṁ sattāyāṁ pravṛtteḥ sāpekṣatvena amānatā prasajyena... ato brahmaṇi mānāntarānupreveśepi na sāpekṣatvenā 'prāmāṇyaṁ śabdasya ity arthaḥ.

[693]

नियोगे लौकिके चाऽपि हरीतक्यादिभक्षणे ।
मानान्तरासंभवेन प्रसज्येतानपेक्षता ॥ ६९३ ॥

Even in the case of a secular injunction (*laukika-niyoga*) like the eating of the myrobalan, there would result independence as no other *pramāṇa* would be possible.

So far, we have argued against the view which holds that, since Brahman is an existent reality, the text about it cannot be an independent *pramāṇa*. Now as regards the contention that, since *niyoga* is not the content of any other *pramāṇa*, the text about that is independent *pramāṇa*. Here we have to ask: is *niyoga* not the content of any other *pramāṇa* because it is *niyoga* as such? Or, because it is Vedic *niyoga*? If the former, then even secular injunctions will become independent of other *pramāṇas*, which is not the case.

[694]

नैष दोषो नरज्ञानपूर्विका विनियोगधीः ।
येन लोकेऽस्त्यतोऽपेक्षा वेदे तु स्याद्विपर्ययः ॥ ६९४ ॥

"There is not this defect; the knowledge of application (*sādhya-sādhana-saṁbandha*) is preceded by the knowledge of the human origin (of the injunction); hence, in the world, there is dependence; in the Veda, however, the opposite is the case."

The *pūrvapakṣin* argues that there is no independence for human statements. The speaker gets to know the relation between the means and end, and then commands one to do a certain thing. Here, the injunction relates to a content that has been known already through some *pramāṇa*. So, there is dependence for the injunction. In the case of the Veda, however, it is different. Its content is not known through any other *pramāṇa*. Hence, the Vedic *niyoga* is independent.

[695]

नैवं सत्यनपेक्षत्वं वचसः कार्यसंश्रयात् ।

पुंबुद्धिपूर्वकत्वेन यतः सापेक्षतोच्यते ॥ ६९५ ॥

This being so, a sentence would not be independent because of association with *kārya*, for you say that it is dependent because it is subsequent to human knowledge.

The *siddhāntin's* reply: If what you have now said is true, then your original thesis goes under. Your thesis was that those texts which enjoin action are independent because they have what-is-to-be-done for purport, while those other texts which teach about an existent reality are dependent on other *pramāṇas*, because of the existent nature of their content. Just now, you have declared that human injunctions are dependent because they are human statements.

Then, it is only proper that you should admit that Vedāntic texts are not dependent because they are not human statements, even though they relate to what is existent.

AVS—evaṁ-sati kārya-niṣṭhaṁ nirapekṣaṁ, siddha-niṣṭhaṁ sāpekṣam iti pakṣo hataḥ, yataḥ puṁbuddhi-pūrvakatvaṁ sāpekṣatva-prayojakam.

[696]

नैवं नियोगनिष्ठत्वाद्वेदे तेनानपेक्षता ।

सापेक्षत्वं च लोके स्याद्विनियोगप्रधानतः ॥ ६९६ ॥

"Not thus; in the Veda there is independence because of reference to *niyoga;* and there is dependence in the world because of the predominance of application."

The *pūrvapakṣin* (i.e. the *niyoga-vādin*) says: In the Veda, the *liṅ*, etc., have *niyoga* for content, and this *niyoga* is not known through other *pramāṇas*; and therefore, the Vedic injunctions are independent. The secular injunctions, on the contrary, depend so much on the knowledge of procedure, etc., otherwise known; and so they are dependent.

[697]

नैवं शब्दार्थयोरैक्यं यदा स्याल्लोकवेदयोः ।

तदा न शक्यते वक्तुं वैलक्षण्यं तयोरिति ॥ ६९७ ॥

Not so; because words and meanings are the same in empirical usage as well as in the Veda, it is not possible to speak of any difference between them.

Reply: What you now say contradicts the *Lokavedādhikaraṇa* (*PM*, I, iii, 10; *vide* note on v. 21). The suffix *liṅ*, etc., cannot mean one thing in the Veda and quite another thing in secular usage.

[698]

स्वरूपलाभः सिद्धश्चेत्स्वतो वा यदि वाऽन्यतः ।
स्वरूपेऽनुपयोगित्वान्न प्रमाणव्यपेक्षणम् ॥ ६९८ ॥

If the nature of a thing has been established, either by itself or by something else, then, because it would not be useful so far as its nature is concerned, there would be no need for another *pramāṇa*.

The *pūrvapakṣin* contends that the texts that speak of an existent reality are dependent. With reference to this contention, we ask: What is meant by the established-nature (*siddhatva*)? Does it mean the establishment of its own nature? Or, does it refer to its manifestation? In either case, is the establishment by itself, or through some other? The first alternative is not acceptable. In regard to self-existence, other *pramāṇa* is not useful, for even without the latter, it is. Even if its existence is through something else, that does not depend on *pramāṇa*, for *pramāṇa* can bring about only cognition.

NTV—tat-siddhatvaṁ nāma kiṁ svarūpa-lābhaḥ sattālakṣaṇaḥ, kiṁvā abhivyaktiḥ prakāśalakṣaṇā, ubhayam api svataḥ parato veti. tatra ādyaṁ dūṣayati-svarūpeti. svatas-satve na pramāṇāntaram upayujyate, tad-vyatirekeṇāpi satvāt, anyataḥ satvepi na pramāṇam apekṣate, pramitimātra-kāraṇatvāt pramāṇasya.

[699]

अभिव्यक्तोऽथ सिद्धोऽयं स्वतो वा यदि वाऽन्यतः ।
अभिव्यक्तस्य भूयोऽपि निष्फलं मान्तरेक्षणम् ॥ ६९९ ॥

If an existent thing has become manifest either by itself or through something else, then for manifesting it, again, there is no need for depending on another *pramāṇa*.

As regards the second alternative, we reply: whether the self is manifest by itself or by a *pramāṇa*, there is no need of another *pramāṇa* for its re-manifestation.

NTV—svayaṁprakāśatayā vā pramāṇena vā 'bhivyaktasya punar abhivyaktaye mānāntaraṁ nākāṅkṣitavyaṁ niṣphalatvāt, anavasthānāc ca.

[700]

तस्मान्न सिद्ध इत्येव संभाव्येत प्रमान्तरम् ।
नरोक्तौ मान्तरापेक्षा तेन मान्तरसंभवः ॥ ७०० ॥

Therefore, merely because a thing is an existent there is no need for another *pramāṇa*. As regards human statements, there is dependence on other *pramāṇa* because that is possible there.

Thus, just because a text is about an existent reality, it need not necessarily be dependent. With regard to human statements, however, it is intelligible that they are dependent; for, here, a man conveys to another through words what he has already come to know.

[701]

क्रियां विना न संसर्गः पदार्थानामथोच्यते ।
क्रियैवापेक्ष्यतां तर्हि किं न सिद्धं विधिं विना ॥ ७०१ ॥

If it be said that without *kriyā* (verb) the word-senses will not combine, then let *kriyā* alone be depended on. What, then, is not established without injunction?

(1f) Now, as for the alternative that injunction is required for relating the word-senses; (*vide* v. 661) what is it that is required here? If it is the verb (*kriyā*) that is required to combine the word-senses, let it be. How does it follow from this that the injunction to know is also required?

NTV—na vidheḥ kiñcit prayojanam astī 'ti pariharati—kriyaive 'ti. tathā hi śrutayo vidhiṁ vinā janikriyādvāreṇa brahma pratipādayanti.

[702]

क्रिया चापेक्ष्यमाणाऽपि न या काचिदपेक्ष्यते ।
योग्यत्वहेतुतस्तर्हि साऽस्त्येवास्यादिका श्रुतौ ॥ ७०२ ॥

Even though a verb is required, it is not any verb that is required; if the requirement is competency or fitness, then there it is in *Śruti*, in *art*, etc. (That thou art).

If a verb, that is competent, is required, then we have it in the text 'That thou *art* (*asi*).'

NTV—na hi kriyā-dvāreṇaiva padārthānāṁ saṁsarga iti niyamo 'sti, kriyām antareṇā 'pi padārthānāṁ saṁsarga-darśanāt.

[703]

अकर्मकत्वादस्यादेर्न तावत्कर्म विद्यते ।
अभूतभवनं चार्थे नित्यत्वादात्मनश्च न ॥ ७०३ ॥

Since *art*, etc., are intransitive, there exists no object; also, there is no becoming of what has not been, because the self is eternal.

Now, it may be urged, 'Let the action indicated by that verb be enjoined, because the fruit is dependent on the enjoined action.'

Here, what is the fruit? Is it an excellence created in the object? Or, is it coming into being of what has not been? Or, is it the knowledge of the relation between the *jīva* and *Brahman?*

It cannot be the first, because verbs such as 'art' have no object; they are intransitive. It cannot be the second, because the *jīva* is not to *become Brahman;* for it is that already.

[704]

असंसृष्टात्मबोधित्वान्नापि संसर्गधीरतः ।
स आत्मेत्यभिसंबन्धान्नापि सत्ता सतोच्यते ॥ ७०४ ॥

Because the non-relational self is taught, there is no cognition of relation; and because it is stated 'He is the Self', the term does not mean the generic nature 'existence'.

The third alternative too is not sound. The text 'That thou art' teaches sameness of essence; it does not convey any relation between the *jīva* and *Brahman.*

It may be said that the text 'Existence alone, dear one, etc.,' declares that Brahman is the generic nature 'existence,' and that the other text ' That thou art' specifies that reality as the self. But this is not proper; for, the self is devoid of generic nature and special feature. If it had these, it would become the not-self. So, it is wrong to hold that an injunction is required for bringing about the relation of the generic existence, *Brahman,* with a speciality.

[705]

शब्दाद्यगोचरोऽर्थोऽतो लक्षणापाश्रयाच्छ्रुतौ ।
सदित्यादिपदैरात्मा साक्षान्नः प्रतिपाद्यते ॥ ७०५ ॥

Therefore, for us in Scripture the words, *sat*, etc., directly teach, through secondary implication (*lakṣaṇā*), the self, a reality which is beyond the scope of words.

Scripture teaches the unconditioned reality through implication (*lakṣaṇā*)—a reality which does not have the distinction of generic and special. This reality cannot be taught through words with their express meanings, because categories such as generic nature, etc., do not apply to it. So, it is the secondary implication (*lakṣaṇā*) of words that should be understood in regard to the teaching of Scripture.

AVS — sadādi-padais tarhi kiṁ pratipādyam iti nirviśeṣam advayānanda-lakṣaṇaṁ pratyagbhūtaṁ brahma lakṣaṇāvṛttyā pratipādyam.

[706]

यदाऽपि मानयोग्यत्वं सत्त्वं तच्च प्रतीयते ।
तदाऽपि वस्तुपरता नाऽऽगमस्य विहन्यते ॥ ७०६ ॥

Even if existence (*sattva*) be understood as what is competent to be known through *pramāṇa*, Scripture having for purport reality is not impaired.

We have maintained so far the *siddhānta* that, in respect of *Brahman* which is existence-consciousness-bliss, the Vedānta is independent *pramāṇa*. Now, we shall argue that, even if 'existence' were the content of other *pramāṇas*, and if that itself is made known by Vedānta, there is no dependence of the Vedānta on those other *pramāṇas*.

We ask: are the other *pramāṇas* external to the object of knowledge or not? If they are external, then fitness to be known belongs to the object, and the Vedānta texts may reveal it independently, because they are competent by themselves.

[707]

मान्तरेणापि संबद्धमर्थं वाक्यं प्रबोधयत् ।
मानतां न जहात्येव जगत्याप्तवचो यथा ॥ ७०७ ॥

A sentence making known a sense related to other *pramāṇas* does not cease to be a *pramāṇa*, even as the words of a trustworthy person in the world.

Even if the other *pramāṇas* are not external to the sphere of the object, the Vedānta texts do not become invalid. These texts may well validly make known a sense which is the content of other *pramāṇas*. For example, the statement made by a trustworthy person (*āpta*) does not become invalid simply because it relates to a matter already known otherwise.

NKL—māntarāvagata-gamakalaukikavākyasyaiva vedāntānām api prāmāṇyam.

NTV — loke āptavākyaṁ yathā mānāntara-saṁbhinnārtham api pramāṇam evaṁ vedāntavākyāny apī 'ty arthaḥ.

[708]

ज्ञातः सोऽर्थो मयेत्यत्र नाऽऽप्तवाक्यं विहन्यते ।
मानान्तरव्यपेक्षत्वाद्विहन्येतार्थनिश्चितौ ॥ ७०८ ॥

"That sense has been understood by me". Here the statement of the trustworthy person is not destroyed. As regards the determination of the sense (or object), it may be impeded, because that depends on other *pramāṇas*.

The statement of the trustworthy person is independently valid so far as that person is concerned. The knowledge is of the form: "This sense has been known by me." As regards this knowledge, there is no dependence on any other *pramāṇa*. As for the validity of the sense of the statement, that depends on the knowledge of the speaker. And so it is not independently valid.

AVS—āptavākyaṁ vaktṛjñāne nirapekṣaṁ pramāṇam.

[709]

मायोगेऽपि न मानत्वमनाप्तवचसः क्वचित् ।
तेनाऽऽप्तवाक्यं मायोगे मानादर्थेऽपि निष्ठितम् ॥ ७०९ ॥

The words of an untrustworthy person are nowhere authoritative, though associated with other *pramāṇas;* therefore not only are the words of a trustworthy person valid but the sense also, even though known through the other *pramāṇas*.

The statement of the trustworthy person is valid in respect of the sense through the knowledge of the speaker.

AVS—anāptavākyaṁ vaktṛjñāne 'pi na mānam.

[710–711]

एवं च सति वेदान्ता यदि मानमलौकिकम् ।
प्रबोधयन्ति विध्वस्तनिखिलद्वैतगोचरम् ॥ ७१० ॥
कथं तेषाममानत्वं तदा स्यादाप्तवाक्यवत् ।
अर्थासिद्धिश्च मासिद्धौ सिद्धैवेति न साध्यते ॥ ७११ ॥

And this being so, when the Vedāntas generate valid knowledge which is transcendental and which has for its sphere the destruction of the entire duality, how

can they be invalid, even as the words of a trustworthy person are not invalid? When the validity (of the Vedāntas) is established the object (Brahman) is also established, and so it is not to be established.

The statement of the trustworthy person was given as an example. The argument so far has been that the statement can be valid even though it has a content which has been known through some other *pramāṇa*. Now the nature of the exemplified is explained. Just as at the time the knowledge of the speaker is ascertained from his statement, the sense also is ascertained, even so when the Vedānta texts are known to be valid, their content *Brahman* also is established. When the said validity is either generated or known from the Vedānta texts, then Brahman-knowledge also is generated, and there is no need for any further *pramāṇa* to make known *Brahman*. Hence the Vedānta texts have independent validity in respect of Brahman-knowledge.

NKL—evam api vedāntānām vastuparatva-pratijñāhānir atrā 'ha, arthasiddhiś ceti. māsiddhau svarūpabodhasya vākyajanya-buddhivṛtti-vyāptau satyām arthasiddhir aikātmyaviṣayājñāna-nivṛttiḥ siddhaiveti. na punar vedāntaiḥ sādhyata iti nivarttakatvena vastuni prāmāṇyam ity arthaḥ.

NTV—yathaiva laukika-vākyaṁ svaprameya-pramāṇāntara-dvāreṇa arthe pramāṇam evaṁ vedāntā api brahmātmaikatvā 'nubhave nirapekṣaṁ pramāṇam tad-dvāreṇa brahmātmaikatve 'pi mānam.

AVS—svarūpa-jñānaṁ brahmātmaikatve pramāṇam, tatra jñāne vedaśiraḥ pramāṇam.....ato brahmātmaikatva-sādhaka-svarūpa-jñāna-sādhakatvam eva vedaśirasas tadartha-sādhakatvam.....yathā puruṣa-vākyo vaktṛ-jñāne pramāṇam arthe ca tad-balāt pramāṇam ity etad upapadyata eva.

[712]

किंच चिद्धत्वसंबन्धादैकात्म्ये मान्तरानुमा ।
यथैवं कार्यतायोगान्नियोगेऽप्यनुमा न किम् ॥ ७१२ ॥

Further, if other *pramāṇas* be inferred in respect of the oneness of self because it is related to what is existent (*siddha*), similarly, why should there be no inference in regard to the *niyoga* which is related to what is to be done (*kārya*)?

It cannot be contended that other *pramāṇas* are possible in the case of *Brahman* because it is an existent; for, if that were so, even in the case of *niyoga* there should be admitted the possibility of other *pramāṇas* as in the case of direction, etc. And so, if a text relating to *niyoga* could be independently valid, a text about reality also could be so valid in the same way.

NKL—aikātmyaṁ māntara-gamyaṁ siddhatvāt ghaṭavad ity anumāyāṁ, niyogo māntara-gamyaḥ kāryatvād adhyeṣaṇavad ity anumānāt tan-niṣṭhasyāpi sāpekṣatvam ity arthaḥ.

[713]

नियोगस्यापि कार्यत्वं प्रेषणाध्येषणादिभिः ।
समं तद्धर्मनैवास्य संबन्धग्रहणं यतः ॥ ७१३ ॥

Of the *niyoga* too, the nature of what is to be done (*kāryatva*) is the same as of direction and entreaties; for through that channel alone its relation (to meaning) is understood.

It cannot be maintained that there is no parity between *niyoga* on the one hand and direction, etc., on the other. The nature of what-is-to-be-done *(kāryatva)* is the same. Hence, the *probans* mentioned above is valid.

NKL—utkṛṣṭena nikṛṣṭam prati vyāpāraḥ preṣaṇā, satkārapūrvako vyāpāro 'dhyeṣaṇā, ādi-padena nimantraṇādi-saṅgraḥaḥ.

[714]

परायत्तात्मलाभत्वं नियोगस्येह कार्यता ।
कार्यैर्मान्तरगम्यैः सा न कथंचिद्विशिष्यते ॥ ७१४ ॥

The nature of what is to be done (*kāryatā*) in the case of *niyoga* is an accomplishment brought *in* by something else, *i.e.*, by *kāryas* understood through other *pramāṇas:* and that by no means is distinct.

Moreover, the to-be-done nature of *niyoga* is ascertained through other *pramāṇas*. We may formulate the inference thus; *niyoga* is known through other *pramāṇas*, as its being is dependent on something else, like the pot.

NKL—niyogo māntara-gamyaḥ parādhīnātmalābhatvāt ghaṭavat.

NTV—sukhaviśeṣakāmī kṛti-sādhyatvaṁ praiṣādīnāṁ niyogasya ca tulyam, niratiśaya sukhakāmī kṛti-sādhyatvam niyogasya aprasiddhaṁ svargādes sātiśayatvād ity arthaḥ.

[715]

यत्त्वसाधारणं तस्य कार्यत्वमिति भण्यते ।
लौकिकेष्वपि कार्येषु तन्नैव विनिवार्यते ॥ ७१५ ॥

If it be said that its nature of being *kārya* is something uncommon, then that cannot be excluded from the *kāryas* of the world also.

If it be said that *niyoga* is what-is-to-be-done in an uncommon sense, then that statement would apply to secular *kāryas* also. There is no distinction between *niyoga* and direction, etc., because each is what is accomplished by an act.

NTV—sukhaviśeṣakāmī-kṛtyuddeśyatvaṁ praiṣādiṣvapi samānaṁ svargasyāpi sukhaviśeṣatayā laukikatvād ity arthaḥ.

AVS—yathā niyoga-sādhyatvaṁ niyogasyaiva, tathā paṭāder api, na hi paṭasya sādhyatā ghaṭasya bhavati.

[716]

अथासाधारणज्ञानपरिच्छेद्यत्वमिष्यते ।
तच्च सर्वपदार्थानां न दण्डैर्विनिवार्यते ॥ ७१६ ॥

If it be urged that (in the case of the *niyoga*) there is determination by some unique knowledge, then that cannot be prevented by batons in the case of anything.

If it be said that the to-be-done character of *niyoga* consists in its being the content of the knowledge that it is to be done, that would be true of direction, etc., also.

[717]

प्रमाणायत्तमेतावत्स्वप्रमेयावभासनम् ।
कार्यताऽकार्यता वाऽत्र मेयायत्ता न मानतः ॥ ७१७ ॥

This much only is occasioned by *pramāṇa*, viz., the illumination of the object of knowledge; whether something is to be done or not to be done depends on the object, not on the *pramāṇa*.

Moreover, if *niyoga* is the content of the knowledge of what-is-to-be-done, there would be for it the nature of being made known by a *pramāṇa* other than Scripture. Scripture only sets forth such matters as 'This is the means to what is desired','This is the means to what is not desired', etc. The cognitions 'This is to be done', 'This is not to be done', etc., are not conveyed by Scripture. These latter arise in the mind thus: 'This is the means to what I desire:

therefore, I should accomplish it', 'This other is contrary to what I desire; therefore, I should avoid it.' So, *niyoga* would thus be the content of the mental perception of what-is-to-be-done.

NTV—ayam arthaḥ—vedavākyam idam iṣṭasādhanam idam aniṣṭasādhanam iti vā bodhayati nedaṁ kartavyam nedam akartavyam iti ca bodhayati, paścāt tu idam kartavyam idam na kartavyam iti mānasapratyaya upajāyate na tau śāstrārthau iti.

AVS—vedaśāstram idam iṣṭasādhanam idam aniṣṭasādhanam iti bodhayati, nedaṁ kartavyam idam akartavyam iti, tau tu pratyayau mānasau.

[718]

सिद्धत्वहेतुको योऽपि दोष ऐकात्म्य उच्यते ।
नियोगस्यापि संसिद्धौ स दोषो नापनुद्यते ॥ ७१८ ॥

The defect which is said to be caused in the case of the oneness of Self on account of its nature as existent—that defect cannot be warded off in the case of *niyoga* also, when it is established.

To the argument of the opponent that *Brahman* is known through other *pramāṇas* because it is an existent, it was replied above that *niyoga* too is known through other *pramāṇas*, though on the ground of some other reason. Now, the opponent's reason itself is given for proving that *niyoga* is known through other *pramāṇas*.

It is maintained by the *Mīmāṁsaka* that *niyoga* is only what-is-to-be-accomplished (*sādhya*) and not an established entity (*siddha*). But he is to be asked: When the appropriate action has been done, does *niyoga* get established or not? On the first alternative, *niyoga* becomes an established entity; and the defect pointed out by the opponent in the case of *Brahman* would affect *niyoga* also.

NKL—anuṣṭhānottarakālaṁ niyogasyā 'pi siddher ity arthaḥ.

NTV—kiñca vidyamānatvena brahmaṇi mānāntarānupraveśa-doṣo niyogepi samānaḥ, niyogasyāpi anuṣṭhānottarakālaṁ sattvābhyupagamāt.

[719]

यागादिविषयासिद्ध्या न चासौ न प्रसिध्यति ।
विध्युक्तेस्तदसंसिद्धौ निष्फलत्वं प्रसज्यते ॥ ७१९ ॥

Nor may it said that this (*niyoga*) is not established because the content of the sacrifice, etc., has not been accomplished; for if that is not established, the statement of the injunction would be futile.

It is not possible for the opponent to put forward the second alternative. If *niyoga* is not accomplished through the performance of sacrifice, etc., that performance itself would be futile. This would result in the futility of the injunctive text.

AVS—vidhi-vākyasya nairarthakya-prasaṅgāt.

[720]

ऐकात्म्यवस्तुयाथात्म्यप्रकाशनपटीयसः ।
वचसस्त्वतिरेकेण किं मानं तद्धुरं वहेत् ॥ ७२० ॥

Other than the texts which clearly expound the true nature of reality as the one Self, what *pramāṇa* can accomplish that task?

So far the argument has been that, assuming that *Brahman* is known through other *pramāṇas*, it is easy to show that *niyoga* too is the content of other *pramāṇas*. Now it is stated that in respect of *Brahman* no *pramāṇa* other than the Vedānta texts is possible. There is no evidence for maintaining that there are other evidences for *Brahman*.

NKL—brahmaṇi māntarānupraveśam abhyupagamya pratibandyā vedānta-prāmāṇyam sādhitaṁ, idānīṁ tat-saṁbhāvanā nāstīti āha—aikātmyeti.

NTV—na kimapi mānam aikātmya-bodhāya pravartate rūpādi-hīnasya tasya mānāntarāyogyatvāt.

[721]

मात्रादिसव्यपेक्षं सद्यत्र ज्ञानं प्रजायते ।
तत्रैव मान्तरापेक्षा न तु विध्वस्तभेदके ॥ ७२१ ॥

Where knowledge is generated as depending on the knower, etc., it is only there that there is need for other *pramāṇas;* not where all difference has been destroyed.

It cannot be argued that *Brahman* is known through other *pramāṇas* because it is not what-is-to-be-done (*a-kārya*) like pot; for the argument would hold good only in the case of a thing whose knowledge involves the distinction of cognizer, etc. In the case of *Brahman*, however, this distinction is not possible.

NKL—aikātmyaṁ māntara-gamyaṁ bhāvatvāt kumbhavad iti cet, na, jaḍatvopādheḥ.

[722]

विध्यर्थाधीनसंसर्गाः पदार्था वैदिकोक्तिषु ।
लोके मान्तरसंसिद्धसंसर्गा रचनाबलात् ॥ ७२२ ॥

"In Vedic texts the senses of words are related as dependent on the sense of injunction (i.e., *liṅ*, etc.); in the world, the relations are as established by other *pramāṇas*, on the strength of the arrangement.

Here the opponent objects: Even though in the case of *Brahman* the application of other *pramāṇas* be denied, the Vedānta texts cannot become *pramāṇa* by themselves. For what causes the combination of words, making them meaningful, is not found in the case of the Vedānta texts. The words in a Vedic text can convey meaning only when they relate to an injunctive suffix, *liṅ*, etc. In the case of secular words, their combination is caused by other *pramāṇas*, as is made known by the order of their arrangement, etc.

NKL—vedānta-padārtha-saṁsargo niyogādhīnaḥ vaidika-saṁsargatvāt karmavākya-padārtha-saṁsargavat.

AVS—vede 'pi vidhyadhīnaḥ padārtha-saṁsargo loke pramāntarādhīno racanānyathānupapattyā.

[723]

रचना च पदार्थानां विवक्षापूर्विकैव तु ।
प्रमाणान्तरगम्येऽर्थे विवक्षा च व्यवस्थिता ॥ ७२३ ॥

"And the arrangement of word-senses is preceded by the intention of the speaker; and the intention has reference to the sense which is understood through other *pramāṇas*.

Here the opponent explains how the combination of secular words is dependent on other *pramāṇas*.

AVS—pramāṇāntareṇā 'rtham adhigamya vivakṣitvā para-pratipattaye vākya-viracanāl loke saṁsargasya pramāntarādhīnatva-siddhiḥ.

[724]

एवं च सति वेदान्तवाक्यार्थप्रत्ययो भ्रमः ।
उत्खातविधिको लोके तोयबुद्धिरिवोषरे ॥ ७२४ ॥

"This being so, to think that Vedānta texts yield knowledge in the absence of injunction is a delusion, as is the empirical knowledge of water in a mirage."

The opponent concludes: What makes the Vedic words combine is injunction. In the case of secular words the combination is caused by other *pramāṇas*. As regards the Vedānta texts, they have no author and therefore are not secular and you do not accept an injunction. So, the knowledge of their sense must be illusory, even as the knowledge of water in a mirage is.

[725-726a]

इत्युक्ते परिहाराय शृणु यद्भण्यतेऽधुना ।
पदार्थसंगतेः कस्माद्विध्यधीनत्वमाहृतम् ॥ ७२५ ॥
पदार्थान्तरतन्त्रत्वं कस्माद्धेतोर्न कल्प्यते ।

If this be said, listen now to what is stated in reply. Why do you say that the relation of word-senses is dependent on injunction? And on what grounds do you not assume that it depends on other word-senses?

Siddhānta.—What causes the Vedic words—in fact, any words—to combine is there in the case of the Vedānta texts also. Your assumption that injunction is the cause is groundless. What make words to constitute a sentence are compatibility, expectancy, and proximity. These do characterize the words of the Vedānta texts. Therefore, the knowledge of their sense cannot be illusory.

NKL—yogyetarapadārthādhīnaḥ saṁsargo na liṅādyarthādhīnaḥ iti pariharati.

NTV—na vidhis sākṣāt saṁsarga-sāmānyaṁ tad-viśeṣaṁ vā bodhayati, tasmāt padārtha-saṅgateḥ vidhyadhīnatvaṁ nādartavyam ... kiṁtu padārthāntara-tantratvam eva kalpayitavyam ... viśiṣṭārthaparatayaiva padānāṁ prayogāt.

[726b-727a]

संसर्गश्चेत्पदार्थानां विनाऽपि विधिना भवेत् ॥ ७२६ ॥
अनर्थको भवेदेवं विधिर्निर्विषयत्वतः ।

"If the relation of word-senses be obtained even without injunction, injunction would then become useless, being without any purpose."

Pūrvapakṣa.—If the relation of words in a sentence be effected by compatibility, etc., injunction would be futile.

[727b-728a]

ननु दोषः समानोऽयं विधेरन्यपदेष्वपि ॥ ७२७ ॥
विशिष्टार्थावगत्यर्थं प्रयुज्यन्तेऽपराण्यपि ।

Now this defect is common to words other than those of injunction; the others also are employed for the sake of making known some qualified sense.

Siddhānta.—If the relation of words depended on the injunctive verb, then, what about the other words like noun, etc.? Will they not become futile? So, all words are employed to signify a qualified sense.

NTV — prayujyanta ity upalakṣaṇaṁ pratipadyanta ity api draṣṭavyam.

nahi loke padaiḥ svārthāḥ svarūpamātra-niṣṭhatayaiva pratipadyante, tathāsati śrotuḥ vyavahārānupapatteḥ, kiṁtu viśiṣṭhārtha-pratyaya-prayuktāḥ tathāsati vyavahāropapatteḥ.

tathā ca sati pratipadārthaṁ saṁsargāpekṣa iti bhāvaḥ.

[728b-729a]

एवं सति विधिः कस्मान्नानर्थक इतीर्यताम् ॥ ७२८ ॥
योगक्षेमसमानत्वादविध्यर्थपदान्तरैः ।

This being so, say, how is not injunction futile? Because its fortunes are the same as of other words which do not have an injunctive sense.

The injunctive verb has no special virtue as against the other words. If you say that the injunctive verb would be futile if the other words are not related to it, we may as well reply that the same would be the fate of the other words.

NKL—ubhayor ānarthakyaṁ samam ity arthaḥ.

[729b-730a]

उच्यते विधिशब्दो हि मान्तराज्ञातगोचरः ॥ ७२९ ॥
न तस्य विषयाक्षेपं मुक्त्वाऽन्यत्र कृतार्थता ।

"This is the reply. The injunctive word, indeed, has for its sphere what is not known through other means of knowledge. Nor does it fulfil itself except through presenting its content (viz. relation).

Pūrvapakṣa.—The difference between the injunctive verb (with suffix *liṅ*, etc.) and the other words is this: Although the injunctive word has *niyoga* as its sphere, *liṅ.*, etc., will not indicate *niyoga* in the absence of the latter's content which is the relation (*saṁsarga*) of words.

[730b-731a]

मानान्तरप्रसिद्धार्थवादित्वादनुवादकम् ॥ ७३० ॥
विधेरन्यपदं यस्मान्नाऽऽक्षेपोऽतः प्रतीयते ।

"A word other than injunctive words is a restatement, because it is explanatory of what is established by other means of knowledge; therefore implication is not seen in its case."

Other words such as nouns are but re-statements; they do not bring in the relation, as the injunctive word does.

[731b-732a]

अव्युत्पन्नेऽपि संबन्धे विध्यर्थावगमस्तथा ॥ ७३१ ॥
अथ विज्ञातसंबन्धं सिद्धार्थं स्याद्विधायकम् ।

Then, the sense of injunction would be known even when there is no knowledge of the relation. Or, if the relation has been known, then the injunction would relate to what has been established.

Siddhānta.—Admitting that *liṅ*, etc., have for their sense *niyoga* that is not known through any other *pramāṇa*, we ask, do *liṅ*, etc., make known *niyoga* even when the relation between the two is not known, or not? If the first, there would be *niyoga*-prompted activity on the part of one who hears *liṅ*, etc., but has not understood the meaning. If *liṅ*, etc., make known *niyoga* when the relation has been understood, then it would result that they convey a sense that is already known; and there would be no difference between *liṅ*, etc., on the one hand, and nouns, etc., on the other.

[732b-733a]

स्वधर्मं च पदं जह्यात्संबन्धज्ञाननिह्नुतौ ॥ ७३२ ॥
तस्माद्विज्ञातसंबन्धं पदं सर्वत्र बोधकम् ।

And, if the knowledge of relation is denied, a word would lose its nature (*dharma*); therefore, everywhere word conveys meaning only when the relation is known.

It is wrong to hold that *liṅ*, etc., convey their sense, even when their potency remains unknown. A word conveys its sense only when the relation between the two is known, not otherwise. This applies to both secular and Vedic words.

NTV—saṁbandhajñānāpekṣayā bodhakatvaṁ pada-dharmaḥ, tan-nirapekṣatayā bodhakatvaṁ vākya-dharmaḥ.

tasmāt gṛhīta-saṁbandham eva loke vede ca padaṁ padārtha-bodhakaṁ saṁsarga-bodhakaṁ ca.

yady api mānāntara-siddhārthaṁ padam anuvādakaṁ tathāpi loka-vedayoḥ pramāṇāntareṇa padārthānāṁ saṁsarga-yogyatāvagame satyapi pūrvam eva saṁsargaṁ śrotā budhyate, apūrvāgamārthatvāt vākya-proyogasya, anyathā vākya-prayoga-vaiyarthyāt.

[733b-735]

इतोऽन्यथा कल्प्यमाने सर्वं स्यादसमञ्जसम् ॥ ७३३ ॥

वाक्यवाक्यार्थयोगश्चेद्वाच्यवाचकलक्षणः ।
तद्विशेषैकनिष्ठत्वान्न वः संबन्धधीर्भवेत् ॥ ७३४ ॥

न विशेषान्तरे वृत्तिर्विशेषस्यास्ति गोत्ववत् ।
नैराकाङ्क्ष्येण तत्सिद्धेः संबन्धोऽतो न गृह्यते ॥ ७३५ ॥

If it be assumed otherwise, everything will be inconsistent. If it be said that the relation of expression and expressed is as between a sentence and sentence-sense, then, since each sentence would refer to a distinct content, there would be no knowledge of relation. A particular content has no capacity for referring to another content, e.g., cowness. Since each is established independently, the relation would not be understood.

If it be said that, although in the world words require the apprehension of potency, in the Veda they do not require this, there would result a number of defects: (1) Words would go beyond their own nature, which is to convey their sense being dependent on the apprehension of the relation between them and their sense. (2) Words would play the role of sentences. (3) There would be transgression of the rule that the Vedic words are similar to the secular words in the matter of conveying their sense. These are the inconsistencies.

It may be said that the relation of expression and expressed is between sentence and sentence-sense, and not between word and word-sense, and that, since the sentence-sense which is *niyoga* is not made known by other *pramāṇas* there is not the said defect. But this statement is not sound. If each sentence has a unique sense, there would be no principle in language. The sentence 'Bring the cow' would have nothing in common with the sentence 'Tie the cow.' This, however, is not the case. 'Cowness' is meaningful only in dependence on particular cows such as *khaṇḍa;* and 'bringing' is significant because it occurs in other sentences such as 'Bring the horse.' Moreover, if the relation of a sentence to its sense is apprehended, then it must be admitted that that sense is made known through other *pramāṇas.* Therefore, the knowledge of relation is with reference to words and not sentences. And, when the relation remains unknown, a word cannot convey its sense.

[736-737a]

संबन्धं मन्यते योऽपि शाब्दबोधानुसारिणीम् ।
दृष्ट्वेहां श्रोतृगां सोऽपि न सम्यगभिमन्यते ॥ ७३६ ॥
श्रोतृस्थकार्यलिङ्गत्वात्कथं शब्दैकगोचरः ।

He who holds that the relation is after seeing the act of the hearer (intermediate elder) in accordance with the knowledge derived from words—he does not think

well; for since it (*niyoga*) is inferred from the act of the hearer, how can it be the sphere of words alone?

The *niyogavādin* may argue thus: The superior elder (grandfather) gives an order to the intermediate elder (father). The boy (son) sees the intermediate elder carry out the order. He connects the words he hears with the action he sees. Thus he understands the relation between *liṅ*, etc., and *niyoga*.

Here it is to be pointed out that the argument is not valid. The argument would involve reciprocal dependence thus: The cognition of *niyoga* arises from the word whose relation has been known; and from the cognition of *niyoga* there takes place the knowledge of relation. Even if this defect be removed somehow, it would be impossible to show that *niyoga* is known through word alone, for according to the explanation given by the Mīmāṁsaka it is inferred from activity.

[737b-738a]

तस्यापि शब्दपूर्वत्वादिति चेल्लिङ्गपूर्वतः ॥ ७३७ ॥
कस्मान्न शब्दबोधोऽपि ह्यनुमानपुरःसरः ।

If that too is said to be understood from word before any inference, then why should not the knowledge of word also be preceded by inference?

If it be said that inference based on the activity of the intermediate elder is preceded by the *niyoga* understood from the words of the superior elder, we reply that for the hearer the knowledge of *niyoga* from the words is preceded by the inference. Thus there is parity between the inference and the words.

NTV—śrotṛ-gataśabdajñānam api anumāna-pūrvakam ity anumānaika-gocaratā kiṁ na syāt.

[738b-739a]

नियोगं शब्दतो बुद्ध्वा योऽपि श्रोता प्रवर्तते ॥ ७३८ ॥
तस्याप्यनुमितेरेव शब्दार्थप्रत्ययो भवेत् ।

The hearer who is active after knowing the *niyoga* from the word—for him also the knowledge of word-sense there will be only through inference.

We may even say that the inference has precedence over the words. Activity in respect of the sense of *liṅ*, etc., at the time of learning does depend on the inference. So, the inference comes first.

NTV—sva-vyutpatti-kāle anumānād eva śrotuḥ niyogāvagamaḥ na śabdāt.

[739b-740a]

प्रत्यक्षगम्यकार्येण नियोगस्यानुमेयतः ॥ ७३९ ॥
प्रत्यक्षकार्यवत्तस्य लौकिकत्वं प्रसज्यते ।

Since the *niyoga* is inferred from the *kārya* which is known by perception, there is the contingency of its becoming secular, like the perceived *kārya*.

Since the activity that is seen is the *probans* for inferring *niyoga*, verbal testimony (words) cannot be regarded as the only *pramāṇa* for *niyoga*, even as for a pot.

NKL—indriya-gamya-pravṛttirūpa-kāryaliṅgānumeyatvāt ghaṭavan na śabdaikagamyatvam.

AVS—ghaṭādivan niyogaḥ śabdaika-gamyo na bhavati.

[740b-741a]

न चेत्कार्यं नियोगः स्यात्कोऽर्थो यागादिसिद्धितः ॥ ७४० ॥
सिद्धवस्त्ववबोधित्वं विधेरपि तदा भवेत् ।

If the *niyoga* is not a *kārya*, then for what purpose is the accomplishment of sacrifice, etc.? And in that case, even the injunction would be making known an existent thing.

It may be urged that pot is no illustration for *niyoga*, as *niyoga* does not belong to the three-fold time and is not what is produced. But we reply: if *niyoga* is not what is produced, the performance of sacrifice, etc., is futile. Nor may it be said that the performance of sacrifice is for the sake of heaven, for that is not possible except through *niyoga*. Moreover, if *niyoga* is not what is produced, and as its unreality is not acceptable to you, you must necessarily admit that *niyoga* is an eternally established entity. If that be so, *liṅ*, etc., which convey knowledge of it must be taken as making known what is established.

[741b-742a]

प्राथम्यं चात्र दुर्लक्ष्यं बीजतत्कार्ययोरिव ॥ ७४१ ॥
शब्दानुमानयोर्नातः शब्दप्रथमतेष्यते ।

Between word and inference it is difficult to indicate the priority, as between seed and its effect; therefore, it cannot be stated that word is prior.

Verbal testimony and the inference from activity are related as seed and sprout. And so, it cannot be maintained that *niyoga* is understood from verbal testimony alone.

NTV — bījāṅkurayor iva śabdānumānayor ekasya prāthamyaṁ vyavasthāpayituṁ na śakyaṁ śabdāvagatasyā 'numānād anumitasya viditasaṅgateḥ śabdāvagamāt.

[742b-743a]

यद्वाऽनुमानमेवात्र शब्दात्पूर्वं हि युज्यते ॥ ७४२ ॥
नाविज्ञातसंगतिः शब्दो गमकोऽतोऽनुवादकः ।

Or, it is proper to state here that inference alone is prior to word; for a word whose relation has not been understood does not make known (its sense); it will only restate.

Of the two, verbal testimony and inference from activity, the latter is primary; for, as has been shown already, words will convey their meaning only when their potency has been known. If *niyoga* is known through inference, *liṅ*, etc., must be regarded as re-stating it.

[743b-744a]

बुध्यते योऽनुमानेन शब्दबुद्धं न वेत्ति सः ॥ ७४३ ॥
भिन्ने भिन्नेऽपि मेये धीर्नानुवादोऽन्यबोद्धरि ।

He (the child) who understands through inference does not know what is revealed by the word; the knowledge of that or a different object of cognition is not a re-statement in the case of another knower.

Nor may it be contended that the inference may be a re-statement; for the child who hears the words does not understand the sense; it understands only as an inference from the intermediate elder's activity. It is true that the child's inference is subsequent to its hearing the words of the superior elder. But thereby the child's inference does not become a re-statement. When a pot has been seen by Caitra, and when subsequently Maitra sees the pot or some other, the knowledge that Maitra has is not of the nature of a re-statement.

NTV — sarva-pratipattṛṇām avyutpanna-śabdāt bodhotpatty anupapatteḥ.

[744b-745a]

प्रवृत्तिहेतुमात्रं च प्रवृत्त्याऽल्पानुमीयते ॥ ७४४ ॥
लौकिकेनापि तत्सिद्धेर्नास्ति मानमलौकिके ।

The mere cause of activity is here inferred from the activity; since that is achieved even through what is secular, there is no evidence for the supernormal (*niyoga*).

Admitting for the sake of argument that *niyoga* is inferred from activity, it was shown earlier that *niyoga* is on a par with other things. Here it is stated that *niyoga* is not even what is inferred from activity. He who hears the words and sees the activity infers only the cause of that activity, and not any supernormal *niyoga*.

NTV—vaidikīṣv api pravṛttiṣu laukika eva pravṛttihetur yuktaḥ lokāvagata-sāmarthyasyaiva śabdasya vede 'pi bodhakatva-niyamāt.

AVS—ayam arthaḥ-madhyamavṛddha-pravṛttyā pravṛttihetor iṣṭasādhanatvasyā 'numitatvāt tatraiva liṅādi-śabdasya śaktigrahaṇān nālaukikaniyogasiddhir iti.

[745b-746a]

कार्यबुद्ध्यैव संव्याप्तिः प्रवृत्तेर्न च गम्यते ॥ ७४५ ॥

सर्पादिवस्तुबोधेऽपि प्रवृत्तिर्वीक्ष्यते यतः ।

There is no pervasion of activity exclusively by the cognition of what is to be done; for activity is seen also to follow the cognition of things like serpent, etc.

There is no rule that all activity with deliberation is caused by the cognition of what-is-to-be-done; for there is seen activity even in the absence of the cognition of what-is-to-be-done. The proper rule of pervasion is: that which is activity with deliberation is caused by the cognition that that activity is the means to what is desired. For example, the activity of removing a serpent from one's way is caused by the cognition that that activity will destroy something that is harmful.

NKL—palāyana-pravṛttau sarpādijñānasya ahetutvād ity arthaḥ.

[746b-747a]

पुंस्प्रवृत्तेः फलं कार्यं विध्यर्थश्चापि कारणम् ॥ ७४६ ॥
प्रवृत्तिहेतुर्न फलं भवतैवाभिधीयते ।

The fruit of human action is *kārya*; and the sense of the injunction is the cause. The cause of action cannot be the fruit (of action). This is stated by you yourself.

For this reason also, *niyoga* cannot be the cause of activity: you say that *kārya* alone is the prompter of activity, and not the fruit. And, at the same time you establish that *kārya* is the fruit of activity. It is also your view that the fruit cannot be the cause of activity.

NTV—kṛtyuddeśyatayā jñāyamānaṁ hi kāryaṁ pravṛtti-hetuḥ bhavati tadevacet pravṛtteḥ phalaṁ tadā virodhaḥ svakāryāt svayam utpadyata iti.

NKL — kṛtiyogyatvopalakṣita-hitasādhanatvasya pravartakatvaṁ balād āpādayati.

AVS—ayam arthaḥ vidhyartha-śabdena kāryam ucyate, puruṣa-vyāpāra-phalaṁ kāryaṁ tvayocyate, tad eva kāryaṁ pravṛttihetur iti ca. atha ca phalaṁ pravṛttihetur na bhavatīty evaṁ vidho virodho bhavataiva vaktuṁ śakyate. ataḥ phalakāryayor ekatvam abhyupa-gacchatā siddhasya pravṛtti-hetutvaṁ svavācā 'bhyupagatam iti.

nanu bhavatu phalakāryayor aikyam, tathāpi na phalāvasthāyām kāryasya pravṛttihetutvam, kiṁtu kāryāvasthāyam eva, ato na siddhasya pravṛttihetutvam iti cet, na tayor ekatve kālavibhāgakaraṇā 'yogād anyathā ekatvaṁ paribhāṣāmātraṁ syāt.

[747b-748a]

अपसर्प्यस्य सर्पादेर्न च कार्यं फलं मतम् ॥ ७४७ ॥
अनर्थाभावमात्रत्वान्नचाभावः फलं क्वचित् ।

The running away from serpent, etc., which is a *kārya* cannot be the fruit; because it is only the absence of evil; and nowhere is absence (*abhāva*) a fruit.

Assuming that *kārya* is the fruit of human activity, it was argued above that *niyoga* cannot be the cause of activity. Here it is shown that *kārya* is not at all the fruit of activity. The activity of removing the serpent from one's way cannot be cited as an instance of *kārya* being the fruit; for the fruit, there, is only the removal of misery. The absence of misery too is not directly the fruit; it becomes so by manifesting happiness.

NTV—sarvatra sukhaprāptir eva phalaṁ nābhāvaḥ ato 'pasarpaṇād anarthanivṛttāv api sukhaprāptir eva phalam ity arthaḥ.

NKL—duḥkhābhāvasyāpi sukhavyañjakatvena phalatvam ity arthaḥ.

AVS — tad duḥkhābhāvasyāpi na svarūpeṇa phalatvaṁ sukhahetutvena ity arthaḥ.

[748b-749a]

नियोगोऽथ प्रमारूपो विधिशब्दप्रकाशितः ॥ ७४८ ॥

मानान्तरानपेक्षः सन्नाक्षेपकतया प्रमा ।

"Now, the *niyoga* which is made known by the injunctive suffix has the nature of validity; because it does not depend on any other means of knowledge, it is valid by implying (relation)."

Pūrvapakṣa—What is expressed by *liṅ*, etc., viz. *niyoga* has validity; it is not expectant of any other *pramāṇa*; and it is not of the nature of a re-statement. *Niyoga* is not possible without the relation to instrument, etc. So, as implying that, *niyoga* is valid.

[749b-750a]

आक्षेप्तृत्वं न शब्दोत्थं न च मानान्तरात्तथा ॥ ७४९ ॥
अव्युत्पन्नप्रवृत्तिश्चेत्युक्तदोषप्रसङ्गतः ।

The nature of being the implier is not derived from the suffix (*liṅ*, etc.), nor from any other means of knowledge. And, because of the contingency of the aforesaid defect, there would be activity on the part of one who has not understood (the word-sense).

Siddhānta—Niyoga implying the relation—is it established from word or from something else? Not the first: this is not known from *liṅ*, etc., for these latter get exhausted after making *niyoga* known. Nor the second: for it is not seen that some other *pramāṇa* establishes the alleged implication by *niyoga*; if that were so, even *niyoga* would become the content of that *pramāṇa*. And, if *niyoga* were dependent on some other *pramāṇa*, there would be no *apūrvatā* for it.

[750b-751a]

स्वाभ्युपेतनयस्यैव त्यागः प्राप्नोत्यनीप्सितः ॥ ७५० ॥
प्रामाण्यं चास्य यत्रेष्टं श्रुतेस्तत्रास्त्वनेन किम् ।

Without your willing it, you will have to give up the position acceptable to you. The validity of the *niyoga*, where it is desired, there let it be on the basis of Scripture. Of what use is it?

If you say that activity is only for him who has not understood the meaning of *liṅ*, etc., that he has heard, you will be contradicting the view that is acceptable to all schools of thought, viz., that the empirical usage based on verbal testimony is only for him who has understood the meaning.

NTV—yatra niyogasya prāmāṇyam iṣyate śabdasyaiva tatrā 'stu prāmāṇyaṁ kiṁ niyogena?

[751b-752]

क्व चेष्टमस्य मानत्वं न यागादौ स्वशब्दमे ॥ ७५१ ॥

लौकिकोऽपि न संसर्गो विध्यायत्तः स्थितो यतः ।

विध्यभावे हि संसर्गः श्रोतुरस्त्यविधावपि ॥ ७५२ ॥

And, where is its validity desired? Not with reference to sacrifice, etc., where the evidence is the word setting it forth; nor is the relation known from secular usage dependent on injunction, for the hearer understands the relation even in the absence of injunction from a text which is non-injunctive.

Moreover, in respect of what is there validity for *niyoga*? It is not in respect of sacrifice, etc.; for these latter are known from such words as *yāga*, etc., themselves. Nor is it in regard to relation between words and senses; for the relation between the words such as *yāga* and their senses is not dependent on *niyoga*, as it is what belongs to worldly usage. Even in regard to sentences such as 'This is the king's man' which are not commands, the hearer understands the relation between the words and their senses. Since the relation is seen even in the absence of *niyoga*, the relation must be admitted as what is based on worldly usage.

NTV—natāvad yāgādayo niyoge prameyāḥ teṣāṁ yajatyādi-śabda-mānatvād ity āha na yāgādau svaśabda iti. nāpy apūrve saṁsarge niyogaḥ pramāṇam ity āha laukiko 'pī 'ti. vidhipadarahiteṣu laukika-vākyeṣu vidhyarthābhāve 'pi śrotur anadhigatopūrvaḥ saṁsargaḥ pratīyate, devadatta diṣṭyā vardhase, putras te jātaḥ, ityādāv iti hetum āha yato vidhyabhāve 'pī 'ti.

NKL—yāgādi-padārtha-saṁsargo na vidhyadhīno laukikatvād ity arthaḥ ..... rājñaḥ-puruṣaḥ ityādi-vidhivikalavākye saṁsarga-darśanād ity arthaḥ.

[753]

फलसाधनशक्तिश्चेद्विध्यायत्ता भविष्यति ।
नैवं तत्रापि शब्दस्य सामर्थ्यं केन वार्यते ॥ ७५३ ॥

If it be said that the capacity to bring about the fruit depends on injunction, not so; for why should the capacity of the word even there be prevented?

Nor may it be said that *niyoga* is the evidence for sacrifice, etc., being the means to what is desired; for it can be shown even here that the words themselves may convey this meaning.

[754]

तस्मादितरतुल्यत्वान्न विध्यर्थनिबन्धनः ।
संसर्गः स्यात्पदार्थानां सुस्थमेवं विधिं विना ॥ ७५४ ॥

Therefore, because of similarity with others, the connection of word-senses is not dependent on the injunctive sense; this is thus well-settled without injunction.

It has now been established that an injunction is not necessary in the matter of knowledge through verbal testimony. And so, it is settled that there can be knowledge of texts such as 'The self is Brahman' even without an injunction.

NKL—niyogābhāve 'pi vedaprāmāṇyaṁ sustham ity arthaḥ.

[755]

तस्मात्सर्वपदार्थानामाकाङ्क्षायोग्यसन्निधेः ।
परस्पराभिसंबन्धाद्विशिष्टार्थावबोधिता ॥ ७५५ ॥

Therefore, all word-senses convey a qualified meaning by mutual relation, because of expectancy, competency, and proximity.

The relation of word-senses is thus not dependent on injunction. The word-senses get mutually related as conditioned by expectancy, etc. And, it is in this way that words cause the cognition of a qualified sense.

NKL—ayam eti putro rājñaḥ puruṣo 'pasāryatām ity atra rājña-padasya putra-padādinā 'nvitasya nirākāṅkṣasya puruṣa-padena anvayād ākāṅkṣā saṁbandhakāraṇam, agninā siñced ityādau ayogyayor ananvayād yogyatā 'pi kāraṇam, bhinnavākyagatayor asaṁsargāt sannidhir api hetur ity arthaḥ.

[756-757]

ननूत्पत्तिविधिर्यद्वत्कर्मबोधे व्यवस्थितः ।
आत्मज्ञानविधिस्तद्वदात्मबोधेऽवतिष्ठताम् ॥ ७५६ ॥
कर्माधिकारवच्चात्र प्रवृत्तिरपि सेत्स्यति ।
अप्रवृत्तप्रवृत्तिश्च तथाऽबुद्धार्थबोधनम् ॥ ७५७ ॥

"Now, as originative injunction (*utpattividhi*) is established in the case of knowledge of rites, so also let there be established the injunction of self-knowledge in respect of knowledge of the self. And, like eligibility for rites, here activity will also result: the activity of one who has not been active, and likewise the knowledge of a sense not already known".

Here the *pūrvapakṣin* seeks to show that there are two types of injunction in regard to the Vedānta texts: originative injunction (*utpatti-vidhi*) and injunction of eligibility (*adhikāra-vidhi*) 'He is to offer the *agnihotra* oblation' is a case of originative injunction; similarly there is the injunction of self-knowledge in the form, 'The self is to be seen' (*ātmā draṣṭavyaḥ*). There is also the injunction of eligibility in the text 'He who desires release should be active in respect of knowledge' (*mokṣa-kāmaḥ prajñāṁ kurvīta*). The originative injunction makes known what is unknown; the injunction of eligibility makes one who is not active active.

NTV — vastusvarūpamātra - jñānaṁ kartavyatā - jñāna - rahitaṁ pravṛtti-nivṛtti-śūnyam anarthakaṁ, pravṛtti-nivṛtti-prayuktatvāt vākya-pravṛtteḥ, ato vākyasyā 'rthavatvāya vidhiḥ prārthanīyaḥ, anyathā 'narthakyam iti tad anuvadati nanv ityādinā.

NKL—āgneyo 'ṣṭākapālaḥ kartavya ity utpattividhiḥ karma-kartavyatā-jñāne paryavasyati, na pravartayati evaṁ ātmā draṣṭavya iti vidhir jñāna-kartavyatāyāṁ paryavasyati, na pravartayati.....āgneyo 'ṣṭākapāla-ityādinā utpannasya darśapūrṇamāsyāṁ svargakāmo yajeta-ityanena pravṛttiḥ, tadvad vijñāya prajñāṁ kurvīta ity adhikārabalān mokṣakāmino 'vahita-jñāne pravṛttiḥ.

AVS—yathā āgneyo 'ṣṭākapālaḥ kartavya ity utpattividhiḥ karma-kartavyatā-jñāne paryavasyati, na pravartayati, evam ātmā draṣṭavya ity ātmajñāne vidhir ātmajñāna-kartavyatāyām paryavasyati, na pravartayati.

[758]

एवं विधिमिहेच्छन्ति विध्ययोग्येऽपि वस्तुनि ।
विधिरागवशात्केचित्तान्तप्रतीदमथोच्यते ॥ ७५८ ॥

Thus some people, because of attachment to injunctions, desire injunction even in a matter which does not admit of injunction. As against them, this is stated.

The *siddhāntin* introduces his reply.

[759]

कर्मस्वरूपबोधे हि व्यापारो नेष्यते विधेः ।
किंतूत्पन्नस्य सापेक्ष्यादधिकारेण संगतिः ॥ ७५९ ॥

The operation of the injunction is not desired for knowing the nature of ritual only; but also for the connection of what has been originated with the eligibility (*adhikāra*), since it depends on that.

It was stated by the *pūrvapakṣin* that the originative injunction simply makes known what is unknown, i. e. that its function is merely to inform about the nature of a particular ritual. This definition is not satisfactory. The mere knowledge of the nature of a ritual carries no fruit. So, the originative injunction will not stop till there is the application of the ritual through the instrumentality of relation with the *niyoga* leading to the appropriate fruit.

NKL—utpannasya karmaṇaḥ phalākāṅkṣatvād adhikārasaṁbandha-niyogadvārā anuṣṭhāne paryavasyati.

[760]

अधिकारप्रवेशित्वं नाऽऽत्मज्ञानस्य युज्यते ।
यस्याधिकारसंबन्धः स आत्मा न विधीयते ॥ ७६० ॥

Self-knowledge cannot properly be included in the eligibility. He who is related to the eligibility—the self—cannot be the enjoined.

It cannot be urged that the self-knowledge, whose nature is made known by the injunction 'The self is to be seen' is related to eligibility; for the self-knowledge which is said to be enjoined as what is to be gained cannot be the content of an injunction of eligibility. Self-knowledge is not a matter of faith, as heaven is; it has its *pramāṇa*; and also, as it is not dependent on human will or activity, it cannot be related to eligibility. Nor may it be said that since the self is the master, it is related to eligibility, and through that self-knowledge also gets related to eligibility; for it must be first stated which is the self that is so related? Is it the transmigrating soul, or the supreme Self? Although the transmigrating soul is related to eligibility, it cannot be what is enjoined, for it is an established entity. It cannot also be the content of the knowledge that is enjoined; for the transmigrating soul is not the object of knowledge for the text 'The self is to be seen.' As for the supreme Self, that is not at all subject to eligibility. How, then, could self-knowledge become related to eligibility through the supreme Self?

[761]

व्रीह्यादिविषयं यद्बुद्धयत्नेनापि निरूपितम् ।
प्रत्यक्षं नाधिकारानुप्रवेशं प्रतिपद्यते ॥ ७६१ ॥

This is just as perception having for its content rice-grains, etc., howsoever carefully examined, is not seen to enter into the eligibility.

Perception of rice-grains, etc., does not enter into the eligibility for *Darśa-pūrṇamāsa*, through rice-grains, etc. Even so, self-knowledge does not enter into eligibility through the self. Thus, although there is a possibility of the originative injunction in the Vedānta texts, there is no possibility of the injunction of eligibility, etc. The Vedāntic injunction, if there is one, makes known what is unknown.

[762]

अन्योऽप्यनुभवोपायो मननध्यानलक्षणः ।
सोपायो विहितोऽस्त्येव प्रतिपत्तिविधिं विना ॥ ७६२ ॥

"Without there being an injunction to know, there is enjoined the other which is the means to experience consisting in reflection and meditation together with the auxiliaries.

(2) Here the *pūrvapakṣa* is that, although there is no injunction of self-knowledge, there is the injunction of the means thereto, and that this is required in order that the one who desires release may be active.

The means consists of reflection (*manana*) and meditation (*nidi-dhyāsana*); the end is realization (*anubhava, sākṣātkāra*). The auxiliaries are calmness (*śama*), etc.

With this verse commences the consideration of the second alternative mentioned in the notes to v. 661. The view expressed in this alternative is that it is the contemplation of Brahman that is enjoined. (See also note to v. 461b–462a.)

NKL—śābdajñānasyā 'vidheyatve 'pi tad-abhyāsasya vidheyatvād vidhiparatvaṁ vedāntānām śāmādy-aṅga-sahitaḥ sākṣātkāraphalaḥ paśyed-ityādau vidhīyate.

AVS—śābdajñānād anyaḥ sākṣātkaraṇopāyaḥ mananadhyānātmakaḥ paśyed-ityādau vidhīyate.

[763]

दर्शनस्य विधेयत्वात्तत्संबन्धोपलक्षितः ।
प्रसंख्यानात्मकोऽत्रापि प्रयत्नोऽनुभवं प्रति ॥ ७६३ ॥

"Because seeing (*darśana*) is enjoined, that which is implied as related to that, *viz.* the effort called continued meditation (*prasaṅkhyāna*), is also here enjoined for the sake of experience.

He who sponsors the second alternative shows that the third alternative, *viz.* that what is enjoined is direct intuition (*sākṣātkāra*), is not sound. The intuition which is of the nature of the self cannot be enjoined, for that is eternal. Nor is it possible to enjoin the modification of the mind which is of the form of the self, for that is the fruit, being the intuition of happiness. Therefore, by implication, the text 'Thou shalt see' should be understood as enjoining that which is the means thereto, *viz.* continued meditation (*prasaṅkhyāna*).

NTV—darśanasya avidheyatvāt prasaṅkhyāna-lakṣaṇaḥ prayatno vidhīyata iti saṁbandhaḥ. apāstāśeṣaduḥkhā-'natiśayānandā-'dvaya-brahmātma-darśanasya phalarūpatvāt svargādivan na vidheyatvam ity arthaḥ.

[764]

शमाद्यङ्गान्वितः सर्वमात्मेतिस्तुतिभूषणः ।
मननाद्यर्थवत्त्वाय पश्येदिति विधीयते ॥ ७६४ ॥

"That which is associated with the auxiliaries 'calmness', etc., and which is praised in the text 'All this is the self' is enjoined thus: Thou shalt see, in order that reflection, etc., may become meaningful."

Therefore, the text 'Thou shalt see' enjoins meditation as endowed with its auxiliaries, calmness, etc. Texts like 'All this is the self' should not be understood in their primary sense; they are but eulogies. In the text 'The self, verily, dear one, is to be seen, heard, thought about, and meditated on,' the expression 'is to be thought about' is not an injunction; for, if it were to be taken as an injunction, there would be sentence-split. Even if it be regarded as an injunction, it would only be an originative injunction. An injunction of eligibility is necessary; and that we have in 'Thou shalt see.'

NTV—śamadamādayo yamaniyamādayaś ca aṅgatayā vihitāḥ.

[765]

पश्येदिति प्रयत्नश्चेत्फलं स्याद्दर्शनं तदा ।
लक्षणं न प्रयत्नस्य लक्षणं चेत्कथं फलम् ॥ ७६५ ॥

"If in 'Thou shalt see' the effort (*prasaṅkhyāna*) is enjoined, then seeing would be the fruit. It cannot be a characteristic of the effort; if it is a characteristic, how can it be the fruit?

Here the *siddhāntin* objects that the text 'Thou shalt see' cannot enjoin continued meditation (*prasaṅkhyāna*). If meditation is enjoined for the sake of 'seeing', then 'seeing' would be the fruit (*phala*) and not a qualification (*viśeṣaṇa*) of meditation. A fruit is that which is yet to be, whereas a qualification is that which already is. So, it is not possible to enjoin meditation as qualified by 'seeing.'

AVS—siddhaṁ hi lakṣaṇaṁ kākavad atha lakṣaṇaṁ na phalaṁ bhavet siddhatvād anyathā lakṣaṇāyogāt.

[766]

लोके दर्शनसंबद्धं प्रसंख्यानं समीक्षितम् ।
वेदेऽपि किं तथा तत्स्यान्न वाऽतस्तद्विधीयते ॥ ७६६ ॥

"In the world, continued meditation is seen to be related to seeing (*darśana*); (as it is doubted whether) in the Veda too it is so or not, that is enjoined.

The *prasaṅkhyāna-vādin* replies: In the world it is observed in the case of Śāstraic learning, etc., that meditation is related to perception as means to end. The doubt arises whether in the case of the Veda too there is a similar relation or not. In order to remove this doubt meditation is enjoined in the text under discussion 'Thou shalt see'. Here we learn that 'seeing' is the fruit, and that, as indicated thereby, meditation is enjoined as the means.

NTV—vede 'pi prasaṅkhyānād eva darśanaṁ bhavati anyasmād ve 'ti prāpya-prāpti-saṁbhavāt tathaive 'ti niyama-vidhir ity arthaḥ.

NKL—śāstra-śravaṇādau darśanaprasaṅkhyānayoḥ sādhya-sādhana-bhāvo loke siddhaḥ.....prasaṅkhyānaṁ darśana-sādhanaṁ bhavati nave 'ti vicāre, darśanena prasaṅkhyānam upalakṣya darśana-phalena vidhīyate.

[767]

सामान्येनौषधं यद्वज्ज्वरनाशोपलक्षितम् ।
दृष्टं कष्टज्वरेऽप्येवं विशेषेणोपदिश्यते ॥ ७६७ ॥

"The medicine which is ordinarily prescribed for curing fevers, is seen to be taught specifically also in the case of typhoid.

An example is given to substantiate the statement made in the previous verse. A certain decoction is known to cure ordinary fevers. When a difficult case arises, say, of typhoid, there may be a doubt whether the decoction will cure or not. In such a situation, in order to remove the doubt, the decoction is explicitly prescribed.

NKL—kaṣāya-pānaṁ sāmānyena jvara-nivartakaṁ dṛṣṭaṁ, tat kaṣṭa-jvarasya nivartakaṁ naveti sandehe tan-nivartakatvena aṅga-viśeṣa-viśiṣṭaṁ vidhīyate yathā, tathā loke darśana-sādhanaṁ prasaṅkhyānaṁ vede 'pi syāt na ve 'ti viśaye sādhanaṁ syād eve 'ti veśeṣeṇo 'padiśyate.

[768]

अप्यज्ञातफलं साक्षान्मान्तरैर्विधिसंश्रयात् ।
अभावनिश्चयाभावात्प्रसंख्यानं फलाय नः ॥ ७६८ ॥

"Though through other means of knowledge continued meditation may not be known to be related to the fruit, here to us continued meditation bears fruit, because it is dependent on an injunction, and there is not the certainty of its absence.

It may be argued thus: Meditation (*prasaṅkhyāna*) does not have intuition as its fruit, because it is meditation, like secular meditations. The *prasaṅkhyāna-vādin* replies to this argument

saying: although it is not known through *pramāṇas* other than Scripture that meditation has intuition as its fruit, we have to admit that it is so on the strength of the Vedic injunction. There is nothing wrong in this admission because it is not definitely known that meditation is not the means to intuition, and also the injunction of meditation which is transcendental is superior to any human argument.

NTV—paśyed ity atra niyogastāvat śrūyate, sa ca viṣayaṁ niyojyaṁ ca apekṣate, prasaṅkhyānasya ca svarūpaṁ loka-siddhaṁ, vede 'pi saguṇabrahma-vidyāsū 'pāsanādi-śabda-vācyam ihā 'dhyāharaṇīyam.

AVS—samāhito bhūtvā paśyed ity atra samāhita-śabdena prasaṅkhyāna-grahād ato darśana - phalatvena prasaṅkhyāna - vidhir atrā-'vakalpata eva, athā 'tra samāhita-śabdena prasaṅkhyānam na gṛhyate, tathāpy atra darśana-phalatvena vidhānaṁ saṁbhavaty eva. anyatra ātmā vā 're draṣṭavya ityādau nididhyāsitavya iti darśanaphalatvena vihitatvāt.

[769]

पश्वादावेवमेव स्यात्संदिग्धेऽपि विनिश्चयः ।
खपुष्पे त्वनुपायत्वान्निश्चयोऽस्ति विपर्यये ॥ ७६९ ॥

"In the case of cattle, etc. (which are the fruit of the *Citrā* rite), even though there is doubt, there is certainty (of the fruit); in the case of sky-flower, however, because it is not (something to be attained by) a means, there is certainty as to the contrary."

The *prasaṅkhyāna-vādin* completes the present argument: The fruit of meditation is to be assumed on the analogy of the fruit of the *Citrā* rite. Although immediately on the conclusion of the *Citrā* rite, its fruit consisting of cattle is not observed to accrue, it is assumed on the strength of the injunction that the fruit will result.

Similarly, even though meditation may not immediately lead to intuition, we presume that it would on the strength of the injunction.

It may be asked: Why not imagine, on the strength of an injunction, that a sky-flower exists? But there is no point in this objection. The sky-flower is non-existent; it cannot be brought into being by any means. As its non-existence is a settled fact, no injunction can cause its existence; nor can there be any injunction for causing its existence.

NTV—khapuṣpasya tucchatvād eva upāya-sādhyatvābhāvāt na bhavatyeve 'ti viparyaya-niścayopapattau na vidhibalāt tat-kalpanā.

NKL—na kārīryādi-tulyaṁ prasaṅkhyānaṁ kiṁtu citrādi-tulyam.

AVS—paśvādi-phalasya ca anantarādarśane tat-kiṁ janmāntare bhavati na veti vīkṣāyāṁ, na bhavaty eve 'ty abhāva - niścayā - 'bhāvāt vidhibalācca bhavaty eve 'ti kalpyate.

[770]

एवं केचिद्व्यवस्थाप्य प्रसंख्यानविधिं पुनः ।
ऐकात्म्यज्ञानतात्पर्यं तस्यापीच्छन्ति युक्तिभिः ॥ ७७० ॥

Thus some seek to establish the injunction of meditation, and desire therefor, through reasonings, the purportfulness in respect of the knowledge of the oneness of the self.

According to the *prasaṅkhyāna-vādin*, the texts like 'That thou art' assert the nature of reality, and the injunction of meditation is auxiliary thereto.

[771]

विधिस्वातन्त्र्यपक्षे हि किलैकात्म्यं न सिध्यति ।
तच्छास्त्रं विधिनिष्ठत्वान्न स्वरूपेऽर्थवादतः ॥ ७७१ ॥

On the view that injunction is independent, indeed, oneness of self would not result; because Scripture has for purport injunction, it cannot have for purport the nature of self, as that would be *arthavāda.*

As between the assertive statements that set forth the nature of reality and injunctive texts, which are principal and which are subsidiary? The *prasaṅkhyāna-vādin* would say: In the ritual section of the Veda the injunctions are primary; but in the Vedānta it is the assertive statements that are principal, to which injunctive texts are auxiliary. If injunction is primary, the reality would not be established; and if the reality of the self were not established, there would be no meaning in enjoining meditation thereon. If importance be given to injunction, then the texts like 'That thou art' would have to be treated as eulogistic passages, and they would not mean the oneness of self.

NTV—na tu iha vidhi- svātantryam asti tattvamasyādi-vākyārtha-prādhānyāt, prasaṅkhyānasya tac-cheṣatvād iti vākyaśeṣaḥ.

NKL—bhūtaṁ bhavyāyo 'padiśyata iti nyāyād aikātmya-śruter eva vidhi-śeṣatvaṁ yuktaṁ na punar vidhes tac-cheṣatvam, atrāha-vidhīti.

[772]

अपि शास्त्रात्प्रपन्नेऽस्मिन्पारोक्ष्यानपहारतः ।
तत्साक्षात्करणायैव प्रसंख्यानं विधीयते ॥ ७७२ ॥

"Even though understood from Scripture, the mediacy of that (self) is not removed; in order to make it immediate, continued meditation is enjoined.

The *prasaṅkhyāna-vādin* argues still further: From the texts 'That thou art', etc., mediate knowledge results. In order to transform this into immediate experience, continued meditation is necessary.

[773]

मानेन विषयासिद्धौ तद्दिदृक्षावियोगतः ।
प्रसंख्यानविधिर्न स्यात्सहापि मननादिभिः ॥ ७७३ ॥

"If the reality is not established through means of valid knowledge, there would be no desire to know it; and there would be no injunction of continued meditation along with reflection, etc.

Mere injunction of meditation also is not enough. If the reality that is the self is not established through Scripture, there would be no desire for realizing it, and consequently there would be no injunction of meditation along with its auxiliaries, reflection, etc. Therefore, the real should be known through Scripture.

AVS—mānena viṣayasya brahmātma-lakṣaṇasyā 'siddau, tat-sākṣātkaraṇe icchā asambhavāt, prasaṅkhyāna-niyogo na sambhavet, ataḥ śāstreṇa brahmā 'vagantavyam iti.

[774]

श्रुतेर्ज्ञातात्मवृत्तान्तोऽननुभूतमपि स्वकम् ।
स्थानकं वाञ्छतः शास्त्रात्प्रसंख्यानं विधीयते ॥ ७७४ ॥

"For the sake of the one who has known the story of the self from Scripture, but has not experienced it,

and yet who desires to make it his own place, meditation is enjoined by Scripture.

If the self has been known from Scripture, what for is meditation, it may be asked. The reply is: Although he has understood the meaning of texts like 'That thou art', that meaning has not yet given him direct experience of the self. In order to gain this experience, he has to meditate.

NTV—aitihyamātreṇa anubhavātma-brahmarūpam śrutyā, na ca tāvatā tad-bhāva-prāptiḥ, ataḥ svasthānaka-prāpti-vānchāyāṁ śāstreṇa prasaṅkhyānaṁ vidhīyate.

[775]

स्वव्यापारमुखेनैव शास्त्रं स्वार्थावबोधकृत्।
न तु व्यापारविरहान्नातो द्विकरता श्रुतेः ॥ ७७५ ॥

"It is only through its own (intermediate) operation (of continued meditation) that Scripture makes known its own sense; and not without the operation; therefore there is no two-fold denotativeness for Scripture.

There is another objection: If Scripture were to instruct about reality and also enjoin meditation, there would be the defect of sentence-split *(vākyabheda)* for it. The reply is: no. Continued meditation is the intermediary operation through which Scripture reveals reality. So, there is no double sense for Scripture, and hence no sentence-split.

NKL—śāstrasya svārtha-pratipādane prasaṅkhyānam avāntaravyāpāraḥ, teṇa arthabhedābhāvān na vākyabhedaḥ.

[776]

स्वव्यापारतिरोधानं कारकाणां न च स्थितम् ।
तस्मादैकात्म्यतात्पर्ये प्रसंख्यानादि सुस्थितम् ॥ ७७६ ॥

"There is not for agents (here, Scriptural texts) obscuration by their own operation (continued meditation); therefore it is well-established that meditation, etc., have for purport oneness of self.

If meditation is the intermediary operation of Scripture, then, Scripture being obscured by it would not convey its sense. If thus it be objected, it is replied that what is auxiliary cannot obscure its principal. Without the injunction of meditation, there is not the intuition of reality. In the absence of a knowledge of reality gained through Scripture, there cannot be injunction of meditation thereon. Thus, even though the texts 'That thou art', etc., have reality for purport, there is required an injunction of meditation as auxiliary.

NTV—na hi kāṣṭhair odanaḥ pacyata ity atra pākasādhanāny api kāṣṭhāni sva-vyāpāra-jvālām tirodadhati, tadvat svavyāpāram api sādhayaty eva ity arthaḥ.

[777]

बोधयित्वाऽपि चैकात्म्यं नान्तरा पर्यवस्यति ।
आ पुमर्थावधेः शास्त्रमप्रामाण्यभयात्स्फुटम् ॥ ७७७ ॥

"Scripture, even after making known the oneness of self, does not end without the culmination of the human goal, for the fear that it may (otherwise) become invalid.

When from scripture the one Self has been known, there is the gaining of the human goal. Of what use, then, is intuition? And, why should there be meditation for the sake of that?

The reply is: Scripture imparts only mediate knowledge. With that the human goal is not gained. And without resulting in the attainment of the human goal, Scripture will not be finally valid. The attainment of the human goal, however, depends upon meditation. Hence the injunction of meditation.

NTV—pumarthaparyantaṁ śāstrasya asti vyāpāraḥ.

NKL—parokṣadhīmātreṇa kaivalyāyogād aparokṣadhīdvārā kaivalyaparyantaṁ vyāpriyata eva śāstraṁ, itarathā apumartha-paryavasāyitvena aprāmāṇya-prasakter ity arthaḥ.

[778]

परोक्षवृत्त्या शाब्दो हि वदन्स्वार्थं स्वभावतः ।
संभावयन्प्रमाणत्वं युक्तिं स्वीकृत्य वर्तते ॥ ७७८ ॥

"The word (Scripture) by nature expresses its own sense mediately, and in consideration of securing for itself validity, functions by taking the help of reasoning.

What, then, is the place of reason, one may wonder. Scripture takes the help of reasoning also, as it does that of injunction, in achieving for man his final goal; for reasoning too is auxiliary to validity.

NTV—yata evam ataḥ śāstraṁ svaprāmāṇya-siddhyarthaṁ yuktim api svīkaroti, na kevalaṁ prasaṅkhyānam.

NKL—asaṁbhāvanā-nirāsaphalaṁ yuktim aṅgatvena svīkṛtya aparokṣa-pramāṁ kurute ity arthaḥ.

[779]

याथात्म्यावगमेऽशक्ता धूमोऽग्नाविव साऽपि च ।
स्वीकृत्यैव प्रसंख्यानं युक्तिर्वस्तुनि वर्तते ॥ ७७९ ॥

"That (reasoning) also is incapable in respect of understanding of the truth, as smoke is in respect of fire; reasoning functions in respect of the real only by taking the aid of continued meditation.

Then, why should it not be that Reasoning itself, as assisting Scripture, generates the cognition of truth. Where is the need for injunction of meditation ?

To this objection, the reply is: Reasoning, even as in association with Scripture, cannot give rise to the intuition of the real ; for both reasoning and Scripture can yield only mediate knowledge. In the typical syllogism of Indian logic 'Wherever there is smoke, there is fire ; there is smoke on the hill; therefore, there is fire on the hill', what we gain is only mediate knowledge of the presence of fire this would be so even if the inference is confirmed by the testimony of a trustworthy person. So, even reasoning has to depend on meditation for yielding direct experience.

NKL—sā yuktir api ātma-sākṣātkāraṁ janayitum aśaktā parokṣadhī-hetutva-svābhāvyāt. tasmāt prasaṅkhyānaṁ śāstraṁ ca svīkṛtyaiva pravartata ity arthaḥ.

[780]

इत्यादिवर्त्मना शास्त्रं साक्षाद्वस्तु प्रसाधयेत् ।
विधिं प्रति प्रधानत्वं स्वीकृत्याभ्येति मानताम् ॥ ७८० ॥

"In this manner, Scripture, establishing the real directly, and by assuming primacy in relation to injunction, becomes the means of valid knowledge.

Scripture, in fact, seeks the aid of meditation, reasoning, and the self, in its function of revealing the truth. Its validity thus is four-fold (*catuṣpān-mānam*). In relation to meditation and reasoning, Scripture is the principal.

NTV—tadevaṁ krameṇa śabda - yukti - prasaṅkhyāna-pramātṛbhiś catuṣpādeva brahma pramāṇam iti vidhiṁ prati pradhānatvam iti, prasaṅkhyānavidhy-apekṣayā tattvam-ādi-śāstrasya prādhānyaṁ svīkṛtya ity arthaḥ.

NKL—śabdo yuktim ātmānaṁ prasaṅkhyānaṁ vā apekṣya vastu sākṣād bodhayan vidhiṁ-prati prādhānyena pravartamānaḥ prāmāṇyaṁ labhate, tarkādeḥ pratibandha-vigamamātra-kāritvād ity arthaḥ.

[781]

संसर्गकल्पनाशून्यमप्यैकात्म्यं प्रबोधयेत् ।
अनयैव दिशा शास्त्रं संसृष्टार्थाभिधाय्यपि ॥ ७८१ ॥

"Though Scripture expresses a related sense, it can make known the oneness of self, devoid of any assumption of relation, in this manner (i.e. through continued meditation, etc.).

Scripture can convey only a related sense, and that too mediately. How, then, can it reveal the pure reality, even as assisted by meditation, etc.?

The reply is: although Scripture conveys a related sense that is mediate, it can reveal, when helped by meditation, etc., the relationless absolute truth. The strength of an auxiliary may produce an entirely different effect.

NTV—yathā viṣaṁ maraṇakaram api svabhāvato mantra-saṁbandhāt svabhāvaṁ parityajya puṣṭikaraṁ bhavati, yathā ca dadhi jvarakāranaṁsac-carkarā-saṁbandhāt puṣṭikāraṇaṁ bhavati, tathā śāstram apīty arthaḥ.

[782]

यतो वाचो निवर्तन्त इति श्रुत्यैव दर्शितम् ।
व्यपास्ताशेषसंसर्गकल्पनं ब्रह्म निर्भयम् ॥ ७८२ ॥

"In the text 'Whence words return,' etc., Scripture itself shows the fearless Brahman from which the assumption of all relation has been removed.

A Scriptural text is here quoted to show that Scripture can impart knowledge of the relationless Absolute.

NKL—akhaṇḍāparokṣa-svarūpe śruti-tātparya-liṅgam āha-nirbhayam-iti. na bibheti kutaścane 'ti phala-śravaṇāt.

AVS—etad eva vākyaṁ svabhāvāt saṁsṛṣṭa-parokṣabuddhiṁ janayati, ukta-sādhanavato yathā-śāntyaiva jñānam utpādayatīty arthaḥ.

[783]

शास्त्रेणानभिधाने तु नियोगेऽपि न युज्यते ।
प्रवेशो विषयत्वेन तुल्यं चोद्यमतो द्वयोः ॥ ७८३ ॥

"If it is not expressed by Scripture, then it cannot enter into the *niyoga* also as its content; the objection is equal as regards both.

Now, if Scripture expounds in the text quoted above the reality that is distinctionless, where is the need for that reality to become the content of the injunction of meditation? To him who has known the reality from the text, of what use is the injunction?

Reply: If Scripture does not expound the distinctionless reality, there will be no content at all for the injunction of medita-

tion. We may well ask, says the *prasaṅkhyāna-vādin*, what is your reply to this objection ?

NTV explains the objection thus: Scripture which has a related sense cannot have as its content the relationless Brahman; and the reply thus: Brahman, then, cannot be the content of the injunction of meditation either. There would thus be the unintelligibility of both, viz., the injunction of meditation and the Scriptural teaching about Brahman.

nanu vyapāstā-'śeṣa-saṁbandha-kalpanaṁ nirbhayam aparokṣaṁ paraṁbrahma na pratipādayati śāstram, tasya saṁsṛṣṭa-parokṣa-buddhi-janana eva sāmarthyāt, tasya ca abrahmatvāt, tataś ca śāstrasya prasaṅkhyānaniyoga-mātra-paratvena yukti-prasaṅkhyāna-pramātṛṇāṁ brahma-pramāṇapādatve 'pi na śabdasya tatpādate 'ti tripād eva brahmapramāṇaṁ na catuṣpād, ata āha śāstreṇā 'nabhidhāne tu-iti.

niyoge'pi tadviṣaya - prasaṅkhyāna viśeṣaṇa - jñāna - viṣayatvena brahmaṇaḥ praveśo na yujyate, na kevalaṁ śabdaviṣayatvenaiva śāstreṇa, tasya anabhihitatvāt, ataḥ prasaṅkhyānavidhi-brahmaśāstrayor anupapattis tulyā iti bhāvaḥ.

NKL—yathā śāstraṁ prasaṅkhyānaṁ vinā anupapannaṁ, tathā prasaṅkhyānam apī 'ti tulyaṁ parasparāpekṣatvam ity arthaḥ.

According to an alternative explanation given in *AVS*, this verse may be treated as setting forth an objection raised by the *niyogapara-vādin* as against the *prasaṅkhyāna-vādin.*

[784]

विधिं विना श्रुतैकात्म्यस्तदर्थानुभवादृते ।

उपायाज्ञतया कुर्यात्तच्छास्त्रस्यार्थवादताम् ॥ ७८४ ॥

"If there is no injunction (of meditation), he who has heard of the oneness of self, but is without the experience of its sense, would make of Scripture an *arthavāda,* because he is ignorant of the means.

Let not reality become the content of the injunction, because even without this there is knowledge of reality from Scripture and as a result the human goal is reached.

Reply: If an injunction of meditation be not admitted, the text expounding reality would become invalid. As the means to experience, viz. continued meditation, is not recognized, and as no other means is observed, Scripture which by itself does not yield intuitive experience would become an eulogy. Therefore, an injunction of meditation should be admitted.

NTV—sākṣātkāropāyā 'parijñānāt tattvamādi-śāstram arthavādaṁ karoti, prasaṅkhyāna-niyogā- 'pekṣāyāṁ sākṣātkāropāya-parijñānān nārthavādo bhaved iti bhāvaḥ.

[785]

विधिनिष्ठेऽपि शास्त्रे स्यादसिद्धेर्वस्तुनो मितेः ।
देवताध्यानवत्कल्प्यं फलमैकात्म्यवेदनम् ॥ ७८५ ॥

"Even if Scripture has for purport injunction, the knowledge of reality (*vastu*) would not be established, and as in the case of meditation on the deities, the knowledge of oneness of self will have to be postulated as the fruit.

If the fruit, viz. the intuitive experience of the self, be dependent on the said injunction, then that injunction should be regarded as the principal, and not the text setting forth the nature of reality.

The reply to this has been stated in v. 771. The same is explained here.

If the injunction to meditate be the principal and the texts 'That thou art', etc., be subsidiary, then the cognition of the reality would not be established, and would have to be postulated as the fruit. This would not be proper. Although the injunction may be the principal as it is the means to the fruit, the fruit itself in this case being the cognition of reality, the texts expounding the reality should be regarded as the principal, and cannot be taken as restatements.

[786]

प्रतिपन्नात्मयाथात्म्यः प्रसंख्यानादि नेक्षते ।
अज्ञस्तु श्राविताऽप्यस्माद्विना नाऽऽप्नोति तत्फलम् ॥ ७८६ ॥

"He who has realized the truth of self does net need continued meditation; but he who is ignorant, even after study of Scripture, does not attain the fruit thereof without this.

He who has realized the truth through continued meditation, etc., does no longer stand in need of meditation. But he who has only known of the truth from the texts should meditate in order to realize the truth. He who has not realized may hear the text 'That thou art' repeated nine times in the *Chāndogya;* but no realization will come to him unless he meditates.

NTV—ajño 'sākṣātkṛta-brahmaḥ tattvamasīti śrāvito 'pi śravaṇa-phalaṁ sākṣātkāraṁ na prāpnoti asmāt prasaṅkhyānād vinā.

[787-788]

शास्त्रेऽस्मिन्वस्तुनिष्ठेऽपि प्रसंख्यानविधिं विना ।
पुमर्थो लभ्यते नैवेत्यसावपि समाश्रितः ॥ ७८७ ॥

नान्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यामैकात्म्यानुभवो भवेत् ।
तत्सिद्धावेव तौ स्यातां स च ताभ्यामिति श्रयः ॥ ७८८ ॥

"Even if Scripture have for purport the reality (*vastu*), the human goal is not gained, without the injunction of meditation; so that also has to be resorted to. By co-presence and co-absence there does not come about the experience of oneness of self. Only when that is established, they would be; and that from them; thus there is reciprocal dependence.

The argument that the Vedānta texts stand in need of the injunction to meditate is here concluded.

The reasoning based on co-presence and co-absence is not enough. Such reasoning cannot independently lead to realization. It is only when a thing is known that there can be reasoning about it. If it be said that reasoning results in knowledge, there would be reciprocal dependence thus: When there is the experience of reality, there is reasoning based on co-presence and co-absence; and when there is the latter, there is the former.

NTV — aikātmyānubhave sati anvaya-vyatirekau bhavataḥ, tat-siddhau ca brahmātmānubhava siddhir ity anyonyāśrayaḥ.

[789-790]

यथैव विश्वजिद्यागपदे स्वार्थानुपालनम् ।
कुर्वती स्वर्गकामेन(ण) गच्छतः सह मानताम् ॥ ७८८ ॥

तथैव शास्त्रतद्युक्ती स्वाभिधेयार्थपालनम् ।
कुर्वत्यौ मानतां यातः प्रसंख्यानेन नान्यथा ॥ ७९० ॥

"Even as the words '*viśvjit*' and '*yāga*' (in the text '*viśvajitā yajeta*'), while preserving their own senses attain validity by (the assumed word) 'desire-for-heaven';

so also, Scripture and reasoning, while preserving the sense expressed by them, attain validity through continued meditation; not otherwise".

Scripture and reasoning convey their meaning and bring about the realization of the truth only in dependence on continued meditation (*prasaṅkhyāna*).

This is explained here on the analogy of the text of the *viśvajit* sacrifice (*viśvajin-nyāya*).* The *viśvajit* is a part of the great sacrifice called *gavām-ayana* which lasts for a year. In the command which relates to the *viśvajit* sacrifice, viz. 'Let him sacrifice with the *viśvajit*' (*viśvajitā yajeta*), no mention is made of any fruit. Here the enquiry is whether this text enjoins a mere action, or an action that results in a fruit. The *prima facie* view is that, as no result is mentioned in the injunction, only an act is enjoined here. The *Pūrva-mīmāṁsā* view is that it is not true to say that the action in question is not conducive to any result. Although no fruit is declared in this text, the fruit is to be known by implication. What, then, is the fruit? The *prima facie* view suggests that it may be any fruit, since no specific fruit is mentioned. The *Mīmāṁsā* view is that heaven is the fruit, since all desire heaven. [See *PM*, *IV*, iii, 10-16.]

Now, in the text '*viśvajitā yajeta*', the words '*viśvajit*' and '*yāga*' convey their respective meanings, no doubt. But they become *pramāṇa* only when the word '*svarga-kāma*' is supplied. Similarly Scripture and reasoning, while having each its place, gain validity only in association with continued meditation.

NTV—tatra hi sarvābhilaṣitatva-lakṣaṇa-yukti-siddhena niyojyā-kāṅkṣā-pūrakeṇa svargakāmena svābhidheyārtha-pālanaṁ kurvatī viśvajidyāga-padena saha mānatāṁ gacchataḥ anyathā aprāmāṇya-prasaṅgāt.

NKL—viśvajitā yajete 'ti viśvajic-chabdasya tṛtīyāntasya karaṇa-bhūta-yāganāmadheyatvāt.

* G. A. Jacob, *A Third Handful of Popular Maxims*, Pp. 127-8.

viśvajidyāga-vākyasyāpekṣita-svargakāmi-kalpanayā svārthabodhakatvaṁ tadabhāve pravṛttyabhāvād viśvajidyāga-padayoḥ svargakāmena svārthānupālanaṁ kurvato mānatvaṁ yathā.

[791]

एवमैकात्म्यतात्पर्ये शास्त्रस्येष्टेऽपि युक्तिभिः ।
केचित्कार्यमपीच्छन्ति तदर्थं तन्न युज्यते ॥ ७९१ ॥

Admitting that Scripture has for purport oneness of self, some seek to establish *kārya* also through reasonings, for the sake of that, (the experience of oneness of self); that is not right.

The *prasaṅkhyāna-vāda* is here concluded. Those who sponsor this view, while admitting that Scripture has the one reality for purport, maintain through the aforementioned arguments that in Vedānta there is *kārya* also which is of the nature of *prasaṅkhyāna*.

Siddhānta—The *prasaṅkhyāna-vāda* is not sound.

[792]

प्रमात्रादित्रयं यस्मात्संविन्मात्रवपुर्भृतः ।
सिद्धायतेऽप्रसिद्धं सत्तात्सिद्धौ किमपेक्षते ॥ ७९२ ॥

The triad, cognizer, etc., constituted by pure consciousness as they are, look like the established though they are not established; what then is required for their establishment?

What for is *prasaṅkhyāna*? (1) Is it required for establishing reality? (2) Or, for removing the mediateness thereof? (3) Or, for warding off its non-establishment? (4) Or, for destroying the ignorance thereof? (5) Or, for making it immediate? (6) Or, for the sake of its release?

(1) The first alternative is not possible. The reality with which we are acquainted is of the triple form, cognizer, cognition, and object cognized. This triad has no reality other than that of pure consciousness, the self. Because of the self, the triad appears as if established. Nothing else is required for the establishment.

NTV mentions only the first two alternatives:

kiṁ vastu-siddhyarthaṁ prasaṅkhyānavidhir apekṣyate, uta vastunaḥ pārokṣya-nivṛttyartham.

NKL has these two alternatives:

prasaṅkhyāna-niyogasya vastvāparokṣaṁ phalam, tat-pārokṣya-nivṛttir vā.

AVS has the same alternatives as *NTV*.

[793]

परोक्षमपि सद्वस्तु यत्साक्ष्यात्मस्वरूपतः ।
साक्षादात्मेव चाऽऽभाति तस्मिन्पारोक्ष्यधीः कथम् ॥७९३॥

The witness-self, the reality, by which even the mediate (objects) are made to appear as if immediate and as if the self—in respect of that, how can there be mediate knowledge?

(2) The second alternative is to be rejected. Egoity, etc., which constitute the not-self, are made manifest by the witness-self, although by themselves they are mediate; and because of this manifestation they appear as if they are the self. The witness-self, therefore, can never be mediate. It is the most direct and immediate reality. As there is no mediateness for it, how can there be removal of mediateness?

[794]

अप्यज्ञानादि निःशेषप्रमेयव्यवधानकृत् ।
स्वतः प्रसिद्धात्संसिध्येत्तदसिद्धिः कुतो भवेत् ॥ ७९४ ॥

Because by that self-established (reality) even ignorance, etc., which veil the entire object of knowledge, are established, from what can its non-establishment result?

(3) The third alternative is here rejected. It is the self that establishes even ignorance, doubt and erroneous knowledge that veil the world of objects. The self is, thus, ever-established; it is self-established. So, non-establishment is impossible in regard to it. Where is the need, then, for *prasaṅkhyāna* for the purpose of warding off non-establishment?

[795]

स्वमहिम्नैव यः सिद्धः सर्वप्रत्यक्तमश्च यः ।
तत्तमोहतितः कार्यं किमन्यत्तत्प्रमाणजम् ॥ ७९५ ॥

That which is established by its own glory and is innermost of all—what else than the effect of removing the darkness (of ignorance) can the means of knowledge relating to that produce?

(4) The self is established by its own right, and in its own greatness. Nothing else is required to establish it. All that we need is to recognize its eternally established nature. For this, ignorance has to be removed. But the removal of ignorance is the fruit of *pramāṇa*, and not of *prasaṅkhyāna*.

NTV—na vastunaḥ sphuraṇaṁ pramāṇa-phalaṁ kiṁtu avidyā-nivṛttir ity arthaḥ.

NKL—avidyādi-nivartakatvena vākya-prāmāṇyam iti bhāvaḥ.

AVS—na vastu-siddhiḥ pramāṇa-phalam, kiṁtu avidyā-nivṛttir ity arthaḥ.

[796]

मात्रादित्रयहानेऽपि हानसाक्षितयेक्ष्यते ।
येनासावविलुप्ताक्षस्तत्पारोक्ष्यं कथं भवेत् ॥ ७९६ ॥

Even in the absence of the triad, cognizer, etc., that which sees the absence as the witness, because it never loses its sight—how can that be mediate?

(5) The inner self is eternal and self-luminous. It is the never-failing witness of the being as well as non-being of cognizer, etc., enjoyer, etc., and agent, etc. It is absurd to suggest that such a reality is not immediate. Nothing else is immediate. Hence, there is no need for an injunction of *prasaṅkhyāna* to render the self immediate.

NTV—na svatas-siddhasya lopa-janmādayaḥ svato 'nyato vā siddhy anupapatteḥ.

NKL—svāpādau pramātrāder abhāve tad-abhāva-sākṣitayā ātmeṣyate yena kena kāraṇena aviplutākṣo nitya-caitanya-svabhāvāt.

[797]

भावनावर्त्मनैकात्म्ये विध्यर्थासंभवो यथा ।
अधिकारपरीक्षायां तथा प्राक्प्रतिपादितम् ॥ ७९७ ॥

The impossibility of injunction through the channel of *bhāvanā* in the case of the one self has already been explained in our examination of eligibility.

In the verses of the *Vārtika* (v. 20 f.) dealing with eligibility, it has already been shown that there is no need for the injunction of the practice of contemplation after knowledge has arisen from scriptural testimony.

NTV — bhāvanā puruṣa-prayatnādiḥ vedārtha iti bhaṭṭapādamatāvalaṁbanena vidhir adhikāri-parīkṣāyāṁ nirākṛtaḥ, idānīṁ brahmadattādi-matāvalaṁbanena niyogo vākyārtha iti vidhir nirākriyate.

AVS puts v. 654 before the present verse, and v. 655a after the present verse. This is followed by the remark: *ity evaṁ vārtikānāṁ kramo draṣṭavyaḥ, pāṭhakramād arthakramo balavān iti.....*

tasmāt tatra likhitavyaṁ vārtikadvayam atra likhitam upadeśataḥ śāstrārtho 'dhigantavya iti pratipādanāya. anye tu atraiva vārtikadvayasaṁbandhaṁ varṇayanti.

[798]

नियोगपक्षमाश्रित्य विध्यर्थासंभवो यथा ।
ऐकात्म्यसिद्धौ यत्नेन तथाऽत्र प्रतिपाद्यते ॥ ७९८ ॥

As to how the sense of injunction is impossible following the doctrine of *niyoga*, in the matter of establishing oneness of self, is here explained with care.

Here, the view that is refuted is that of Brahmadatta, viz. that there is need for injunction in the matter of the practice of *jñāna*. Hence, this is no repetition.

[799]

ऐकात्म्यस्य स्वतो मुक्तेरज्ञानात्तस्य बद्धता ।
साध्येऽर्थे साधनापेक्षा सिद्धे तन्न व्यपेक्षते ॥ ७९९ ॥

Because oneness of self is itself release, bondage is from ignorance of that; there is need for means in the case of what is to be accomplished; that is not required in the case of what is already established.

(6) The sixth alternative is here shown to be unsound. Release is the very nature of the self. The self is not really bound. The sense of bondage is due to ignorance. A means is required for accomplishing what is not accomplished. In respect of what is eternally established, no means for its establishment is necessary.

NTV frames two alternatives, for the first of which the present verse gives the answer. The alternatives are: (1) Is the prompted person he who desires release? (2) Or, he who desires the experience of *Brahman-Ātman?* The second alternative is replied to in verse 801.

[800]

तमोमात्रान्तरायत्वादैकात्म्याख्यस्य वस्तुनः ।
असाध्यसाधने तस्मिन्काऽपेक्षा भावनां प्रति ॥ ८०० ॥

For the reality which is called oneness of self, the only obstacle is darkness; it is neither what is to be accomplished nor means; in regard to that there is no need of *bhāvanā.*

Release, it has been said, is self-established, and is not dependent on any means. What for is *jñāna*, it may be asked. The reply is that *jñāna* is required only for destroying ignorance. As the self which is the sole reality is devoid of the distinction of what-is-to-be-accomplished and what-accomplishes, there is no need for the injunction of practice.

NKL—asādhya-sādhane sādhya-sādhana-bhāva hīna ity arthaḥ.

[801]

यदाऽनुभवकामस्य कार्यं साध्यं प्रतीयते ।
प्रसंख्याने तदैकात्म्यतात्पर्यं कथमुच्यते ॥ ८०१ ॥

If continued meditation is seen to be the *kārya* to be accomplished by him who desires direct experience, then how can oneness of self be said to be the purport?

It may be argued thus: Although there is no injunction of *prasaṅkhyāna* as the direct means to release, it becomes an auxiliary through *jñāna* to which it is subsidiary.

Reply: If *prasaṅkhyāna* is enjoined by the Vedānta texts for the benefit of those who desire realization, then those texts cannot have the oneness of self for purport.

AVS—sākṣātkaraṇakāmasya kāryaṁ niyogaḥ prasaṅkhyāne viṣaye sādhyaṁ pratīyate yadā, tadā prasaṅkhyāna-niyogasya aikātmya-paratvaṁ kathaṁ, na kathaṁcit.

[802]

कार्यं चान्यपरं चेति द्वयमेतद्विरुध्यते ।
साध्यं हि सर्वदा कार्यमन्यत्तस्य प्रसिद्धये ॥ ८०२ ॥

Having the *kārya* for purport and having something else for purport—these two are contradictory. Indeed, the *kārya* is always what is to be accomplished; what is other is only for accomplishing it.

The same texts cannot contain an injunction as well as teach the oneness of self. If injunction is the purport of the *Vedānta* texts, then any other teaching must be for the sake of that, on the principle that "things that have already come to be are taught for the sake of what-is-yet-to-be" *(bhūtaṁ bhavyāyo 'padiśyate)*.

[803]

विशेषणं नियोज्यस्य भवन्ननुभवः फलम् ।
विषयः सत्प्रसंख्यानमनुभूतेर्न साधनम् ॥ ८०३ ॥

Being the qualification of what is prompted, if direct experience be regarded as the fruit, then continued meditation which is the content (of the injunction) cannot be the means to direct experience.

If it be said that continued meditation (*nididhyāsana*) is also enjoined, like 'hearing' (*śravaṇa*), as means to direct experience, and *prasaṅkhyāna* is only another name for *nididhyāsana*, true; but *prasaṅkhyāna* does not make known the reality by being the content of the cognition of *niyoga;* for the direct experience is the fruit of *pramāṇa*, and *prasaṅkhyāna* is not a *pramāṇa*.

AVS—anubhavakāmaḥ prasaṅkhyānaṁ kuryād iti niyojyasyā 'dhikāriṇo viśeṣaṇaṁ bhavann anubhavaḥ phalam iti tvayocyate niyoga-viṣayaṁ sat prasaṅkhyānam anubhūter na sādhanam, anubhavasya māna-phalatvāt, niyoga-viṣaya-prasaṅkhyānasya apramāṇatvāt.

[804]

भावार्थविषयं कार्यं प्रसंख्याने कथं भवेत् ।
आवृत्तिर्हि प्रसंख्यानं शब्दयुक्त्योरिति स्थितम् ॥ ८०४ ॥

How can the *kārya* which is the sense of the verbal root occur in the case of continued meditation? Indeed, continued meditation is the repeated reflection with the help of word and reasoning. This is settled.

So far we have argued that *prasaṅkhyāna* is not the means to experience, admitting for the moment that it is the content of *niyoga*. Now, we affirm that *prasaṅkhyāna* is not at all the content of *niyoga*.

The content of *niyoga* must be the sense of a verbal root, e. g., *yāga*. *Prasaṅkhyāna* is not so. It is of the nature of a repetition of 'hearing' (*śravaṇa*) and 'reflection' *(manana)*. It is not an act; it is the repetition of an act.

[805]

अथ श्रवणभावार्थविषयं कार्यमिष्यते ।
तदा श्रवणमेव स्याद्विशिष्टो विषयस्तव ॥ ८०५ ॥

If the content of the sense of the verbal root of *śravaṇa* (hearing) be the *kārya*, then *śravaṇa* alone will be for you the specific content.

If it be said: "Let there not be in the Vedānta an injunction for meditation. Let hearing and reflection be the content of injunction", we reply that the opponent's thesis would then be destroyed. The *prasaṅkhyāna-vādin's* thesis is that meditation is enjoined. We on our part do admit that hearing, etc., are enjoined in order to make him who desires release turn to the Scriptural texts.

[806]

दाक्षायणादावावृत्तेर्यत्रापि फलमुच्यते ।
सगुणात्पौर्णमासादेः फलं तत्रापि नो गुणात् ॥ ८०६ ॥

Even in the *Dākṣāyaṇa* rite, etc., where repetition is said to bear fruit, the fruit is from the *Paurṇamāsa*, etc., as associated with the *guṇa* (repetition), and not from the *guṇa* alone.

The *pūrvapakṣin* may argue that repetition may be enjoined on the analogy of the *Dākṣāyaṇa* sacrifice. The *siddhāntin* replies that, on the same analogy, it is the act that is enjoined, not repetition.

In the context of the *Darśapūrṇamāsa*, we have the passage, '*dākṣāyaṇa-yajñena yajeta prajākāmaḥ*' (One desirous of offspring should perform the *Dākṣāyaṇa* sacrifice.) [See *Taittirīya-saṁhitā*, II, v, 4. 3.] Here the question to be settled is whether the passage speaks of a particular result following from the adoption of a particular accessory at the *Darśapūrṇamāsa* sacrifice, or whether the act mentioned is a distinct and independent sacrifice. The *prima facie* view is that it is the latter. The reasons adduced are that a particular name is attached to the act, that there is no mention of an accessory in the text, and that the text is complete with the mention of the result. The *Pūrva-mīmāṁsā siddhānta* is that the text in question speaks of a particular result following from the adoption of a particular accessory at the *Darśapūrṇamāsa*. From the context of the present passage we learn that the *Dākṣāyaṇa* falls within the purview of the *Darśapūrṇamāsa*, and that it is not an independent or separate sacrifice. There is a text which reads thus: 'One should perform the *Darśapūrṇamāsa* for thirty years; if he is a performer of the *Dākṣāyaṇa* he should perform it for fifteen years only; even thus does it become accomplished; as the *Dākṣāyaṇa* contains two *Paurṇamāsa* and two *Darśa* sacrifices: thus is there accomplishment in fifteen years'. From this we know that *Dākṣāyaṇa* is not a separate sacrifice. The term '*ayana*' means repetition. *Dakṣa* is the sacrificer who is quick and an expert. So, the expression *Dākṣāyaṇa* signifies the *repeated* performance of the *Darśapūrṇamāsa* by the *expert* sacrificer and priests. *Dākṣāyaṇa*, thus, connotes a certain accessory detail at the *Darśapūrṇamāsa*. And, the text in question speaks of the result following from the adoption of an accessory; it does not enjoin a distinct sacrifice. [*PM*, II, iii, 5-11.]

In v. 806, the *pūrvapakṣa* is that there is realization through the *repetition* of hearing, etc., even as in the case of the *Dākṣāyaṇa* it is repetition that brings in the fruit. The *siddhāntin's* reply is that, even in the example cited, the fruit which is heaven does not result from the accessory by itself, but from the *Darśapūrṇamāsa* as endowed with the accessory which is *repetition*. Similarly, here

when it is settled that the fruit is gained through the act, viz. hearing, etc., as endowed with the accessory, it is not proper to hold that there is injunction of *repetition* too for the sake of intuiting reality.

[807]

गुणो यत्रापि दध्यादिः कार्यावच्छेदको मतः ।
धात्वर्थावेशतः सोऽपि प्राप्ते चास्मिन्न तु स्वतः ॥ ८०७ ॥

Even where curd, etc., are taken to be *guṇa*, they are so as distinctive of the *kārya*, having been entered into by the meaning of the verb-root. This has already been attained, and (the curd, etc.,) are not independently (enjoined).

It may be argued that, even though 'repetition' is not the sense of the verb-root, it may be the content of injunction, even as the accessory curds (*dadhi*) in '*dadhnā juhoti*' (With curds he offers the oblation), which are not the sense of the verb-root, are enjoined. The reply is that even the curds are enjoined only as influenced by the sense of the verb, and not independently. So, here also, repetition without the act (hearing, etc.) cannot be enjoined for the sake of the fruit.

There is the text '*agnihotram juhoti*', and then the texts '*dadhnā juhoti, payasā juhoti*', etc. The question with regard to those texts is this: Are the *homas* enjoined by the texts '*dadhnā*', etc., and are these collectively referred to in the text '*agnihotram juhoti*'? Or, is this latter sentence injunctive of an independent *homa*? The *prima facie* view is that this sentence refers to the *homas* enjoined in the sentences '*dadhnā*', etc. The *Pūrva-mimāṁsā siddhānta* is that the injunctive text is '*agnihotram juhoti*', and that the other sentences specify the accessories, etc. The term '*agnihotra*' does not refer collectively to sacrifices already enjoined. In '*agnihotram juhoti*', the act of *homa* (i.e. offering into fire) is enjoined. The sentence

'*dadhnā juhoti*' cannot convey the notion that the *Agnihotra* should be performed; what it signifies is simply that the connection between the *dadhi* and the *homa* should be brought about. Thus it is settled that the repetition of the mention of *homa* in such texts as '*dadhnā juhoti*' serves the purpose of indicating the accessory details. In other words, the use of the term '*juhoti*' is a reference to the *homa* enjoined elsewhere in the text '*agnihotram juhoti*'. In the term '*juhoti*' as appearing in the sentence '*dadhnā juhoti*,' the conjugational affix serves the purpose of enjoining the material, *dadhi*, mentioned by the word *dadhnā*, and it is only the verbal root that contains the reference to the *homa* enjoined elsewhere. [*PM*, II, ii, 13–16.]

[808]

श्रवणादेर्न च प्राप्तिर्गुणान्न च फलं श्रुतम् ।
पश्येदिति हि धात्वर्थः केवलो विषयः श्रुतः ॥ ८०८ ॥

Hearing, etc., have not been enjoined; nor is the fruit declared in Scripture for *guṇa*; in 'Thou shalt see', only the content, the sense of the root, is declared.

It cannot be said that in the statement 'Let one become calm and collected and then see the self,' meditation which is of the form of repetition is enjoined. Seeing is not the fruit of repetition which is an accessory; it is the fruit of hearing, etc. Nor is release the fruit of repetition; for that is the fruit of *jñāna*. Here the content of injunction is seeing (*darśana*,) and not repetition.

[809]

नापि तल्लक्षितावृत्तिर्विधेया श्रुतहानतः ।
कार्यं यन्नापि भावार्थात्तदावृत्तिगुणात्कथम् ॥ ८०९ ॥

Nor is the repetition implied by that (*darśana-vidhi*) enjoined, for there would be giving up of what is declared. That which is not accomplished by the sense of the verb, how can that result from the *guṇa* called repetition?

It may be contended that, as seeing cannot be enjoined, we should take repetition as what is enjoined by implication. But this contention is pointless. There is no reason for rejecting what is expressly taught and assuming what is not taught. If a fruit does not result from an act, it cannot result from repetition. If intuition does not arise from the kndwledge that is born of Scriptural testimony, how can it arise from a repetition thereof? So, even if an injunction of seeing is to be rejected, there cannot be assumed an injunction of repetition for the sake of intuition.

[810]

स्वयं प्रबोधितेऽप्यर्थे यदि युक्त्याद्यपेक्षते ।
शास्त्रं सापेक्षमेवं स्यात्स्वतः प्रामाण्यवर्जनात् ॥ ८१० ॥

As regards the sense made known by it, if Scripture needs reasoning, etc., then it would become dependent, by relinquishing self-validity.

In v. 774 it was stated by the *pūrvapakṣin* that meditation is enjoined for one who has known the nature of the self from Scripture but has not experienced it. It was also contended in that context (see v. 778) that reasoning too is required. That is recalled here and refuted. It Scripture depends for its sense on reasoning, etc., its self-validity would be destroyed, and would become dependent and defective like secular statements.

[811]

युक्त्यादि मान्तरं नो चेन्मानांशत्वेन तत्स्थितेः ।
संभूय पादाः सर्वेऽपि ह्यैकात्म्यं बोधयन्ति नः ॥ ८११ ॥

"If reasoning, etc., are not different *pramāṇas*, because they are parts of *pramāṇa*, all the parts together, for us, make known the oneness of self."

Pūrvapakṣa — Reasoning, etc., are not different *pramāṇas*. They, together with Scriptural testimony, constitute a single *pramāṇa*. It has already been stated that the self is to be realized through verbal testimony, reasoning, meditation, and the self.

[812]

न संभूय यतः पादास्तैलवर्त्यग्नयो यथा ।
मितेः स्वरूपलाभाय न तु मेयोपलब्धये ॥ ८१२ ॥

Not together (do they make known the self); for the parts, like oil, wick and fire, are for the sake of securing for *pramāṇa* its nature, and not for attaining the object of cognition.

Siddhānta — It is wrong to say that these four together reveal the reality. Just as oil, etc., together contribute to the flame, and the flame illumines the object, here too the four parts together make for the *pramāṇa*, and it is the *pramāṇa* that reveals the real. So, it is settled that the four parts are not the means to the intuition of reality.

[813]

संभूय यदि सर्वाणि फलमेकं प्रतन्वते ।
प्रत्येकं प्रमितेर्वृद्धिरित्येतत्स्यात्तदा मृषा ॥ ८१३ ॥

If all of them together produce a single fruit, then the view that each fosters the *pramāṇa* would be false.

If the parts by themselves reveal the real, then it cannot be maintained that the *pramāṇa* is strengthened by each of these. The *prasaṅkhyāna-vādin* does maintain this latter view. So, on his own testimony, it must be admitted by him that the parts are only contributory to the *pramāṇa*.

[814]

संभूय फलकारित्वं क्रियाकारकसंगतेः ।
स्वरूपलाभतो नान्यदभिव्यक्तावपेक्षते ॥ ८१४ ॥

The fruit of the coming together of *pramāṇa* and the causal agents is the accomplishment of its own nature as *pramāṇa*; in the matter of manifesting the object nothing else is required.

Thus, the parts accomplish the *pramāṇa*; and the *pramāṇa* reveals the real. In the matter of its coming into being, the *pramāṇa* does depend on the causative factors; but in the matter of revealing the object, it depends on nothing else.

AVS—śabdādi-pādacatuṣṭayaṁ jñānotpādakam eva nārthaprakāśakam ity etat sādhayati.

[815]

तैलवर्त्यग्नयो यस्मात्प्रदीपोत्पत्तिकारणम् ।
लब्धात्मलाभो दीपोऽर्थं स्वयमेव प्रकाशयेत् ॥ ८१५ ॥

For, oil, wick, and fire are the cause of producing the lamp; the lamp which has thus been brought into existence illumines the object by itself.

The illustration given in v. 812 is here explained.

Just as the lamp, which is the result of oil, wick and fire combining together, illumines the object by itself, so also the *pramāṇa*, which is given rise to by verbal testimony, etc., reveals its object independently without any further aid.

[816]

शब्देन ज्ञाप्यते यद्वत्तथैव यदि युक्तिभिः ।
व्यर्थताऽथ विशेषश्चेत्संप्राप्ता भिन्नमानता ॥ ८१६ ॥

That which is made known by Scripture, if that alone is made known by reasonings, then there is futility; if there is some difference, then they (reasonings) would constitute a different *pramāṇa*.

It may be held that verbal testimony, etc., are not contributories to the rise of *pramāṇa*, but are themselves *pramāṇa*. Then, the question would be: Are they *pramāṇas* collectively, or individually? If the first, then we have to enquire: the sense that is conveyed by verbal testimony—is that itself made known by reasoning, etc., or some other sense? If it is the same sense, then there is futility for reasoning, etc. If it is a different sense, then reasoning, etc., would be separate *pramāṇas*, and there would he no collectivity.

[817]

स्वप्नादियुक्तिभिश्चेत्तल्लौकिकीभिः प्रसाध्यते ।
अवैदिकं भवेद्वस्तु स्याच्च शास्त्रानुवादता ॥ ८१७ ॥

If reality be established through empirical arguments based on dream, etc., then it would be non-Scriptural; and Scripture would be a re-statement.

If verbal testimony, etc., be regarded as *pramāṇas* individually, then we have to ask: Are the reasoning, etc., that are *pramāṇa* such as are empirically known or those that are known through the *Veda* alone? The enquiry into the three states of experience is empirical. By the rule of co-presence and co-absence, it is argued that the three states are illusory and that the self alone is real. But, then, this reasoning is not dependent on the *Veda;* and the texts 'That thou art" etc., would turn out to be dependent *pramāṇa.*

NTV—vedaika-samadhigamyaṁ brahma na bhavet, śāstraṁ ca yuktisiddānuvādakaṁ na pramāṇam ity arthaḥ.

NKL—avasthātrayasya vyabhicārād ātmano 'vyabhicārād avasthā-traya-taddharma-sambandho na vāstava iti laukika-tarkād ātmasiddhau vedasya anuvādakatvam avaidikatvaṁ ca ātmanaḥ ity arthaḥ.

[818]

वैदिकत्वेऽपि युक्तीनामागमार्थप्रबोधतः ।
अनुवादत्वमेव स्यात्स्याच्च शास्त्रादभिन्नता ॥ ८१८ ॥

If the arguments be Scriptural, as they serve only to elucidate the sense taught by Scripture, then also those arguments would be re-statements, and they would be non-different from Scripture.

If the reasoning, etc., are those that are known through the *Veda,* then they would be of the nature of restatements, and not *pramāṇas.* Also, they cannot be regarded as different from the *Veda;* and the four factors will have to be reduced to three.

[819]

आवृत्तिश्च प्रसंख्यानं कुर्यात्सातिशयं कथम् ।
न ह्यावृत्तौ प्रमाणस्य प्रमेयेऽतिशयो यतः ॥ ८१९ ॥

Continued meditation is repetition. How can repetition (of *śabda*) endow an object with an excellence? There is no excellence brought about in the object of knowledge by repetition of the *pramāṇa*.

It has been shown that verbal testimony does not depend on reasoning. Now, we proceed to show that there is no dependence of verbal testimony on meditation (*prasṅkhyāna*).

Prasaṅkhyāna is repetition. As applied to verbal testimony, it must mean a repetition thereof. But such repetition does not bring about any excellence in the object. In the case of the perception of a pot, for example, there is no excellence seen in the object by a repetition of the perception.

NTV — prasaṅkhyānaṁ nāma pramāṇāvṛttir ucyate, sā katham atiśayaṁ kuryāt.

[820]

यत्रापि चान्धकारादिदोषात्क्रमविनिश्चयः ।
तत्रापि भिन्नमेयत्वान्नैव संभूयमानता ॥ ८२० ॥

Even where because of the defect of darkness, etc., there is determination (of the object) in sequence, there is no validity for the combination (of parts), for the object cognized (at each stage) is different.

It is true that in the case of the determination of an object that is in semi-darkness or at a distant place, repetition of a *pramāṇa* is useful. But, here, it must be realized that the determination is not the result of the collective operation of *pramāṇas*. In fact, the object is different each time.

[821]

पूर्वं वस्त्विति विज्ञानं प्राण्ययं मानुषस्तथा ।
पुरुषोऽयमथ श्यामो डित्थ इत्यर्थभिन्नता ॥ ८२१ ॥

It is first known as a thing, then as a living being, then as a human being, as a man, as being dark, and then as so-and-so; thus there is difference in the object.

How the object of knowledge is different is shown here.

[822]

परिच्छेदफलत्वं हि मानत्वं तच्च भिद्यते ।
तदभावे तु पूर्वेषामुत्तरस्यैव मानता ॥ ८२२ ॥

To be a means of valid knowledge, indeed, is to have definiteness as its fruit; and that is different. When the earlier cognitions do not have that there is validity only for the last one.

The function of a *pramāṇa* is to define the object. As the definition of each object is different, the *pramāṇa* also is different. If the earlier cognitions have not defined the object, the last one alone should be regarded as *pramāṇa*.

[823]

अथ मेयप्रभेदेऽपि प्रमाणैकत्वमिष्यते ।
वस्तुग्राहितयाऽक्षादेरैकार्थ्येऽभिन्नमानता ॥ ८२३ ॥

If it be said that even though there is difference in the object of knowledge, the *pramāṇa* is one because the same reality is apprehended, then (for the same reason)

perception, etc., having the same object must be a non-different *pramāṇa*.

If it be said that, though there is a difference in the object when there is a series of cognitions, the *pramāṇa* itself is single because the thing itself is non-different, we reply: if that were so then the five *pramāṇas*, perception, etc., should be regarded as a single *pramāṇa* when they have the same content.

[824]

साध्यमानं प्रसंख्यानं यागवत्साधयेत्फलम् ।
कारकं ज्ञापकं शास्त्रं तयोः स्यादेकता कथम् ॥ ८२४ ॥

If continued meditation which is being accomplished were to accomplish the fruit, like sacrifice, then it would be what causes to act, and Scripture is what makes known; how could the two be one?

If meditation is like sacrifice, yielding its fruit through being performed, then it is a causative factor (*kāraka*), and cannot, therefore, be identical with Scriptural teaching whose function is to make known (*jñāpaka*).

[825]

प्रमाताऽऽत्मा न मानांशो यद्ययं व्यावहारिकः ।
परश्चेत्स प्रमेयः स्यात्कथं चानुभवः फलम् ॥ ८२५ ॥

The cognizer-self cannot be a part of the *pramāṇa*, if it be the empirical soul (that is meant); if it be the supreme Self, that is the object of knowledge (*prameya*); how then can experience be the fruit?

It was stated by the *pūrvapakṣin* that there are four factors constituting the *pramāṇa* for Self-realization. One of the factors is the self. Which self is this? Is it the empirical self? Or, the supreme Self? It cannot be the empirical self, because that self is the locus of *pramāṇa*, and cannot, therefore, be a part of *pramāṇa*. Nor can it be the supreme Self, for that Self is the object of *pramāṇa*. So, how can experience be the fruit of the said four factors?

[826]

स्वरूपं यद्यसाध्यं तत्स्वातन्त्र्येण प्रसिद्धितः ।
तज्ज्ञानं चेत्प्रमाणं तत्तच्च शास्त्रान्न कार्यतः ॥ ८२६ ॥

If experience is one's own nature (*svarūpa*), then it is not what-is-to-be-accomplished, as it is established independently by itself; if it be the knowledge thereof, then that is *pramāṇa*; and that is (i.e. arises) from Scripture and not from a *kārya*.

What is this experience? Is it the nature of *Brahman?* Or, is it the psychosis of the form of *Brahman?* If it be the former, it cannot be the fruit of *pramāṇa*. If it be the latter, then that is the result of the Scriptural texts 'That thou art', etc., and not of *prasaṅkhyāna* which is a *kārya*.

NKL—tattvamādivākyaphalaṁ vṛttirūpajñānaṁ na prasaṅkhyānaphalam.

[827]

शास्त्रमावर्त्यमानं हि स्वभावं नैव मुञ्चति ।
परोक्षवृत्तिर्युक्तिश्च कथं ते मितिवर्धने ॥ ८२७ ॥

Scripture which is being repeated, verily, does not lose its nature; and how can reasoning and that which is mediate be for you the means of increasing validity?

According to you, Scripture can yield only mediate knowledge of the real. Reasoning is, no doubt, mediate. By merely repeating these, how can one get immediate experience?

[828]

प्रमितेश्च प्रमेयस्य वृद्धौ वृद्धिः स्वतो न हि ।
तस्य वृद्धिर्मितेर्वृद्धावित्यन्योन्यसमाश्रयः ॥ ८२८ ॥

The growth in validity depends upon growth in the object of knowledge; it does not occur by itself; and the growth of that (object) depends on the growth of validity. Thus there is reciprocal dependence.

If it be held that by the said repetition there is an increase in knowledge, there would be the defect of reciprocal dependence thus: when there is excellence brought about in the object of knowledge, there occurs similar excellence in the means of knowledge, and *vice versa*.

NKL — prameyasya vṛddhau viṣayasyātiśaya-siddhau pramiter vṛddhiḥ.....mitivaicitryam antareṇa meyavaicitryam nāsti mānādhīnatvān meyasiddhir iti anyonyāśrayaḥ.

[829]

उत्पाद्यापि मितिं शास्त्रं यदि युक्त्याद्यपेक्षते ।
स्वर्गादावेवमेव स्यात्सापेक्षं च भवेत्तदा ॥ ८२९ ॥

If Scripture, even after generating knowledge, should stand in need of reasoning, etc., then that would be so even in the case of heaven, etc.; and in that case it would become dependent.

You say that Scripture stands in need of reasoning, etc. Now, does Scripture expect help from reasoning, etc., after making known the real, for the sake of the fruit which is intuitive experience, or does it require help even in the matter of making known the real? If it be the first, then it must be said with regard to the text 'He who desires heaven should sacrifice,' etc., that it occasions the sacrificial activity of the person concerned by making known the relation between the means and end, and then requires help from reasoning for the accomplishment of the end which is heaven. But such is not the case. If the second alternative be sponsored by you, then Scripture would cease to be *pramāṇa*, being dependent on reasoning.

[830]

व्यपास्तानर्थसंदर्भमात्मानमवगच्छतः ।
किमाप्यमधिकं शास्त्राद्येन युक्त्याद्यपेक्षते ॥ ८३० ॥

What more from Scripture is to be attained by him who has known the self as free from the aggregate of evil—in which case there may be dependence on reasoning, etc.?

More than the realization of the pure self, there is nothing that is to be achieved through Scripture. Where is, then, the need to depend on reasoning?

[831]

का वा युक्तिः प्रदीपस्य सर्पाद्याकम्पनाशनम् ।
रज्ज्वादितत्त्वविज्ञानं कुर्वतः स्वेन तेजसा ॥ ८३१ ॥

What reasoning does the lamp require which by its own light dispels the serpent and the shudder (caused by it) and makes known the truth, viz. the rope, etc.?

An example is given for showing that Scripture does not depend on reasoning for making known its own sense. The example is the familiar one of the lamp dispelling the rope-snake illusion.

NKL—vimatam adhyasta-nivarttakaṁ tattvajñānatvāt rajjutattva-jñānavat.

[832]

गुणप्रधानभावो हि विना नैवैकवाक्यताम् ।
वस्तुकार्यार्थतात्पर्यभेदान्नापीह सा भवेत् ॥ ८३२ ॥

The relation of subsidiary and principal cannot be without syntactical unity; and that cannot obtain here because of difference in purport as reality and *kārya.*

Scripture and *prasaṅkhyāna* are not related as principal and subsidiary, because there is no syntactical unity between them. And there cannot be syntactical unity, because their purports are different; the texts 'That thou art,' etc., have reality for purport, while the injunction of meditation has *niyoga* for purport.

AVS—prasaṅkhyānavidhi-śāstrayoḥ śeṣaśeṣibhāva ekavākyatāṁ vinā na sambhavati, sā caikavākyatā na sambhavati, tattvamāder vastu-paratvāt prasaṅkhyānaviddhāyaka-vākyasya niyogaparatvāt.

[833]

न च प्रयोजनैकत्वलक्षणाऽत्रैकवाक्यता ।
अङ्गप्रधानवद्येन कल्पेतात्रैकवाक्यता ॥ ८३३ ॥

Nor is there here syntactical unity of the nature of identity of fruit, as between auxiliary and principal, in which case syntactical unity could be postulated.

It may be contended that there is syntactical unity for *prasaṅkhyāna* and Scripture because of the sameness of fruit, as for the texts relating to the *Prayājas* and the *Darśapūrṇamāsa.* In connection with the *Darśapūrṇamāsa* sacrifice, we read—'*samidho yajati, tanūnapātaṁ yajati, iḍo yajati, barhir yajati, svāhākāraṁ yajati*' (*Taittirīya-saṁhitā*, II, vi, 1, 1). This text mentions the fore-sacrifices that are to be performed in connection with the *Darśapūrṇamāsa.* These fore-sacrifices have no independent fruit; they are auxiliary to the principal act which is the *Darśapūrṇamāsa.*

Now, if *prasaṅkhyāna* and Scripture are to be related in this way, what is the fruit, we ask? Is it heaven? Or, is it release?

The fruit cannot be heaven; and *prasaṅkhyāna* and Scripture cannot have syntactical unity because of having heaven as their fruit. A contrary example is given here. There are two sets of texts (A) one commencing with the words '*yadāgneyo'ṣṭākapālaḥ,*' etc., and (B) the other with the words '*āghāram āghārayati,*' etc. They relate to two sets of sacrifices. The question to be settled is whether both the sets of sacrifices are equally primary, or whether the first set alone is primary, the second being auxiliary. It is argued by the *Mīmāṁsaka,* as against the *prima facie* view, that the first set comprises the principal acts constituting the *Darśapūrṇamāsa,* while the second set consists of auxiliary acts. It is also maintained by him that the text, '*ya evaṁ vidvān paurṇamāsīṁ yajate, ya evaṁ vidvān amāvāsyāṁ yajate*' (*Taittirīya-saṁhitā*, I, vi, 9, 1-2), does not enjoin two different acts, but prescribes the time of performance with reference to the first set of sacrifices. [See *PM*, II, ii, 3-8.] Here again we have syntactical unity because the texts are related as enjoining the principal and subsidiary acts. And, the fruit is heaven.

This contingency does not arise with reference to *prasaṅkhyāna* and Scripture, because even you do not hold that heaven is their fruit.

[834]

स्वतःसिद्धस्य मोक्षस्य न साध्यमुपकारकम् ।
न चान्यथाऽङ्गता दृष्टा प्रधानानुपकारिणः ॥ ८३४ ॥

For release which is self-established, what is to be established (*prasaṅkhyāna*) cannot be the helper; auxiliariness is not to be found in any other way in the case of what does not help the principal.

In regard to the other alternative, namely, that *prasaṅkhyāna* and Scripture have syntactical unity because they have release as their fruit, we have to ask; does *prasaṅkhyāna* help Scripture in the matter of bringing about the fruit, or in establishing Scripture itself?

Not the first; for it has already been shown that in the matter of release which is the fruit of Scripture, the injunction of *prasaṅkhyāna* is of no use.

NTV—kaivalyaṁ hi svataḥsiddham na ca tasya kṛtisādhyatayā 'nuṣṭheyam prasaṅkhyānaṁ sādhanopakārakaṁ bhavati.

[835]

आत्मलाभे न शास्त्रं च नित्यत्वात्कार्यमीक्षते ।
स्वतोऽभिधानशक्तत्वान्नापि चैकात्म्यबोधने ॥ ८३५ ॥

Scripture does not need *kārya* for establishing itself, for it is eternal, nor for teaching the oneness of self, for it has the capacity to express by itself.

The second alternative too is not possible; Scripture is eternal, and so it does not require *prasaṅkhyāna* for its establishment; nor does it need *prasaṅkhyāna* for revealing its sense, for it has the ability by itself to make known the one self.

AVS—vedasya nityatvāt svato bodhana-sāmarthyāc ca.

प्रसंख्याने च शास्त्रार्थे सकृदेव कृते भवेत् ।
ऐकात्म्यानुभवो नो चेद्विसंवादादमानता ॥ ८३६ ॥

If continued meditation be the sense of Scripture, when performed once, there should be experience of the oneness of self; if not, there would be failure of fruitfulness, and there would result invalidity (for Scripture).

Let *prasaṅkhyāna* be the principal or a subsidiary to Scripture. But we have to settle this question, viz. whether it has an unseen result or a seen result. It cannot have an unseen result; for that is unacceptable to both of us. If it has a seen result, does that result come about when *prasaṅkhyāna* is performed once, or only when it is repeated? If the first alternative be sponsored, then you will have to give up advocating *bhāvanā* which is prolonged and uninterrupted meditation. As for the second alternative, that too is unintelligible. If a single performance of *prasaṅkhyāna* does not yield the fruit, how can a repeated performance yield it?

[837]

न चात्र चोदितः कालः संख्या वा येन निश्चयः ।
तद्द्वारेण भवेन्नापि संदिग्धे स्यात्प्रवर्तनम् ॥ ८३७ ॥

Nor is there prescribed here time or number in which case there could be certainty about the result through that. Indeed, there cannot be activity in respect of what is in doubt.

In the injunction of *prasaṅkhyāna* there is not mentioned 'time' or 'number' by virtue of which it may be said to yield the fruit. Contrary examples may help in elucidating the point here. In the

case of the *Agnihotra* sacrifice, 'morning' and 'evening' are prescribed. In the text 'He takes hold of the seventeen *Prājāpatya* animals,' the number 'seventeen' is prescribed. In regard to *prasaṅkhyāna*, no similar prescriptions are there. When one is in doubt about the fruitfulness of an act, one would not perform it.

NKL—asmin-kāle etāvat - saṅkhyākaṁ prasaṅkhyānād anubhavo bhaved iti ... na.

[838]

आरुह्याप्यथवा दूरं विसंवादपराङ्मुखः ।
यत्किंचित्कामतः कुर्यादकृतार्थोऽथवा पतेत् ॥ ८३८ ॥

Or (i.e. even if he is active), having climbed up high, he will turn indifferent because of failure and do as he likes, or fall without gaining his objective.

Or, when in doubt, if one performs *prasaṅkhyāna*, no good would come out of it. After trying and failing, one may become indifferent or despondent and end in utter defeat.

[839]

अदृष्टफलता वाऽपि कल्प्याऽग्निष्टोमवद्भवेत् ।
कर्माङ्गता वा कल्प्या स्यादुद्गीथविधिवत्तदा ॥ ८३९ ॥

Or, unseen fruit will have to be assumed, as in *Agniṣṭoma;* or it should be assumed to be an auxiliary to rite, as the injunction of the *Udgītha* chant.

If it be said that there in no question of failure, because one is asked to do *prasaṅkhyāna* till the end of one's life, then we must assume an unseen result for it, as for the *Jyotiṣṭoma.* Or, *prasaṅkyāna* must be regarded as an auxiliary to ritual, even as the *Udgītha* chant is.

[840]

ततश्च प्रातिलोम्येन कार्यं स्याच्छास्त्रबाधनात् ।
अश्रद्धा च मुमुक्षूणां कार्यबाधोऽपि च स्थितः ॥ ८४० ॥

Thence there would be the *kārya* contrary to what is taught and sublating Scripture; there would also be loss of faith for those who desire release and there would be sublation of the *kārya*.

If *prasaṅkhyāna* is an auxiliary to ritual, it cannot serve as a subsidiary of Scripture (that teaches the one self). If it has an unseen fruit, then it would be a principal act, like the *Jyotiṣṭoma*. That would mean that you have to give up your view that *prasaṅkhyāna* is subsidiary to Scripture. Moreover, if *prasaṅkhyāna* is an auxiliary to ritual and has an unseen result, then the one who desires release would not be interested in it even as he is not interested in the *Jyotiṣṭoma*. As realization is not seen to result from it, the one who desires release would not perform it; and so far as he is concerned, there could be no injunction of *prasaṅkhyāna*.

[841]

वस्तुतत्त्वानपेक्षत्वात्कार्यमात्रप्रधानता ।
शास्त्राच्च वस्तुनोऽलाभात्कार्यं किंविषयं भवेत् ॥ ८४१ ॥

The *kārya* alone would be the principal, because there would be no need of the truth of reality; and since from Scripture the real cannot be gained, what content will the *kārya* have?

Further, on the view of *prasaṅkhyāna*, we have to ask, what makes the reality known? Is it the text that enjoins *prasaṅkhyāna?* Or, is it the text 'That thou art,' etc.? Not the first, because the injunction

has *niyoga* for purport, and cannot, therefore, reveal the real. Nor the second; for if the text 'That thou art' has *niyoga* for purport, it cannot serve as *pramāṇa* in regard to its own sense. And, in the absence of the knowledge of reality, a repetition of that knowledge would be impossible, and the *niyoga*, thus, would be void of content.

[842]

यदि तद्वस्तुयाथात्म्यं शास्त्रं न प्रतिपादयेत् ।
वस्त्वसिद्धेस्ततः कार्यप्राधान्यादर्थवादता ॥ ८४२ ॥

If Scripture does not expound the true nature of reality, then since the real has not been established and as that text treats principally of *kārya*, there would be for that the nature of eulogy.

On the view of *prasaṅkhyāna*, does the sacred teaching about the one self, while having that self for purport, not expound it, or does it expound? If it does not expound, then it would not be *pramāṇa*.

[843]

अथैकात्म्यार्थनिष्ठं सच्छास्त्रं स्यात्प्रतिपादकम् ।
आपरोक्ष्यात्तदा कार्यं व्यर्थं पारोक्ष्यहानिकृत् ॥ ८४३ ॥

If Scripture does expound the oneness of self as its purport, then that oneness will be immediate, and so it is futile to assume a *kārya* which destroys the mediacy.

If the sacred teaching does expound the oneness of self, then the intuitive experience thereof would result from that text itself, and there would be no need for *prasaṅkhyāna* to remove mediacy.

[844]

शास्त्रात्कथं च तत्सिद्धिर्याथात्म्यानवबोधकात् ।
नानश्वरूपे सिद्धेऽपि गव्यश्वस्य प्रसिद्धता ॥ ८४४ ॥

How does that result from Scripture which does not teach the true nature (of the self)? When the cow which is non-horse is established, the horse is not established.

Now, it may be argued thus: From Scripture there does not result the immediate experience of the real; for it can convey only a related and mediate sense. In order to make it immediate, there is the injunction of *prasaṅkhyāna*.

Reply: There is the text which declares, 'That which is direct and immediate,' etc. If from this and similar texts there does not arise the direct experience of the one self, Scripture would become *apramāṇa*.

Objection: Scripture teaches a reality which is distinct from the relationless and direct self, and also as the counter-correlate thereof the relationless and direct self. So, there is validity for Scripture.

Reply: How is this possible? Suppose we see a cow which is distinct from the horse; do we thereby see the horse also?

AVS—aśvād bhinne gavi siddhe 'pi pratyakṣādinā na taj-jñānād aśvasiddhiḥ.

[845]

शास्त्राच्छ्रवणमात्रेण कार्याच्चानुभवो यदि ।
वस्तुन्यनिश्चिते वार्ता साऽर्थवादेऽपि दृश्यते ॥ ८४५ ॥

If it be said that the self is only heard from Scripture, and that the experience thereof is from *kārya*, then

the real is not determined, and Scripture would be mere words as is seen in the case of eulogy also.

Objection: From Scripture, the relationless and direct reality is established. But a mere hearing of Scripture does not produce experience. In order to have this experience, one must do *prasaṅkhyāna*. Thus, there is validity for Scripture, and there is need for *prasaṅkhyāna*.

Reply: From Scripture, is there determinate knowledge of reality, or only doubtful knowledge? If there is determinate knowledge, then that is experience, and nothing more is required. If there is only doubtful knowledge, then that is no knowledge. To say that there is knowledge from verbal testimony would thus be a mere figure of speech. If this be so, the text 'That thou art,' etc., would be but an eulogy.

[846]

ततश्च कार्यनिष्ठत्वं मुधैव परिवर्जितम् ।
संपत्परं भवेच्छास्त्रं वस्तुतात्पर्यवर्जनात् ॥ ८४६ ॥

And so, the doctrine that Scripture has *kārya* for purport has been given up (by the *prasaṅkhyānavādin*) only in vain; Scripture would have *sampat* (meditation) for purport, since it ceases to have reality for purport.

You cannot say, "Let the text 'That thou art' be an eulogy. What is the harm?" If the text is an eulogy, then its purport would be *kārya*. But this is not acceptable to you, for you too hold that the one self is the purport of the text. Self-consistency would demand of you to say that *prasaṅkhyāna*, and not reality, is the purport.

NKL — vastuparaṁ śāstram icchatā na prasaṅkhyāna-niyogā 'ṅgīkārya ity arthaḥ.

AVS — vastuparatvena vastuni mātram icchataḥ prasaṅkhyāna-niyogo nābhyupagantavyaḥ.

[847]

न चाप्याख्यायिकारूपमनुग्राहं श्रुतौ मतम् ।
आदिमत्त्वादिदुष्टत्वात्पुमर्थत्वेन वर्ण्यते ॥ ८४७ ॥

Nor is Scripture to be taken as of the form of story, though (stories are) heard; for there would be the defect of having a beginning, etc. Stories are related only as being subsidiary to the human goal.

There are stories related in the Upaniṣads. But they are not their purport; for by listening to them the human goal is not reached. If the stories were to constitute the purport, Scripture would have a beginning and cease to be eternal. The stories are there only as subsidiary aids to understanding.

AVS—tarhi kimartham ākhyāyikārūpaṁ śrutyā bhaṇyate ... abhyudayamokṣa-sādhana-stutyartham iti brūmaḥ.

[848]

पौनरुक्त्यभयाच्चाल यद्यर्थान्तरकल्पनम् ।
ऐकात्म्योक्तौ विधिर्व्यर्थ इति द्वैतप्रकल्पनम् ॥ ८४८ ॥

If, for the fear of futile repetition, another sense be assumed here (for *uttara-kāṇḍa*), and it be stated to be oneness of self, then injunction would be futile, and so duality would have to be assumed (that there may be continued meditation).

For this reason also there cannot be the injunction of *prasaṅkhyāna* in the Upaniṣadic texts 'That thou art, etc.: if the Upaniṣads have *niyoga* for purport, like the ritual sections of the Veda, there would be futile repetition.

Objection: In the ritual sections, injunction is independent, whereas in the Upaniṣads the main teaching is about Brahman, and the injunction of *prasaṅkhyāna* is auxiliary thereto. Thus there is no repetition. Or in the ritual section, *niyoga* is the external means, whereas here it is the internal means. Or, the connection may be stated thus: if *prasaṅkhyāna-niyoga* is not admitted in regard to the text 'That thou art,' there would be release through knowledge generated by the text heard only once, and the repetition of the text nine times in the *Chāndogya* would be pointless. Therefore the injunction of *prasaṅkhyāna* as auxiliary to the sacred teaching should be recognized.

Reply: The first explanation offered is not sound. If there be admitted *niyoga* in the Upaniṣads, that would become the principal according to the rule that what is existent is for the sake of what is to be occasioned (*bhūta-bhavya-nyāya*). So, the proper distinction between the two sections should be stated thus: In regard to the Vedāntic texts there could be no injunction by any means. Injunction is pertinent only to the texts that relate to ritual.

The second explanation too is not proper. That explanation would obtain if the two sections constituted one teaching like the second and third chapters of a single book. But that is not the case. As there can be no injunction at all in regard to the text 'That thou art,' etc., the two sections must be regarded as two different teachings.

The third explanation is equally unintelligible. If it is urged that the injunction of *prasaṅkhyāna* is for the wise one also because the text 'That thou art' is repeated, then it would follow that duality is real, as without duality there could be no injunction. It cannot be said that only an apparent duality is required, for your view is that the *niyoga* is necessary even after there is knowledge. Otherwise, the *niyoga* too would become unreal. So, the reason for the repetition of the text 'That thou art' must be stated thus: it is for the removal of doubts that arise in the way of understanding the text.

Note: AVS introduces the second alternative in the *pūrvapakṣa* thus: *brahmadattādi-matānusārī kaścic codayati.*

[849]

न च मानेन विषये बोधितेऽन्वेषणं पुनः ।
कार्ययुक्त्योः क्वचिद्दृष्टं स्वतःप्रामाण्यबाधनात् ॥ ८४९ ॥

In a matter which has been known through means of valid knowledge nowhere is again seen enquiring through *kārya* and reasoning, for then, self-validity would be destroyed.

When is *prasaṅkhyāna* required—is it when the Scriptural teaching has been understood only superficially, or even when that teaching has been directly and determinately known? The first alternative is acceptable to us, not the second. On the evidence of the Scriptural teaching when a matter has been settled, there is no need either for *niyoga* or for reasoning. When the supreme truth has been seen, there is no room for the sense of agency. How, then, can there be scope for injunction, etc.? Moreover, if Scripture were to be dependent on them, its self-validity would be destroyed.

[850]

प्रत्यक्षेण घटे बुद्धे का युक्तिः कार्यमेव वा ।
अदुष्टकारणत्वं चेत्सिद्धं वेदे नृवर्जनात् ॥ ८५० ॥

When a pot has been known through perception, why reasoning and why *kārya*? If they are needed for having a defectless cause, that is already established in the case of the Veda, because it has no human author.

An illustration is here given for showing that Scripture does not depend on reasoning, etc. When a pot is directly perceived, there is no need to reason about it. Sometimes, in the case of perception, etc., there may be a defective cause, which may necessitate dependence on reasoning, etc. But as regards Scripture, there can be no defect at all, for it is not the work of a human agent.

NTV—tatra kācādidoṣasaṁbhavād anveṣaṇam, śābdepi pauruṣeye puruṣadvāraka-doṣa-saṁbhavād anveṣaṇā bhavaty eva, vedasya tu apauruṣeyatvād doṣarahitatvaṁ svataḥsiddham iti nānveṣaṇaṁ yuktam iti bhāvaḥ.

[851]

प्रत्यक्षादिविरोधश्च कार्यपक्षेऽपि तु स्थितः ।
ऐकात्म्यानुभवो हि स्यात्कथमक्षादिबाधनात् ॥ ८५१ ॥

As for contradiction with perception, etc., that remains even on the view of *kārya*. How can there be the experience of oneness of self, since it is contradicted by perception, etc.?

It cannot be maintained that, as the Scriptural knowledge of the oneness of self is opposed to perception, there is need for *prasaṅkhyāna-niyoga*. For, even then the opposition to perception would remain.

NTV — siddhavastu-bodhakatve vākyasya pratyakṣādi-virodhepi prāmāṇyaṁ yujyate, upakramādiliṅgaiḥ tatra tātparya-nirṇayāt, niyoga-paratve tu ādityo yūpa ityādivat na vastuni prāmāṇyaṁ pratyakṣādi-virodhād ity arthaḥ.

[852]

तन्निषेधात्तु या सिद्धिर्न सा कार्यप्रसादतः ।
प्रमाणादेव शास्त्रात्सा न मेयात्कार्यतो भवेत् ॥ ८५२ ॥

That which is established by the denial of that (perception, etc.) is, indeed, not a gift from the *kārya*; that is only from Scripture which is a valid means of knowledge, and not from the object of knowledge which is *kārya*.

The establishment of the non-dual reality through the rejection of the evidence of perception, etc., is not on the strength of *niyoga*, but on the testimony of Scripture which is a valid means of knowledge. *Niyoga* is not a means of knowledge; it is an object of knowledge.

[853]

का वा कार्येऽस्ति ते युक्तिः शास्त्रं चेदुभयोः समम् ।
अज्ञातज्ञापनादन्यच्छास्त्रान्नेति पुरोदितम् ॥ ८५३ ॥

If the nature of Scripture be the same for us both, then what argument of yours will justify *kārya*? That there is no Scripture other than that which makes known what has not been known, we have said already.

Both of us are agreed that the Vedānta texts validly teach a sense which relates to the established reality. We have also defined *pramāṇa* as that which conveys a sense not already known. Thus, when it is shown that Scripture is the evidence for Brahman which is not known earlier, where is the need for dependence on *niyoga*?

[See vv. 561-b — 562-a f.]

[854]

पुमर्थं प्रतिपाद्यापि प्रकृत्यैव श्रुतिः पुनः ।
तमेव युक्तिभिः सार्धं वदन्ती स्वार्थमीक्षते ॥ ८५४ ॥

After expounding the human goal by the force of its own nature, Scripture in speaking of that again with the help of arguments, is expectant only of its own sense.

It may be argued that although *niyoga* is not needed, reasoning is required thus: Scriptural texts do contain arguments. The reasoning based on arguments is not possible before knowing a thing. So, it must be admitted that Scripture stands in need of reasoning for establishing what is taught by it.

Reply: Scripture teaches its sense which is the human goal. The arguments are adduced to remove possible doubts. Although the knowledge of the inner reality, Brahman, is given by Scripture, there arise doubts on account of the limitations of man. The arguments that are advanced are designed for the removal of these doubts. They are not the means for generating the intuitive knowledge of Brahman. For this, the Scriptural text alone is the cause.

NKL—śrutiḥ prakṛtyaiva svārasikasāmarthyenaiva saṁvid-ānanda-vastu pratipādya, sambhāvanā - viparītabhāvanā - 'bhibhūtam āpāta-darśanam utpādya, tad asambhāvanādi-nirāsaphala-yuktibhiḥ saha vadantī svārtham akhaṇḍāparokṣam īkṣate sadyomuktiphalam anu-bhavaṁ prasūta ity arthaḥ.

[855]

नैतावताऽपराधेन युक्त्या मानकारणम् ।
शब्दमात्रादसंसिद्धेरनपेक्षत्वहानतः ॥ ८५५ ॥

On account of a fault such as this the reasonings are not the cause of a means of valid knowledge; for if the self would not be established from Scripture alone, there would be the destruction of the latter's independence.

Scripture teaches its own sense; here there is no dependence on reasoning. The latter helps only by way of removing doubts. Otherwise, Scripture would cease to be an independent *pramāṇa*.

NTV — pauruṣeyavākyavat vedaḥ sāpekṣaḥ prāpnoti, yuktyādy-upanyāsasyā 'nyathāsiddhau na sāpekṣaḥ syād ity arthaḥ.

[856]

न वायोः क्षिप्रकारित्वाच्छ्वेतालम्भो विभूतये ।
विध्युद्देशात्तु तत्सिद्धेः शैघ्र्यं तूक्तं प्रवृत्तये ॥ ८५६ ॥

Not because Vāyu is quick in giving reward is the sacrifice of a white goat enjoined for attaining prosperity; for that is established as the aim of the injunction; and quickness is mentioned for the sake of performance.

Here an illustration is given to show that reasoning is only for the purpose of removing obstacles that lie in the way of determinate knowledge. There is the Vedic text (see note to *v.* 36): 'One desiring prosperity should sacrifice the animal *śveta* dedicated to Vāyu: Vāyu, verily, is the eftest deity ... he leads the man to prosperity.' Here the relation of means and end as between sacrificing the white animal and gaining prosperity is not established on the strength of the words 'Vāyu, verily, is the eftest deity.' That relation is known from the earlier part of the text 'One desiring,' etc. The other part of the text is for removing a possible obstacle by putting enthusiasm into the agent of the sacrifice.

Similarly, here, reasoning is given, not for generating knowledge from the text, nor for the sake of determining the sense of the knowledge that has arisen, but for removing the obstacles thereto.

NTV—na vākyāt jñānotpattaye yuktyādy-upanyāsaḥ, nāpy utpanna-jñānasya svārtha-niścayāya, kiṁtu niścita-pratibandhavigamanāya.

NKL — vāyur vai kṣepiṣṭā devateti kṣiprakāritva-kathanaṁ na śvetālaṁbhasya vibhūti-sādhanatva-jñāpanāya vidhita eva tatsiddheḥ, kiṁtu prarocanādvārā puṁ-pravṛttyarthaṁ. evam atrāpi jñānasyotpattau arthaniścitau ca na yuktyapekṣā apitu pratibandha vigame eva.

AVS—nanu jñānaphale pratibandho na bhavatī 'ty uktam ācāryaiḥ evaṁ muktiphalāniyama ity atra, ataḥ katham adhikaraṇaviruddham ucyate. naitatsāram, jñānasya dvividhaṁ phalaṁ svaviṣayaniścaya ekaṁ phalam, aparaṁ niścayadvāreṇa avidyā-tatkārya-nivṛttis tatra niścayākhyaṁ phalaṁ pratibandhuṁ śakyate.

[857]

जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्तेभ्यो यदि नामातिरेकतः ।
व्यक्तिभ्यो गोत्ववद्दृष्टं ब्रह्मत्वेऽस्य किमागतम् ॥ ८५७ ॥

If the self be seen as distinct from the states of waking, dream and sleep, as cowness is from the individuals, what bearing has it on the self being Brahman?

The determination of truth does not result from reasoning. For example, one may know through reasoning that the self is distinct from the three states of experience. But, with this much, it is not realized that the self is Brahman, that the sense of 'thou' is the sense of 'that.' This latter realization is got only from the Vedāntic text.

NTV—tvaṁ-padārtha-śuddhir eva yuktibhiḥ bhavati na tasya brahmatvam avagataṁ bhavati, vākyad eva kevalāt tad avagamād ity arthaḥ.

NKL — tvaṁ-padārtha-viveko yukti-phalaṁ brahmatvānubhavo vākya-phalam.

[858]

असिद्धं शास्त्रयुक्तिभ्यामावृत्त्याऽपि न सिध्यति ।
नैव ह्यावर्तनं हेतुः प्रामाण्येऽन्येष्वनीक्षणात् ॥ ८५८ ॥

What has not been established by Scripture and reasoning cannot be established by repetition. Verily, repetition is not seen to be the cause of validity elsewhere.

The opponent may argue that, as knowledge is not seen to result from the text that has been heard or from reasoning, there is need for repetition (*prasaṅkhyāna*). The reply is that repetition is not a means of knowledge. Even as the repetition of perception is not the cause of validity, the repetition of verbal testimony is not the cause of validity.

NKL — ātmājñānam abhyasyamānam nāparokṣapramiti-janakam, jñānatvāt, pratyakṣādi-jñānavat.

AVS—jñānasya āvṛtyā niścayajanakatvaṁ na dṛṣṭam ity arthaḥ.

[859]

न चेदृशं प्रमाणत्वं दृष्टमन्यत्र कुत्रचित ।
अन्यादृक्षप्रमाणस्य न च नास्त्यत्र संभवः ॥ ८५९ ॥

Nowhere else is this kind of validity seen; nor can it be said that there is no possibility here of a unique kind of proof.

It may be that secular statements convey a sense that is related and mediate. That does not mean that it is impossible for the Vedāntic texts to reveal Brahman that is unrelated and immediate. A *pramāṇa* must be in consonance with the real.

AVS — apratibandha-vijñānaṁ svarūpalābhamātreṇa niścitim avidyātatkārya-nivṛttiṁ ca karotī 'ty arthaḥ.

[860]

अलौकिकार्थवादित्वादात्मब्रह्माभिधानयोः ।
संबन्धाग्रहणादात्मा ब्रह्मेति कथमुच्यते ॥ ८६० ॥

"Because the names *Ātman* and *Brahman* are expressive of nonempirical senses, how can it be said that the Ātman is Brahman without knowing their relation?

Objection: You say that the text 'That thou art', etc., is the *pramāṇa* for Brahman-Ātman. Now, are the words 'Brahman' and 'Ātman' known through some other *pramāṇa* or not? If they are not known, the text cannot convey meaning.

[861]

ज्ञातार्थसङ्गतिः शब्दो वाक्यार्थावगमक्षमः ।
ब्रह्मात्मार्थप्रसिद्धौ च लोकान्मानप्रवेशिता ॥ ८६१ ॥

"The word whose relation to the sense is known is capable of conveying the sentence-sense. If the senses of Brahman and Ātman were known from empirical usage, then the knowledge would enter the empirical sphere."

If those words are already known, then the text 'That thou art,' etc., would be but a re-statement.

[862]

नाऽऽत्मन्येवाऽऽत्मशब्दस्य प्रयोगात्स्यादलौकिकः ।
ब्रह्मार्थोऽपि महत्त्वेन प्रसिद्धो व्यवहारतः ॥ ८६२ ॥

Since the word 'self' is used only to refer to the self, it has an empirical sense; and the sense of 'Brahman' also is well known in empirical usage as greatness.

Reply: The two words are not unknown in empirical usage. The word 'Ātman' is employed to refer to self. The word 'Brahman' means 'that which is great.'

[863]

एवं पदात्परिज्ञाते पदार्थे लोकमानतः ।
वाक्यार्थोऽतीन्द्रियो वेदे वाक्यात्केन निवार्यते ॥ ८६३ ॥

When thus the word-senses have been known from the words through the empirical means of knowledge, who can prevent the super-sensuous sentence-sense from the sentence in the Veda?

Although the word-senses are known earlier, the sense of the text 'That thou art' is not empirical, in which case alone the text would be a re-statement. The impartite sense which the text conveys is not known through any other *pramāṇa*.

[864]

अपूर्वदेवतास्वर्गपदार्थेष्वपि लोकतः ।
सिद्धेष्वतीन्द्रियोऽप्यर्थो वाक्यादेवावगम्यते ॥ ८६४ ॥

When through empirical usage the senses of words like *apūrva*, *devatā* and *svarga* have been established, the super-sensuous sense is understood from the sentence alone.

An example is given here from the ritual section of the Veda. Words such as 'apūrva,' 'devatā,' and 'svarga' carry their meanings even in empirical usage. But, as employed in the Vedic texts, they acquire a supernormal meaning.

NKL — kṛtisādhyamātre saṁpradānakārakamātre sukhamātre vā apūrvādi-śabdānāṁ loka-gṛhīta-saṅgatikānāṁ vede svargakāmādi-padāntara-samabhivyāhāreṇa viśiṣṭārtha-bodhakatvaṁ yathā tathā atrāpī 'ty arthaḥ.

[865]

नापेक्षापूरणाशक्तेः प्रयोगे समवायिता ।
पदानां सपदार्थानां वाक्याद्व्यवहृतिर्यतः ॥ ८६५ ॥

There is no coherence when words along with the word-senses are used, as they have not the capacity to satisfy the expectancy ; for, empirical usage is from sentence.

The objector may say that there is no sentence-sense other than the word-senses put together. But he is wrong. On hearing a set of words without mutual expectancy, one does not make out any sense. In order to convey sentence-sense, a sentence has to be employed.

[866-867]

वाक्यार्थायैव वाक्यं हि सर्वदैव प्रयुज्यते ।
व्यवहारेषु वृद्धानां संबन्धस्तत्र गृह्यते ॥ ८६६ ॥
भागान्तरप्रवेशेन भागत्यागेन च स्फुटम् ।
वाक्यवाक्यार्थयोर्भेदे पदार्थानां निमित्तता ॥ ८६७ ॥

In the empirical usages of elders a sentence is always used for the sake of sentence-sense; there the relation (of words and their senses) is understood clearly by the entry of other parts and leaving off of certain parts (i. e. *āvāpodvāpa*); for the difference between sentence and sentence-sense, the words and their senses are the cause.

Objection: Words make their senses known; from the word-senses there is knowledge of the sentence-sense, and not from the sentence.

Reply: Both in the state of learning and in the state thereafter it is only the sentence that is used. Never do the word-senses make sentence-sense known; for they are not *pramāṇa*. If it were not thus, knowledge of the sentence-sense would not be through verbal testimony. Moreover, in the empirical usage of elders it is the knowledge of the sentence-sense that is intended. It is from this that the relation of particular words to their senses is known through the method of insertion and elimination.

Objection: Insertion and elimination stop when the senses of words have been grasped. How, then, to account for the difference between sentences and between sentence-senses?

Reply: Words are the cause for the difference between sentences; and word-senses for the difference between sentence-senses.

AVS — na kevalaṁ padārthajñānāya vākyaprayogaḥ, kiṁtu vākyārtha-jñānāya.

[868]

यद्भागस्याऽऽगमाद्योऽर्थभागः स्यादधिकः क्वचित् ।
तस्य भागस्य भागोऽसौ निमित्तं स्यान्न तु प्रमा ॥ ८६८ ॥

If by the in-coming of a part there is increase of a part in the sense, then of that (increased) part this (added) part is the cause, and not the means of valid knowledge.

When a word is inserted in a sentence, there is an addition in sense. Of this added sense, the inserted word is the cause. Thereby that word does not become *pramāṇa*.

[869]

अत एव समागत्वं वाक्यवाक्यार्थयोर्मतम् ।
वाचकत्वेऽपि वाक्यस्य संसृष्टार्थाभिधानतः ॥ ८६९ ॥

It is therefore held that the sentence and sentence-sense have parts; and the sentence, while conveying its meaning, expresses a composite sense.

Objection: Like word and word-sense, sentence and sentence-sense, you say, are related as expression and expressed. Then, even as for the former, for the latter too parts are not possible; and sentence must convey its sense even as word does. You would thus have to admit that sentence is not *pramāṇa*, even as word is not.

Reply: Although sentence expresses its sense, the sense that it expresses is a related one. So, both sentence and sentence-sense have parts. The relation thus is between word which is a part of sentence and word-sense which is a part of sentence-sense. The same does not obtain between sentence which is a collection of words and sentence-sense which is a collection of word-senses.

[870]

ततश्चैवं समूहस्य वाचकत्वमवस्थितम् ।
भागवत्त्वं च संसिद्धं वाक्यवाक्यार्थयोरतः ॥ ८७० ॥

And thus it is settled that the capacity to express meaning is for a collection (of words) (only); and it is also, therefore, established that sentence and sentence-sense have parts.

Word has capacity to convey its own sense as associated with other competent words. And, sentence and sentence-sense have parts. From this we conclude that sentence which is a collection of

words conveys a meaning which is not known earlier from the words themselves, and so it is *pramāṇa*, while word is not.

NKL—yato vākya-tadarthayor bhāgavatvam eva tataḥ samūhasya vācakatvaṁ pramāṇatvam avasthitam ity arthaḥ.

AVS—ataḥ-śabdo yata ity asminn arthe ca-śabda evakārārthe.

[871]

एवं च लोकतः सिद्धो वाक्यार्थः स्याच्छ्रुतावपि ।
लौकिका एव शब्दार्था न्यायेनोक्ताः श्रुतौ यतः ॥ ८७१ ॥

And thus, even in Scripture there would be the sentence-sense established in empirical usage; for, the empirical word-senses alone are declared in Scripture through reasoning.

Just as in empirial usage words have capacity to express a sense as construed with other competent words, so also do they have that capacity in the Veda. So far as the use of words in sentences is concerned, there is no difference between empirical usage and Vedic usage. As for the Vedānta texts conveying a sense that is impartite, that is made possible by secondary implication (*lakṣaṇā*).

[872]

नृविवक्षाव्यवायेन लोके शङ्का भवेदपि ।
वेदे त्वपौरुषेयत्वात्साक्षात्स्वार्थे प्रमाणता ॥ ८७२ ॥

Even though, due to the intervention of human intention, there be doubt in empirical usage, in the Veda, because it is not a product of any human agency, there is direct validity in respect of its own sense.

Objection: If empirical usage and the Veda do not differ in the matter of sentence-sense, then like empirical words, the Veda too should be a contingent *pramāṇa*.

Reply: Empirical words are contingent because they are uttered by fallible human beings. Not so is the Veda, because it has no human author.

[873]

न च कार्यपरत्वेऽपि पदानां संहतिः स्थिता ।
अन्यत्रावगमो न स्यात्संबन्धज्ञानवर्जनात् ॥ ८७३ ॥

Even if the Veda had *kārya* for purport, it does not follow that combination of words has that for purport; for if that were so, there would be no knowledge of sense elsewhere, because there is not the knowledge of relation (to *kārya*).

Even if the Veda had *kārya* for purport, it does not follow that every combination of words should have that for purport. For, we have already shown that words have capacity in conveying sense in combination with competent words. And, sentences are employed to convey a sense that has nothing to do with *kārya*, even as there are sentences relating to *kārya*. So, it must be admitted that a sentence can mean something which is already there. To the question how a sentence can convey a sense that is unrelated and impartite, we have replied that it is by secondary implication.

If *kārya* is said to be necessary for words or sentences to make sense, then, what about words and sentences which have no relation to *kārya* and yet make sense?

[874]

यथा च कार्ये तात्पर्यं कार्यं चापि न विद्यते ।
पूर्वमेव तथाऽस्माभिर्युक्तिभिः संप्रसाधितम् ॥ ८७४ ॥

How *kārya* is not the purport (of the Veda) and how there is no *kārya* at all we have already established through reasoning.

That *kārya* is not the purport of the Veda, we have established already.

[875]

अनादिवृद्धव्यवहृद्भ्युत्पत्त्यैव च तत्स्थितेः ।
शब्दस्यार्थेन संबन्ध आदिमत्ता न शङ्क्यते ॥ ८७५ ॥

Because the relation of a word to its meaning is established by the immemorial usage of elders, the doubt cannot be raised that the relation has a beginning.

If it be objected that because the relation between words and meanings depends on convention and so has a beginning, verbal testimony cannot be an independent *pramāṇa,* the reply is that the usage of words is without a beginning.

NTV — cakṣurāder yathā rūpagrahaṇe sāmarthyaṁ sahajam na saṅketikaṁ evaṁ śabdasyāpīty arthaḥ.

[876]

प्रथमश्रवणे यत्र न शब्दार्थावधारणम् ।
तत्राव्युत्पन्नता हेतुः शब्दानां न त्वशक्तिता ॥ ८७६ ॥

Where on the first hearing the sense of a word is not determined, there the lack of learning (on the part of the hearer) is the cause and not the incapacity of the words.

Objection: If words have capacity to convey meanings, why is it that all who hear words such as 'cow' do not have the knowledge of their meaning? Is it not, then, reasonable to say that the relation between words and meanings is dependent on convention?

Reply: Those who have not learnt the meanings of certain words do not understand the meaning when they hear those words, not because the words have no capacity but because those persons are not aware of that capacity. There is no need, therefore, to assume a relation called convention over and above capacity.

[877]

चक्षुर्द्रष्टृपि बाह्यं हि न प्रकाशं विनाऽर्थदृक् ।
नैतावताऽस्य सामर्थ्यं हन्यतेऽन्यस्य वा भवेत् ॥ ८७७ ॥

Though seeing, the eye does not see the object in the absence of external light; but with this much its capacity is not destroyed, nor does the capacity belong to something else.

An example is given here. The eye has the power to see. But in the absence of external light it does not see. This does not mean that the eye has no power to see, nor that the power belongs to light.

[878]

व्युत्पत्त्या न च संबन्धः क्रियते ह्यर्थशब्दयोः ।
अवस्थिते हि संबन्धे वृद्धेभ्योऽसौ प्रजायते ॥ ८७८ ॥

The relation between word and sense is not created by learning; when the relation is there, learning results from the usage of elders.

On the view which says that the relation between word and sense is conventional, we ask, what is the origin of the convention? Is the convention due to what one learns? Or, is it created by someone who is parviscient? Or, is it fixed by the omniscient God?

Not the first; because it is only when the relation between word and its sense is there that learning arises on the strength of the empirical usage of elders. How can that which is posterior be the cause of that which is earlier?

[879]

संबन्धकरणाशक्तेस्तत्कर्तुश्चास्मृतेरपि ।
तद्विना व्यवहाराच्च सिद्धा संबन्धनित्यता ॥ ८७९ ॥

Because no one is capable of creating the relation, as no such creator is remembered, and because there is usage even without such remembrance, the eternality of the relation is established.

The second alternative is not sound. No one who is parviscient can be the author of the relation between word and sense which is endless.

Nor is the third alternative intelligible. We do not experience a God that is the author of the relation. No one remembers such an act of creating the relation by God. The empirical usage of words takes place even without remembering some one as the author of the relation between words and their sense. The relation in dispute is eternal, like the self, because no author thereof is remembered.

NTV—anena ayaṁ kṛta ity asmaraṇāt.

NKL—vimataḥ saṁbandho nityaḥ, vyavahārāvicchede saty asmaryamāṇakartṛkatvād ātmavad ity arthaḥ.

AVS—īśvara-sadbhāve pramāṇābhāvāt nā 'dhyakṣa-pramāṇam anabhyupagamāt, tasya rūpādimad-vastu-viṣayatvāc ca, īśvarasya rūpādy-abhāvāt, adhyakṣāntarasya īśvara-samatvāt, nā 'numānaṁ tad-vyāpti-liṅgābhāvāt, na kārya-liṅgena īśvarānumānam, tasya kāraṇamātra-sādhakatvāt, ekatva-niravayavatva-sarvagatatva-sarvajñatva-sarvaśaktitva-svapratiṣṭhitatvāder anumātum aśakyatvāt, tadvyatirekeṇa īśvarāsiddher ātmano 'nyatra. nāpy upamānaṁ mānam īśvara-sadṛśasyā 'bhāvāt. nāpy arthāpattis tadvinā 'nupapannasya kasyacid abhāvāt, na kāryasya tadvinā 'nupapattiḥ, kartranekatvepi kāryasyo 'papatter gṛhādivat. nāpy āgamo mānaṁ, āgamo dvividhaḥ kṛtako nityaś ca, kṛtakastāvat uktaprakāreṇa mūlapramāṇābhāvat neśvare mānam, nityo na sambandha-kartarī īśvaravādi-parikalpite mānam, veda-siddhas tv īśvaro na saṁbandhaṁ karoti abhivyanakti paraṁ nitya-siddhaṁ sambandham. evaṁ avaidikeśvara-sadbhāve pramāṇābhavāt na tat-kṛtaḥ saṁbandhaḥ.

[880]

जीर्णकूपादिवत्कर्तुर्यदप्यस्मरणं न तत् ।
अभावगमकं नापि संबन्धेनास्य तुल्यता ॥ ८८० ॥

The non-remembrance of agent in the case of dilapidated well, etc., does not convey that there was no agent; it is not similar to the relation (between word and sense).

Objection: One may not remember the person that built a well that is now old and broken. Similarly, may it not be that one does not remember the author of the relation between word and sense?

Reply: No; the relation is endless, and so it is not something which can be made. The illustration of the well is not apt. A well is a small structure, and may be constructed without much difficulty.

NTV—jīrṇa-kūpādeḥ kartur yadākadācit yasyakasycit smaraṇam asti, na tathā śabdārtha-saṁbandhasya kadācit kasyacid api smaraṇaṁ saṁbhavati.

[881]

क्वचिज्ज्ञातेषु दूरादिकारणे संशयोऽपि च ।
नात्यन्तानुपलब्धेषु त्वभावोऽतोऽस्य निश्चितः ॥ ८८१ ॥

Where a thing has been known in some cases, there may be doubt because of distance, etc., and not in respect of what is absolutely unknown; hence the non-existence of this (creator of relation) is settled.

No creator or originator of the relation between word and sense is ever seen. So, not even a suspicion of the existence of such a creator can arise. On the contrary, it is quite certain that there is no such creator. Hence also, the relation is eternal.

NKL—deśāntare kālāntare vā dṛṣṭeṣu sthāṇvādiṣu dūratva-mandāndhakārādi-kāraṇāt sthāṇur vā puruṣo veti saṁśayaḥ. natv atyantā 'paridṛṣṭeṣu saptamarasādiṣu, tena saṁbandhakartur atyantānupalabdhasya na saṁśaya ity arthaḥ.

AVS—jñāteṣu padārtheṣu kartṛṣu ca saṁbhāviteṣu pakṣe kim idaṁ kenacit kṛtaṁ na veti saṁśayaḥ syāt, iha tu śabdārtha-saṁbandhakartuḥ sarvātmanā 'nupalaṁbhāt saṁbandhasya ca kāryatvānupapatteḥ śabdasyā 'rthabodhakatva-sāmarthyaṁ cakṣurādivat sahajam iti.

[882]

संनिकृष्टार्थसंसृष्टस्वार्थमात्राभिधानतः ।
तस्मात्सिद्धोऽत्र वाक्यार्थो लोके वेदे प्रमाणवान् ॥ ८८२ ॥

Therefore, it has been established here, both in empirical usage and Veda, that the sentence-sense is

valid, as it expresses its own sense in relation to the proximate and connected senses.

It is now settled that words convey their senses as related to other senses characterized by proximity, etc., that the senses of the words may be *kārya* or what is not *kārya*, and that the sentence-sense, which is either the relation of word-senses or related word-sense, is valid testimony both in empirical usage and in the Veda.

[883]

अतोऽवबोधकत्वेन दुष्टकारणवर्जनात् ।
अबाधाच्च प्रमाणत्वं वस्तुन्यक्षादिवच्छ्रुतेः ॥ ८८३ ॥

Therefore, Scripture is valid in respect of the real, like perception, etc., because it conveys knowledge, because it is free from defective causes, and because it is not sublated.

The testimony of the Scriptural texts such as 'That thou art' is valid because it instructs the eligible person, and the knowledge that results from it is faultless. Neither doubt nor error is possible here because Scripture is not the work of any human author. Consequently, there can be no sublation of its testimony.

NKL—vedaḥ siddha evārthe pramāṇaṁ pramāṇatvāt cakṣurādivat.

[884]

पुरुषार्थोपदेष्टृत्वाद्यद्वत्कार्ये प्रमाणता ।
तथैकात्म्ये विशेषाद्वा पुमर्थातिशयत्वतः ॥ ८८४ ॥

Because Scripture teaches the human goal, as it is a means of valid knowledge in respect of *kārya*, so is it a

means of valid knowledge in respect of the oneness of self, or even more so, because of the excellence of the human goal.

Just as the texts of the ritual section of the Veda are valid, so are the Upaniṣadic texts valid. Especially the latter cannot but be valid because they make one realize the truth, and lead to the final human goal.

[885]

पुमानिष्टस्य संप्राप्तिमनिष्टस्य च वर्जनम् ।
इच्छन्नपेक्षते योग्यमुपायमपि तत्परः ॥ ८८५ ॥

Desiring to attain what is good and to avoid what is evil, and being devoted to that, man stands in need of the proper means also.

The human goal has two aspects—the attainment of what is desired, viz. happiness, and the avoidance of what is not desired, viz. misery. What is required is the proper means that would lead to this goal.

NKL—iṣṭāniṣṭa-prāptiparihāra-mātram apekṣate na sādhyatvam apī 'ty arthaḥ.

[886]

ग्रामादि किंचिदप्राप्तं प्राप्तुमिष्टमिहेच्छति ।
हेमादि विस्मृतं किंचित्करस्थमपि लिप्सते ॥ ८८६ ॥

One may desire to reach a village, etc., which have not been reached; or one may desire to regain gold, etc., which, though being in one's own hand, has been forgotten.

What is to be attained may be of two kinds: (1) that which is yet to be accomplished, e. g. the reaching of a village, and (2) that

which is already there, but only has been forgotten, e. g. a gold piece that is in one's hand.

[887]

परिहार्यं तथाऽनिष्टं कण्टकादि जिहासति ।
रज्ज्वां सर्पादि किंचिच्च त्यक्तमेव जिहासति ॥ ८८७ ॥

Likewise, one may desire to remove what is unpleasant like thorn, etc., or one may desire to avoid the serpent, etc., in the rope, which are already not there.

What is to be removed is also of two kinds: (1) a factual impediment to one's happiness, e. g. a thorn that has entered the flesh, and (2) an imagined source of pain, e. g. the serpent in the rope.

[888]

नियतोपायसाध्यत्वादवाप्यपरिहार्ययोः ।
विधितः प्रतिषेधाच्च साधनापेक्षता भवेत् ॥ ८८८ ॥

Because what is to be attained and what is to be avoided are to be accomplished by the allotted means, there is the need of means through both prescription and prohibition.

For attaining what has not been attained, and for removing what has not been removed, one has to follow the prescriptions and prohibitions taught by Scripture.

[889]

अज्ञानान्तरितत्वेन संप्राप्तत्यक्तयोः पुनः ।
याथात्म्यज्ञानतो नान्यत्पुरुषार्थाय कल्पते ॥ ८८९ ॥

But as regards what are already attained and already avoided, because they are veiled by ignorance, nothing but the knowledge of truth serves as the means for the human goal.

What stands in the way of attaining what is already attained and avoiding what is already avoided is ignorance. In order to remove ignorance what is required is knowledge.

[890]

अशेषानर्थविच्छेदं वाञ्छतः श्रुतितः श्रुतेः ।
त्वं ब्रह्मेति हताशेषक्लेशो मोहप्रहाणतः ॥ ८९० ॥

For one who desires the destruction of the entire host of evil, when he hears from Scripture 'Thou art Brahman', there is the removal of all sorrow because of the destruction of delusion.

When from the Scriptural teaching 'Thou art Brahman' the truth is known and ignorance is removed, misery and evil disappear, and the goal that is unexcellable and unsublatable bliss is gained. Hence the Vedānta texts have absolute validity.

[891]

वेदस्य सिद्धे प्रामाण्ये ह्यज्ञातार्थावबोधतः ।
कार्ये यथा प्रमाणत्वमैकात्म्येऽप्येवमिष्यताम् ॥ ८९१ ॥

When thus the validity of the Veda has been established on the ground that it makes known a sense which was not known, just as there is validity in respect of *kārya*, validity in respect of the oneness of self must also be admitted.

The Veda is *pramāṇa* in the sense that it reveals a sense that is unknown. Just as its ritual section is valid by making known *kārya* which is otherwise unknown, even so its knowledge-section is valid by making us realize the oneness of self.

NKL—karma-jñāna-vākyayor ajñāta-jñāpanaṁ tulyam ity arthaḥ.

[892]

कार्याद्यदि तु मानत्वं मानत्वात्कार्यनिष्ठता ।
अन्योन्याश्रयतैवं स्यादेकस्यासिद्धितोऽन्यतः ॥ ८९२ ॥

If there is validity for the Veda because of *kārya*, then the Veda would have *kārya* for purport because it is valid; thus there would be reciprocal dependence because either will not be established without the other.

It is not proper to say that the Veda is valid because it has *kārya* for purport. For, there would be reciprocal dependence thus: the Veda is valid *pramāṇa*, and so it teaches *kārya;* it has *kārya* for purport, and therefore it is valid.

[893]

औदासीन्यान्निषेधेषु न लभ्येत प्रमाणता ।
औदासीन्यं निवृत्तिर्हि स्वरूपालम्बनं च तत् ॥ ८९३ ॥

Because prohibitions are of the nature of indifference (and not *kārya*), they would not attain validity; and indifference, indeed, is withdrawal (from action, and not action); that is remaining in one's own nature.

Objection: What is in dispute, viz. the Vedānta, is not valid in regard to its sense, as it does not have *kārya* for purport.

Reply: The *probans* is inconstant. The prohibitory texts of the Veda, such as 'Do not kill', 'Do not drink', do not have *kārya* for purport; yet they are admitted to be valid. What such texts teach is not action, but indifference or withdrawal from action. And, withdrawal means remaining in the state of the immutable self.

NTV—audāsīnyaṁ nāma nivṛttiḥ na bhāvarthaḥ, sā ca ātmādīnāṁ svarūpam eva.

NKL — rāga-prāpta-brāhmaṇahanana-kalañjabhakṣaṇādi-kriyā-nivṛttir ity arthaḥ.

AVS—audāsīnyaṁ nivṛttir na kāryam, sā ca nivṛttir vastveva ity arthaḥ.

[894]

सोऽरोदीत्यादिवाक्यानां कार्यावेशात्प्रमाणता ।
अपुमर्थोपदेष्टृत्वात्तच्च नात्रेत्यकारणम् ॥ ८९४ ॥

The texts 'He howled', etc., are valid by entering into *kārya*, because they teach what is not a human goal; but that is not so here, hence it cannot be the reason.

Objection: The texts 'That thou art,' etc., are valid in regard to what is auxiliary to *kārya*, because they are Vedic statements devoid of injunction, like the eulogistic texts (*arthavāda*).

Reply: There is no parity between the Vedānta texts and the *arthavāda* texts. While the latter do not have an end in view, the former have for purport the highest human end. So, the *probans* in the inference given above is vitiated by an adventitious circumstance.

NKL — vedāntāḥ kāryaśeṣatvena pramāṇaṁ siddhārtha-vedatvāt, sorodīdityādi-vākyavad ity āśaṅkya svārthe-phalavikala-vedatvam upādhir ity āha—sorodīd iti.

[895]

न चैकात्म्याभ्युपायस्य मिथ्यात्वमिह शङ्क्यते ।
उपेयाप्तौ कृतार्थत्वादुपायं प्रत्यनीक्षणात् ॥ ८९५ ॥

Nor may it be doubted here that the means to the oneness of self is illusory; for it is only when the object has been attained that the means is neglected, because the aim has been fulfilled.

Objection: The knowledge that results from the texts like 'That thou art' is not valid, because its cause is illusory, even as the inference of fire from the pseudo- smoke as *probans* is.

Reply: When the knowledge is gained, release is attained. After that there is no need to inquire into the ontological status of Scripture.

NKL—upeyasyaikātmyasya satyatvena taj-jñānasya pratibimba-janya-bimbānumānasyeva prāmāṇyopapattau upāya-satyatvā-'nādaraṇād ity arthaḥ.

AVS—jñānopāyasya śrutyācāryāder mithyātvena tadutttha-jñānasyā 'mātvaṁ nāśaṁkanīyam, upeyasya kaivalyasya prāptau puruṣasya kṛtārthatvād upāyānveṣaṇābhāvād iti.

[896]

ऐकात्म्यप्रतिपत्तेः प्राङ् न मिथ्या हेत्वभावतः ।
पुरुषार्थावसायित्वान्नाप्यूर्ध्वमनपेक्षतः ॥ ८९६ ॥

Before the realization of the oneness of self, the means is not illusory, bccause there is no *probans*; nor after, because it is not required, as the human goal has been reached.

Before the fruit of release comes about, the means which is Scripture is not known to be illusory. After the goal has been gained, although the means is known to be illusory, there is no destruction of the validity of the knowledge gained; and as the end which is release has already been reached, there is no further dependence on *pramāṇa*.

AVS—vākyārthajñānodayāt prāk upāyo na mithyā nopāyasya mithyātva-jñānam ity arthaḥ. gamakābhāvat bādhapūrvakatvāt tasya. yadyapy uttarakālaṁ mithyātvam upāyasya gamyate na tat prāmāṇyaṁ vihanti, pramāṇaphalasya prāptatvena pramāṇāpekṣā 'bhāvād iti.

[897]

उपेयबोधनं मुक्त्वा मितेर्नान्याऽस्ति सत्यता ।
सत्यादप्यनुपायत्वाद्घटान्नाग्निर्हि गम्यते ॥ ८९७ ॥

For a means of valid knowledge there is no reality other than revealing the object; nor is fire inferred from pot which is not a means, even though it is real.

A means, although illusory, may lead to true knowledge, e. g. a reflection. A means, although real, may not result in knowledge, e. g. a pot cannot serve as *probans* for inferring fire. What is required of a means of valid knowledge is that it generates that knowledge, and not that it must be absolutely real or that it must remain unsublated always.

[898]

धूमाभासात्तु बाष्पादेर्यदग्निर्नावगम्यते ।
हेतुस्तत्रानुपायत्वमसत्यत्वं पुनर्न तु ॥ ८९८ ॥

Where fire is not inferred from apparent smoke such as vapour, etc., there the reason is, that (vapour, etc.) being not a means, and not unreality.

As for pseudo-smoke not leading to the valid knowledge of fire, the reason is not that the pseudo-smoke is illusory, but that there is no pervasion between pseudo-smoke and fire. In other words, pseudo-smoke is not the means for inferring fire.

[899]

धूमवत्परमार्थत्वमुपायत्वान्न लभ्यते ।
वेदान्तानां तथैकात्म्यंश्रुतिबाधः स्फुटो भवेत् ॥ ८९९ ॥

Th *Vedāntas* do not gain absolute reality, like smoke (in its field), because they are the means; for then clearly there would be the contradiction of the Scriptural text declaring oneness of self.

Nor may it be urged that Scripture must be real because it is the means to the knowledge of the absolutely real, viz. the oneness of self; for if Scripture were real, the declaration that the sole reality is the self would be contradicted.

[900]

बाष्पवन्नापि मिथ्यात्वादनुपायत्वमिष्यते ।
ऐकात्म्याबोधबाधेन सिद्धा तूपायसत्यता ॥ ९०० ॥

Nor can it be said that the *Vedāntas* are not the means, like vapour, because they are illusory; for the reality required for being the means is established by the sublation of the ignorance about the oneness of self.

Nor may it be said that Scripture is not the means to the knowledge of the self even as pseudo-smoke is not the means for inferring fire: for, it is seen that Scripture accomplishes the destruction of ignorance.

[901]

श्रुतेरैकात्म्यसंवित्तौ चरितार्थत्वतो मितेः ।
वृथोपायपरीक्षा स्यादुत्तीर्णस्य प्लवे यथा ॥ ९०१ ॥

When the oneness of self has been realized from Scripture and the means of valid knowledge has fulfilled its aim, an examination of the means would be futile, as it would be for one who has crossed (the river) in regard to the boat.

An example is given to show that after the end has been gained there is no need to worry about what happens to the means.

[902]

बाह्येष्वर्थेष्वनात्मत्वात्पुनः शङ्का भवेदपि ।
अत्राऽऽत्मत्वादुपेयस्य का शङ्का मानतां प्रति ॥ ९०२ ॥

Even though, in the case of the external objects which are not self, doubt may arise again, here because the object attained is self, what doubt can there be in respect of the means of valid knowledge?

In regard to external objects like colour, etc., there may arise doubt about their valid perception, for they constitute the not-self. What is known from Scripture, however, is the self. How can there be doubt in regard to that?

An alternative interpretation of this verse is as follows: The means for cognizing fire, etc., is of the nature of the not-self, and hence is illusory. But Scripture which is the means for realizing the one self is of the nature of the self; and so the doubt that it may be invalid

or illusory cannot arise. Scripture is the absolute reality. It is only by an assumed difference that it is spoken of as means.

NKL—ātmā mithyā kalpita-janya viṣayatvāt svapnadṛṣṭārthavad atrāha—bāhyeṣv iti—jaḍatvam upādhir ity arthaḥ.

[903]

अन्यत्रेव न चाप्यत्र वाक्यार्थो भेदलक्षणः ।
संसर्गलक्षणो वाऽपि ब्रह्मात्माभेदतो भवेत् ॥ ९०३ ॥

Unlike elsewhere, here the sentence-sense is not characterized by difference, nor by relation, because Brahman and self are non-different.

For the sentence 'Bring the cow' the sense is the difference in relation between the act and the agent. For the expression 'The blue lily' the sense is relation between two things expressed by words in apposition. Not thus is the case with the text 'That thou art,' which has an impartite sense.

NTV—bhedo viśiṣṭa-saṁsargi-saṁsarga eva vākyārtha iti naiva vedānte niyamaḥ brahmātmanor abhedād ity arthaḥ.

[904]

ब्रह्मणोऽनात्मतारूपमब्रह्मत्वं तथाऽऽत्मनः ।
अज्ञानलक्षणं शास्त्राज्ज्ञानं हन्ति समुत्पतत् ॥ ९०४ ॥

The non-self-hood of Brahman and the non-Brahman-hood of self are of the nature of ignorance; the knowledge arising from Scripture destroys that.

Objection: Brahman and the self are not non-different, because they are opposed to each other, like cold and heat.

Reply: No; there is no opposition that is validly known. The so-called difference is the work of nescience.

NKL—vimatam ajñānakṛtaṁ jñānena samūlaṁ nivarttyamānatvād rajju-bhujaṅgavat.

[905]

नेहान्यत्राऽऽत्मनो ब्रह्म तथाऽऽत्मा ब्रह्मणोऽन्यतः ।
तादात्म्यमनयोस्तस्मान्नीलोत्पलविलक्षणम् ॥ ९०५ ॥

Here (in Scripture) Brahman is not other than the self, and so also the self is not other than Brahman. The identity of the two, therefore, is different from that between lotus and blue.

Brahman and the self are not related like 'blue' and 'lily'. If the self be other than Brahman, then like pot it would be non-Brahman; if Brahman be other than the self, then it would be not-self. Since these contingencies are not acceptable, it must be admitted that there is oneness (*ekarasyam*) of Brahman and the self, and not identity-in-difference (*tādātmya*) between them.

[906]

अब्रह्मानात्मते यद्वदत्राज्ञाननिबन्धने ।
आत्मब्रह्मते नैवमन्यस्मादित्यतः स्वतः ॥ ९०६ ॥

As non-Brahman-hood and non-self-hood are conditioned by ignorance, not so are selfhood and Brahman-hood conditioned by that (ignorance); they are self-established.

The self-hood of Brahman and the Brahman-hood of the self are of the nature of the real; they are not the products of nescience.

NTV — jīva-brahmaṇoḥ pramāṇāntarāgocaratvena tad bhedasyāpi pramāṇāntarāviṣayatvāt bhedasye 'taretarāśrayādi-doṣa-duṣṭatvāt tasyaiva kalpitatvaṁ nābhedasye 'ty arthaḥ.

[907]

नाम्नोरेवं च संबन्ध ऐकात्म्यात्स्यात्क्रियां विना ।
षष्ठीं च न क्रियाषष्ठ्योर्विना भेदात्प्रवर्तनम् ॥ १०७ ॥

Thus the relation between the two nouns is even without activity or the sixth case, because of the oneness of self; where there is no difference, activity and the sixth case cannot function.

The two nouns are not related as agent and act, substance and attribute or possessor and possession. There is not even a trace of difference. The two nouns signify the same reality; and the signification is by secondary implication (*lakṣaṇā*).

[908]

महत्ता यद्वदाकाशे घटाकाशव्यपेक्षया ।
पराक्त्वापेक्षया तद्वत्प्रत्यक्ता नाऽऽत्मनीक्ष्यते ॥ १०८ ॥

As greatness is in the ether in relation to the pot-ether, so is not inwardness admitted in the self in relation to outwardness.

Objection: Although there may not be difference between the inner self and Brahman, difference must be admitted as between the inner self and not-self. That would mean that being inner will be conditioned by what is outer. That would mean again that there is not impartiteness.

Reply: No: when a distinction is made in ether between pot-ether and great ether, there is conditioning. Not so is the case with the inner self. Here 'inner' does not mean 'what is not outer'; it means 'what is real', 'what is natural', 'what is not adventitious.'

[909]

प्रत्यक्त्वमद्वितीयत्वं बोधवन्नान्यबन्धनम् ।
अपारार्थ्यान्न बोधो हि स्यादबोधनिरासतः ॥ ९०९ ॥

Inwardness and non-duality, like knowledge, are not dependent on others (their opposites); knowledge which is not for the sake of another, is not the result of negating what is inert.

When it is said that Brahman-self is non-dual, no dependence on duality is meant, even as when it is said 'Brahman is consciousness' the exclusion of the non-conscious is not meant. 'Non-dual' means 'full'.

[910]

आत्माऽपि सदिदं ब्रह्म मोहात्पारोक्ष्यदूषितम् ।
ब्रह्मापि संस्तथैवाऽऽत्मा सद्वितीयतयेक्ष्यते ॥ ९१० ॥

This Brahman, though the self, is through delusion affected by the defect of mediacy; likewise the self, though Brahman, is looked upon as having a second.

How the Vedānta texts teach the impartite non-dual Brahman-self is shown here.

[911]

आत्मा ब्रह्मेति पारोक्ष्यसद्वितीयत्वबाधनात् ।
पुमर्थे निष्ठितं शास्त्रमिति सिद्धं समीहितम् ॥ ९११ ॥

Through the sublation of mediacy and duality, Scripture teaches that the self is Brahman and thus culminates in the human goal. Thus the desired end has been achieved.

By cancelling the mediacy of Brahman through apposition with the self, and the finitude of the self through apposition with Brahman, the Scriptural text culminates in teaching oneness which is the supreme bliss. Thus through the knowledge of oneness resulting from the text there is release.

[912]

ननु भेदाश्रितैर्वाक्यैर्विधायकनिषेधकैः ।
अक्षादिभिश्च नैकात्म्यं बाधितत्वात्प्रमाणवत् ॥ ९१२ ॥

"Now, oneness of self is not valid, because it is sublated by prescriptive and prohibitory texts which are based on difference and by perception, etc.

The *pūrvapakṣin* objects: The texts of the *karma-kāṇḍa* consisting of prescriptions and prohibitions as also empirical means of knowledge like perception are opposed to oneness. How, then, can the Vedānta texts validly teach non-difference?

[913]

न चाप्यैकात्म्यशास्त्रस्य तैर्विकल्पसमुच्चयौ ।
प्रामाण्येनापि बाध्यत्वं तेषां तेन कथंचन ॥ ९१३ ॥

"Nor is the teaching of oneness of self valid as an alternative to or in combination with them; nor even are they sublated by it in any manner.

The oneness that, you say, is taught by Vedānta cannot be taken as an alternative to the plurality revealed by the aforementioned evidence; nor may it be construed in combination therewith. Nor may it be held that the evidence of the *karma-kāṇḍa*, perception, etc., is sublated by the teaching of Vedānta.

[914]

विरुद्धमानभावेऽपि न हि वस्तु विकल्प्यते ।
भेदाभेदौ न च स्यातां विरोधाद्युगपत्क्वचित् ॥ ९१४ ॥

"Though they are opposed as means of valid knowledge, the real cannot have an alternative nature; difference and non-difference can nowhere exist together, because of contradiction.

Although Vedānta and the other *pramāṇas* may be regarded as alternative means of knowledge, a similar attitude is not possible in regard to the nature of reality. The real cannot be alternately one and many; nor can it be both one and many.

[915]

भिन्नाभिन्नं न वो वस्तु येन मानाविरोधिता ।
नेह नानेति भेदानां निषेधात्क्व नु भेदधीः ॥ ९१५ ॥

"For you the real is not different-cum-non-different, in which case there may be no opposition between means of valid knowledge. How can there be cognition of difference, since differences are denied in 'No plurality here' ?

Moreover the concept of difference-*cum*-non-difference is not acceptable to you. The Upaniṣad text 'There is no plurality whatsoever here' negatives plurality. The real, therefore, cannot be both

one and many. The other *pramāṇas* either imply or make known plurality. How can you accept them as equally valid means of knowledge?

[916]

वर्णादिग्रहणापायो नापीहाक्षादि बाध्यते ।
संस्काराय च यच्छास्त्रमात्मज्ञानोपकारकम् ॥ ९१६ ॥

"Nor are perception, etc., which are the means for cognizing letters, etc., sublated here (by Vedānta texts); nor Scripture (*karma-kāṇḍa*) which (according to you) is for purification and which helps self-knowledge.

Nor can you say that the evidence of the other *pramāṇas* is sublated by the Vedānta texts. Perception, etc., are necessary for cognizing letters, words, etc., of which the Vedānta texts are composed. The *karma-kāṇḍa*, according to you, is helpful in that it purifies and thus makes one eligible for self-knowledge.

[917]

उपचारार्थतः शास्त्रं सावकाशं जपेऽथवा ।
अक्षादेरकृतार्थत्वात्कथं स्यात्तेन बाधनम् ॥ ९१७ ॥

"Therefore Vedānta-śāstra has the sense of eulogy, or it has the purpose of repetition; perception, etc., do not have their aim fulfilled (except through teaching difference); how can they be sublated by that?"

What, then, is the fate of the Vedānta texts? Just as when we say 'The headman of the village is without a second', the phrase 'without a second' carries a figurative sense, the Vedāntic declaration of non-duality must be understood as a figure of speech. Or, meditation may be the purport of the Vedānta texts.

Without duality the other *pramāṇas* would have no place at all. How, then, could they be sublated by the Vedānta texts?

[918]

उच्यते लोकतः सिद्धं भेदमाश्रित्य चोदना ।
प्रवृत्ता पुरुषार्थाय न तु भेदावबुद्धये ॥ ९१८ ॥

This is the reply: Basing itself on the empirically established difference, the (Vedic) command functions for the sake of the human goal, and not for teaching difference.

The *siddhāntin's* reply: There is no opposition of the *karma-kāṇḍa* to what the Vedānta teaches; for it is not the aim of the *karma-kāṇḍa* to establish plurality. Basing itself on the empirical difference of agent, etc., it merely shows man the way to prosperity. So, its purport is not to teach difference or plurality.

AVS—yadi karmaśāstraṁ bhedaniṣṭhaṁ tadā karmaśāstra-virodhaḥ syāt, na tathā, lokasiddhabhedāṅgīkaraṇena puruṣārthāya pravṛttatvāt, iti.

[919]

भेदस्य चापुमर्थत्वात्तादर्थ्ये स्यादमानता ।
पुमर्थत्वेन चास्येष्टं प्रामाण्यं वेदवादिभिः ॥ ९१९ ॥

Because difference is not a human goal, if Scripture had that for purport, it would not be valid; and by those who follow the Veda, the validity of the Veda is accepted for the sake of the human goal.

For this reason also difference cannot be the purport of the Veda: difference is not a human end, and Scripture declares that difference is the cause of fear. Therefore, if the *karma-kāṇḍa* had difference for purport, it would cease to be valid.

[920]

वस्तुस्वरूपसंस्पर्शिचक्षुरादिभ्य उत्थितम् ।
भेदस्पृङ्नाक्षजाद्येवं न तेनैकात्म्यबाधनम् ॥ ९२० ॥

From the sense of sight, etc., which are in contact with the form of the thing, knowledge is generated; no idea of difference arises from perception; so by that there is no sublation of oneness of self.

Perception, etc., should not be taken as evidence against the teaching of the Upaniṣads. Does perception, for instance, reveal the identity of an object, or the exclusion from other objects, or both? If it be the first, then difference cannot be its content, and therefore it cannot sublate the Vedānta which reveals the absolute reality.

NTV—pramāṇasya vastubodhakatva-niyamān na bhedaspṛṅ mānam.

[921]

प्रमेयविषयं मानं वस्तुनश्च प्रमेयता ।
न च भेदस्य वस्तुत्वं वस्तुतत्त्वानपेक्षणात ॥ ९२१ ॥

Means of valid knowledge has for its content the object of knowledge; and reality is the object of knowledge; difference is not reality, because the nature of reality is not to be dependent.

The second alternative is not possible. Perception has for its content an object. Difference or exclusion cannot be a content because it is not an object. It is dependent and illusory like the rope-snake.

[922]

लब्धे हि भूतलेऽलब्धो घटस्तत्र निषिध्यते ।
मानान्तरेण विज्ञातो नाज्ञातः शून्यतातितः ॥ ९२२ ॥

When the floor is cognized, the pot which is not cognized is denied there; that (viz. the pot) which is known by some other means of knowledge cannot be unknown, for otherwise there would be nullity.

It cannot be maintained that exclusion or denial is the content of perception. When the locus like floor is perceived, there is the exclusion or denial of the counter-correlate such as pot. Here, what is perceived, viz. floor, is not denied; for that would be to go against the evidence. Nor is what is unknown the content; for all that is unknown should then become the content, not pot alone.

NKL — pratipanne vastuni pratipannasya vastuno nedam idaṁ nehedam iti vā niṣedhaḥ, anyathā nety eva niṣedhe sarva-niṣedha-prasaṅgāt.

[923]

व्यञ्जकस्य समायोगो वस्तुनो वस्तुनैव हि ।
नाभावेन निरात्मत्वाद्भेदाद्वृत्त्या वा मितेर्भवेत् ॥ ९२३ ॥

Of what is a manifestor (perception, etc.) there can be contact only with a thing, and not with no-thing; nor can there be contact of perception, with difference, for it (difference) is not an entity.

What does exclusion or denial mean? Does it mean non-existence (*abhāva*)? Or does it signify difference (*bheda*)? It cannot be the first; for perception is an existent, and cannot be related to the non-

existent. The latter is void of nature and cannot serve as the basis of any relation. The second meaning too is not possible; for difference too is a non-entity, and to that perception cannot be related.

NKL—pradīpāder ghaṭādisaṁyogo na śaśa-sṛṅgādinā, iti dṛṣṭatvāt.

[924]

नातो वस्तुनि संभेदो वस्तुनोऽभेदरूपतः ।
न प्रमाणाद्बहिर्वस्तु न मानं वस्तुनो बहिः ॥ ९२४ ॥

Therefore, there is no difference in the real (self), for the real is of the nature of non-difference. The real is not outside the means of knowledge, nor is the means of knowledge outside the real.

Non-difference is the very nature of the real. Non-existence and difference cannot touch it. Even the difference of *pramāṇa* and object is apparent, and not real.

NKL—pramāṇa-prameya-bhedo vyāvahārika ity arthaḥ.

[925]

नाभावयोर्मिथो योगोऽवस्तुत्वाभेदतस्तयोः ।
अभावभावयोस्तद्वद्भावरूपेषु का भिदा ॥ ९२५ ॥

Not between two non-existences is there relation (here, difference), for as non-entities they are non-different; nor likewise between non-existence and existence; between existents what difference is there?

Difference is unintelligible. What is the nature of the correlate and counter-correlate of difference? Are these two non-existents, existent and non-existent, or existents? They cannot

be non-existents; for there can be no relation in that case. Nor is relation possible between the existent and non-existent; for the latter cannot serve as the basis of relation. As between existents there can be no difference; for there is nothing that makes for the difference. 'Existence' cannot be the differentiating condition; for that is present in the counter-correlate also. Nor can 'non-existence' be the condition, because that is non-entity, and the counter-correlate would then become nothing.

[926]

अनित्यत्वस्य धर्मस्य घटादेर्धर्मिणस्तयोः ।
संयोगः समवायो वा तादात्म्यं वेह संगतिः ॥ ९२६ ॥

Between the attribute of non-eternality and the substances like pot, etc., the relation must be either conjunction (*saṁyoga*) or inherence (*samavāya*) or identity (*tādātmya*).

By denying difference non-existence has been denied. Now, by denying non-existence difference is being denied. Here, 'non-eternality' (*anityatva*) means non-existence. As between existence and non-existence, is there relation or not? If there is no relation, then existence would be without beginning and end, and non-existence would be independent. If there be relation, then that relation should be either conjunction, or inherence, or identity.

[927]

आधाराधेययोगेषु घटोऽत्रेति यथा मतिः ।
नाभावभावयोगेषु मितेर्धीः कस्यचित्तथा ॥ ९२७ ॥

Just as there is knowledge of the form 'Here is the pot' in regard to what are related as support and suppor-

ted, there is no such knowledge for any one in regard to non-existence and existence.

None of the three relations mentioned is possible as between existence and non-existence.

AVS—sarvathā 'bhāvasya bhāva-saṁbandho na ghaṭate, tataś cā 'meyatvam abhāvasya.

According to *AVS*, the impossibility of inherence (*samavāya*) is shown here.

[928]

नहि भावातिरेकेण भावाभावः प्रमाणभाक् ।
भावात्मनाऽप्यतो भावो व्यवहाराय कल्पते ॥ ९२८ ॥

Mere absence of existence cannot brook means of valid knowledge either as being other than existence or as being identical with existence; hence existence alone is fit for empirical usage.

Is non-existence different from existence, or non-different? If the first, there should be another non-existence, and then another, and so on *ad infinitum.* If the second, there would be non-difference whether non-existence be included in existence or *vice versa.*

[929]

अथाभावोऽपि वस्त्वेव नास्तीति मितिजन्मतः ।
द्वयोर्भावैकरूपत्वात्काऽतिशीतिर्मितेस्तयोः ॥ ९२९ ॥

If it be said that non-existence too is a real because, of the rise of cognition 'is not', then because the two

have the same nature as existence, what is the difference between the two cognitions?

If non-existence, like existence, be real, then what is the difference between the two? The two would be one, and no difference could validly be established between existence and non-existence. If they are not two, there can be no relation between them.

[930]

विश्वं सदेव यस्येष्टं तस्याभावः कुतो मितेः ।
न च भावातिरेकेण भाववत्सिद्धिमश्नुते ॥ ९३० ॥

He to whom the universe is existent, for him, how can there be valid cognition of non-existence? Nor can it be established, even as existence (cannot be established), as something other than existence.

Moreover, is non-existence real or unreal? If real, then as all is real there can be no non-existence and no relation thereof with existence. If non-existence is unreal, then since nothing is there to be distinguished non-existence is not established and much less any relation.

[931]

अभावयोगं भावश्चेत्सहते नीलयोगवत् ।
अविरोधादभावेन न भावापह्नुतिर्भवेत् ॥ ९३१ ॥

If existence admits of relation with non-existence as (lotus) with blue, then because of non-opposition to non-existence, there cannot be suppression of existence.

Just as there is the relation of inherence between lily and blue, if there be relation between existence and non-existence, then, since

there would be no opposition between the two, existence would not be cancelled by non-existence, and existence would be without beginning and end.

[932]

योगोऽयं वस्तुनोर्दृष्टः पृथक्सिद्धौ परस्परम् ।
मेषयोर्मल्लयोर्यद्वन्न भावाभावयोस्तथा ॥ ९३२ ॥

Relation is seen between things that are established separately, independent of each other as between two goats or wrestlers; and not so between existence and non-existence.

That there can be no relation between existence and non-existence is explained by means of examples.

According to *AVS*, the relation that is shown to be impossible here is conjunction (*saṁyoga*).

[933]

न योगोऽभावयोर्दृष्टो वन्ध्यासूनुखपुष्पयोः ।
न भावाभावयोरेवं विरोधादितरेतरम् ॥ ९३३ ॥

No relation is seen between two non-existences, e. g. between the barren woman's son and sky-flower; nor between existence and non-existence because each is opposed to the other.

There can be no relation between two non-existences. So also there can be no relation between existence and non-existence. The reason is that the two are opposed to each other.

NKL—abhāvo na saṁyoga-samavāyayor anyatarādhāraḥ, abhāvatvāt, vandhyāputravat.

[934]

क्षितिदेशे घटाभावो घटवन्न प्रमीयते ।
योगो वा समवायो वा नाभावक्षितिदेशयोः ॥ ९३४ ॥

In the region of the floor the non-existence of pot is not validly seen, like the pot. Neither conjunction nor inherence is there between non-existence and floor-space.

The pot that is on the floor can be visually perceived because there could be conjunction of the sense of sight with pot. But the non-existence of pot cannot be so perceived because no such relation is possible between sight and non-existence, and between the floor and non-existence.

[935-936a]

सदात्मतैवं सर्वस्य नाभावात्मकता सतः ।
अप्यभावात्मकत्वेऽपि सतोऽभावात्मकत्वतः ॥ ९३५ ॥
कुतो भेदावकाशः स्याद्भेदेऽसति कुतो युतिः ।

(If non-existence is included in existence) then all would be of the nature of reality. Nor can reality be of the nature of non-existence. Even if it be of the nature of non-existence, then because reality is of the nature of non-existence, where is room for difference? And if difference is unreal, how can there be relation?

Supposing there is identity between existence and non-existence, is non-existence to be included in existence, or is existence to be included in non-existence? If the first be the case, there would be only non-dual existence. The second alternative is not possible because

existence is opposed to non-existence. Even if this difficulty be waived, one would have to say that non-existence alone is. If this be so, there is no difference between existence and non-existence, and consequently no relation.

AVS says that the relation of identity (*tādātmya*) is rejected here.

[936b-937a]

यावत्किंचिज्जगत्यस्मिन्भेदकं वस्तु लक्ष्यते ॥ ९३६ ॥
अनापन्नादिमध्यान्तं सदेव तदितीष्यते ।

Whatever differentiating thing is found here in this world, all that is to be regarded only as the real without a beginning, middle and end.

Anything that is to be regarded as the condition of difference must be existence. But existence, we have shown, is without beginning, middle and end. So, how can difference be established?

[937b-938a]

सदेवेदमिति स्पष्टं सन्मूला इति चापरम् ॥ ९३७ ॥
श्रुत्योदाहारि नः साक्षात्सदैकात्म्यावबुद्धये ।

To us in the matter of knowing directly the oneness of reality, Scripture is evidence which declares 'This is reality alone'[1] and again '(All have their) root in the real.'[2]

Scripture is quoted to show that all is existence alone. The first of these texts teaches the non-duality of existence directly, and the second by implication.

1. *CHU*, VI, ii, 1.
2. *CHU*, VI, viii, 4.

[938b-939a]

मानाभावस्य मानत्वं मेयाभावस्य मेयता ॥ ९३८ ॥

न्यायं न सहतेऽतीव यथा तदधुनोच्यते ।

Now will be explained how it is absolutely illogical to say that the absence of means of valid knowledge is a means of valid knowledge and the absence of object is an object.

The *siddhāntin* now turns to an examination of another *prima facie* view.

According to *NKL* the *prima facie* view here is that of the Bhāṭṭas.

[939b-940a]

बोधकं यदबुद्धस्य तन्मानमिति हि स्थितिः ॥ ९३९ ॥

न च प्रमाणतास्तित्वमीदृक्तस्मान्न युज्यते ।

That which makes known what has not been known is a means of valid knowledge. This is the position. Such nature of being a means of valid knowledge is not there (for absence of *pramāṇa*). So that is not proper (*pramāṇa*).

The absence of *pramāṇa* does not have the characteristic of *pramāṇa*. The characteristic of *pramāṇa* is to make known what is unknown.

[940b-941a]

मेयाभावः प्रमाणानां यद्यभावेन गम्यते ॥ ९४० ॥

प्रमाणानामभावस्य गमकः को भविष्यति ।

If the absence of object is cognized by the absence of means of valid knowledge, what is that which makes known the absence of means of valid knowledge ?

If the absence of *pramāṇa* should make known the absence of object, it must be as itself known. But what is it that makes known the absence of *pramāṇa*?

[941b-942a]

नाक्षादिपञ्चकं तस्य बोधकं सत्समन्वयात् ॥ ९४१ ॥

नयतस्तदभावो वा मेयत्वेनैव तत्स्थितेः ।

The five means of valid knowledge beginning with perception do not make it known ; for they are related to reality ; nor is their absence (the revealer) through reasoning (inference) for that itself stands as an object to be known (or proved).

Neither the five *pramāṇas*, perception, etc., nor their absence can make known the absence of *pramāṇa*. Perception, etc., can be related to only what exists. The absence of *pramāṇa* cannot become its own object.

[942b-943a]

नीलादिवदभावस्य यद्यक्षादिविशेषणम् ॥ ९४२ ॥

विशेषणेन तद्व्याप्तेस्तदभावः कुतो मितेः ।

As blue, etc., (are attributes of lily), if perception, etc., be the attributes of non-existence, then, since as attributes they qualify that, how can the absence thereof be validly known ?

Does non-existence have attributes or not? On the first alternative, does non-existence have means of valid knowledge or object of knowledge as its attribute?

If non-existence has *pramāṇa* as its attribute, even as lily has the attribute, blue, then non-existence cannot become the object of *pramāṇa*, perception, etc. The qualified does not become the object of its own quality.

[943b-944a]

अथाविशेषणोऽभावो भवद्भिरभिधीयते ॥ ९४३ ॥
मेयाभावस्य मानत्वमविशेषात्प्रसज्यते ।

If it is stated by you that non-existence is without attribute, then, there is the contingence of the non-existence of object being a means of valid knowledge, because there is no distinction.

If it be held that non-existence is attributeless, then it cannot be stated that absence of *pramāṇa* is a *pramāṇa* and absence of object is an object; for absence or non-existence cannot be qualified that way. If non-existence is without qualification, how can such a distinction be made?

[944b-945a]

घटाद्यभाव इत्युक्तिर्न सम्यगिति मे मतिः ॥ ९४४ ॥
पदानामसमर्थत्वाद्विरोधाद्वस्तुनोर्मिथः ।

My view is that it is not proper to say 'The non-existence of pot', etc., because the words are not capable of being combined that way, as the things are mutually opposed.

As for the other possibility mentioned in v. 942b–943a, viz. that non-existence has the object as its attribute, our view is that it has no sense at all. The expression 'non-existence of pot', for instance, has no meaning if 'pot' be regarded as a qualification of 'non-existence'. How can existence and non-existence be combined in any manner? As they are opposed to each other, no relation is possible between them.

[945b-946a]

भावाभावाख्यपदयोः सामर्थ्ये चेत्समासता ॥ ९४५ ॥
घटादिनाऽनपेक्षत्वान्न समासः प्रसिध्यति ।

If two words expressing existence and non-existence could be combined provided they have capacity, then since pot, etc., are not expectant (of non-existence), the compound does not result.

If it be said that, although there is opposition between existence and non-existence, there may be combination of the words expressive thereof, even as in the case of the words 'darkness' and 'light', we reply: It is true that words such as 'pot' are expectant of other words to complete their meaning. Not so is the case with the words 'existence' and 'non-existence'. The words] 'darkness' and 'light' also are in a similar plight, and cannot therefore serve as examples.

NTV—samarthaḥ padavidhir iti smaraṇāt samarthānām eva samāso iṣyate. sāmarthyaṁ ca sahaikārthībhāvaḥ, samāse ekārthībhāvo 'pi ākāṅkṣāyogyatā-sannidhibhiḥ saṁbandhe, nacātra yogyatā 'sti virodhād ity arthaḥ. kiṁca ākāṅkṣā 'pi nāsti.

[946b-947a]

भावस्याभाव इत्यत्र षष्ठ्यर्थः कतमो मतः ॥ ९४६ ॥
न कश्चिदपि संबन्धो नीरूपस्यासदात्मनः ।

In 'the non-existence *of* existence' what is the sense of the sixth case? No relation whatever is possible of the colourless non-entity!

The phrase 'non-existence of existence' has no meaning. There can be no relation whatever with the void.

AVS—na saṁyogo niravayavatvād abhāvasya, nāpi samavāya-tādātmye avastutvād abhāvasya, ata eva na sva-svāmi-sambandha iti.

[947b-948a]

वस्त्वन्तरमभावश्चेदन्यदन्यद्भवेत्कथम् ॥ ९४७ ॥
अन्योऽपि चेद्भवेदन्योऽविरोधो नीलवद्भवेत् ।

If non-existence is another reality, how can one thing become another? If one thing can become another, then there would be no opposition as in the case of blue.

If it be contended that non-existence is not void but another existence, in reply we ask: why then call it non-existence? And, look at the consequences of your contention! Just as when it is said 'Pot exists' 'pot' and 'existence' are taken to be one, when it is said 'Pot does not exist' 'pot' and 'non-existence' must be regarded as identical. If 'non-existence of pot' means 'cloth', then it would amount to saying 'Pot is cloth', which is absurd. Or, if the non-existence as qualified by pot is cloth, even then it should be admitted that the qualification 'pot' is included in 'cloth'. In that case the expression 'Pot is cloth' should be as meaningful as 'Lily is blue'.

NKL—bhāvāntarābhāvapadayor aparyāyatvāt aikārthyam ayuktam ity āha—anyad iti. ghaṭābhāvaḥ paṭād anyaḥ, paṭopi ghaṭābhāvāt, tayor abhedo na yukta ity arthaḥ. bhāvāntarābhāvau nābhinnāv aparyāya-śabda-vācyatvāt ghaṭapaṭavad ity uktam. vipakṣe bādhakam āha—anyopīti. nīlavad avirodho nīlakaṁbalayor iva bhāvābhāvayos tādātmyaṁ syād ity arthaḥ.

AVS—etad uktaṁ bhavati—ghaṭābhāvaḥ paṭād anyaḥ, paṭopi ghaṭābhāvād, atas tayor ekatvaṁ na ghaṭata iti. athavā ghaṭo 'stīty ukte yathā bhāva-ghaṭayor ekatvaṁ bhavati, evaṁ nāstīty ukte'py abhāva-ghaṭayor ekatvaṁ tatra ghaṭābhāvasya bhāvāntaratve ghaṭaḥ paṭa ity uktaṁ syāt.

[948b-949a]

संगतावविरोधी चेन्न संबन्धिनिवृत्तिकृत् ॥ ९४८ ॥

न संबन्धिग्रहाभावे संबन्धोऽयं प्रसिध्यति ।

If non-existence is said to be not opposed to some relation or other (though identity is impossible), then it cannot remove that with which it is related. If that with which it is related is not cognized, this relation will not be established.

If it be said that although there is no identity (*tādātmya*) between existence and non-existence, it is possible that there is some other relation, we reply: no. That no relation whatever is possible has already been shown. Moreover, does non-existence remove that with which it is related or does it not remove? If it does not remove, then there can be no opposition between non-existence and existence. If it does remove, then it must be opposed to the relation also. Further, does non-existence have a counter-correlate or not? On the first alternative, is the counter-correlate real or unreal? If the counter-correlate be real, then there is opposition between non-existence and its counter-correlate, in which case there can be no relation at all. If the counter-correlate be unreal, then since that is not cognized, how can there be relation of non-existence therewith?

[949b-950a]

संबन्धिविरहेऽसिद्धौ षष्ठ्यर्थत्वं न सिध्यति ॥ ९४९ ॥

विरोधाद्युगपन्नापि विधानप्रतिषेधनम् ।

Since the relation is not established in the absence of that with which there is to be relation, the sense of the sixth case does not result. Nor can perception affirm and deny at the same time because of contradiction.

On the view that non-existence has no counter-correlate, there is the following defect. If there be nothing with which non-existence is related, then it follows that there is no relation. If there is no relation, there is no sense in the expression 'non-existence *of* existence'.

In v. 920 three alternatives were set forth: (1) Does perception reveal the identity of an object, (2) does it make known the exclusion from other objects, (3) does it convey both?

If the first of these be the case, it was shown, difference cannot be the content of perception. The second alternative has been discussed so far and shown to be untenable. Now about the third.

The third alternative is that perception both affirms and denies. Here, does perception affirm and deny simultaneously? Or, does it first affirm and then deny? Or, does it first deny and then affirm? Not the first, because affirmation and denial are contradictory processes, and simultaneity is not possible as between them.

[950b-951a]

क्षणिकत्वाद्धियां नापि स्थायिधर्मः क्रमो भवेत् ॥ ९५० ॥

अनीलाभावपृष्ठेन नापि नीलस्य वेदनम् ।

Since cognitions are momentary, there is no sequence with permanent attributes; nor is there cognition of blue except through the basis of the absence of every colour but blue.

The second and third alternatives are rejected here. Cognitions are momentary; one and the same cognition cannot first affirm and

then deny. Nor can there be first denial and then affirmation; for the cognition of blue implies the absence of the other colours, and is not preceded by the denial of those colours.

[951b-952a]

नह्यदृश्यनिषेधः स्याद्घटादेरिव भूतले ॥ ९५१ ॥
नान्याभावविशिष्टत्वं कृत्स्नाभावगतौ भवेत् ।

There can be no negation of the unseen, as of pot, etc., on the ground. Nor can there be qualification by the non-existence of all other things, for that would require the knowledge of the entire existences and non-existences.

The cognition of blue does not arise from the denial of yellow, etc. The denial is possible only of that which can be perceived and is not perceived in a particular place, e. g. a pot on the ground. A similar phenomenon is not possible in regard to the atom, because the atom is imperceptible. So also there cannot be a general denial such as 'not-blue'. And it is not proper to say that through such denial there is the affirmation of blue.

Moreover, is the non-existence of non-blue (i.e. yellow, etc.) a qualification of blue or its nature? Not the first; if the qualification is the absence of all colours other than blue, then one must cognize the absence of all colours and only then it would be possible for one to cognize blue. This is certainly impossible for the parviscient individual to accomplish.

[952b-953a]

अन्याभावस्य भावत्वे स्यादभावः खपुष्पवत् ॥ ९५२ ॥
भावान्तरमभावश्चेत्सिद्धं वस्तु ततः स्वतः ।

If the non-existence of the other be existence, then the non-existence would be like sky-flower; if non-existence be another existence, the real would be self-established.

If the non-existence of yellow, etc., be the nature of blue, we ask, is blue, to be included in the non-existence, or is it the other way about? On the first of these alternatives, blue would be void like the sky-lotus. On the second alternative too, the non-existence would be void. If non-existence be taken to mean another existence, then, as already shown, difference and non-existence would not be established, and only the self-existent reality would have to be recognized.

NKL—bhedābhāvayor bhāvātirekeṇābhāvād advaitam āyātam.

[953b-954a]

तद्ग्राहीणि च मानानि व्यावृत्तिः केन गम्यते ॥ ९५३ ॥
चित्रेऽपि विषये चित्रमेकं वस्त्वेकमानतः ।

The means of valid knowledge reveal that (reality); by what is exclusion revealed? Even a multi-coloured object is a single object, since it is revealed by a single means of knowledge.

Exclusion, whether it be difference or non-existence, is not made known through any *pramāṇa*. Therefore, it must be admitted that the *pramāṇas* reveal the real which is untouched by difference and non-existence. Even if the real be varied or complex in nature, it is that real which is the content of *pramāṇa*, not difference or non-existence.

NKL—mānāni vastumātra-prakāśāni ato vyāvṛttir bhedābhāvaś ca na kenāpi gamyata ity arthaḥ.

[954b-955a]

प्रत्येकं नीलपीतादिग्रहणे चित्रता कुतः ॥ ९५४ ॥
वस्तुनो भेदरूपत्वे वस्त्वभावः प्रसज्यते ।

If blue, yellow, etc., are cognized each separately, how can there be multi-colour? If the real be of the nature of difference, there is the contingence of the non-existence of reality.

How can a multi-coloured object, for instance, be one reality? If thus it be objected, we reply: what are the many colours of the object? Are the colours severally cognized? Then, there is nothing like a multi-coloured object that is cognized. If the complex of colours is what is cognized, then it would be difficult to say whether there is difference or non-difference as between the various colours, blue, yellow, etc. Hence, as the so-called variety is not an entity, any exclusion that may be included in it would also be a void.

Exclusion cannot be regarded as the nature of blue, etc. The defect in so regarding we have already pointed out. Whether reality be included in difference or difference be included in reality, there would be defect.

[955b-956a]

अन्यधर्मे त्वभिन्नं स्यात्स्वतो वस्तु प्रमाश्रयम् ॥ ९५५ ॥
भिन्नाभिन्नं विरुद्धत्वान्नैकमानस्य गोचरः ।

If difference (*bheda*) be the attribute of the other (the unreal), then the real would be non-different, and it would be of itself the content of a means of knowledge. It cannot be both different and non-different, for, because of contradiction, it would not be the sphere of a single means of knowledge.

Now, it may be urged that difference is an attribute. If that be so, we ask, is difference an attribute of the real or of the unreal? It cannot be the first; for if the attribute too is a real entity, there would not result difference between the alleged relata, and if the attribute is a non-entity, there would be the non-duality of reality. If the second alternative, viz. that difference is an attribute of the unreal be sponsored, then the real remains untouched and its validity would have to be admitted.

The view that the real is both different and non-different is unacceptable because it involves a contradiction.

[956b-957]

वस्त्वात्मनाऽविरोधश्चेद्वस्त्वेव विषयस्ततः ॥ ९५६ ॥

सत्यं वस्तु कथं भिन्द्यात्पुंव्यपेक्षाविनिर्मितः ।

भेदः पुत्रादिभावे तु जन्यत्वं वस्तुकल्पितम् ॥ ९५७ ॥

If it be said that difference and non-difference are not contradictory since they are of the nature of reality, then reality alone is the content; how can there be difference in the true reality—difference which is produced by human desires? In the matter of difference as son, etc., the nature of being generated is posited in an entity.

If it be said that difference and non-difference are not opposed to each other as they are of the nature of the real, then it is only in that form as not opposed that they would become the content of knowledge.

Moreover, since difference is dependent it cannot be real; it is illusory like the rope-snake. The difference of son, etc., too is not real. It is with reference to bodies that we speak of father, son, etc., the former being the generator, the latter the generated, and so on. The bodies, being dependent, are illusory.

NTV—ayam arthaḥ nāpekṣā nāma kaścid vastu-dharmaḥ yena vastūni vyavasthāpyeran tasmāt puṁvyapekṣāvinirmita eva bhedo na vastu-svarūpaṁ bhidyād iti.

[958]

दाहपाकप्रकाशादिभेदेऽप्यग्नेरभिन्नता ।
कार्यतोऽपि न भेदः स्याद्धस्त्वभेदव्यवस्थितेः ॥ ९५८ ॥

Even though burning, cooking, shining, etc., are different, the fire is non-different; there is no difference even due to the effects, for the non-difference of the substance (fire) remains.

Inference and postulation may be adduced as evidence for difference. Inference: What is in dispute is different, since it gives rise to different effects, like clay. Postulation: The difference in effects is unintelligible without the difference in cause; so the difference in cause has to be postulated.

Reply: The reason given in the inference is inconstant. The postulation is not necessary because another explanation is possible. Although fire is one, different effects thereof are observed. So also, even though the effects constituting the world are different, the cause may be non-different.

AVS—dāha-pāka-prakāśa-kāryāṇāṁ bhede 'py agneḥ kāraṇasyā 'bheda-darśanād evaṁ jagad-bhede 'pi na tat-kāraṇa-bhedaḥ. ato nānumānam.

[959]

विभिन्नकार्यकर्त्रीणां शक्तीनां यद्वदाश्रयः ।
न विरुद्धोऽग्निरेकोऽपि तद्वत्कार्येऽपि किं न ते ॥ ९५९ ॥

There is no contradiction in a single fire being the locus of capacities which produce different effects; even so why should it not be for you (a single cause) in the case of the effect?

Objection: Fire gives rise to different effects through different capacities. The capacities which are the causes are, therefore, different; and there is no non-difference of cause.

Reply: Fire must be admitted to be the cause of the capacities. It is one, although its effects, the capacities, are different.

[960]

घटाभावे घटः सिध्येत्पटाभावे पटस्तथा ।
अन्योन्याभावदृष्टेः स्यादन्योन्याश्रयता तव ॥ ९६० ॥

If there is non-existence of pot, pot will be established, and if there is non-existence of cloth, cloth will be established; if each is seen to be the non-existence of the other, there would be for you reciprocal dependence.

So far, assuming difference and non-existence in regard to effects, it was argued that these two are not possible in regard to cause. Now, it is shown that even in regard to effect they are not possible.

You look upon pot and cloth, for instance, as each the non-existence of the other. Then, it would be seen that if pot is established cloth is established, and *vice versa*. That would mean the defect of reciprocal dependence. And thus nothing would get established. If difference and non-existence are non-existent, there would be only the non-dual reality.

[961]

प्रत्यक्षत्वं पृथक्त्वस्य गुणत्वाद्यैरपीष्यते ।
तेषामपि गुणे मानं नीलवन्न त्ववस्तुनि ॥ ९६१ ॥

Even for those (Vaiśeṣikas) who hold that separateness (*pṛthaktva*, i.e., *bheda*) is perceived because it is a quality, the evidence is in respect of a quality, like blue, and not in respect of non-entity (*avastu*).

It has been shown that difference and non-exsitence are not established in the view of the Mīmāṁsakas. Now is commenced an examination of the Vaiśeṣika position. According to the Vaiśeṣika, separateness (*pṛthaktva*) which is difference (*bheda*) is a quality which is a real, and is perceived. Even thus perception is *pramāṇa* in respect of what is a real quality like blue, and not in respect of a non-entity which is difference.

[962]

अथ वस्तु पृथक्त्वेन विशिष्टं गम्यते तदा ।
शुक्लो गौरितिवन्मानं वस्तुन्येव न भेदगम् ॥ ९६२ ॥

If it be said that substance is made known as being qualified by separateness, then as in 'The cow is white' the means of knowledge reveals substance alone and not difference.

Objection: Separateness which is difference is not a non-entity since it is a qualification of what is real, like colour.

Reply: On the analogy of colour, if it is maintained that difference is perceived, then difference would be what is inherent in a single substance. Just as in the case of 'The cow is white' it is the

white cow that is perceived, even so in the case of 'The pot is different' it must be the pot that is different that is perceived, and not difference.

AVS—śuklo gaur ity etan mānaṁ śukla-vastuny eva yathā, tathā bhinno ghaṭa ity etad api mānaṁ bhinnavastuny eva na bhede.

[963]

अभेदेनैव वर्तेत पृथक्त्वा यदि वस्तुषु ।
वस्त्वेव तत्ततोऽन्या चेदपृथग्वस्तु तर्हि ते ॥ ९६३ ॥

If separateness resides in substances as non-different, then that would be a substance; if it is different, then substance would be non-separate for you.

Objection: The cognition 'The cow is white' is evidence for the cow and also for whiteness. Likewise, the cognition 'The pot is different' must be taken as evidence for both pot and difference.

Reply: Is difference which is separateness non-different or different from the thing? If the former, the non-duality of the thing results. If the latter, i.e. if difference is different from the thing, then the thing must be non-different or non-separate.

[964]

भावाभावपृथक्त्वाऽपि यद्यभिन्ना ततोऽपृथक् ।
भावाभावविभिन्ना चेत्पृथक्त्वा न परस्परम् ॥ ९६४ ॥

The separateness of existence and non-existence also, if it is non-different, it will not be separate from them; if it is different from existence and non-existence, then the separateness will not be mutual.

Moreover, is there separateness or not as between existence and non-existence? If there is separateness, is that separateness non-different from them or different? If non-different, then there cannot be difference between existence and non-existence, in which case there can be no exclusion at all from anything, and the non-duality of reality would result. If separateness is different from existence and non-existence, then the relation thereof with them is not possible. And, as there would be no mutual difference between existence and non-existence, there would be non-duality. If it be held that there is no separateness as between existence and non-existence, the same contingency would arise.

[965]

अन्यापेक्षं पृथक्त्वं चेत्स्वयं तर्ह्यपृथग्घटः ।
द्विधर्मत्वेऽपि वस्त्वेतदेकं स्यादुत्पलादिवत् ॥ ९६५ ॥

If separateness is dependent on another, pot by itself will be non-separate; if there be both features (separateness and non-separateness), the substance will be only one, like the lily.

Is the separateness of pot conditioned by pot itself or by another? If the former, the pot would turn out to be a void. If the latter, then the pot would itself be non-separate and non-dual; and what is conditioned by another is illusory, like the rope-snake.

If it be said that the pot by nature has the attributes of separateness and non-separateness, we reply that it would be difficult to determine whether the two attributes are different or non-different. In that case, the pot itself would be impartite and one, even as the lily is inspite of having many attributes.

[966]

धर्मबुद्धिप्रभेदेऽपि धर्म्यभेदः सदेष्यते ।
अतो गवादेर्भेदेऽपि सन्मात्रमवसीयते ॥ ९६६ ॥

Though there are different attributes cognized, the non-difference of the substance is always admitted; therefore, though cow, etc., are different, the real *per se* remains.

Although the attributes seem to be different, there is no difference of the substrate. Similarly, cow, etc., may be different—but there is no difference of existence or reality *per se*. So, it is the real *per se* that is the content of knowledge. The non-dual alone is thus validly cognized.

NTV—yathā jalataraṅga-candraviśeṣāṇāṁ bhede 'pi candramātram avyabhicārat paramārthaṁ, evaṁ gavādi-bhedānāṁ vyabhicārāt sanmātraṁ vastv ity arthaḥ, tasmāt sad eva mānagrāhyaṁ netarat.

[967]

गोत्वादिमेयपक्षेऽपि सद्रूपस्यानपायतः ।
वस्त्वेव मेयं गोत्वादि शाबलेयादिवत्स्फुटम् ॥ ९६७ ॥

Even on the view that cowness, etc., are the objects cognized, the cognition of the reality-nature is not denied; therefore reality alone is the object of knowledge, as for cowness, etc., they are like spottedness. This is clear.

Even if it be admitted that cow, etc., are what are cognized, there can be no dispute about the fact that they are cognized as existing or being real. Existence is constant in 'The cow exists', 'The

pot exists', etc. Just as spottedness, etc., are not the meaning of the word 'cow', even so cow, etc., are not the meaning of the terms 'existence' and 'reality'. Cow, etc., vary; existence is constant. Hence the latter alone is validly cognized.

NTV—gotvādeḥ meyatvāṅgīkārepi sadrūpasyāpi meyatvam abhyupagantavyaṁ tasya sarvatrā 'nusandhīyamānatvāt.

[968]

सद्रूपत्वापरित्यागादवान्तरनिबन्धनाः ।
व्यवहाराः प्रतीयन्ते सत्तत्त्वं तेष्ववस्थितम् ॥ ९६८ ॥

The empirical usages conditioned by intermediate objects are seen to be even without relinquishing the reality-nature; for the reality-principle resides in them.

The empirical usage about things belonging to intermediate classes such as pillar and pitcher does not give up their form as real or existent. Hence in pillar, etc., there is reality. There is no generality other than reality which is the substrate of all assumptive natures; and there is nothing superior thereto wherein it may stand cancelled.

NKL — kuśa-palāśādi-viśeṣanimittā vyavahārāḥ san kuśaḥ san palāśaḥ iti pratīyante tasmāt satvaṁ teṣv avasthitaṁ avyabhicāri sthitam, itare vyabhicāriṇaḥ tatra kalpitā ity arthaḥ.

[969]

सत्तातोऽपि न भेदः स्याद्द्रव्यत्वादेः कुतोऽन्यतः ।
एकाकारा हि संवित्तिः सद्द्रव्यं सन्गुणस्तथा ॥ ९६९ ॥

There is no difference of substance-ness, etc., from real-ness; from what else can they be different? Consciousness is of one form, as substance *exists*, quality *exists*.

Substance, etc., cannot be different from reality. If they are different, they would become unreal. What is real, viz. pure consciousness, is of one form, as evidenced by the usage, 'Substance is *real*', 'Quality is *real*', etc.

NKL—sat-sāmānyād bhedābhāvaṁ sādhayati.

[970]

समवायाच्च संबन्धे नैकरूप्यं विभिन्नयोः ।
तच्चेत्ततो न विश्वासो जातावप्येकबुद्धितः ॥ ९७० ॥

This oneness of form of what are different cannot be due to the relation of inherence; for if that were so, there would be no certainty, as there is the cognition of oneness in the class-nature also.

It cannot be said that the oneness of what are different as substance, quality, etc., is the result of inherence (*samavāya*); for as there would be the doubt whether the cognition of oneness is brought about by inherence or by the oneness of nature, it is not possible to assert that it is because of inherence alone. For instance, in the case of the cognition of oneness in 'Cowness is one', inherence is not the cause, as oneness is not inherent in cowness.

[971]

संसर्गधर्मता नापि भेदेनानुपलम्भनात् ।
समवायेन संबन्धे को हेतुरिति नेष्यते ॥ ९७१ ॥

Nor can there be relationness between reality and cow, etc., for no difference is seen. It is not determined what the cause is that relates inherence with the inherent.

Assuming inherence as between reality on the one hand and cow, etc., on the other, we have argued so far that the cognition of their oneness is not caused by inherence. Now, we proceed to show that the relation of inherence is not possible as between reality and cow, etc. Reality and cow are not seen to be different. So, there cannot be inherence as between them, even as there is no inherence as between the generality 'existence' and cow, etc. Moreover, is inherence independent or dependent? If it is independent of the relata, there is no meaning in using the possessive case 'inherence *of*'. If it is dependent, then the relation between inherence and the relata should be determined. This relation, however, cannot be either conjunction or inherence, as there is no evidence.

[972]

संयोगश्चेद्वियोगोऽपि समवायेऽनवस्थितिः ।
स्वतश्चेत्कल्पना व्यर्था द्रव्यस्याप्येकता स्वतः ॥ ९७२ ॥

If it is conjunction, there would be disjunction also; if it is inherence, then there would be endless regression; if (the relation of inherence with the relata be) self-established, then the assumption (of inherence) is futile, and the unity of the substance (and reality-nature) would also be of its own accord.

The relation of conjunction is impossible. If there be conjunction between inherence and its relata, there would be disjunction also at sometime hence, which would mean that quality, etc., are independent.

There cannot be inherence between inherence and its relata; for to say that there is would go against the Vaiśeṣika view that there is no inherence between the eternal substances and inherence.

Nor may it be held that the dependence of inherence on its relata is self-established; for in that case the assumption of inherence itself would be futile. Moreover, if the dependence of inherence on its relata be natural, then why should not the cognition of oneness of substance, etc., as existence be natural? If this is natural, then there is no need of inherence.

[973]

सत्तावगुण्ठिताश्चैते सर्वे भावाः सदैव हि ।
व्यवहाराय कल्पन्ते भ्रान्तो भेदः सदैव तु ॥ ९७३ ॥

All these things being always encompassed by reality-nature, are fit for empirical usage; difference is always illusory.

It cannot be maintained that the particulars alone are real; for even to say that would show that it is reality that persists in them. It is as pervaded by reality or existence that the particulars become fit for empirical usage during the time of empirical affairs. In fact, the difference of the particulars is illusory appearance, like the difference in the reflections of the moon.

NKL—sarve viśeṣāḥ sattāvyāptā vyavahārayogyā bhavanti, atas teṣāṁ bhāsamāno bhedo bhrānta ity arthaḥ.

[974]

येषामपि हि सामान्यभेदवद्भ्रस्तु गृह्यते ।
तेषामपि कुतो भेदो वस्त्वैक्याद्धर्म्यभेदतः ॥ ९७४ ॥

Those who hold that a thing is made of both generality and particularity—for them also how can there be difference, as the thing is one and the qualified thing is non-different?

If it be held that what is called a thing has both generality and particularity, even then difference would not be established. The substrate which is of the nature of generality and particularity is non-different; and it is the real.

[975]

अपि भेदेन या बुद्धिः स्यात्सामान्यविशेषयोः ।
साऽपि तन्मात्रनिष्ठत्वान्नैव भेदस्पृगिष्यते ॥ ९७५ ॥

The cognition of difference between generality and particularity—even that because of being in them alone is not true cognition of difference.

Objection: There is seen reciprocal difference between generality and particularity; that difference would devolve on the substrate also.

Reply: In your view, generality and particularity are not entities. Therefore, there cannot be cognition of difference in regard to them. In what is not an entity or thing, the cognition of difference is impossible. Even setting aside this difficulty, we ask, what is that cognition which, you hold, is of the difference between generality and particularity? Is that the cognition of generality, or of particularity, or of both, or some other cognition? On the first three alternatives, the cognition would be of generality, etc., alone, and not of difference. If it be held that that cognition is of something else, then that something else cannot be difference, because of the defects like reciprocal dependence, etc.

[976]

एकं चेद्भिन्नता नास्ति भेदश्चेदेकता कुतः ।
चित्रेऽप्यनुगमाभावान्न सामान्यविशेषता ॥ ९७६ ॥

If generality and particularity are one with a thing, there cannot be difference; if there is difference, how can unity be? Since there is no persistence in what are variegated, there are not both generality and particularity.

Are generality and particularity non-different from that which has them, or different? If they are non-different, then there would not be the relation of generality and particularity. If different, there is the contingence of there being three entities.

Although it is wished by you that the thing is of the nature of both generality and particularity, the thing can be only of the nature of a particular. The particular does not persist, e. g. the cow with broken horns (*khaṇḍa*) is not seen in the cow without horns (*muṇḍa*). The pure generality which persists, however, is not an entity.

[977]

स्वरूपपररूपाभ्यां यदा सदसदात्मकम् ।
वस्त्वेकं मानविषयमभावस्ते तदा कुतः ॥ ९७७ ॥

If the one reality be the content of means of knowledge as being and non-being, through its own form and other-form, how can there be non-existence for you?

Now, it is sought to reject difference through the rejection of non- existence.

If it be said that the same entity is real by its own nature and unreal as of the nature of something else, then it would result that, of that entity there is no unreality or non-existence since there is no evidence. In that case there would be no difference too which is dependent thereon.

[978]

प्रत्यक्षादिनिवृत्तिश्चेत्तस्याः किं रूपमुच्यताम् ।
स्तैमित्यमात्मनश्चेत्स्यात्तद्वस्त्वेवास्मदीहितम् ॥ ९७८ ॥

If the turning away of perception, etc., be the evidence for non-existence, say, what is the nature of that? If it is the non-activity of the self, then it is verily the reality which is acceptable to us.

If you say that the evidence for the non-existence of an entity is the non-rise of any of the five *pramāṇas*, we ask, what is the nature of the non-rise? (1) Does it mean that the self remains in itself without any activity? (2) Or, is there cognition of another entity? (3) Or, does it imply another existent?

(1) It cannot be the first; for there would then be the adoption of our position.

[979-980a]

अथ वस्त्वन्तरज्ञानं नितरां तस्य वस्तुता ।
भावान्तरमभावोऽपि निरुपाख्यः स नेष्यते ॥ ९७९ ॥
तस्माद्वस्त्वेकनिष्ठत्वान्न भेदोऽक्षादिगोचरः ।

If it (the turning away) is knowledge of some other entity, then by all means it is a reality. Even non-existence as another existence will not be admitted if it is

investigated into. Therefore, since perception, etc., relate only to the one reality, difference is not their sphere.

(2) If the non-rise of perception, etc., be the cognition of another entity, then also there is no non-existence, since cognition is an existence and its content also is an existent.

(3) The view that non-existence is another existence is untenable. If it is existence, the expression 'another' is meaningless. If it is non-existence, then the term 'existence' is inapplicable to it.

In any case, the so-called non-rise of the quintuple *pramāṇas* must be regarded as an entity; and the content or object of an entity must be an entity. An entity cannot establish the non-existence of entity; if this be not admitted, the establishing of one's own non-existence should be possible.

Rejecting difference through the rejection of non-existence, and accepting the view that generality alone is the real, it is concluded that difference has no evidence.

[980b-981a]

घटोऽयमिति संवित्तेर्घटो मेयः प्रतीयते ॥ ९८० ॥
न व्यावृत्तिः पटादीनामतद्रूप्यात्तथा पटे ।

In the cognition 'This is a pot' the pot appears as the object of knowledge, and not exclusion from cloth, etc., because it is not of that form; so also in the case of cloth.

If it be contended that the perception of a thing, say, pot, reveals also the exclusion of other things, such as cloth, we ask: is this done by the indeterminate perception or by the determinate perception? The indeterminate perception reveals only the object.

As for the determinate perception of pot, it is the pot alone that is the content, and not the exclusion of all other things; for this is an endless process and is not the sphere of the pot-perception. The same argument holds good with regard to cloth, etc.

[981b-982a]

घटाभावो विरोधित्वान्न घटेऽर्थान्तरेऽपि न ॥ ९८१ ॥
अषष्ट्यर्थतया तस्माद्विकल्पोऽयं न वस्तुगः ।

The non-existence of pot cannot be in pot because of contradiction; nor in some thing else, for it is not the sense of the sixth case; therefore, this is imagination and does not conform to reality.

Does non-existence of pot have no locus? Or, does it have one? If it is without locus, then it is independent. If it has a locus, what is that locus? Is it pot, or some other object? The pot cannot be the locus of its own prior non-existence, etc. As for reciprocal non-existence, that is another expression for difference which has been rejected. If the locus is something else, is that non-existence or existence? Not the first, because non-existence cannot be the locus of non-existence. Nor the second, for we have shown that no relation is possible as between existence and non-existence.

[982b-983a]

घटो हि संविदं कुर्वन्नात्माकारविशेषणम् ॥ ९८२ ॥
आत्मानं लभते तद्वद्व्यावृत्तिं न पटादितः ।

The pot, indeed, causing the cognition which has taken on the attribute of its form, makes itself known, and not its difference from cloth, etc.

The exclusion from cloth, etc., is neither the nature of pot, nor its attribute. In the pot-cognition it is pot alone that becomes the qualification of consciousness.

[983b-984a]

पटसंवेदनेऽप्येवं पटमात्रं विशेषणम् ॥ ९८३ ॥

ईक्षतेऽत्राधिकं नान्यदभावादि यदुच्यते ।

So also in the cognition of cloth, cloth alone is the attribute; nothing more such as non-existence that is alleged is seen here.

Similarly, in regard to cloth. Just as in the pot-cognition the specification is pot alone, so also in the cloth-cognition it is cloth alone that is the specification.

[984b-985a]

संदिग्धनिश्चयाद्येवं ज्ञानधर्मो विशेषयन् ॥ ९८४ ॥

संविदं भिद्यते मेयात्प्रत्येकं भेदधीर्न तु ।

Doubt, determination, etc., which are the attributes of the internal organ, as they qualify the knowledge, differ due to the objects cognized and there is no independent cognition of difference.

Just as external objects like pot, cloth, etc., the internal contents such as doubt, determination, etc., do not import any difference into knowledge. Doubt, etc., constitute the qualification or attribute of knowledge, which here means the internal organ; hence we speak of doubtful knowledge, determinate kmowledge, etc. These distinguish knowledge from the object known; but they do not convey any mutual distinction or distinction from knowledge.

AVS — saṁśaya-jñānaṁ mithyā-jñānaṁ pramāṇa-jñānañ ca jñānasyā 'ntaḥkaraṇa-dharmaḥ saṁvidaṁ viśeṣayan saṁśayānubhavaḥ viparyāsānubhavaḥ pramāṇānubhavaḥ iti, meyān na tu bhidyate.

[985b-986a]

तथाऽहमेव जानामि माता नान्य इतीदृशाः ॥ ९८५ ॥
मातृधर्माः प्रसिध्यन्ति विशिंषन्तः स्वसंविदम् ।

Thus 'I alone, the cognizer, know, no one else'. This and similar ones are established as attributes of the cognizer, distinguishing one's own cognition.

Cognizer, hearer, seer, etc., are features that are superimposed on consciousness; so they are not different in reality. The same is the case with doubt, etc., and pot, etc.

NKL—jñātā mātā śrote 'tyādi mātṛ-dharmāṇām api parasparato 'nyataś ca bhedāsiddher anubhave 'dhyastāḥ sidhyantī 'ty arthaḥ.

[986b-987a]

संविदेका स्वतःसिद्धा प्रत्यग्रूपैकलक्षणा ॥ ९८६ ॥
भावाभावादिरूपाय व्यवहाराय कल्पते ।

Consciousness which is one, self-established, of the nature of the single inner reality, appears in empirical usage as existence, non-existence, etc.

Consciousness which is the self is the substrate of all appearances such as particularized existence, non-existence, etc.

NKL — adhiṣṭhānatvena rajjvādivad anyatrānadhyastatve hetum eketyādi viśeṣaṇair darśayati.

AVS—ahaṁ jānāmi mātāhaṁ draṣṭā śrotā mante 'tyādi mātṛ-dharmād yasmād anubhave 'dhyastaṁ sarvaṁ tasmād anubhavo 'dvayaḥ kūṭasthaḥ prayagbhūtaḥ sarvavyavahārāspadaś ca siddhaḥ.

[987b-988a]

अतोऽनुभवमुल्लङ्घ्य न भेदो नाप्यभिन्नता ॥ ९८७ ॥
तत्पृष्टेन तु मानानि विरोधः किंसमाश्रयः ।

Therefore, setting aside experience there will be neither difference nor non-difference; means of valid knowledge are only based on that; on what will contradiction be based?

What was premised earlier, viz. that there is no conflict of the Vedānta texts with other *pramāṇas* is here concluded.

The immutable inner experience is the substrate of all; transgressing that, neither the world nor its difference, etc., get established. The text 'That thou art', etc., teaches that experience; with that there could be no conflict of the other *pramāṇas*. The *pramāṇas* become valid only by being in conformity with experience. How can the Vedānta texts which conform to experience be in conflict with the other *pramāṇas*?

NTV—tasmād anubhava eva pratyakṣādi-māna-meyaḥ na bhedo nāpy abhedaḥ ity upasaṁharati.

NKL—saṁvid atirekeṇa viśvasya bhedo 'bhedo vā nāstīty arthaḥ.

[988b-989a]

अविज्ञातः प्रमाणानां विषयो वादिनां मतः ॥ ९८८ ॥
न तस्य मानतः सिद्धिस्तत्सिद्धेः प्राक्प्रमागमात् ।

Disputants believe that the object of means of valid knowledge is unknown before; but that is not *established* by means of valid knowledge, because that exists even before the functioning of means of valid knowledge.

It is experience that remains unknown and is the content of perception, etc. The Vedānta texts also relate to the same. How, then, can there be conflict between them and perception, etc.?

The *pramāṇas* do not produce the experience; they only reveal it.

[989b-990a]

अमानकं कथं च स्यादज्ञातत्वमिहोच्यताम् ॥ ९८९ ॥
कथं वा तद्विना मानं विषयासंभवाद्भवेत् ।

"If the object exists even before the functioning of means of valid knowledge, then it cannot be known through means of valid knowledge. How then, can there be for it unknownness? This is to be explained". (The reply is:) Without that how can there be means of valid knowledge, because it would be void of object?

Without the unknownness of the object, there cannot be the functioning of *pramāṇa*. If there be no unknownness, there will be no content indicated thereby; consequently *pramāṇa* would be void of content.

[990b-991a]

अज्ञातत्वक्षतिं कुर्वन्मानं मानत्वमश्नुते ॥ ९९० ॥
मानादज्ञातता चेत्स्यान्न सा तत्फलमिष्यते ।

Means of valid knowledge becomes means of valid knowledge by destroying unknownness; if there should be unknownness as a result of a means of valid knowledge the destruction of that cannot be the fruit thereof.

The unknownness itself is not the content of *pramāṇa;* for what the *pramāṇa* does is the destruction of unknownness. The lamp, indeed, does not have the darkness for its object!

[991b-992a]

अतोऽनुभवतो लब्धमज्ञातं ज्ञापयत्सदा ॥ ९९१ ॥

प्रत्यक्षादि प्रमाणं स्यान्न स्वतो नापि चान्यतः ।

Therefore, making known the unknown that has already been established in experience, perception, etc., become means of valid knowledge; not by themselves, nor by something else.

Perception, etc., are *pramāṇas* with reference to the pure inner self which is indicated by unknownness that is established by the experience which is the self that has neither a rise nor a setting. In other words, the self is the object of knowledge as well as that which establishes ignorance.

[992b-993a]

नाज्ञासिषमहं पूर्वमित्येवं प्रमिते घटे ॥ ९९२ ॥

पूर्वाज्ञातत्वविषयो भूयोऽप्यनुभवो यतः ।

"I did not know it before". Thus with reference to a pot which has been known, the earlier unknownness as the content is experienced again.

The unknownness of a thing, say, pot, prior to the cognition thereof, is experienced thus: 'Till this time I did not know the pot'. On the strength of this reflective cognition, we say, the unknownness is established by experience.

NTV—etāvantaṁ kālaṁ nājñāsiṣam iti jñānotpatteḥ prāg ajñātatvenā 'nubhūtasya punaḥ parāmarśa-darśanād ajñātatvam anubhava-siddham ity arthaḥ.

[993b-994a]

प्रवृत्तं विषये मानमवच्छेदफलं मतम् ॥ ९९३ ॥

ज्ञाताज्ञाते प्रति त्वस्य न व्यापारोऽप्रमाणतः ।

Means of valid knowledge is thought to yield the fruit of defining the object with reference to which it started functioning; as regards the knownness thereof it has no operation, for that would be invalid.

The *pramāṇa* which has the pot for content cannot establish its earlier unknownness, for that is not its function. The knownness as well as the unknownness of a thing are experience-established. What the *pramāṇa* does is only to define the object.

[994b-995a]

सर्वोऽप्यनुभवात्सिद्धां बालोऽप्यज्ञाततां स्वतः ॥ ९९४ ॥

न किंचिज्जान इत्येवं पृष्टो वक्ति प्रमां विना ।

All—and even children—give expression to their own experience-established unknownness. When asked about anything they say in the absence of evidence, "I do not know anything about it".

That unknownness is experience-established is within the purview of everyone's experience.

AVS—prākṛtānām apy ajñātatvam anubhava-siddham.

[995b-996a]

निःशेषकरणग्रामलयेऽप्यनुभवः स्वतः ॥ ९९५ ॥

अलुप्तदृक्सुषुप्तेऽपि जाग्रद्बोधाविशेषतः ।

Even in sleep where the seer is not absent, though the entire host of instruments have resolved themselves, there is the self-same experience which is not different from the awareness in waking.

That unknownness is experience-established will be evident also when sleep-experience is analysed. On waking up one recalls 'I did not know anything in sleep'. The instruments of *pramāṇa* were not there in sleep. Yet there was the experience of unknownness. As between sleep and waking there is no difference so far as the experience or awareness of unknownness goes.

NTV — sakalamānopasaṁhārepi suṣuptāv ajñātatvam anubhava-siddham iti na mānāt siddham.

[996b-997a]

अत्यन्ताननुभूतेषु हिमवत्पृष्ठवस्तुषु ॥ ९९६ ॥
जाग्रतोऽनुभवोऽप्येवं सुषुप्तान्न विशिष्यते ।

Thus is also the experience of one in waking, of the things on the top of the Himalayas which have never been experienced; so the waking experience (of unknownness) does not differ from the sleep-experience.

Here is a case of unknownness where the content cannot be validly cognized.

AVS—yathā suṣupte 'jñātatvā 'nubhavo 'nubhavād eva, tathā jāgraty apī 'ty arthaḥ.

[997b-998a]

न चात्रानुभवो लुप्तो न जानामीति बोधनात् ॥ ९९७ ॥
अदृष्टमपि दृष्ट्वाऽस्ति बोधो नाज्ञासिषं त्विति ।

Here the experience is not lost, since there is the awareness 'I do not know', and even when what was unseen is seen, there is the experience 'I did not know it (then)'.

It is not right to say that experience itself is absent sometimes so that there is no question of its establishing unknownness during those moments; for experience could never be absent. Not during waking: witness such experience as, 'I do not understand the thing stated by you', 'So long I did not know this'.

[998b-999a]

पुमान्सुप्तोत्थितोऽप्येवं प्रमात्रादिलयं स्वतः ॥ ९९८ ॥
अनुभूत्यैव संधत्ते नान्तराऽतोऽस्य लुप्तता ।

Thus also the man who has risen from sleep remembers of his own accord the resolution of cognizership, etc., through experience alone; so in the interval there was no loss of this experience.

Nor is experience absent during sleep. On waking one says, 'I did not know anything in sleep'. There must have been experience then, even though there was not cognizership, etc.

NTV—sarvāntaḥkaraṇa-pariṇāmo-'paramasyaiva suṣupti-lakṣaṇatvāt, nānubhavoparamaḥ suṣupti-lakṣṇam.

[999b-1000a]

न चेदानींतनाद्बोधाद्बोधाभावगतिर्भवेत् ॥ ९९९ ॥
सौषुप्ती नाहि बोधस्य कालभेदेन भिन्नता ।

Nor can the absence of knowledge in sleep be inferred from the present knowledge; knowledge does not become different, because of difference in time.

The absence of knowledge during sleep cannot be inferred on the strength of the knowledge that one has during waking. Experience does not become different because of differences in place, time and condition. The prior non-existence of experience can never be established.

The absence of that knowledge cannot be postulated on the ground of the awareness that is in sleep; for to say so would involve a contradiction.

[1000b-1001a]

बोधादेव प्रसिध्यन्ति कालावस्थादयो यतः ॥ १००० ॥
मातृमानादयश्चापि कुतस्तैरस्य विक्रिया ।

From awareness (*bodha*) alone are established time, states of experience, etc., and cognizer, means of cognition, etc. How, then, could that be a modification of them?

Experience is immutable, and is not altered by time, etc. Time, etc., are inert, and so are not self-established. They depend on consciousness for the manifestation of their existence. What is established earlier to them, viz. consciousness, cannot be modified by them. Experience which is self-nature, being without modifications earlier, cannot of its own accord get modified subsequently; for the self-nature connot be destroyed.

[1001b-1002a]

प्रमातृमानतन्मेयेष्वागमापायिषु त्विषु ॥ १००१ ॥
अलुप्तानुदितो बोधः प्रथते प्रत्यगेकलः ।

While the three, cognizer, means of cognition and object, come and go, knowledge which neither rises nor sets, shines as the one inner reality.

This is another reason for stating that the self which is experience is immutable. The inner self which is of one consistency shines without coming and going, and establishes the cognizer, etc., and their comings and goings. That self which is experience is not subject to change.

NKL—pramātrādi-bhāvābhāva-sādhakatvād ātmā svaprakāśaḥ.

AVS—ekaḥ svayaṁprasiddha ātmā na mā-siddha ity arthaḥ.

[1002b-1003a]

अभितोऽनुभवाक्रान्ता ज्ञाताज्ञातत्वभूमिषु ॥ १००२ ॥
नान्यत्रार्थाः प्रसिध्यन्ति लीयन्ते नाप्यनात्मनि ।

All things, everywhere, in the regions of the known and the unknown, are encompassed by experience; nowhere else are the things established, nor do they resolve into the not-self.

All objects, whether as known or as unknown, are pervaded by experience during the time of their empirical usage. It is thus that they gain their being. They do not stay elsewhere than in experience. Nor do they get resolved in something else. Therefore, cognizer, etc., —in fact, all things—arise from, stay in, and get resolved into experience which is the self.

[1003b-1004a]

अतोऽनुभव एवैको विषयोऽज्ञातलक्षणः ॥ १००३ ॥
अक्षादीनां स्वतःसिद्धो यत्र तेषां प्रमाणता ।

Therefore, the one experience alone, which is of the nature of the unknown, is the object of perception, etc.; it is the self-established, in respect whereof they (perception, etc.) have validity (*pramāṇatā*).

It is experience alone that is the content of perception, etc.; and there is no other content. *Pramāṇas* become valid by removing unknownness in regard to experience. This is not incompatible with the self-luminosity of experience. Although experience is of one consistency and its luminosity is not other-dependent, *pramāṇa* is required to remove the nescience located therein.

NTV—yato 'nubhava-vyatirekeṇa kiñcin nāsti ato 'nubhavasyaivā 'jñātatvād anubhave sarvaṁ mānaṁ pravartata iti.

[1004b-1005a]

तेनानुभवसिद्धानां लोकेऽज्ञानविघातिनः ॥ १००४ ॥
मात्वमक्षादयो यान्ति नाज्ञातज्ञाततोऽन्यथा ।

Therefore, in the world, in respect of things which are established by experience, perception, etc., which destroy ignorance attain validity, not as otherwise than making known the unknown.

In the world, indeed, perception, etc., gain empirical validity only as removing the unknownness of pot, etc., which are established as superimposed on experience that is unknown.

NTV—anubhavād ajñātatvena pratipannānāṁ ghaṭādīnam ajñānanivartakatvena ghaṭādāv akṣādīnāṁ prāmāṇyaṁ nā 'nyathā.

[1005b-1006a]

घटादयः प्रमासिद्धा मुञ्चन्त्यज्ञाततां न तु ॥ १००५ ॥
स्वतःसिद्धोऽपि वस्तुत्वान्मुञ्चत्यात्मा प्रमां विना ।

Pot, etc., having been established as valid through *pramāṇa*, leave off their unknownness; though self-established, the self, because of being an entity, does not leave off its unknownness without *pramāṇa*.

Just as pot, etc., being established by empirical *pramāṇas*, leave off their unknownness, so also the self, although self-luminous, becomes known only through *pramāṇa*, because it is also *vastu* (content of *pramāṇa*). Ignorance or unknownness is removed only by the luminosity that is the fruit of *pramāṇa*, and not by the self-luminosity of the self.

NKL — vṛttivyāpta-ghaṭādīnām ajñāna-nivarttakatvād ātmanopi vṛttivyāptasya tan-nivarttakatvam svarūpa-jñānasyā 'jñāna-sādhakatvād ity arthaḥ.

[1006b-1007a]

प्राग्बाधकागमात्सिद्धिर्लौकिकस्यापि वस्तुनः ॥ १००६ ॥
वस्तुतत्त्वबलादेव तत्तमोव्यवधानतः ।

Prior to the oncoming of the sublating Scriptural testimony, the empirical objects are established on the strength of the true reality (viz. the self)—and that, through the interposition of ignorance.

Just because the self becomes known through *pramāṇa*, it does not cease to be self-luminous. Before the final realization of the form 'I am Brahman' occurs, it is the self or experience that establishes all things as superimposed on itself by nescience.

NKL—aham brahmā 'smīti jñānotpatteḥ prāg ajñāna-vyavahitā-'nubhavād eva prapañca-siddher ātmā svaprabha ity arthaḥ.

[1007b-1008a]

कृत्स्नमात्राद्युपादानतमोबाधस्तु बोधतः ॥ १००७ ॥
तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्योत्थात्पूर्णैकात्म्यस्वलक्षणात् ।

The sublation, however, of the ignorance which is the material cause of all things, cognizer, etc., is through the knowledge which is of the nature of the one plenary self, arising from the text 'That thou art', etc.

Perception, etc., are not the *pramāṇas* that will dispel the ignorance about the self. The knowledge that dispels it is the one that arises from the Scriptural text 'That thou art', etc.

[1008b-1009a]

तेनाऽऽगमस्य तत्र स्यादज्ञातत्वविघातिनः ॥ १००८ ॥
प्रमाणत्वं पुमर्थश्च स एव विदुषां मतः ।

Therefore, there is validity for Scripture, which destroys unknownness in respect thereof (the self); and that alone is regarded by the wise as the human goal.

The knowledge of what is conditioned is caused by perception, etc. In respect of what is unconditioned, Scripture alone is capable of functioning as *pramāṇa*. The knowledge of the conditioned cannot remove ignorance, for it depends on ignorance. The knowledge of the unconditioned dispels ignorance because the nature of the unconditioned reality is such. Therefore, it is through the knowledge generated by the Scriptural text alone that the root of all evil, ignorance, is destroyed. Thus it is clear that the text 'That thou art', etc., is *pramāṇa* in respect of the oneness of self. It is but proper that this should be so because the Brahman-self is of the nature of the supreme bliss and the final goal.

NTV–vākyottha-jñānād eva sakala-bandhopādānātmājñāna-nivṛttiḥ.

NKL—sukharūpatvād ātmaiva phalam ity arthaḥ.

AVS—yato vākyārtha-jñānād eva sakala-jaḍopādānā-'tmā-'jñāna-nivṛttis tenā 'gamasya tatra prāmāṇyam.

[1009b-1010a]

ननु दुर्वारसंसारदुःखसंदर्भहानतः ॥ १००९ ॥
किमन्यत्सुखमिष्टं स्याद्यस्याऽऽप्तेः पुरुषार्थता ।

"Now, other than the destruction of the host of misery consisting in the transmigration, difficult to avoid, what happiness is desired, the attainment of which is said to be the human goal?

The *pūrvapakṣin* (here the older Naiyāyika) objects: It is not right to say that the human goal is happiness or bliss. There is no happiness other than the removal of sorrow. Over and above the destruction of the entire host of misery which is called transmigration, nothing else is desired.

NKL characterizes the *prima facie* view as that of the older Vaiśeṣika.

sukhasya duḥkhābhāvatvān nābhāvarūpātmatvam iti vṛddha-vaiśeṣikaś codayati.

AVS—duḥkha-nivṛttir eva sukham ity arthaḥ.

[1010b-1011a]

लोकेऽपि व्याधिसंतापविच्छित्तौ सुखितेक्ष्यते ॥ १०१० ॥
व्यतिरिक्तसुखार्था च न प्रवृत्तिर्विरागिणाम् ।

"Even in the world, when the burning pain of disease is put out, happiness is seen; and for those who

are non-attached there is no pursuit of happiness other than that of release.

The destruction of sorrow alone is happiness. When a person, for instance, is afflicted with disease, he is said to be in misery. When he becomes rid of disease, he is considered to be happy. Even in the case of one who has renounced the world, seeking release, the goal is freedom from bondage which is misery.

[1011b-1012a]

असंवेद्यं सुखं नापि पुमर्थो न च कर्मता ॥ १०११ ॥
स्वरूपे वेद्यवेत्तृत्वायोगाद्द्वैतप्रसङ्गतः ।

"A happiness that is unknown cannot be the human goal, nor the object, for, in the self, the relation of the object of knowledge and the knower is not possible, as there is the contingence of duality."

Moreover, if happiness which is an existent is said to be the goal, we have to ask: Is that happiness unknown or known? If it is unknown, like the hidden treasure, it cannot be the human goal. If it is known, then we should admit the duality of knower and known. This would militate against Advaita.

NKL—mandira-madhya-nihita-dhananicayavad ity arthaḥ.

[1012b-1013a]

नैवं भेदेन संसिद्धे सुखदुःखे कथं तयोः ॥ १०१२ ॥
ऐक्यं सुखस्य विच्छेदो दुःखं वा किं न कल्प्यते ।

Not so. When happiness and misery are established as distinct, how can they be identified? Or, why should it not be assumed that the absence of happiness is misery?

The *siddhāntin's* reply: The destruction of misery cannot be the same as happiness, for in the case of a person who is half-immersed in water with the scorching sun above, there is simultaneous and separate experience of pleasure and pain.

Moreover, if the absence of misery be happiness, why cannot the absence of happiness be misery?

NKL—nidāghe divākarakaravyāpta-śarīrasya mandākinī-hrade nimagnādhobhāgasya aparaparyāyam evā 'hlāda-duḥkha-saṁvedanāt.

[1013b-1014a]

अदुःखिनोऽपि दृश्यन्ते सुखप्राप्तीच्छया यतः ॥ १०१३ ॥
तदुपाये प्रवर्तन्तस्तदभेदे न युज्यते ।

For, even those who have no misery are seen to be active in respect of the means of happiness, desiring to attain it. This will not be the case if the two were non-different.

It is observed in the case of some, e. g. the kings, that even though they have no misery they exert themselves in cultivating the means to happiness such as music and dance. This only shows that the destruction of misery and happiness are not identical.

AVS — duḥkha-rahitasyā 'pi sukhecchayā tad-upāye pravṛtti-darśanāc ca na duḥkhābhāvaḥ sukham.

[1014b-1015a]

चन्दनादिसुखोपायसंपन्नाः सुखिनोऽप्यलम् ॥ १०१४ ॥
पुत्रजन्मादिवार्ताभिः प्राप्नुवन्ति सुखान्तरम् ।

Even those who are endowed fully with the means of happiness such as sandal (paste), etc., and are suffici-

ently happy, attain more happiness through the words about the birth of a son, etc.

There are also different happinesses. A person becomes happy through means such as sandal-paste, etc. He gains happiness again on hearing that a son has been born to him.

AVS—sukhinām anīhamānānām api putra-janmādi-vārtā-śravaṇāt sukham dṛśyata ity arthaḥ.

[1015b-1016a]

पुत्राद्यप्राप्तिरूपं च दुःखं तत्र न कल्प्यते ॥ १०१५ ॥

असंवित्तेरवेद्यं हि न दुःखं वैरिदुःखवत् ।

It cannot be assumed there that there is misery of the form of the non-birth of a son; for that is not known; what is unknown is not misery as the misery of an enemy.

It cannot be said that, in the case of the man who hears the birth of a son, what is called happiness is the destruction of the misery that was caused by the non-birth of a son; for, he was not thinking earlier of the fact that a son was not born to him, and so how could he have had misery? A misery that is not experienced is not misery. If an enemy feels miserable, do we feel that misery?

NTV— na hi puruṣāntara-gata-duḥkham puruṣāntarasya duḥkham bhavati.

NKL—ananubhūyamānam na duḥkham puruṣāntaragatam duḥkham puruṣāntarasyā 'nanubhūyamāntvād yathā na duḥkham ity arthaḥ.

AVS—yatra putra-janma-śravaṇāt sukham utpadyate na tatra duḥkham asti duḥkhānubhavābhāvāt, ananubhūtam api duḥkham astīti na śakyate vaktum, avedyasyāduḥkhatvāt puruṣāntara-gata-duḥkhavat.

[1016b-1017a]

तिर्यञ्चोऽप्यत एवेह कामयन्ते सुखं तथा ॥ १०१६ ॥

अप्रियं विजिहासन्ति न तु जानन्ति साधनम् ।

Therefore, even animals, here, desire happiness and want to avoid the unpleasant; but they do not know the means.

Even animals and birds seek pleasure as well as the destruction of pain. The only difference between them and the humans is that for the latter the proper means as taught in the Veda is available.

NTV — paśvādīnāṁ sukha-prāptīcchā duḥkha-parihārecchā ca vibhāgena dṛśyate yataḥ.

[1017b-1018a]

वेदोऽपि शुद्धमात्मानं सुखं मुख्यं प्रदर्शयन् ॥ १०१७ ॥
अनात्मानं तथा दुःखं पुमर्थत्वेन संमतः ।

And, the Veda is admitted to be the means of human goal, as it exhibits the pure self as the supreme happiness and the not-self as misery.

The Veda becomes *pramāṇa* by revealing the supreme happiness that is the self, free from all characteristics such as hunger, etc., and by showing up the misery that is the not-self.

[1018b-1019a]

तदेतत्प्रेय इत्यादिवाक्येभ्योऽनेकधा श्रुतम् ॥ १०१८ ॥
तथाऽऽत्मनस्तु कामाय तस्मान्नान्यत्सुखं भवेत् ।

It is declared in Scripture, in many ways, thus: 'This is dear',[1] and 'For the love of the self'[2] etc. Therefore, there is no other happiness.

Here are cited texts from the Veda which declare that the self is the supreme happiness.

1. *BU*, I, iv, 8.
2. *BU*, II. iv, 5 *et seq*;
   IV, v, 6 *et seq*.

[1019b-1020a]

पुरुषार्थाभिसंबन्धाद्विरागित्वं यथाऽऽश्रितम् ॥ १०१९ ॥
परानन्दाभिलाषोऽपि तथा चेत्किं निषिध्यते ।

Just as, being related to the human goal, renunciation is depended upon, so also is the desire for the supreme bliss (depended upon). That being so, why is it prohibited ?

It cannot be said that, if he who seeks release desires happiness which is identified with the self, he would be subject to transmigration; for, just as it is admitted that he should have non-attachment because that is necessary for attaining the goal which is release, so also it must be conceded that he should have desire for the supreme bliss if it can be shown that it is for the sake of gaining release.

NKL — virāgitvaṁ saṁsārāsāratā-darśana-niṣpannaṁ saṁsāra-dveṣitvaṁ puruṣārthābhisaṁbandhāt sādhanatvena mokṣasaṁbandhāt tadadhīnā pravṛttiḥ na saṁsārāyeti bhavadbhir abhyupagataṁ yathā, tathā parānandābhilāṣopi puruṣārthābhisaṁbandhīcet tan-mūlā pravṛttiḥ kasmāt saṁsārakāraṇatvena niṣidhyata ity arthaḥ.

[1020b-1021a]

आत्यन्तिकसुखेच्छायां यदि रागित्वमुच्यते ॥ १०२० ॥
विविक्तदेशसेवादाविच्छायां किं न रागिता ।

If the desire for absolute happiness is said to be attachment, then how is there not attachment in the desire for a solitary place, etc.?

In fact, what is called the desire for the supreme happiness is not really attachment; it is the interest (*śraddhā*) evinced in the supreme happiness. Attachment is born of delusion; the interest which we

speak of is caused by discrimination. This interest is exactly in the same position as the desire for solitude, attending on a teacher, etc.

NKL—virāgitvaṁ na dveṣaḥ kiṁtu saṁsāra-darśana-janyo-'dvegaḥ iti cet tarhi paramānandecchāpi śraddhaiva na rāgaḥ.

AVS—yad avidyākṣiptam abhūtaguṇābhiniveśaṁ rāgam ācakṣata iti rāga-lakṣaṇaṁ kṛtam.

[1021b-1022a]

अथ ये शतमित्यादिवाक्यैरेतत्प्रपञ्चितम् ॥ १०२१ ॥
एष ह्येवेति च व्यक्तं तैत्तिरीयश्रुतावपि ।

This has also been clearly explained in the *Taittirīya* texts, 'Now, that which is a hundredfold of the pleasure',[1] etc., and 'This alone gives happiness',[2] etc.

Two texts from the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* are quoted here to show that the self is of the nature of the supreme happiness.

1. *TU*, II, viii, 1.
2. *TU*, II, vii, 1.

[1022b-1023a]

स्वानन्दाभिमुखः स्वापे बोध्यमानोऽत एव च ॥ १०२२ ॥
पीड्यते स्त्र्यादिसंपर्कसुखविच्छेदतो यथा ।

And, therefore, a man who in sleep enjoys the bliss of self, when awakened, is afflicted even as when interrupted in the enjoyment of contact with woman, etc.

The experience of sleep is also evidence for the bliss-nature of the self. When a person's sleep is interrupted he does not like it,

even as he dislikes a hindrance to the enjoyment of pleasure in the waking state. From this it is to be concluded that in sleep there is bliss.

[1023b-1024a]

आनन्दैकस्वभावत्वाद्वेद्यता तत्र नार्थ्यते ॥ १०२३ ॥
निःसंबोधेऽर्थ्यते सा हि न तु बोधैकलक्षणे ।

Because it (viz. the self) is of the nature of pure bliss, knowability (*vedyatā*) is not required there; that, indeed, is required in what is not of the nature of intelligence, and not in the case of that which is solely of the nature of intelligence.

Objection—If Brahman-bliss is an object of knowledge, there would be duality; if it is unknown, it would not be the human goal.

Reply—Although the self is of the nature of the one consistency of happiness, it is not an object of knowledge. It is only what is inert that may become an object of knowledge. The self, on the contrary, is pure consciousness. For understanding the bliss-nature of the Brahman-self, therefore, the Vedānta may well be the *pramāṇa*.

[1024b-1025a]

अधिकारस्य सौलभ्यप्रतिपत्त्यर्थमीरणम् ॥ १०२४ ॥
सर्वपुंसामिति तथा पूर्वमेव प्रपञ्चितम् ।

The words "for all men" (of the commentary) are stated for the purpose of teaching that the eligibility is simple. This has already been explained.

Having explained the meaning of the word "the entire Veda", etc., the implication of the words "for all men", etc., is here indicated.

There is the wish on the part of every one thus: 'Let happiness be to me; let not misery come to me'. *Mokṣa* is pure unconditioned bliss. He who desires that is the eligible person in respect of knowledge. Therefore, the eligible person here is easily secured. In order to remind us of that, the commentary says, "for all men".

NTV—sukhaṁ me syāt duḥkhaṁ me mābhūt iti viṣaya-viśeṣā-'navacchinna-sukhamātre duḥkha-nivṛttimātre ca sarva-puruṣāṇām abhilāṣa darśanāt.

[1025b-1026a]

स्वर्गादिकाम्यपि यतो मुक्तिं कामयते न तु ॥ १०२५ ॥
मुक्तिं कामयमानोऽन्यत्कटाक्षेणापि वीक्षते ।

For, even he who desires heaven desires release; but he who desires release does not even cast so much as a side-glance at the other.

The pleasures of heaven are small as compared with the supreme bliss which is release. He who seeks release will never court them.

[1026b-1027a]

सर्वेषामपि च नृणामधिकारोऽनिवारितः ॥ १०२६ ॥
यतोऽतः सर्वतो नॄणामिति भाष्यकृदब्रवीत् ।

And, to no man may the eligibility be denied; therefore, the commentator said " for all men ".

When it is said that all are eligible for knowledge, what is meant is that no one is barred therefrom provided he is endowed with the fourfold means consisting of discrimination, etc.

[1027b-1028a]

शुक्लां गामानयेत्युक्ते कांचिद्गोकर्मिकां क्रियाम् ॥ १०२७ ॥
कुर्वाणमभिवीक्ष्याज्ञः कुरुते कारणानुमाम् ।

"When it is said 'Bring the white cow' a certain person performs the act having the cow as its object; an ignorant person seeing this infers the cause (of the action).

Next is commenced the explanation of the commentary beginning with the words, "in the matter of what is seen", and ending with the words "investigation of Scripture".

Here there is a *pūrvapakṣa.*

When the superior elder says, 'Bring the cow', the intermediate elder performs the appropriate act in relation to the cow. The child observes this and infers the cause of the intermediate elder's act.

[1028b-1029a]

ज्ञातं ध्रुवमनेनैतद्यद्गोकर्मकमीक्ष्यते ॥ १०२८ ॥
प्रागज्ञातस्य निर्वृत्तिर्न यतो वीक्ष्यते क्वचित् ।

"This has certainly been known by him—this which is seen as having cow for its object; for nowhere is it observed that one who does not know earlier does something."

This is how the child infers: The activity in question is caused by the cognition of what prompts, since it is a conscious activity.

AVS—śuklāṁ gām ānaya iti kaścid vadati, tad-vākya-śravaṇānantaraṁ śrotā pravartate, tataḥ goviṣayāṁ pravṛttiṁ dṛṣṭvā anuminoti.

[1029b-1030a]

यद्यर्थं कारकाधीनं दृष्ट्वा तत्कारणानुमा ॥ १०२९ ॥
प्रमाणान्तरगम्यत्वाल्लौकिकत्वं तदाऽऽपतेत् ।

If the cause is inferred by seeing the thing (viz. the activity of the hearer) which depends on the causal agent (*kāraka*), then since that (i.e. *niyoga*) is understood through some other means of valid knowledge, there is the contingence of its being empirical (*laukikatva*).

Is that which prompts something other than *niyoga*, or is it *niyoga* itself? It cannot be the first; for, if it is admitted that words have capacity to get related to other words, the view that all words have *niyoga* for purport will have to be given up.

As regards the second alternative, this is the defect: If on seeing the activity of the hearer that is generated by causal agents one were to infer *niyoga* as the prompter thereof, then *niyoga* would be on a par with pot, etc., ceasing to be that which is special to the Veda.

[1030b-1031a]

न चेत्कारकतन्त्रोऽर्थो ज्ञातस्यानुष्ठितिः कथम् ॥ १०३० ॥
न सिद्धो नापि चाभावः कारकापेक्ष ईक्ष्यते ।

If the thing does not depend on the causal agent, how can there be the performance of what has been known? Neither what has been established nor what is non-existent is observed to require a causal agent.

Moreover, *niyoga* which is the sense of *liṅ*, etc.,—is it not accomplished through causal agents, or is it accomplished? The first alternative is not possible. Although *niyoga* is known somehow through *liṅ*, etc., it cannot be accomplished through performance, and so the performance of the stem-sense (sacrifice) would be fruitless and futile. On the second alternative, viz. that *niyoga* is accomplished through causal agents, is it as existent, as non-existent, or as

both? It cannot be the first, for neither the existent nor the non-existent depends on causal agents. For example, the self which is existent is not caused, nor the human horn which is non-existent.

NTV says that we may so split the words of the first line that we may read *ajñātasya* instead of *jñātasya*. Then the meaning would be that the performance of *niyoga* does not take place because *niyoga* is unknown.

ajñātasya iti vā padacchedaḥ. dṛṣṭa-viṣaye ca iṣṭāniṣṭa-prāpti-parihāro-'pāya-jñānasyaiva pratyakṣānumānābhyāṁ siddhatvāt, niyogasyā 'siddhatvāt vyutpattyabhāvena abodhakatvāt nāgamānveṣaṇā ato 'nuṣṭhānaṁ tasya na sidhyet.

[1031b-1032a]

आरभ्ये कारकत्वे न बलात्प्रामाण्यमापतेत् ॥ १०३१ ॥
व्यङ्ग्ये तु कार्ये वेदस्य सिद्धेऽर्थे मानता भवेत् ।

If the *niyoga* were originated by Scripture, then Scripture would be causal agent and therefore would not be *per force* a *pramāṇa*; if the *kārya* were only manifested, then the Veda would be *pramāṇa* in respect of what is established already.

On the view that *niyoga* is existent, is *niyoga* originated by Scripture, or is it manifested? If it be the first, Scripture would be a causal agent, and not a *pramāṇa*. If it be the second, Scripture becomes *pramāṇa* in respect of what is already accomplished; for manifestation or revelation is possible only of what is already there.

AVS—na śabdārabhyo niyogaḥ kiṁtu vyaṅya iti cet tarhi siddhavastuni mātvaṁ vedasya bhavet.

[1032b-1033a]

वाक्यस्य च प्रमाणत्वं नाप्यभावैकगोचरम् ॥ १०३२ ॥

न चेदभावः कार्योऽर्थः सिद्धेऽर्थे मानता भवेत् ।

The validity of verbal testimony cannot have for its sphere what is non-existent; if the sense of the *kārya* were not non-existence, there would be validity in respect of what is already established.

If *niyoga* be non-existent, there is no question of Scripture being a *pramāṇa* in respect thereof; for knowledge is never *pramāṇa* in regard to what is non-existent. If *niyoga* be existent, as was shown above, Scripture would become *pramāṇa* in respect of what is already accomplished.

[1033b-1034a]

अथोभयात्मकं कार्यं सिद्धासिद्धस्वभावकम् ॥ १०३३ ॥

उक्तदोषद्वयासक्तिर्न च वस्त्वीदृशं क्वचित् ।

If the *kārya* be of the nature of both, the established and the non-established, both the aforesaid defects would result; nor is there anywhere such a thing.

If *niyoga* be both existent and non-existent, then the defects pointed out in both the alternatives would result. Moreover how can such a thing be which is existent as well as non-existent?

[1034b-1035a]

सिद्धस्य व्यञ्जकं मानं न मानं कारकं क्वचित् ॥ १०३४ ॥

चोदना मानकं चेत्तत्कथं कार्यं तदुच्यताम् ।

Pramāṇa is that which manifests what is already established; *pramāṇa* is never a causal agent; if injunction be *pramāṇa*, how can it be *kārya*? That must be explained.

Perception, etc., make known what is already accomplished. Such is the function of *pramāṇas*. If *niyoga* which is said to be *kārya* is revealed by Scripture, it must be an established entity, i. e. it cannot be *kārya*.

NTV—evaṁ liṅādi-yukta-vākya-pramāṇam api siddhārtha-bodhakaṁ pramāṇatvāt anyathā ukta-prakāreṇa kārye prāmāṇyāyogāt.

NKL—vidhi-vākyaṁ siddhe mānaṁ mānatvāt pratyakṣavat.

AVS—pratyakṣādi-mānam akārakaṁ vidyamāna-prakāśakaṁ ca dṛṣṭam. evaṁ yadi niyogo 'pi vidhi-vākya-pramāṇakaḥ tadā tasya kāryatvaṁ na siddhyati.

[1035b-1036a]

मतं विषयसंसिद्ध्या कार्यमित्यभिधीयते ॥ १०३५ ॥
यागसिद्धेः पुराऽसिद्धेः कथं चोदनया मितम् ।

If it be thought that by way of establishing the object (*viṣaya*) it is designated as *kārya*, then since it is not established prior to the establishment of the sacrifice, how can it be known through injunction?

Is *niyoga* accomplished only after the performance of the stem-sense (viz. sacrifice), or even earlier? If the first, then *niyoga* cannot be known from Scripture before the performance of the sacrifice. What is non-existent, like the human horn, cannot be known.

NKL—yāgānuṣṭhānātprāg asatve niyogasya nṛśṛṅgasyeva na veda-gamyatvam.

[1036b-1037a]

प्राक्प्रयोक्तव्यभिसंसिद्धौ किं फलं यागसिद्धितः ॥ १०३६ ॥
यागसिद्ध्याऽपि तत्सिद्धौ प्रयोज्यत्वं कुतो यजेः ।

If, even before the performance of the sacrifice, *niyoga* be established, then, of what use is the performance of the sacrifice? If *niyoga* is established through performance of the sacrifice, then, how can the sacrifice be such as to be performed (by *niyoga*)?

If *niyoga* is accomplished even before the performance of sacrifice, then since it is not achieved through sacrifice, the performance of sacrifice would be futile. It is not possible to accomplish what is already accomplished. So, where is the need for performing sacrifice?

NKL—siddhasya sādhyatvā-'yogāt niyogaprayuktānuṣṭhānavatvaṁ yāgasya hīyeta.

AVS—yāgānuṣṭhānaṁ niṣphalaṁ niyogāsādhakatvāt.....siddhasya siddhy ayogān niyogaprayuktaṁ yāgasyā 'nuṣṭheyatvaṁ na ghaṭata ity arthaḥ.

[1037b-1038a]

यागाद्यनुष्ठितेरस्य घटादेरिव चेन्मतः ॥ १०३७ ॥
उपकारो नियोगस्य कथं न घटतुल्यता ।

If the performance of sacrifice, etc., is to be regarded as an aid (in bringing about the *niyoga*) even as the operations of the potter are in relation to the pot, then how is there no similarity between *niyoga* and pot?

If the performance of sacrifice is said to be helpful in the accomplishment of *niyoga* even as the operations of the potter are in regard to the production of a pot, then *niyoga* would be an empirical phenomenon like the pot.

[1038b-1039a]

अपुमर्थे नियोगे च तात्पर्यं स्यात्तथा सति ॥ १०३८ ॥
प्रत्यर्थिनि पुमर्थे तत्सुधीभिर्गृह्यते कथम् ।

And if that were so, Scripture would have for purport the *niyoga* which is not a human goal; and when the human goal is inimical to it, how can the wise grasp it?

If *niyoga* be on a par with the pot, then it cannot be the human goal. And, if it is not the human goal, the wise would not seek it.

[1039b-1040a]

लिङादिश्रवणात्पुंसः कार्यं यत्प्रसमीक्ष्यते ॥ १०३९ ॥
उपकाराद्यपेक्षं तद्वक्तृकर्तोः प्रसिध्यति ।

The *kārya* which is looked forward to by the man who hears the potential mood (*liṅ*), etc., depends for its coming into being on some benefit (resulting) to the speaker or the doer.

When an injunction is heard, the hearer seeks to fulfil it in order to accomplish happiness either for himself or for the one who gave the injunction, or in order to avoid pain for either. If that were so, the sense of *liṅ*, etc., is the instrument to what is desired, and not *niyoga-kārya*.

[1040b-1042a]

न चेत्संभाव्यते कर्त्रा पुमर्थः कस्यचिद्विधेः ॥ १०४० ॥
आज्ञोक्तेरेव न तदा कश्चिज्जगति चेष्टते ।
आज्ञार्थमात्रसिद्ध्यर्थं न कश्चित्स्ववशो नरः ॥ १०४१ ॥
दुःखात्मके मनो धत्ते यागादौ चोदनावशात् ।

If from the injunction no human goal is understood to be accomplished by the agent, then in the world no one would be active merely because of the injunctive statement.

No man who has an independent will, for the mere sake of fulfilling the sense of the injunction, sets his mind to the difficult tasks like sacrifices by virtue of the injunction.

In all cases, the sense of *liṅ*, etc., is instrumentality to what is desired. When some one hears the command 'Bring the cow', if he does not understand that the execution of the command will result in an advantage either to himself or to the one who issued the command, he would not proceed to act. The sense of *liṅ*, etc., thus, is only the instrumentality to what is desired. This is true of both injunctions and prohibitions.

Even in the case of a servant obeying the orders of a king, etc., the obedience is for the sake of avoiding pain.

The performance of sacrifice involves an enormous amount of effort and labour. No one would voluntarily undertake to perform such tasks if there be no advantage. So, even in the Veda the sense of *liṅ*, etc., is instrumentality to what is desired.

NKL—prayojanam anuddiśya na mando 'pi pravartata iti nyāyāt.

[1042b-1043a]

पुमर्थमभिसंधाय यागादावथ चेष्टते ॥ १०४२ ॥
फलं प्रवर्तकं प्राप्त नियोगस्तथा सति ।

If for the sake of the human goal one is active in respect of sacrifice, etc., then the fruit which impels him to activity has come in and not *niyoga*.

If it is granted that one performs sacrifice only after knowing that it is the means to the accomplishment of what he desires, then it must be admitted that what prompts activity is the instrumentality to what is desired, and not *niyoga*.

AVS—tadā rāga eva pravartako na niyoga ity arthaḥ.

[1043b-1044a]

मन्त्रोक्तेरिव लोडादेः प्रवृत्तिरिति चेन्मतम् ॥ १०४३ ॥
प्रायश्चित्ती भवेन्नैव तत्पराधीनवृत्तितः ।

If activity as a consequence of the imperative mood (*loṭ*), etc., is thought to be like that which is due to incantations, then since one would be entirely governed by it in his actions, there would be no need for expiation.

If activity in obedience to a command be on a par with the activity of a person who is under a spell, then the agent would have no responsibility for his actions. Even if he transgresses, that would be no fault of his, and there would be no need for any expiation.

NTV — kiṁ mantravat puruṣecchām anapekṣya niyogaḥ puruṣaṁ pravartayati utā 'napekṣya uttaratra rāgasyaiva pravartakatvaṁ prāpnoti pūrvatra niyogātikramāt na doṣabhāk puruṣo niyoga-paratantratvāt.

[1044b-1045a]

प्रवर्तकत्वं मन्त्रस्य न प्रवर्त्यवशाद्यथा ॥ १०४४ ॥
स्वत एव न यागादेः कार्यसिद्धिस्तथा भवेत् ।

If it be said that *mantra* (incantation) causes activity not through the object to be set to act but of its own accord, then from sacrifice, etc., there will be no attainment of *kārya*.

If it is said that the incantation or spell prompts activity of its own accord, and that the prompted person is helpless, and if it be maintained that the Vedic command also functions in the same way, then it would be meaningless to talk of any accomplishment through sacrifice.

AVS—yathā mantra-prerito mantra-paratantraḥ pravartamāno yadi kathaṁcin mantram atikrāmati na kaścid doṣaḥ evam atrāpīty arthaḥ. .....yadi niyogātikramān na doṣaḥ tathāsati niyoga-viṣayaṁ yāgādikaṁ na ko'py anutiṣṭhed ato yāgāder na niyoga-siddhir iti.

[1045b-1046a]

कारकं वा क्रिया वा स्याद्यदि वा स्यात्क्रियाफलम् ॥ १०४५ ॥
तस्य लौकिकमासिद्धेर्लौकिकत्वं प्रसज्यते ।

Whether it is causal agent or activity or fruit of activity, there would be secular nature for *niyoga*, because it is established through secular *pramāṇas*.

Whether *niyoga* be a causal agent, or act, or the fruit thereof, since it is known through other *pramāṇas*, it would be a secular phenomenon, like a pot, which would mean that it is not something which is known from the Veda alone.

[1046b-1047a]

ऐकात्म्यवस्तुनिष्ठे तु यथोक्तन्यायवर्त्मना ॥ १०४६ ॥
न कश्चिदपि दोषः स्याद्बुचस्यास्मिन्मनागपि ।

As for the texts which have for purport the one self, there is not the slightest defect, as we have already explained through reasoning.

A similar contingency does not arise in the case of Brahman. We have already shown that the Upaniṣad texts such as 'That thou art' are *pramāṇa* for the Brahman-self, So, there is not even the least parity between *niyoga* and Brahman.

[1047b-1048a]

नेति नेत्यादिवाक्येभ्यो योऽर्थोऽनन्यानुभूतिगः ॥ १०४७ ॥
लौकिकत्वं कथं तस्य सर्वमेयातिलङ्घिनः ।

The sense which is understood from the texts like 'Not this, not this'[1], and which is not got through any other experience—how could it be secular, since it transcends all objects of knowledge ?

Brahman is not what is known through secular *pramāṇas*, because it is without any quality, as is taught by the negative texts of Scripture such as 'Not this, not this', and because it is self-luminous, as is declared in the text 'Consciousness is Brahman', etc.

[1] *BU*, II, iii, 6; III, ix, 26.

[1048b-1049a]

इत्युक्तमभिसंधाय दृष्टादिवचनं जगौ ॥ १०४८ ॥
लौकिकत्वप्रसिद्ध्यर्थं नियोगस्य घटादिवत् ।

Bearing in mind what has been stated above, the Commentator wrote the words 'the seen (*dṛṣṭa*)', etc., for establishing the secular nature of *niyoga*, as of pot.

The words of the commentary, "the seen", etc., show that Brahman alone is the purport of the Veda, not *niyoga*. *Niyoga* is secular like a pot, and is known through other *pramāṇas*.

[1049b-1050a]

आस्तां वेदान्तमानत्वं त्यक्तं तत्कामतस्तव ॥ १०४९ ॥
वस्तुन्युक्तेर्न चेन्मात्वं कर्मकाण्डेऽपि तद्भवेत् ।

Let alone the validity of the Vedānta which you have rejected at your pleasure; but if the Veda were not *pramāṇa* in respect of the self (*vastu*), the same fault will affect the ritual-section.

You do not admit that the Veda is *pramāṇa* in respect of Brahman-self on the ground that the self is an existent entity. But this prejudice of yours will result in the destruction of your own *siddhānta*. In order that *karma-kāṇḍa* may be meaningful, you must *per force* admit that the Veda teaches a self that survives death and gets related to another body, etc., and a heaven to which it can go through acquiring merit. The transmigrating self and heaven are existent entities. If the Veda can teach these, can it not teach Brahman?

NKL—tattvamādeḥ prāmāṇyaṁ tāvat tiṣṭhatu tad asmābhir api tvad-icchayā uktaṁ siddha-vastuni vedasya prāmāṇyaṁ nacet karma-vākyānām api prāmāṇyaṁ na syāt. dehāntara-saṁbandhy ātmano prāmāṇikasyā 'siddher ato bhaviṣyad-dehasaṁbandhy ātmani vākya-prāmāṇyo-'pagame tattvamāder api siddhe prāmāṇya-siddher ity arthaḥ.

AVS — tattvamādi-vākyaṁ pramāṇam ity etat tāvat tiṣṭhatu. siddhavastuni vedasya mātvaṁ naced iṣyate karma-vākyānām api na mātvam sidhyet. ataḥ karma-vākyānām mātvam icchatā siddha-vastuni bhaviṣyad-deha-saṁbandhiny ātmani svarga-devatādi-svarūpe ca vedasya mātvam abhyupagantarvam. ataḥ kārya eve 'ti niyamābhāvat vedāntānām api svārthe mātvaṁ bhavet.

[1050b-1051a]

भविष्यद्देहसंबन्धी वाक्यादात्मा न चेन्मितः ॥ १०५० ॥
मानान्तराच्च कः कुर्याददृष्टार्थाः क्रिया सुधीः ।

If the soul to be related to the future body is not known validly from the text or through some other *pramāṇa*, which wise man will perform the sacrifices which have unseen fruit?

If the transmigrating self were not known through Scripture and other *pramāṇas*, no one would perform the sacrifices. Thus the commentary says, "if not", etc. It is the transmigrating self that is the enjoyer of the fruit of sacrifices. In the absence of a knowledge of that, who would undertake to perform the sacrifices?

[1051b-1052a]

नापि सांख्यप्रमासिद्धमात्मानमवगच्छतः ॥ १०५१ ॥
देहाद्यनभिसंबन्धात्प्रवृत्तिः स्यात्क्रियास्विह ।

Nor can there be activity in respect of rites, here, on the part of those who understand the self as established by the *pramāṇa* given by the Sāṅkhyas, for that self is not related to the body, etc.

The self that is established through inference by the Sāṅkhyas is of no use in the performance of ritual; for, that self is without activity and unrelated to a body.

[1052b-1053a]

कर्मकाण्डेऽधिकार्यस्मिन्यादृक्संभाव्यतेऽञ्जसा ॥ १०५२ ॥

तादृक्संप्रतिपत्त्यर्थं न चासतीति भण्यते ।

The commentator says, "Nor if it were not so", for the purpose of making us understand quickly the nature of the eligibility for the ritual-section.

The words of the commentary which indicate the nature of the eligibility for the ritual-section are now explained.

[1053b-1054a]

कर्मभ्यः फलमिच्छद्भिरदृष्टं दृष्टमेव वा ॥ १०५३ ॥

देहावस्थान्तरावेशे प्रमाणं वाच्यमात्मनः ।

Those who desire fruits, seen or unseen, from rites must state the evidence for the self entering into a different state of the body.

Although the self is self-established, the *pramāṇa* should be stated for its taking on another body after leaving off the present one. Otherwise the transmigrating self will not be established. Without that there would be no agent and enjoyer for the Vedic rites.

[1054b-1055a]

कथं च तस्य कर्तृत्वं व्यापित्वान्निष्क्रियत्वतः ॥ १०५४ ॥

न चाकर्तुः फलं गौण्या वृत्त्या चेत्सुतरां न तत् ।

And how can there be agency for it, since it is all-pervading and actionless? Nor can there be fruit for the non-agent; figuratively also it cannot be.

The self that is established through argument by the Vaiśeṣikas is of no use here; for that self, being all-pervading and without action, cannot be the agent of sacrifices.

Nor may it be said that although the self is not an agent, it is the enjoyer, as in the Sāṅkhya system; for the fruit can accrue only to the one who is prompted to act by Scripture. Moreover, the self is not the enjoyer in the principal sense of the term; for its true nature is to be unattached and indifferent. If the self is not the enjoyer in the principal sense, it cannot be the enjoyer in the figurative sense also.

[1055b-1056a]

मुख्यकर्तृत्वपक्षेऽपि ह्यनिर्मोक्षः प्रसज्यते ॥ १०५५ ॥

मानेन नाश्यतेऽज्ञानं ज्ञापकं हि न कारकम् ।

On the view that agency is principal, there is the contingence of non-release. Through *pramāṇa* ignorance is destroyed; *pramāṇa* is what makes known, and not what causes one to act.

If the enjoyership is in the principal sense, then agency also must be for the self in the principal sense. If that is so, then there can be no release.

Nor may it be said that, although agency is real, it is removed through *pramāṇa*, for *pramāṇa* can never remove what is real; it can only reveal the real.

[1056b-1057a]

देहान्तराभिसंबन्धो भावित्वान्नाक्षगोचरः ॥ १०५६ ॥

लिङ्गसादृश्यविरहान्नानुमा नोपमा तथा ।

Relation to another body, because it belongs to the future, is not an object of perception; nor of inference and analogy, because there are no *probans* and similarity.

Perception, inference, and analogy cannot serve as *pramāṇas* in respect of the self that is related to a future body.

[1057b-1058a]

शब्दादात्मनि संसिद्धे पूर्वोक्तन्यायतो न च ॥ १०५७ ॥
श्रुतार्थापत्तिरप्यत्र नाभावो मानभावतः ।

When the self is established from Scripture, it is not established through the aforesaid reasoning; there is not even presumption from what is heard here; nor non-cognition, since there is cognition.

Presumption from what is seen (*dṛṣṭārthāpatti*) is not the evidence; nor presumption from what is heard (*śrutārthāpatti*). Nothing is seen that is unintelligible without presuming the self. And there is no unintelligibility either in what is heard from Scripture in regard to this matter.

As there is the *pramāṇa* of Scripture in respect of the self, there is no scope for non-cognition too to function as *pramāṇa*.

[1058b-1059a]

न चाहंप्रत्ययात्सिद्धिरात्मनः स्यात्कदाचन ॥ १०५८ ॥
बोधानुभवसंवित्तिवित्तयो ह्यात्मवाचिनः ।

Nor is even the self established through the cognition 'I', for the words expressive of the self are awareness, experience, consciousness, knowledge.

As the self is self-luminous, it is not grasped through the cognition 'I' also.

NTV — ātma-pratipādaka-śabda-buddhiṣu vipratipatti-darśanān nāhaṁ-pratyaya-gamya ātme 'ty arthaḥ.

AVS—svayaṁprakāśatvād ātmano nāhaṁ-pratyaya-gamya ātmā.... ātma-prasādād ahaṁ-pratyaya-siddheś ca nāhaṁpratyayād ātma-siddhiḥ.

[1059b-1060a]

यस्यानुभवसिद्ध्यैव सिद्धिः स्याद्घटसिद्धिवत् ॥ १०५९ ॥
ततोऽहंप्रत्ययात्सिद्धिमीक्षतेऽनुभवः कथम् ।

That whose establishment, like the establishment of pot, is through the establishment of experience—how from that cognition 'I' can experience expect its own accomplishment ?

Moreover, the cognition 'I' cannot grasp the self, because it is grasped by that, like the cognition of pot. Just as the pot-cognition which is a psychosis requires to be established by experience which is the self, so does the cognition 'I' require the self for its establishment. How can that establish the self?

NKL—aham-pratyayo nātmasādhako dṛśyatvāt ghaṭavat.

[1060b-1061a]

मानादनुभवः सिद्धो जडः स्याद्घटवन्न चेत् ॥ १०६० ॥
नैरपेक्ष्यं चिदात्मत्वे स्याच्चान्योन्यसमाश्रयः ।

If experience is established through *pramāṇa*, it would be inert like pot; if not (inert), it will be independent, and the self is intelligence; also there would be reciprocal dependence.

If the 'I' cognition were to apprehend the self, the self would become inert like pot. If the self were not inert—as it is not inert—it must be admitted that it is pure consciousness, not requiring the 'I' cognition for its apprehension. And, if the self which is pure consciousness were to be apprehended by the 'I' cognition, there would be reciprocal dependence as between the two.

[1061b-1062a]

आत्मनोऽहंधियः सिद्धिरात्मसिद्धिरहंमतेः ॥ १०६१ ॥
अन्योन्याश्रयतैवं स्यादहंबुद्ध्यात्मनोर्ध्रुवम् ।

Through the self the establishment of the cognition 'I', and through the cognition 'I' the establishment of the self—thus there would surely be reciprocal dependence as between the cognition 'I' and the self.

How there would be reciprocal dependence is explained.

[1062b-1063a]

अहंधीरात्मनः कार्यं कारणेनाऽऽप्यते सदा ॥ १०६२ ॥
तया तस्य कथं व्याप्तिरव्याप्तौ मेयता कथम् ।

The cognition 'I' is an effect of the self; and it is always accomplished through the cause. How can by that (cognition 'I') the self be pervaded? If it is not so pervaded, how can the self be the object of knowledge?

The 'I' cognition is not what apprehends the self, as it is an effect of the latter, like desire.

The self is not what is apprehended by the 'I' cognition, since it illumines that; whatever illumines another is not illumined by that, even as the lamp which illumines a pot is not illumined thereby.

As the 'I' cognition does not prevade the self, the self cannot be the content thereof.

NTV—saṁvid-balād evā 'haṁ-pratyayasya sadbhāva eṣṭavyaḥ, saṁvid evā 'smākam ātmā, tasyā api saṁvidaḥ sad-bhāvo 'haṁ-pratyayād eva cet sādhyate tadā 'haṁ-pratyayā-'tmano vyāpya-vyāptṛtva-lakṣaṇa-viruddhārtha-pratipatti-darśanād vādinām iti.

NKL—ahaṁ-pratyayo nātmagrāhakaḥ tat-kāryatvāt sukhādivat..... ātmā nāhaṁ-pratyaya-vyāpyas tad-vyāpakatvād yo yad-vyāpako nāsau tad-vyāpyo yathā paṭa-vyāpakas tantur na tad-vyāpyaḥ.

[1063b-1064a]

क्रियाकाले गुणीभावात्क्रियासिद्धावसंभवात् ॥ १०६३ ॥

कर्तुः प्रमेयता न स्यादहंबुद्ध्या कथंचन ।

The agent is by no means the object known through the cognition 'I', for at the time of action he is the attribute, and when there is no action he is not established.

Moreover, is the self apprehended as the agent by the activity which is the 'I' cognition? If so, is it at the time of the act, or before, or after? It cannot be at the time of the act; for at that time the agent-self is subsidiary to the act, and therefore cannot be the object of the act. Nor is the self as agent apprehended either before or after; for either before or after there is no act, and in the absence of the act there cannot be the agent. Also, if the agent were to be the object of the act which is the 'I' cognition, it might as well be its own object which is absurd.

[1064b-1065a]

संविद्रूपे प्रमेये च संविदन्या फलं भवेत् ॥ १०६४ ॥

न च संविद्द्वयाभासो नानुमेयं फलं क्वचित् ।

If consciousness be the object of knowledge, there would be another consciousness as the fruit; but there cannot be the appearance of two consciousnesses; nor is the fruit to be inferred by any means.

If the self which is of the nature of consciousness be the object of knowledge, then another consciousness should be admitted as the fruit of knowledge. But this is not what is experienced. In the consciousness-self there is not experienced another consciousness. Nor may it be said that although the other consciousness is not experienced, it is to be inferred; for in regard to the unconditioned self-luminous conciousness there can be no inference.

[1065b-1066a]

घटाद्याकारसंविद्वच्छुद्धायामपि संविदि ॥ १०६५ ॥
संविद्विशिष्टा संवित्स्यान्न चासावात्मनीक्ष्यते ।

As in the case of the consciousness of the form of pot, etc., even in the case of pure consciousness there would be consciousness qualified by consciousness; but this is not observed in the self.

The fruit-consciousness is intelligible in the case of inert objects like pot, but not in regard to pure consciousness which is the self.

[1066b-1067a]

प्रमातरि च मेये स्यात्फलं कस्येति भण्यताम् ॥ १०६६ ॥
न मातुस्तस्य मेयत्वान्नापि मेये फलं क्वचित् ।

And if the cognizer is the object of knowledge, it is to be stated, of whom is the fruit? It cannot be of the cognizer for he is the object of knowledge; nor is there fruit anyway in the object of knowledge.

If the cognizer is the object of cognition, then for whom is the fruit which is cognition? It cannot be for the cognizer because the cognizer, you say, is the object of cognition. Nor may it be said that the fruit may belong to the cognizer as the object, even as it does to objects such as pot; for, we ask, what is this fruit—is it luminous or non-luminous? If it is luminous, it cannot belong to the non-luminous pot, etc.; if it is non-luminous, it cannot illumine pot, etc.

[1067b-1068a]

जडत्वात्तत्र मेयस्य फलं मातरि चेन्मतम् ॥ १०६७ ॥
मेयतो जडताऽत्रापि संविच्चेन्न प्रमाणजा ।

If it be thought that since pot, etc., which are objects of knowledge are inert, the fruit is in the cognizer, then since the cognizer is the object here, there would be inertness; if there is consciousness, then, it would not be the result of *pramāṇa*.

If it be said that the fruit is not in pot, etc., because they are inert, but in the cognizer, because there is no inertness there, we reply: if the cognizer is the object of knowledge, inertness would result there also. If the self is admitted to be of the nature of consciousness, then it cannot be the result of a *pramāṇa*.

AVS—saṁvid-rūpaśced ātmā na pramāṇajā saṁvid-ātmani saṁvid-dvayādarśanād ity arthaḥ.

[1068b-1069a]

धर्मत्वेनाप्यहंबुद्धेर्न भेदो धर्मिणाऽऽत्मना ॥ १०६८ ॥
रूपं द्रव्यात्मनो नान्यद्रसादेस्तद्विभिद्यते ।

Even as an attribute the cognition 'I' has no difference from the substance, the self; colour is not different from the substance, though it differs from taste, etc.

If the cognition 'I' be considered to be an attribute of the self, then there can be no difference between the two. Substance and attribute are not different from each other, as, for instance, a cow and a horse are. Colour cannot be different from the coloured substance. If colour appears as distinct, it is with reference to another attribute or another substance.

Thus if the 'I' cognition be an attribute of the self, then the two would be non-different, and therefore the self cannot be the object with reference to that cognition. If the two be different, then there cannot be the relation of attribute and substance as between them.

NTV—na hy aham-buddheḥ pramātuś ca bhedo 'sti rūpasyeva dravyāt, ataś caikasya jñāna-jñeya-rūpatvaṁ virudhyata ity arthaḥ.

[1069b-1070a]

द्रव्यादि चाऽऽत्मनो रूपं प्रमेयं यदुदीरितम् ॥ १०६९ ॥
घटवत्तदहंबुद्धेः प्रत्यग्वृत्तेर्न गोचरः ।

Substance, etc., which are stated to be the nature of the self and to be the objects of knowledge,—they are like pot, and are not the sphere of the cognition 'I' which has for its scope the inner self.

If it be said that the self as substance is the object of knowledge, and as consciousness is the cognizer, we reply: the self which as substance is regarded as the object of knowledge cannot, then, be the sphere of the 'I' cognition, because the sphere of this cognition is the inner self.

NTV—yadyat prameya-rūpaṁ tasya tasye 'daṁ-buddhi-gocaratva-niyamād dravya-rūpasyāpī 'daṁ-buddhi-gocaratvenā 'nātmatvam eve 'ti bhāvaḥ.

[1070b-1071a]

अस्मत्प्रत्ययसंभिन्नं प्रत्यक्कर्तरि वेदनम् ॥ १०७० ॥
ज्ञानस्य यदुपन्यस्तं विशेषस्तत्र नेक्ष्यते ।

The apprehension, in which the cognition 'I' is mixed up, of the inner agent by knowledge as taught by you is not different (from the Bauddha position).

You reject the Bauddha view of momentary cognitions on the ground that one and the same cognition cannot be both apprehender and apprehended. But that defect would result for you also, if you were to hold that the self is of the nature of both apprehended and apprehender and that it is apprehended by the 'I' cognition.

AVS—nahi gami-kartā gami-kriyā-viṣayaḥ, ato bauddha-pakṣāt svap[illegible]akṣasya viśeṣam abhyupagacchatā nāhaṁpratyaya-grāhya ātme 'ty upaganta[illegible]vyam.

[1071b-1072a]

ज्ञानबोधेन नैवाऽऽत्मा मितो नाप्यात्मसंविदा ॥ १०७१ ॥
ज्ञानं न च द्वयं भे[illegible]दादभेदेऽनुभवः स्वतः ।

The self is not known by the awareness of knowledge, nor knowledge by the awareness of the self; nor is knowledge twofold, for there would be difference; if there is non-difference, experience is self-established.

By the manifestation of the knowledge-element, the self, the substance-element is not manifested, since the two are different. If the self were manifested by the manifestation of the knowledge-

element, then the two would be non-different. Nor is the knowledge-element made manifest by the manifestation of the self, for the same reason. Since the two elements are differently manifested, it must be admitted that the twofold self is not established through the 'I' cognition.

If you agree that there are not two elements and that the self is one, then you must necessarily accept the view that the self which is of the nature of experience is self-established.

NTV—dravya-rūpa ātmeti naiyāyikādayaḥ, bodha-rūpa ātmeti vedāntinaḥ, dravya-bodha-rūpa ātmeti bhaṭṭamatānusāriṇaḥ, itthaṁ vādi-vipratipatti-darśanāt nāhaṁ-pratyaya-vedya ātmeti, tasmād dravya-rūpa eva vā bodha-rūpa eva vā ātmā, na dravya-bodha-rūpaḥ, tasmān mām ahaṁ jānāmī 'ti vikalpa-mātram.

[1072b-1073a]

किं प्रमाणमहंरूपमुताऽऽत्मैवेति कथ्यताम् ॥ १०७२ ॥

प्रत्यक्षत्वान्न तन्मानं नाऽऽत्मा स्वार्थजडत्वतः ।

This must be stated: Is the cognition 'I' the *pramāṇa* or is it even the self? It (the 'I' cognition) is not the *pramāṇa*, because it is directly perceived; nor the self, because of the difference between being its own end and being inert.

You hold that the self is cognized through the 'I' cognition. What is this 'I' cognition—is it a *pramāṇa*, or is it the self itself? It cannot be a *pramāṇa*, for it is directly apprehended like desire, etc., and *pramāṇa*, according to you, is what is inferred. Nor is the 'I' cognition the self, for it is other-dependent and inert whereas the self is independent and non-inert.

NTV — natāvat pramāṇatvam ahaṁrūpasya ghaṭate icchādivat aparokṣatvāt. na hi pramāṇam aparokṣam icchanti nityānumeyatvā 'bhyupagamāt. nāpy ātmatvam ahaṁ-rūpasya parārthatvāt jaḍatvāc ca.

[1073b-1074a]

न चाप्यात्मन्यविज्ञातेऽहंबुद्धेः सिद्धता तव ॥ १०७३ ॥

येनाऽऽत्मा स्यादहंबुद्धेरनुमेया हि सा स्थिता ।

When the self is not known the cognition 'I' is not established for you; the self is not established through the cognition 'I' which is not itself known; that (cognition 'I') is established as what is inferred.

The 'I' cognition cannot be what establishes the self, for in the absence of the manifestation of the self, it itself is not established. And, if you still insist that the 'I' cognition establishes the self, there would result the defect of reciprocal dependence. The 'I' cognition, according to you, is what is inferred on the strength of the *probans*, the manifestation of the self. This would mean that there is the 'I' cognition when the self is known; and at the same time if you hold that the 'I' cognition manifests the self, there would be reciprocal dependence.

[1074b-1075a]

निरंशस्य न चाप्यंशकल्पनाऽप्युपपद्यते ॥ १०७४ ॥

स्वात्मतन्त्रे च विषये मानबोधः सदा भवेत् ।

And, it is not proper to assume difference of parts in what is partless; if the cognition 'I' be the object dependent on the self, there would be knowledge through *pramāṇa* always.

Admitting for the sake of argument that there is distinction of elements in the self, we showed that the 'I' cognition cannot be that which establishes the self. But the truth is that there is no distinction in the self. Twofoldness is not seen in the self; nor is there any need to assume such a distinction. Scripture declares that the self is without parts.

It is not proper to say that the self alone is the cause of the 'I' cognition; for if that be so, there should always be the 'I' cognition, which is not the case. In sleep, for instance, there is not the 'I' cognition.

NKL — niṣkalaṁ niṣkriyaṁ śāntam ityādi śruti-virodhāc ca nātmano rūpadvayam.

AVS—ātmana evāhaṁ-pratyaya-kāraṇatve ahaṁ-pratyayasya sadā-bhāva-prasaṅgāt.

[1075b-1076a]

अज्ञातत्वं विना मानं नाहंप्रत्यय आत्मनः ॥ १०७५ ॥
अज्ञातत्वमतो वाच्यमात्मनोऽत्र घटादिवत् ।

The cognition 'I' cannot be the *pramāṇa* in respect of the self without its being unknown; therefore as for pot, etc., unknownness must be predicated of the self.

Without recognizing unknownness in respect of the self which is the cognizer, it is not possible to show that the 'I' cognition is *pramāṇa* for the self. In order that *pramāṇa* may function in the case of the self, it must be admitted, therefore, that the self is unknown. Is this unknownness self-established, or established through some other? It cannot be the first, for that would be a self-contradiction. If it be the second, is the unknownness established through *pramāṇa*, or through the cognizer, or through the eternal experience? The unknownness cannot be established through *pramāṇa*, for that would

involve infinite regress, and also that would mean that no *pramāṇa* could remove the unknownness. Nor can the cognizer establish the unknownness, for the cognizer which is an object of knowledge, like pot, cannot establish anything.

[1076b-1077a]

तस्याप्यनुभवात्सिद्धिर्यद्युच्येत घटादिवत् ॥ १०७६ ॥

सिद्ध आत्मा पृथज्ज्ञातुर्नो चेन्माता न सिध्यति ।

If it be said that the establishment of even that is by experience, as of pot, etc., then the self is established to be different from the cognizer; if not, the cognizer is not established.

If the third alternative, viz. that the unkownness of the cognizer is established through the eternal experience is accepted, then it must be admitted that the self which is the eternal experience is different from the cognizer. That being so, even if the cognizer be apprehended through the 'I' cognition, it does not follow that the self is so apprehended.

And, if the witness-self is not recognized as that which establishes the unknownness of the cognizer, there would be no functioning of *pramāṇa* in respect thereto, and the cognizer would not be established.

NTV—ātmani nāhaṁpratyayaḥ pramāṇaṁ kiṁtu yeyaṁ prete ityādyā śrutir eva pramāṇam ity arthaḥ.

[1077b-1078a]

प्रमाणसंप्लवोऽप्युक्तो दूरादेव निवर्तितः ॥ १०७७ ॥

अन्यत्रापि हि मानानां नैव संप्लव इष्यते ।

As for the cumulation of *pramāṇas* (being evidence for establishing the self), that has been removed far away; even elsewhere (in the view of the logician) the cumulation of *pramāṇas* is never admitted.

So far, the view of the Bhāṭṭas that the self is apprehended through the 'I' cognition was examined and rejected; now, the Prābhākara view that the cognition of all objects is *pramāṇa* for the self is considered.

When it has been shown that even the 'I' cognition is not *pramāṇa* for the self, it goes without saying that the cognition of sound, etc., cannot establish the self.

The Naiyāyika contends that the self is not known exclusively through Scripture, as perception, inference, and Scripture are equally *pramāṇas*. But even according to the Naiyāyika, there is no cumulation of these *pramāṇas*. If, as shown already, the self is not the object of the 'I' cognition, how can it become the object of inference, etc.?

[1078b-1079a]

अज्ञातावगमे यद्वत्प्रमातर्यर्पितं फलम् ॥ १०७८ ॥

न मेये पूर्वमानेन तद्वन्मानान्तरैरपि ।

Just as the earlier *pramāṇa*, in knowing the unknown, offers the fruit to the cognizer, and not in the object of knowledge, even so should be the case with the other *pramāṇas*.

How is there the cumulation of the *pramāṇas*? Is it because each subsequent *pramāṇa* causes the fruit, viz., knowledge, in the same object? Or, is it because the knowledge so caused is for the same cognizer?

The first alternative is not possible; for the object is inert, and knowledge cannot be caused in it. So, the *pramāṇas* in sequence bring in knowledge only in the cognizer.

AVS—meyāśritaṁ yadi phalaṁ tadā saṁplavaḥ śakyetāpi mātrāśrayaṁ jñāna-phalam atha śuddhe vastuni pūrvamānavad uttara-mānānāṁ praveśān na saṁplava iti.

[1079b-1080a]

अतोऽनधिगतावेशात्सर्वेषां संप्लवः कुतः ॥ १०७९ ॥

मान्तरैरवबुद्धेऽपि ज्ञातेऽप्यज्ञाततोऽन्यतः ।

Thus, since the other *pramāṇas* relate to the uncognized, how can there be the cumulation of all *pramāṇas*? Even if it be known through other *pramāṇas* it would be other than that which was unknown and then known (by the previous *pramāṇas*).

Just as the earlier *pramāṇa* makes known what is unknown, the later *pramāṇas* too should do likewise. How then can there be the cumulation of *pramāṇas*?

Nor is there such cumulation because the knowledge caused is for the same cognizer; because the content of each *pramāṇa* being different, there is nothing like all the *pramāṇas* combining to produce knowledge.

[1080b-1081a]

अथाप्यवगमो मेये तथाऽपि स्यान्न संप्लवः ॥ १०८० ॥

पूर्वोऽनधिगते वृत्तः प्रत्ययोऽधिगते परः ।

Even supposing the object is understood (by these *pramāṇas*), there will be no cumulation; the earlier

cognition took place in regard to the uncognized, the later in regard to the cognized.

Even if the fruit be admitted to occur in the object of knowledge, there is no cumulation of *pramāṇas;* for while the first *pramāṇa* makes known what is unknown, the subsequent *pramāṇas* relate to what is already known.

[1081b-1082a]

पूर्वेण निश्चिते चेत्स्यान्नोत्तरस्य प्रमाणता ॥ १०८१ ॥
तथा संदेह एकस्मादन्यस्माद्धि विनिश्चयः ।

If the object has been determined by the earlier, there will be no validity for the later; if from the one there is re-statement, then from the other there is certitude.

If the object has been ascertained through the earlier *pramāṇa*, the later *pramāṇas* cannot be *pramāṇas;* they can only serve as restatements. Hence also there is no cumulation.

[1082b-1083a]

निःसामान्यविशेषेषु नातः संप्लव इष्यते ॥ १०८२ ॥
यथाऽन्यत्र तथेहापि वेदान्तेष्वभ्युपेयताम् ।

Therefore, in what are devoid of generality and particularity, cumulation is not admitted; as elsewhere so here also, in the case of the *Vedāntas*, let it be admitted.

If even in the case of objects that have generality and particularity the cumulation of *pramāṇas* is not possible, how is that possible in the case of the souls which have no distinctions?

It may be said that since cumulation is possible in respect of Brahman-Ātman, the Upaniṣads are not the only *pramāṇa*. But this is not sound. If there can be no cumulation in respect of objects and souls, it goes without saying that that is not possible in the case of Brahman-Ātman. Thus it is settled that the Vedānta texts alone are *pramāṇa* here.

[1083b-1084a]

यतो मानानि सिध्यन्ति जाग्रदादिलयं तथा ॥ १०८३ ॥

भावाभावविभागश्च स ब्रह्मास्मीति बोध्यते ।

It is taught : 'I am that Brahman' from which result the *pramāṇas*, as also the three states, waking, etc., and the distinction of being and non-being.

Brahman becomes the content of other *pramāṇas* through adjuncts. The pure Brahman, however, is known through Vedānta alone.

Perception, etc., are inert, and are not self-established. They shine by virtue of the Brahman-self. How can the self be their content? Surely, colour, etc., which shine by the light of the lamp cannot make the lamp shine.

It may be asked: how can the inner self which is endowed with the states of experience, waking, etc., be identical with Brahman? The reply is: the inner self is the witness of those states, and is not, therefore, endowed with them.

Objection: How can there be identity between the dual and the non-dual? Reply: Duality is illusory; therefore, the non-dual reality is not affected thereby.

Restating the pure self which is the sense of the word 'thou', the text 'I am Brahman' declares that the same is the sense of Brahman.

NKL—avasthātrayādi-sākṣitvād ātmanaḥ sad-brahmatvam upapannam ity arthaḥ.

[1084b-1086a]

यतोऽसिद्धानि सिध्यन्ति भावाभावौ यदाश्रयौ ॥ १०८४ ॥
योऽनन्यार्थो यदर्थं च सर्वं योऽनन्यदृक्सदा ।
प्रमेयादित्रयं यस्मात्परस्परविलक्षणम् ॥ १०८५ ॥
आत्मानं लभते सत्यः सोऽध्यक्षोऽत्राभ्युपेयताम् ।

That whence what are non-established are established, whereon are grounded being and non-being, which is not for the sake of anything else, and for the sake of which all is—the non-different ever-seer; whence the three, object of cognition, etc., which are mutually distinct, attain their nature—let that true witness-self be admitted.

Having stated the sense of the text 'That thou art' by explaining the meaning of the term 'thou', the same is taught by expounding the meaning of 'that'.

The supreme Self is that by whose grace the inert things are established; it is that wherein the existents and non-existence stay; it is that which, Scripture declares, is of the nature of happiness; it is that which eternally shines without depending on any causal factors. With that supreme Self, the witness is identical. This is the meaning of the text.

The witness is that by virtue of which are established the mutually distinct cognizer, etc., agent, etc., and enjoyer, etc.; it is that which does not depend on anything else for its own existence; it is the unsublated immutable reality which is of the nature of pure consciousness: this witness it is not possible to deny, for it is most immediate.

NKL—dehādīni jaḍāni yataḥ sidhyanti ajaḍātmavad ābhāsante pramātrādīnāṁ bhāvābhāvau ca yadāśrayau yadadhīnau sidhyataḥ yo 'nanyārthaḥ sarvaṁ ca yadartham iti sukha-lakṣaṇa-lakṣitatvena sukha-rūpo ya ātmā sa brahmeti tattvamādi-vākyena bodhyata ity arthaḥ.

AVS—yat-prasādād akhila-vastu sphuratīva tasya sākṣiṇaḥ kūṭas-thasya nityasiddha-nirviśeṣa-niratiśayānanda-brahmaṇaikatvaṁ bodhyate tattvamādinā.

[1086b-1087a]

असंकुचितचित्पद्मः प्राज्ञे स्वप्नप्रबोधवत् ॥ १०८६ ॥

तथा प्रफुल्लबोधाब्जः प्राज्ञवत्स्वप्नबोधयोः ।

As in dreams and waking, so in sleep there is the unclosed lotus of intelligence; likewise, as in sleep, so in dream and waking there is the lotus of knowledge in full bloom.

The witness-intelligence is never absent; it ever shines.

NTV—kūṭasthānubhavasya nirākaraṇaṁ na saṁbhavati tasyāpi nirākaraṇasyā 'nubhavād ity arthaḥ.

[1087b-1088a]

साक्ष्यसंबन्धतः साक्षी न स्वतः साक्षिताऽऽत्मनः ॥ १०८७ ॥

प्रत्यङ्मात्रैकदृष्टित्वाद्धियां वाचामगोचरः ।

It is the witness in relation to the seen; for the self there is no inherent witness-nature. Because it is of the nature of pure inner consciousness, it is not the sphere of mind and speech.

The self is said to be the witness only in relation to the objects. In itself there is not for it the witness-nature too. The witnes-nature

which is a product of nescience cannot destroy the pure nature of the self which is distinctionless. The self is beyond the reach of speech and mind.

[1088b-1089a]

अस्मत्पक्षे हि कर्तव्यमविद्यामात्रकल्पितम् ॥ १०८८ ॥
तदभावान्न संसारो भूतो भावी न वर्तते ।

In our view, agency is fabricated by nescience; in its absence there is no transmigration, in the past, in the future, or in the present.

Agency, etc., are not real: they also are the products of nescience. When nescience which is the basis of all projections is destroyed through knowledge, there is no bondage at any time.

NTV—ajñānasya jñānān nivṛttau tat-kāryatvāt saṁsāropi nivartata ity arthaḥ.

[1089b-1090a]

स्वाभाविक्यप्यविद्येयमनुभूत्याऽवभासिता ॥ १०८९ ॥
तमः सूर्योदयेनेव ज्ञानेनोत्कृत्य नाश्यते ।

Though natural and manifested by experience, this nescience is destroyed, root and branch, by knowledge, as darkness at sun-rise.

Nescience is removed completely by knowledge.

NKL—brahmājñānaṁ jñāna-nivartyam ajñānatvāt śukty-ajñānavat.

[1090b-1091a]

अनादिकालमज्ञानं ज्ञानेनाऽऽदिमता क्षणात् ॥ १०९० ॥
दृश्यते नाश्यमानं हि न चास्याऽऽवृत्तिरीक्ष्यते ।

The beginningless ignorance is seen to be destroyed in a moment by knowledge which has a beginning; and of this (knowledge) repetition is not required.

Knowledge destroys nescience without residue; there is no need for repetition of knowledge.

[1091b-1092a]

एवंभूतोऽप्ययं प्रत्यक्स्वात्मानुभवसंश्रयात् ॥ १०९१ ॥
व्युत्पत्तेः प्रागविज्ञातः सर्वाज्ञानादिसाक्ष्यपि ।

Though this inner self is of such nature and is the witness of all knowledge, prior to the understanding based on self-experience it is unknown.

Although the self which is the witness of all cognitions is self-luminous, it is not known through self-experience prior to the rise of true knowledge; therefore, the functioning of *pramāṇa* in respect thereof is intelligible.

[1092b-1093a]

तत्त्वमस्यादितस्तस्मादागमादेव नान्यतः ॥ १०९२ ॥
ऐकात्म्यवस्तुनः साक्षाद्व्युत्पत्तिरविचालिनी ।

Therefore, from the Scripture, 'That thou art,' etc., alone, and from nowhere else, is there the unwavering direct knowledge of the reality, the one self.

It is only the Vedāntic texts, 'That thou art', etc., that are *pramāṇa* in respect of the self. In regard to what is without adjuncts viz. the self, perception, etc., cannot serve as *pramāṇas*. The immediate knowledge that results from the Vedāntic texts destroys all bondage along with its cause and yields the fruit of non-return to *saṁsāra*.

NKL — yasmāt tattvamādi-vākya-janya-jñānāt prāg ajñātatvaṁ tasmād aupaniṣadatvaṁ siddham.

[1093b-1094a]

तस्यास्य कर्मकाण्डेन सम्बन्ध इति यः पुरा ॥ १०९३ ॥
प्रश्नस्तन्निर्णयार्थाय सर्वथेत्यादिरुत्तरः ।

The previous question 'Of that this is the relation to the ritual section',—for the sake of settling that the reply is stated in 'By all means,' etc.

The commentary thus explains the relation between the two sections of the Veda: through the performance of the Vedic duties one gets one's mind purified and develops a sense of detachment, etc., which pave the way for the rise of knowledge.

AVS—karmataḥ śuddha-satvasya vairāgyādi-paramparayā jñānot-pattiḥ sambandhaḥ.

[1094b-1095a]

ननु सिद्धे यथोक्तार्थे नाऽऽरम्भे हेतुरीक्ष्यते ॥ १०९४ ॥
कृत्स्नप्रयोजनावाप्तेः पूर्वोक्तैरेव कर्मभिः ।

"Now, since the object (goal) has been accomplished as stated above, there is no reason for commencing (the Vedānta); for by the aforesaid rituals the entire fruit has been obtained."

Pūrvapakṣa—If the *karma-kāṇḍa* teaches the means to the human goal, where is the need to commence the *jñāna-kāṇḍa*? As the goal in its completeness can be gained by the performance of the duties enjoined in the *karma-kāṇḍa* the Vedānta is of no use whatsoever.

[1095b-1096a]

नैतदेवं सुखेप्साया जिहासायाश्च दुःखतः ॥ १०९५ ॥

निदानस्यानिषिद्धत्वात्पूर्वोक्तैः कर्मभिः पुरा ।

It is not so; for the cause of the desire for happiness and for avoiding misery has not been removed earlier by the aforesaid rituals.

Siddhānta—The cause of all evil is ignorance. This is not destroyed through works, for they are not opposed to ignorance. It is only knowledge that can destroy ignorance. The commencement of Vedānta is thus intelligible, as it is required for the sake of gaining knowledge.

[1096b-1097a]

निःशेषाह्लादसंप्राप्तिः सर्वानर्थनुतिस्तथा ॥ १०९६ ॥

सर्वेषां प्राणिनामेतत्स्वत इष्टं प्रयोजनम् ।

The attainment of happiness without residue and the avoidance of all evil—this is the natural aim desired by all beings.

All beings desire plenary happiness and freedom from misery.

[1097b-1098a]

आत्मनस्तत्त्वमेतच्च सिद्धं चैतन्यवत्यतः ॥ १०९७ ॥

अथैष यो वै भूमेतिश्रुतिमानानुभूतितः ।

That this is the true nature of the self is established, like intelligence, from Scriptural texts like 'This which is the supreme bliss,'[1] 'That which is great,'[2] etc., from inference and from experience.

The twofold fruit which is desired by all is the very nature of the self, and is eternally accomplished. The desire to gain it is, therefore, born of ignorance, which is responsible for all *karmas*. The statement that the goal is to be attained is but figurative.

Scriptural texts are quoted as evidence. There is also the inference: the self is happiness, as it is the supreme object of love like pot. The experience of sleep too is *pramāṇa* for understanding the truth that the self is of the nature of happiness and the absence of misery.

1. *BU*, IV, iii, 32. 2. *CHU*, VII, xxiii, 1.

NKL—prāpte icchāyā vastuto 'nupapatter ajñānād eva icchatīty arthaḥ.

AVS—sarvaprāṇibhir iṣṭobhaya-vidha-prayojanasyā 'tmasvarūpatvena prāptatvāt prāpte cecchāyogād ajñānam evecchākāraṇaṁ karmādi nimittakāraṇam iti.

[1098b-1099a]

स्वर्गशब्दाभिधश्चायं पुमर्थो यो यथोदितः ॥ १०९८ ॥
स्वर्गमित्यादिभिर्वाक्यैस्त्रय्यन्तेष्वपि गीयते ।

That which is declared as the human goal by the term '*svarga*,' is also declared in the *Vedānta* by the texts '*svargam*,'[1] etc.

The term *svarga* which is employed in the Veda to indicate the human goal signifies the self.

An Upaniṣadic text where there is such usage is cited.

1. *CHU*, VIII, iii, 3.

[1099b-1100a]

स्वर्गं पुमर्थमुद्दिश्य सर्वप्राणभृतामियम् ॥ १०९९ ॥
वाङ्मनः कायचेष्टा स्याद्याऽपि तत्साधनोपगा ।

"Having *svarga*, the human goal, as the aim, whatever vocal, mental and physical activity of all living beings is there—that is the means."

Pūrvapakṣa—If *svarga* be the human goal, it is gained through works alone; for the Veda teaches the performance of sacrifices for the sake of that. That being so, the commencement of Vedānta is futile.

[1100b-1101a]

उत्पत्त्याद्यर्थनिष्ठानां सर्वेषामपि कर्मणाम् ॥ ११०० ॥
स्वर्गे नैवाधिकारोऽस्ति तस्य सिद्धत्वतः स्वतः ।

Of the various *karmas* which have as their aim origination, etc., there is no application to *svarga*; for that is self-established.

Siddhānta—Works can bring about origination, attainment, modification, and purification. They have no function in regard to the self which is immutable, eternal and unexcellable bliss. This, we have seen, is the true *svarga*, which is self-established, and, therefore, does not require to be accomplished. Works have use only in regard to the pseudo-*svarga* which is non-eternal.

NKL—karmaṇāṁ svargābhāsa-sādhakatvaṁ na mukhya-svarga-sādhakatvam.

[1101b-1102a]

स्वात्मसाध्यातिरेकेण सर्वमेव हि साधनम् ॥ ११०१ ॥
नालं साध्यान्तरायेह किम्वसाध्यार्थसिद्धये ।

No means is capable of accomplishing another object beyond its own end; what to speak of accomplishing an end which cannot be accomplished?

A means can accomplish only the end that is appropriate to it, and not some other end. It goes without saying, therefore, that no means functions in relation to what is not accomplished, viz. the true *svarga*.

[1102b-1103a]

यथोक्तपुरुषार्थस्य यद्यप्याप्तस्वभावता ॥ ११०२ ॥

आत्मस्वभावतो नाऽऽप्तिस्तथाऽप्यज्ञानहेतुतः ।

Though the aforesaid human end is of the nature of the attained, since it is of the nature of self, yet it is not attained because of ignorance.

Although the self which is the true *svarga*, the human goal, is what is eternally accomplished, it seems to be unaccomplished because of ignorance. Hence the need for Vedānta.

[1103b-1104a]

अविद्याव्यवधानस्य नाऽऽत्मज्ञानातिरेकतः ॥ ११०३ ॥

प्रध्वस्तिः कर्मभिः कर्तुं शक्या तेषाममानतः ।

Except by self-knowledge, the interposition of nescience cannot be destroyed by *karmas*, since they are not *pramāṇas*.

Since what makes the self unattained, as it were, is nescience, what is required to remove nescience is knowledge, and not works.

[1104b-1105a]

व्यञ्जकं विरहय्यान्यत्साधनं कारकात्मकम् ॥ ११०४ ॥

तदभिव्यक्तये नालं स्वतःसिद्धस्य वस्तुनः ।

For manifesting a self-established reality, other than a manifestor, a means which is of the nature of producer (*kāraka*) is not fit.

What is required in the case of the self that is veiled by nescience is a manifestor, viz. knowledge, not a producer like *karma*.

[1105b-1106]

कर्माभिनार्पनीतोऽतः प्रत्यङ्मोहोऽप्रमाणतः ॥ ११०५ ॥
यावच्च सम्यग्विज्ञानवह्निनाऽसौ न दह्यते ।
न तावत्किंचिदप्याप्तं सुखं दुःखविवर्जितम् ॥ ११०६ ॥

Therefore, the delusion about the inner self is not removed by *karmas*, since they are not *pramāṇas*. As long as this is not burnt by the fire of true knowledge, so long happiness free from sorrow is not attained.

Release, which consists of the attainment of happiness and the removal of sorrow, results only when ignorance is destroyed through knowledge.

[1107]

नालं विमुक्तये काम्यं यदि नाम तथाऽपि तु ।
पुंसो वैराग्यहेतुत्वादुपकार्येव तन्मतम् ॥ ११०७ ॥

Even though the optional (and obligatory rites) are not sufficient for (effecting) release, they are to be regarded as helpful in that they cause non-attachment in man.

Although *karmas* are not the direct means to release, they are helpful in that they purify the mind.

[1108-1109]

असह्यदुःखफलतः स्वकार्यविनिवृत्तिकृत् ।
विरक्तिहेतुतः कर्मप्रतिषिद्धं यथा तथा ॥ ११०८ ॥
अपि काम्यं कृतं सर्वं दुःखात्मकफलत्वतः ।
आविरिञ्च्यात्स्वकार्येभ्यः स्यादेव विनिवृत्तये ॥ ११०९ ॥

Just as the prohibited act causes non-attachment by making one turn away from itself because it results in unbearable misery, so also, since all optional rite yields fruit which is of the nature of misery, it makes for driving one away from its effects including attainment of the world of Brahmā.

Even as the knowledge of the evil effects of prohibited acts makes one turn away from them, the knowledge of the fact that optional rites are responsible for the continuance of transmigration creates non-attachment and paves the way for the dawn of wisdom through study, etc,, which results in release.

NKL—garbhavāsādi-phalatvāt kāmyam api puṁso vairāgya-kāraṇam.

[1110]

इत्युक्तप्रतिपत्त्यर्थमाजगामोत्तरं वचः ।
एकवाक्यत्वमेवं च वेदस्य स्यादसशयंम् ॥ १११० ॥

In order to teach what has been stated above, the words that follow came from the commentator. Thus without doubt, there will be syntactical unity for the Veda.

The commentary thus teaches that true knowledge alone is the means to *mokṣa*, and not works; the latter, however, are helpful indirectly through purifying the mind, etc.

In this manner the syntactical unity of the two *kāṇḍa*s should be understood.

[1111]

दक्षिणोदगधोगत्या प्रत्यगज्ञानमूढधीः ।
बम्भ्रमीत्यनिशं दुःखी पुमान्कर्मपुरःसरः ॥ १११ ॥

The man who goes after rituals, whose intellect is clouded by the ignorance of the self, and who is sorrow-stricken, wanders eternally by the southern, northern and downward paths.

The ignorant person who does not know the self performs *karmas* and reaps the consequences thereof which constitute *saṁsāra*.

[1112]

काम्यैर्दक्षिणमन्वेति ज्ञानयुक्तैस्तथोत्तरम् ।
निषिद्धैश्चाप्यधोजन्म कर्मसंभारसंभृतः ॥ १११२ ॥

He who is laden with the burden of ritual goes to the southern path by optional rites, to the northern path by those rites combined with meditation, and to low birth by prohibited acts.

By performing the optional rites one goes along the southern path, the path of the manes characterized by smoke, etc. By a combination of works with meditation one goes along the northern path, the path of the gods characterized by light, etc. By doing the prohibited deeds, one is reborn in the lower species.

[1113-1114a]

धर्माधर्मांशसाम्ये च मनुष्यत्वं प्रपद्यते ।
ब्रह्माद्या स्थावरान्तैवं प्रत्यगज्ञानहेतुजा ॥ १११३ ॥
नामरूपेहचित्राऽऽद्या स्वप्नमायेन्द्रजालवत् ।

When there is equality of merit and demerit, he attains the state of man. Thus the primeval transmigration (of beings) from Brahmā down to stationary objects, which is variegated on account of name, form, and action, is born of the ignorance of the self, like dream, delusion and magic.

When merit and demerit are equal, one is reborn as a human being.

Thus the variegated tramsmigratory tract is the result of ignorance.

[1114b-1115]

धर्माधर्माद्युपादानसाधना नश्वरी गतिः ॥ १११४ ॥
व्याकृतं नामरूपाभ्यां यद्यपीदं श्रुतौ श्रुतम् ।
आत्मतत्त्वानभिव्यक्तेर्नाभिव्यक्तं तदुच्यते ॥ १११५ ॥

This perishable process is brought about by the performance of good and bad deeds. Though it is declared in Scripture that the world is made manifest through name and form, it is said to be unmanifest because the truth of the self is unmanifest.

The aforementioned threefold fruit of *karma* is what makes for evil, since it is the product of nescience.

If it be said that *saṁsāra* cannot be illusory because it is established through perception, etc., we reply: no. The reality of the world is the self, for the world is a superimposition thereon. When the self is unmanifest, the world seems to be manifested through perception, etc. But in truth, the world is unmanifest, and its illusoriness cannot be disproved.

NKL—vimatam anityaṁ karma-phalatvāt ghaṭavat.

[1116]

अविद्यातिमिरोच्छित्तौ नाविष्कृतमण्वपि ।
कार्यकारणवद्वस्तु नानपास्तं तमोऽप्यतः ॥ १११६ ॥

When the darkness of nescience is destroyed, not even an atom, whether cause or effect, remains unmanifested, for the darkness has been removed from this (knowledge of self).

When the self is manifest, everything is manifest. It is only the ignorance of the self that conceals the truth. When ignorance is removed, truth is revealed.

NKL—tattva-sākṣātkāre vidvān sarvajñaḥ syād ity arthaḥ.

[1117]

यत एवमतः प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यप्रतिपत्तये ।
प्रारब्धेयं प्रयत्नेन वेदान्तोपनिषत्परा ॥ १११७ ॥

Because this is so, for the sake of understanding the truth about the inner self, this supreme Vedāntopaniṣad (viz. the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*) is begun with care.

When the self is known, all human ends are achieved; when the self is unknown every evil results. Therefore, in order that there

may be self-knowledge, the Upaniṣad is commenced for the sake of the eligible person who is endowed with the fourfold qualification.

NKI.—upaniṣatpadasya vidyāyāṁ mukhyatvād vedāntopaniṣad iti viśeṣaṇam.

AVS—yata ātmani jñāte sakalapuruṣārthāvāptir ajñāte ca sarvānarthāvāptir ata ātmajñānārthatvena yathoktādhikāriṇaṁ prati vedāntopaniṣad ārabhyata iti.

[1118]

यथोक्तफलसिद्ध्यर्थमारब्धोपनिषद्यदि ।
ब्रह्म वा इदमित्यादि कस्मान्नाऽऽरभ्यतेऽधुना ॥ १११८ ॥

"If the Upaniṣad is begun for the sake of accomplishing the said fruit, why is it not now begun thus: 'Brahman, verily, thus,' etc.?"

Objection—If the Upaniṣad is commenced for the sake of imparting Brahman-knowledge, it must begin with an exposition of the nature of Brahman; but, here, the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* starts with the topic of the *Aśvamedha*.

[1119]

येषामनधिकारोऽत्र ह्यश्वमेधक्रतौ भवेत् ।
इत एव तु विज्ञानात्तेषां तत्फलकीर्तनम् ॥ १११९ ॥

For those who are not eligible for the *Aśvamedha*-rite, it is declared here that the fruit results even from the knowledge (i.e. meditation on it).

Reply—The commencement relates to *upāsanā*. Those who are not eligible for performing the *Aśvamedha* may gain its fruit through meditation.

[1120]

कर्मगोचरतैवात्र विज्ञानस्यापि चेन्मतम् ।

विकल्पश्रवणान्नैवं कर्मणो विद्ययाऽथवा ॥ ११२० ॥

If it be said that this meditation is included in the ritual, not so, for these are declared to be alternatives thus, 'Through the ritual, or through the meditation.'

The meditation is not a part of the ritual; for it is declared that the fruit may be gained *either* through the ritual *or* through the meditation.

[1121]

यजते योऽश्वमेधेन यश्चैवं वेद तं क्रतुम् ।

फलं तुल्यं तयोर्युक्तं कर्मिणो विदुषस्तथा ॥ ११२१ ॥

He who sacrifices with the *Aśvamedha* and he who knows that rite thus—it is proper that the fruit is the same for both the man who performs the rite and the man who knows.

The fruit is the same for him who performs the *Aśvamedha* sacrifice and for him who knows its significance and meditates.

[1122]

उपास्तेरपि कर्मत्वादश्वमेधक्रतोरिव ।

नातो धियोऽर्थवादत्वं तद्विधेर्नितरां न च ॥ ११२२ ॥

Because the meditation is also a *karma* like the *Aśvamedha* rite, the knowledge (*phala-śruti*) is not an *arthavāda*; still less is the injunction thereof.

The declaration of fruit in the case of the meditation is not an *arthavāda;* for the meditation, like the rite, is an act. Nor is the meditation an auxiliary to the sacrifice; for option is declared as between the sacrifice and the meditation.

[1123-1124a]

एतावदेव चेदत्र भवतैवं विवक्षितम् ।
प्रयोजनं तत्सुकरं विध्युद्देशेऽपि भाषितुम् ॥ ११२३ ॥
विद्याप्रकरणे तस्य त्वाम्नायः किमितीर्यताम् ।

"If this much alone is thus intended by you here, that result can easily be said to come about even if it were taught in the context of injunction; say, why it is then declared by the Scripture in the context of knowledge?"

Objection—You say that the meditation on *Aśvamedha* is for the sake of gaining the human goal, and not for the sake of accomplishing the sacrifice, and that it is taught for the benefit of those who are not eligible to perform the sacrifice. Granting that it is so, why should the meditation find a place in the *jñāna-kāṇḍa* and not in the *karma-kāṇḍa?*

[1124b-1125a]

सोऽपि ज्ञानेन संयुक्तो ह्यमेधो महाक्रतुः ॥ ११२४ ॥
संसारफल एवेति प्रवृत्त्यङ्गतयोच्यते ।

Even that great sacrifice, *Aśvamedha,* combined with meditation results only in *saṁsāra.* This is stated so that there may be incentive to begin (the study of Vedānta).

Reply—Of all the sacrifices, the *Aśvamedha* is the greatest. Even as combined with meditation, it yields only a perishable result. This is declared at the commencement of the Upaniṣad so that the need for self-knowledge may be realized.

In Ānandagiri's gloss there occurs the following line: *ucyate 'śeṣayajñānāṁ kraturāḍ eṣa ucyate.* This seems to be a part of the *Vārtika. AVS* puts it between 1124a and 1124b.

[1125b-1126]

प्रत्यग्बोधातिरेकेण साधनान्तरनिःस्पृहाः ॥ ११२५ ॥

निर्ज्ञाताशेषकर्मोत्थफलफल्गुत्वबुद्धयः ।

मुमुक्षवः प्रवर्तेरन्कथं नामाऽऽत्मवेदने ॥ ११२६ ॥

Those who have no attachment to means other than the knowledge of the inner self, those who know the vanity of the fruit resulting from the entire host of *karmas*—how would those who desire release be active in respect of knowing the self (is declared by Scripture).

The declaration of the fact that even the *Aśvamedha* results only in *saṁsāra* helps him who seeks release turn away from rituals.

He who realizes the smallness of the fruit of sacrifices cultivates the fourfold means which equip him for acquiring *jñāna;* renouncing all works, he engages himself in *śravaṇa*, etc. It is to teach this that the Upaniṣad begins with a discourse on *Aśvamedha*-meditation.

[1127]

संसारफलता काममस्तु काम्यस्य कर्मणः ।

नित्यानामफलत्वात्तु मुक्तिरेवास्तु तत्फलम् ॥ ११२७ ॥

"Let *saṁsāra* be the fruit, as you please, of the optional rites; of the obligatory rites, however, since there is no fruit, let release alone be the fruit."

Objection—It is only the optional rites that result in *saṁsāra*; the obligatory and occasioned rites are not said to yield any particular fruit. So, let us take release to be their fruit.

[1128]

नह्युत्सर्गेण सर्वेषां फलवत्त्वस्य संश्रवात ।
कर्मणा पितृलोकादि नित्यानामेव तत्फलम् ॥ ११२८ ॥

No; because all *karmas* are declared to bear fruit; in "By *karma* the world of the manes, etc.," that fruit (is declared) of the obligatory rites alone.

Reply—There cannot be any *karma* without a fruit. Scripture declares that the fruit of obligatory rites is the world of the manes.

NKL—nityakarma saṁsāra-phalaṁ bāhyakarmatvāt kāmya-karmavat.

[1129]

फलवत्त्वे हि नित्यानां काम्यत्वमिति चेन्मतम् ।
नैवं शुद्धिप्रमाणत्वाद्भोगनिष्ठस्य काम्यता ॥ ११२९ ॥

If it be thought that since the obligatory rites have fruit they will become optional, not so; for their principal aim is purification, while optional rites have as their aim enjoyment.

Although the obligatory rites too have a fruit, they are distinct from the optional rites in that their main element is not enjoyment, as it is in the case of the latter, but the elimination of demerit or sin.

NKL—phalavatvepi pāpakṣaya-pradhānaṁ nityaṁ bhogapradhānaṁ kāmyam iti vibhāgaḥ.

[1130]

काम्येऽपि शुद्धिरस्त्येव भोगसिद्ध्यर्थमेव सा ।
विड्वराहादिदेहेन न ह्यैन्द्रं भुज्यते फलम् ॥ ११३० ॥

Even in the case of optional rites there is purification, but that is for the sake of accomplishing enjoyment; the fruit of the status of Indra, indeed, is not enjoyed through the body of a hog, etc.

It is true thet even the optional rites purify; but this purification is for the sake of procuring fitness for enjoying their fruit. For instance, one cannot enjoy the pleasures of the world of Indra with the body of a hog. That requires a divine body which can come to one only after purification.

The purification that is effected by the obligatory rites, however, is of a different order. It helps in the acquisition of knowledge.

[1131]

नित्येषु शुद्धेः प्राधान्याद्भोगोऽप्यप्रतिबन्धकः ।
भोगं भङ्गुरमीक्षन्ते बुद्धिशुद्ध्यनुरोधतः ॥ ११३१ ॥

Because in obligatory rites purification is the principal, even enjoyment is not an obstacle; enjoyment is considered to be perishable in accordance with the purification of the intellect.

Although the obligatory rites yield their fruit which is enjoyment in the world of the manes, etc., this enjoyment does not serve as an obstacle, for purification is the principal element here. In

fact, the purification creates a sense of non-attachment to enjoyment, through facilitating the rise of discrimination.

[1132]

तमेतमित्यतश्चोच्चैर्वेदानुवचनादिना ।
विरक्ताः सर्वसंसाराज्जिज्ञासन्ते परं पदम् ॥ ११३२ ॥

Therefore, through hearing the texts, "This self through reciting the Veda,"[1] etc., they become deeply non-attached to the entire *saṁsāra* and seek to know the supreme goal.

They, whose mind has been purified through the performance of the obligatory rites, become non-attached to *saṁsāra*, get endowed with virtues such as calmness, etc., and pursue the path of inquiry into the nature of Brahman.

1. *BU*, IV, iv, 22.

[1133]

आरादेवोपकुर्वन्ति नित्यान्यात्मविशुद्धितः ।
आत्माज्ञानाविरोधित्वात्साक्षान्न त्वात्मबोधवत् ॥ ११३३ ॥

The obligatory rites help through purifying the mind while being remote; because they are not opposed to ignorance of the self, they are not the direct means, like self-knowledge.

The obligatory rites are remote auxiliaries; they do not constitute the direct means to release because they cannot destroy ignorance. The direct means is knowledge.

[1134]

त्यक्त्वा कर्माण्यतोऽसङ्गाः प्रत्यक्प्रवणबुद्धयः ।
अपास्तरागादिमला ईक्षन्ते ह्यं स्वमात्मनि ॥ ११३४ ॥

Renouncing *karmas* and thereby being non-attached, being devoted, in their minds, to the inner self, and leaving off the impurities like passion, etc., they see pure consciousness (i.e. the self) in themselves.

They, whose minds have been purified through the performance of the obligatory rites, acquire the eligibility for *śravaṇa*, etc. Being non-attached, they renounce all works. Renunciation of works without non-attachment is no good at all. They who are non-attached and have renounced become endowed with calmness, etc., and gain the intuition of the inner immutable self.

[1135-1136a]

अतोऽशेषमहानर्थहेत्वात्माज्ञानहानिकृत् ।
प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यविज्ञानभास्करोदयहेतवे ॥ ११३५ ॥
आरब्धेयं प्रयत्नेन वेदान्तोपनिषत्परा ।

Therefore is begun, with care, this supreme *Vedāntopaniṣad*, which will destroy the ignorance of self, the cause of the entire great evil, so that the sun of the true knowledge of self may rise.

As the knowledge of the truth alone is the means to release, the Upaniṣad is begun for the sake of that. It is true that the meaning of the Upaniṣad is difficult to grasp. With a view to making the meaning clear, the commentary has been written.

NKL—evaṁ kaivalyasya dhīmātra-phalatve saty ātmāvidyā-nivartaka-jñāna-janmane vedāntāraṁbhe nigamayati.....vijñāna-bhāskarodayo hetur ajñāna-nivṛttes tadartham ity arthaḥ.

AVS—yato jñānameva kaivalya-sādhanam ato jñānārthatveno-'paniṣad ārabhyata iti.

[1136b-1137a]

शतानि दश चैकं च चत्वारिंशत्तथाऽष्ट च ॥ ११३६ ॥

श्लोकाः संबन्धभाष्येऽस्मिन्संङ्ख्याताः संख्ययाऽखिलाः ।

The verses of this *Sambandha-bhāṣya* are altogether one thousand and one hundred and forty eight in number.

Including the half verse mentioned in the note to verse 1124b-1125a, and omitting the present verse which is not part of the *Vārtika*, the actual number of verses in the extant text is one thousand one hundred and thirty-six.